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Keynote: Vice Admiral David C. Johnson, USN—
Principal Military Deputy, Assistant Secretary of 
the Navy for Research, Development and 
Acquisition 
Vice Admiral David C. Johnson, USN—the son of a Navy captain and a Pensacola, FL, native, 
graduated from the U.S. Naval Academy in 1982 with a Bachelor of Science in Aerospace 
Engineering. 
Upon commissioning, Johnson reported to Trident Refit Facility in Bangor, WA, where he served as 
docking officer, qualified as ship superintendent at Puget Sound Naval Shipyard, and earned his 
engineering duty dolphins. Johnson graduated from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology in 
1989 with a naval engineer degree and a Master of Science in mechanical engineering. 
Subsequently, Johnson held submarine acquisition and repair positions at the Supervisor of 
Shipbuilding in Groton, CT; as a waterfront coordinator delivering Ohio-class submarines and later as 
the program manager’s representative for the Virginia-class submarine; at Trident Refit Facility 
Bangor as the planning officer; and at Program Executive Officer (PEO) Submarines as the assistant 
program manager for USS Jimmy Carter (SSN 23). 
Johnson became major program manager for the Virginia Program Office (PMS 450) in 2005. Under 
his guidance, the Virginia program reduced overall cost by $4 billion and delivered four submarines to 
the fleet. The program was awarded the 2007 DoD Value Engineering Award and the 2008 David A. 
Packard Award for Acquisition Excellence. Johnson also established and served as the first Undersea 
Enterprise chief technology officer. 
Johnson’s flag tours include PEO Submarines, deputy commander for Undersea Technology (SEA 
073), deputy PEO Submarines for the Ohio SSBN Replacement Program, and commander for the 
Naval Undersea Warfare Center. In October 2015, he assumed responsibilities as principal military 
deputy for the Assistant Secretary of the Navy Research, Development, & Acquisition. 
Johnson has received various personal and campaign awards, including the Defense Service Medal, 
Legion of Merit, and the Meritorious Service Medal with three gold stars. 
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Plenary Panel: The 809 Panel. Reviewing the 
Regulatory and Legislative Framework to Improve 
the Efficiency and Effectiveness of Defense 
Acquisition  
Wednesday, April 26, 2017 
9:30 a.m. – 
11:00 a.m. 
Chair: Moshe Schwartz, Executive Director, 809 Panel 
Current Research Agenda for the 809 Panel and Initial Findings 
William A. LaPlante, Vice President, Intelligence Portfolio, National 
Security Engineering Center 
Future Research Agenda 
Joseph W. Dyer, VADM, USN (Ret.), Commissioner, Chief Strategy 
Officer, National Spectrum Consortium 
 
Moshe Schwartz—is a Specialist in Defense Acquisitions at the Congressional Research Service 
and an adjunct professor at National Defense University’s Eisenhower Center. He has written 
numerous reports and testified before Congress on a variety of issues, including the acquisition of 
major defense acquisition programs, the use of contractors in military operations, DoD energy, and 
GAO bid protests. Temporary assignments include serving as a senior advisor to the Commission on 
Wartime Contracting in Iraq and Afghanistan, and as an advisor at ISAF headquarters in Afghanistan.  
Before joining CRS, Schwartz served as a senior analyst at the Government Accountability Office, as 
an Assistant District Attorney in Brooklyn, NY, and as Vice President of the public relations firm KCSA 
Strategic Communications.  
Schwartz received a BA from Yeshiva University, a JD from Yeshiva University’s Benjamin N. 
Cardozo School of Law, an MBA from Carnegie Mellon’s Tepper School of Business, and a master’s 
in Public Policy Management from Carnegie Mellon’s H. John Heinz III School of Public Policy and 
Management 
William A. LaPlante—is Vice President of the Intelligence Portfolio in the National Security 
Engineering Center, a federally funded research and development center that MITRE operates on 
behalf of the U.S. DoD. In this role, Dr. LaPlante leads key initiatives in support of the nation’s 
intelligence community. 
Dr. LaPlante has more than 30 years of experience in defense technology, most recently as Assistant 
Secretary of the Air Force for acquisition. During his three years in that position, Dr. LaPlante led the 
$43 billion Air Force acquisition enterprise budget, bringing it into alignment with the greater Air Force 
vision and strategy. Under his leadership, the Air Force reaped nearly $6 billion in “should-cost” 
savings—the investment of these savings resulted in greater capability for our nation’s warfighters. In 
recognition of his outstanding performance, the Air Force Association awarded Dr. LaPlante the W. 
Stuart Symington Award for the most significant contribution by a civilian in the field of national 
defense. In November 2015, the Air Force bestowed on him its Medal for Exceptional Civilian 
Service, the highest honor it bestows on a civilian employee. And in 2016, the Massachusetts 
Institute of Technology Security Studies Program presented him with the General James Doolittle 
Award in recognition of his contributions to U.S. air power. 
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Prior to entering public service in 2013, he was MITRE’s Missile Defense portfolio director. During this 
time, Dr. LaPlante was appointed to the Defense Science Board (DSB), where he co-chaired a study 
on enhancing the adaptability of U.S. military forces. He has resumed his participation in the DSB, 
where he advises top DoD leadership on critical scientific and technological topics related to the 
effectiveness of the nation’s military forces. 
Before joining MITRE, he was the department head for Global Engagement at the Johns Hopkins 
University Applied Physics Laboratory (APL). In that role he was responsible for all of APL’s work 
supporting offensive military capabilities. He was also a member of the APL Executive Council. 
He holds a bachelor’s degree in engineering physics from the University of Illinois, a master’s degree 
in applied physics from Johns Hopkins University, and a doctorate in mechanical engineering from 
Catholic University of America. 
Joseph W. Dyer, VADM, USN (Ret.)—Commissioner, Chief Strategy Officer, National Spectrum 
Consortium. 
• Chief Strategist, The Strategy Group 
• Chair, NASA Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel 
• Former Chief Strategy Officer and Chief Operating Officer, iRobot Corporation  
• Former Commander, Naval Air Systems Command 
Vice Admiral (Ret.) Dyer is currently an independent consultant in the technology and defense 
markets. 
From 2003 through late 2012, he was an executive at iRobot Corporation, serving consecutively as 
the President of the Government and Industrial Division, Corporate Chief Operating Officer, and as 
the company’s Chief Strategy Officer. 
Vice Admiral Dyer served as Commander of the Naval Air Systems Command, where he was 
responsible for research, development, test and evaluation, engineering and logistics for naval 
aircraft, UAVs, and air launched weapons and sensors, from June 2000 until his retirement in July 
2003. He was assigned as Commander of the Naval Air Warfare Center Aircraft Division at Patuxent 
River in July 1997, and a month later he assumed additional responsibilities as the Assistant 
Commander for Research and Engineering of the Naval Air Systems Command. 
From January 1994 to April 1997, Admiral Dyer served as F/A-18 Program Manager, leading 
engineering and manufacturing development efforts on the new F/A-18E/F, continued production and 
fleet support of the F/A-18C/D, and all F/A-18 foreign military sales. Under his leadership, the F/A-18 
program won the DoD Acquisition Excellence Award and the Order of Daedalian. Earlier in his career, 
he served as the Navy’s chief test pilot. 
Vice Admiral Dyer graduated from North Carolina State University with a BS in chemical engineering 
and from the Naval Postgraduate School with an MS in financial management. 
He is an elected Fellow in the National Academy of Public Administration and the Society of 
Experimental Test Pilots. 
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Panel 2. Maximizing Contracting Effectiveness 
Wednesday, April 26, 2017 
11:15 a.m. – 
12:45 p.m. 
Chair: Elliott Branch—Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Navy (Acquisition and 
Procurement), ASN (RDA) 
Analyzing the Effects of Source Selection Method, Acquisition Type, and 
Service Component on Acquisition Outcomes 
Lieutenant Colonel Karen Landale, USAF, Naval Postgraduate School 
Rene Rendon, Naval Postgraduate School 
Data Consolidation of Disparate Procurement Data Sources for Correlated 
Performance-Based Acquisition Decision Support 
Samantha Nangia, ASN(RD&A) DASN(AP) 
Ryan Dickover, ASN(RD&A) DASN(AP) 
Thomas Wardwell, ASN(RD&A) DASN(AP) 
Randall Mora, AVUM, Inc. 
Customizing the Use of TINA (Truth in Negotiations Act) in the DoD 
Chong Wang, Naval Postgraduate School 
 
Elliott Branch—is the Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Navy (Acquisition and Procurement) in the 
Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Navy (Research, Development, and Acquisition). He is the 
senior career civilian responsible for acquisition and contracting policy that governs the operation of 
the Navy’s worldwide, multibillion-dollar acquisition system. Branch is the principal civilian advisor to 
the Navy Acquisition Executive for acquisition and procurement matters. He serves as the 
Department of the Navy’s Competition Advocate General, and he is the leader of the Navy’s 
contracting, purchasing, and government property communities.  
Prior to joining the Navy Acquisition Executive’s staff, Branch was the first civilian Director of 
Contracts at the Naval Sea Systems Command. In that role, he led one of the largest and most 
complex procurement organizations in the federal government. As the senior civilian for contracting at 
NAVSEA, Branch was responsible for the contractual oversight of the nation’s most complex 
shipbuilding and weapons systems procurement programs. His duties involved the obligation and 
expenditure of approximately $25 billion annually.  
He is a member of the Senior Executive Service (SES). Members of the SES serve in the key 
positions just below the top presidential appointees. They are the major link between these 
appointees and the rest of the federal work force. SES members operate and oversee nearly every 
government activity in approximately 75 agencies.  
Branch spent time in the private sector, where he specialized in acquisition and project management 
education, training, and consulting for the federal workforce and its associated contractors. In this 
role, he was responsible for the design, development, delivery, and maintenance of a wide variety of 
course materials on subjects ranging from project management to contract law. Branch’s clients 
included Computer Sciences Corporation, QSS Group, BAE Systems, the Pension Benefit Guaranty 
Corporation, and the Departments of Defense, Energy, Justice, and State.  
Prior to that, he served as the Chief Procurement Officer for the government of the District of 
Columbia, where he was the agency head responsible for procurement operations and policy, and for 
formulating legislative proposals for local and congressional consideration. Branch led a staff of over 
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200 employees that supported over 40 city agencies, administered a $14 million annual operating 
budget, and oversaw the placement of $1.5 billion annually in city contracts.  
Before joining the District of Columbia’s government, Branch held various positions in the SES with 
the Department of the Navy (DoN). In 1993, he became a member of the SES as the Director of the 
Shipbuilding Contracts Division at NAVSEA. He next served as Executive Director of Acquisition and 
Business Management for the DoN, responsible for policy and oversight of contract operations 
throughout the entire Navy. While in this position, he also served as Project Executive Officer of 
Acquisition Related Business Systems. In this role, he was responsible for the formulation and 
execution of a multi-year effort transforming the Navy’s acquisition system from a paper-based 
system into one that made use of electronic technologies and methods. In this role, Branch was 
directly responsible for a portfolio of projects worth more than $200 million.  
Branch graduated with a Bachelor of Science degree in Economics from the University of 
Pennsylvania Wharton School and completed the Executive Program at the University of Virginia 
Darden School. He has received the Navy Distinguished Civilian Service Medal, the David Packard 
Excellence in Acquisition Award, two Presidential Rank Awards for Meritorious Executive, the Vice 
Presidential Hammer Award for Reinventing Government, and the 2012 Samuel J. Heyman Service 
to America Medal for Management Excellence. 
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Analyzing the Effects of Source Selection Method, 
Acquisition Type, and Service Component on Acquisition 
Outcomes 
Lieutenant Colonel Karen A. F. Landale, USAF—is an Assistant Professor at the Graduate School 
of Business and Public Policy, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA. She teaches strategic 
sourcing and category management as part of the contracting curriculum. Lt Col Landale received her 
PhD from the Kenan-Flagler Business School at the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill. Her 
research focuses on talent management, services marketing, and contracting in the public domain. 
She is married to LTC Gordon Landale, USA, and they have two daughters, Amelia and Caroline. 
[kalandal@nps.edu]  
Rene G. Rendon—is an Associate Professor at the Graduate School of Business and Public Policy, 
NPS, where he teaches defense acquisition and contract management courses. He also serves as 
the Academic Associate for the MBA specialization in contract management. Prior to joining the NPS 
faculty, he served for over 20 years as an acquisition contracting officer in the United States Air 
Force. His career included assignments as a contracting officer for the Peacekeeper ICBM, Maverick 
Missile, and the F-22 Raptor. He was also a contracting squadron commander and the director of 
contracting for the Space Based Infrared Satellite program and the Evolved Expendable Launch 
Vehicle rocket program. Rene has published in the Journal of Public Procurement, the Journal of 
Contract Management, the Journal of Purchasing and Supply Management, and the International 
Journal of Procurement Management. [rgrendon@nps.edu] 
Introduction 
For years, one of the most hotly contested debates in contracting and acquisition has 
been the choice of source selection method and the contract-related consequences of that 
choice. While policy memos encourage contracting officers to “select the appropriate source 
selection process … to match the specific requirement, meet Warfighter needs, and deliver 
a contracted solution that will provide the required performance levels at the lowest cost” 
(Kendall, 2015, p. 3), stakeholders on both sides of the table have differing views about how 
the choice of source selection method affects contract outcomes.  
Anecdotally, from the perspective of the government, lowest priced technically 
acceptable (LPTA) procedures offer a faster time-to-contract, as the technical acceptability 
criteria is binary and the evaluation of price—the most important factor in LPTA source 
selections—is objective. Hence, theoretically, the requirement can be put on contract faster, 
with less likelihood of protest. The sellers’ perspective, however, is that the LPTA source 
selection method stifles innovation, because price is more important than, say, an innovative 
approach that may ultimately better serve the government (Calisti, 2015). Critics argue that 
the LPTA method often results in the selection of a contractor that has undercut the cost of 
the requirement. They argue that the contractor has essentially achieved “buy-in” by 
proposing an unreasonably low price that will later have to be adjusted (i.e., increased) via 
modification in order to fulfill the terms and conditions of the contract. This sort of 
gamesmanship of the LPTA method has been the argument of federal contractors for many 
years. Further, opponents of the LPTA method believe the process represents a “race to the 
bottom” price-wise, and mockingly dub the outcomes achieved by LPTA contracts as “Lousy 
Project, Tragic Act” (Weckstein & Delgado, 2012). In other words, opponents feel LPTA 
source selections produce inferior products and services. Proponents suggest this is not the 
case, and that by providing clear technical acceptability criteria, the government can avoid 
receiving inferior products and services.  
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On the opposite spectrum of the best value continuum, the tradeoff (TO) source 
selection method is anecdotally believed to take more time because of the subjective nature 
of the evaluation and the increased likelihood of protest. Customers and contractors alike 
seem to prefer this approach, as it allows customers to feel a certain measure of control 
over selecting the contractor that represents the best value to the government—that by 
ranking the evaluation factors in terms of importance, they have the option of tailoring the 
evaluation to fully meet their needs. Contractors also seem to prefer this method, as it allows 
them to provide innovative solutions to government requirements, without the burden of 
competing mainly based on price. Proponents of the TO method argue that it results in 
higher quality products and services because contractors are not “squeezed” on price. 
Opponents argue that the method does not necessarily produce better contractual outcomes 
(i.e., better contract performance), particularly given the anecdotal belief that TO 
acquisitions take longer to put on contract. 
Choosing which method is appropriate for a given acquisition is clearly established 
by policy and is not the focus of this research. Instead, we aim to use scientific methods to 
confirm or deny the anecdotal beliefs associated with each source selection method. We 
use multivariate analysis of variance (MANOVA) and multivariate analysis of covariance 
(MANCOVA) methods to determine if statistically significant differences in contract 
outcomes exist based on source selection method. This first-of-kind research uses actual 
contract file data from the Air Force and Navy to test hypotheses associated with the 
anecdotal beliefs. Specifically, we examine whether differences exist in Contractor 
Performance Assessment Reporting System (CPARS) scores and procurement 
administrative lead time (PALT) based on choice of source selection method (LPTA or TO), 
while taking into account several different covariates related to the acquisitions. 
The remainder of this paper proceeds as follows: The Literature Review section 
provides a detailed review of the contract management process, the best value continuum, 
and the relationship between contract type and source selection method. Following that is a 
discussion of the data collection and analysis methodologies, results of the analysis, and 
finally, a review of practical and managerial implications, as well as limitations and areas for 
further research. 
Literature Review 
Contract Management Process 
The contract management process consists of three main phases that encompass 
six basic steps (for a more thorough review, see Garrett, 2010). The pre-award phase 
consists of three steps: procurement planning, solicitation planning, and solicitation. The 
award phase consists of just one step: source selection. Finally, the post-award phase 
consists of two steps: contract administration and contract closeout.  
The first step, procurement planning, involves determining whether the government 
should produce the requirement organically or outsource production. This is known as the 
“make or buy” decision. Procurement planning also involves scoping out the requirement, 
conducting market research, and discussing acquisition strategy in terms of the type of 
contract to use, the appropriate source selection method, and the appropriate procurement 
method (sealed bidding or contracting by negotiation). The results of market research will 
indicate the availability of commercial items or services that meet the requirement, the 
nature of the competitive environment, and the variability in the technology used in industry 
to develop the supplies or services. Based on the results of the market research, the 
solicitation document can be developed.  
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The second step, solicitation planning, occurs after the decision to outsource has 
been made. In solicitation planning, the acquisition team continues to refine the requirement 
and the procurement methods, and it establishes the evaluation criteria that will be used to 
select a contractor. Clearly, these first two steps—procurement planning and solicitation 
planning—have a significant impact on the resulting success or failure of the contract. Poor 
planning or an inadequate requirement definition in the procurement and solicitation 
planning steps can result in unclear solicitation documents or in the inability to properly 
evaluate and choose an offer that represents the best value for the government. It is critical 
that the acquisition team has a clear understanding of the requirement, of how it will be 
solicited, and of how proposals will be evaluated. Any confusion or uncertainty will be 
passed on to potential offerors, who may interpret the requirement differently. In terms of the 
research performed in this study, these first two steps are the most impactful.  
The third step, solicitation, involves publicizing the requirement and instructing 
potential offerors how, where, and when to submit their proposals. Clarifying questions often 
arise, and the government buyer ensures all questions are answered and provided to all 
potential offerors. Lamoreux, Murrow, and Walls (2015) note that 
the fourth step, source selection, involves using the evaluation criteria 
established during the solicitation planning step and specified in the 
solicitation document to formally evaluate each offer. Depending on the size 
and complexity of the procurement, this may involve source selection boards, 
technical panels, and any other expert required to evaluate the offers 
received. Further, the source selection may involve directly negotiating with 
one or more vendors on price, technical factors, or personnel. Finally, the 
acquisition team selects the winner during this step; it is the most vulnerable 
to protests from unsuccessful vendors. (p. 15) 
A successful source selection is a reflection of a successful planning process. 
Source selection is the execution of the evaluation strategy that was designed during 
solicitation planning, which highlights the importance of ensuring the acquisition team has 
adequate time to properly plan for the acquisition. 
The fifth step, contract administration, is typically the longest step in terms of the 
overall life of the acquisition. In this step, the contractor produces the good or service, and 
the government monitors performance and provides feedback. Both parties play an active 
role in ensuring the terms and conditions of the contract are enforced.  
Finally, contract closeout, the sixth step, involves confirming that all work has been 
accomplished and the contractor has been paid in full before finalizing contract details and 
closing the contract. This step also includes the important task of assessing the contractor’s 
performance using the Contractor Performance Assessment Reporting System (CPARS).  
Best Value Continuum 
In government contracting, the best value continuum recognizes the fact that there 
are a variety of ways in which an organization can obtain the best value for their dollar. The 
Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) states,  
An agency can obtain best value in negotiated acquisitions by using any one 
or a combination of source selection approaches. In different types of 
acquisitions, the relative importance of cost or price may vary. For example, 
in acquisitions where the requirement is clearly definable and the risk of 
unsuccessful contract performance is minimal, cost or price may play a 
dominant role in source selection. The less definitive the requirement, the 
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more development work required, or the greater the performance risk, the 
more technical or past performance considerations may play a dominant role 
in source selection. (FAR 15.101) 
For practical purposes, we typically envision the best value continuum using its 
poles: on one end is LPTA, and on the other, TO.1 Both strategies can result in the best 
value to the government, but selecting a proposal that represents the best value varies for 
each method.  
In LPTA source selections, best value is obtained by choosing the lowest priced offer 
that still meets established minimum quality thresholds (i.e., technical acceptability). The 
government establishes minimum thresholds and conveys them via the solicitation 
document. LPTA works best when the requirement is well-defined and the risk of 
unsuccessful performance is minimal. It “should be used in situations where the DoD would 
not realize any value from a proposal exceeding its minimum technical or performance 
requirements” (Government Accountability Office [GAO], 2014, p. 6). The LPTA method is 
typically used in contracting commercially-available goods or services, as the market has 
already established reasonably acceptable quality levels, and, assuming an adequate 
number of offerors supply the market, competition is based on price alone. Source selection 
for an LPTA requirement is typically performed by ranking the proposals from lowest to 
highest price, then evaluating whether the lowest-priced proposal meets the minimum 
quality thresholds (i.e., whether the lowest-priced proposal is technically acceptable).2 If it is, 
the evaluation stops, and the lowest-priced offeror is declared the winner. If the lowest-
priced proposal is not technically acceptable, it is removed from the competition and the 
next lowest-priced proposal is evaluated for technical acceptability. The process continues 
until the evaluation team finds the lowest-priced, technically acceptable offer. In general, 
LPTA acquisitions tend to be simpler than tradeoffs, [as] contracting offices 
can move more quickly through the six-step contract management process, 
reducing administrative operating costs. [T]he generally inflexible nature of 
the LPTA source selection method does not grant contracting officers 
discretion, which serves as a guard against the appearance of favoritism, 
promoting the perception of integrity, fairness, and openness. (Lamoureux et 
al., 2015, p. 20) 
TO source selections, on the other hand, acknowledge that best value may result 
from higher quality ratings, which might consist of a host of factors (e.g., technical capability, 
management practices, past performance, etc.), and that higher quality may cost more. The 
TO method allows the government to establish which evaluation factors are most important 
and which are less important, and the government is allowed to trade cost or price factors 
for non-cost or non-price factors. Using the TO method “is appropriate when it may be in the 
best interest of the Government to consider award to other than the lowest priced offeror or 
other than the highest technically rated offeror” (FAR 15.101-1(a)). In a memorandum 
                                            
 
 
1 In reality, LPTA is on one end of the continuum and highest technically rated offer (HTRO) is on the 
other. Because the FAR requires the evaluation of cost or price in each source selection, the federal 
government can never make an award based only on the HTRO. 
2 Ranking of non-price criteria is not permitted. Technical acceptability is binary: A proposal is 
technically acceptable or it is not. 
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detailing the appropriate use of source selection processes, Under Secretary of Defense for 
Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics, Frank Kendall, asserts that “whenever the 
Warfighter is willing to pay more for above threshold requirements or performance standards 
and may benefit from an innovative and technologically superior solution to meet their 
needs, a tradeoff source selection process between cost or price and non-cost factors is 
optimal” (Kendall, 2015, p. 2).  
Offerors still have to meet minimum standards; however, they may be rewarded for 
surpassing minimum standards where advantageous to the government. The government 
must establish how they will assess each offeror’s quality, cost, and past performance, as 
well as the relative importance of these factors and any subfactors. The government 
communicates the importance of each evaluation factor through numerical and/or textual 
ranking specified in the solicitation document. For instance, the government might state that 
technical capability is twice as important as cost, which is twice as important as past 
performance. This implies a sort of numerical ranking (e.g., technical capability is worth 40 
points, cost is worth 20 points, and past performance is worth 10 points). Alternatively, a 
textual ranking might say something like “technical capability is significantly more important 
than cost, which is more important than past performance.” Using this sort of language 
implies that the technical capability is the most important factor, and that it is much more 
important than either cost or past performance. Naturally, the evaluation of “significantly 
more important” or “more important” are left open to interpretation when comparing offerors. 
This sort of subjective assessment provides the government the flexibility to select the 
offeror that represents the best value to the government; however, it is also subject to 
potential pitfalls. One potential pitfall is that the evaluation of each offer may take more time 
and involve many rounds of internal discussions. A second potential pitfall is that the 
subjective nature of the assessment results in higher risk of the government failing to 
comply with the evaluation process as stated in the solicitation, which can result in a protest 
that delays the acquisition.  
The TO method works best for complex acquisitions where requirements are not 
well-defined, and where increased contractor capability could make the acquisition less 
risky. Source selection for a TO requirement typically involves a source selection authority, a 
source selection advisory council, and a source selection evaluation board. Members of the 
source selection evaluation board evaluate each evaluation criteria independently, scoring 
proposals according to the source selection procedures established in the solicitation. The 
independent scores for each evaluation criterion are presented to the source selection 
advisory council, which then makes an award recommendation to the source selection 
authority. The source selection authority is the ultimate decision-maker—they can choose to 
accept the recommendation or choose a different offeror for the award.  
Clearly, the TO source selection process is more bureaucratic than its LPTA 
counterpart. Further, because of the subjectivity involved in evaluating and rating proposals, 
TO source selections are often more susceptible to protests. However, “proponents of 
tradeoffs argue that the initial costs of a higher-priced vendor are ultimately more efficient, 
as the incentive structure encourages vendors to avoid cutting costs that could jeopardize 
the effort after award” (Lamoureux et al., 2015, p. 21). 
In sum, the best value continuum balances the need to receive quality goods and 
services for the customer with the need to procure those goods and services in a way that is 
fiscally responsible for the taxpayer. Many articles and reports discuss the implications of 
choosing one source selection method over the other, see, for example, GAO (2014), 
Duncombe and Prentice (2013), and Nichols and Totman (2013). For most acquisitions, the 
choice of source selection method that best fits the requirement is clear. However, some 
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acquisitions do fall into gray territory, and for those, the choice of source selection method 
ultimately comes down to a cost-benefit analysis. For a detailed discussion of the costs and 
benefits of each method, particularly the tradeoff method, see Lamoureux et al. (2015).  
Contract Type and Source Selection Methodology 
While contract type and source selection methodology are two distinct decisions, 
source selection method is influenced by contract type. Further, both decisions are 
influenced by the type of requirement being outsourced and the results of market research 
during the procurement planning step.  
In federal government contracting, there are two overarching contract types: fixed-
price and cost-type contracts. FAR 16.202-1 states, 
A firm-fixed-price contract provides for a price that is not subject to any 
adjustment on the basis of the contractor’s cost experience in performing the 
contract. This contract type places upon the contractor maximum risk and full 
responsibility for all costs and resulting profit or loss. It provides maximum 
incentive for the contractor to control costs and perform effectively and 
imposes a minimum administrative burden upon the contracting parties. (FAR 
16.202-1) 
Understanding this risk, contractors often apply a buffer in their proposed pricing to 
account for uncertainty. The more complex the requirement, the larger the buffer. For this 
reason, fixed-price contracts are typically used for commercial products and services. 
Naturally, the more clearly-defined the requirement, the more it lends itself to the LPTA 
source selection method, where price is considered the most important factor. In other 
words, when the requirements are well-defined and technical acceptability is easy to 
describe and evaluate, the determining factor for award is price—hence the relationship 
between fixed-price contracts and the LPTA source selection method. 
On the other hand, 
Cost-reimbursement types of contracts provide for payment of allowable 
incurred costs, to the extent prescribed in the contract. These contracts 
establish an estimate of total cost for the purpose of obligating funds and 
establishing a ceiling that the contractor may not exceed (except at its own 
risk) without the approval of the contracting officer. (FAR 16.301-1) 
Unlike fixed-price contracts, which are recommended for use whenever practical, 
cost-reimbursement contracts should only be used when the requirement cannot be 
sufficiently defined or when uncertainties in contract performance do not allow costs to be 
estimated sufficiently for a fixed-price arrangement (see FAR 16.301-2). In fact, “acquisition 
teams are prohibited from using cost-reimbursement contracts to procure commercial items, 
limiting their use to complex, uniquely governmental efforts” (Lamoureux et al., 2015, p. 17). 
Given the unique nature of many defense-related needs, it is not always possible for the 
federal government to have a well-defined requirement. Many of the weapons systems it 
procures have no equivalent anywhere in the world—they are purposefully different and 
represent innovative capabilities to achieve competitive advantage over our adversaries. 
Because they are “new to the world” requirements, they are often less defined and more 
difficult to clearly articulate to potential offerors. Less defined, more complex requirements 
are better procured using cost-type contracts. Because of the need for innovative solutions, 
cost-type contracts typically lend themselves to the TO source selection method, where the 
cost/price factor can be traded off for more important factors, such as technical capability.  
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Hypotheses 
The purpose of this research is to empirically analyze popular assumptions related to 
source selection method and subsequent contract outcomes. To do this, we test four 
hypotheses. 
Given that LPTA source selections typically occur when requirements are well-
defined and lower risk, and the fact that LPTA source selections generally lend themselves 
to greater objectivity than TO source selections, we posit that LPTA source selections are 
faster (i.e., take less time from requirement generation to contract award) than TO source 
selections: 
• Hypothesis 1: LPTA acquisitions have a shorter PALT than TO acquisitions. 
Further, given that TO source selections are more flexible in allowing the government 
to trade cost/price for non-cost/non-price factors, and that TO source selections allow the 
acquisition team to rank the evaluation factors to best meet the needs of the requirement, 
we posit that TO source selections result in better contract performance3 than LPTA source 
selections: 
• Hypothesis 2: TO acquisitions produce higher CPARS scores than LPTA 
acquisitions. 
We also examine whether different types of acquisitions (product acquisitions versus 
service acquisitions) produce different PALTs or CPARS scores. Because the data we 
collected were from systems-level buying organizations and/or from high dollar value 
contracts, the products and services acquired are more complex than those typically 
purchased at the installation level. Thus, given the similarity in complexity, we find no reason 
why product acquisitions and service acquisitions, using the same general procedures, 
would produce different contract outcomes: 
• Hypothesis 3a: There is no difference in PALT between product acquisitions 
and service acquisitions.  
• Hypothesis 3b: There is no difference in CPARS scores between product 
acquisitions and service acquisitions.  
Next, we examine whether or not the contract outcomes are different between the 
service components. Because all service components are subject to the Federal Acquisition 
Regulation (FAR) and its Defense supplement (DFARS), we find no reason why different 
service components using the same general procedures would produce different contract 
outcomes: 
• Hypothesis 4a: There is no difference in PALT between service components.  
• Hypothesis 4b: There is no difference in CPARS scores between service 
components.  
With the hypotheses in place, we turn to the details regarding the data and the 
analyses. 
                                            
 
 
3 We use contractor performance (i.e., CPARS scores) as a surrogate measure for contract 
performance. The rationale is that if the contractor’s performance is successful, the contract would 
also be considered successful. 
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Methodology 
Data Collection 
To collect the data required for this research, five teams of graduate students 
traveled to seven different Air Force and Navy contracting offices and pulled the data from 
actual contract files. Our goal was to choose contracts that were as similar in complexity as 
possible in order to better understand the effects that source selection method might have 
on contract outcomes. Thus, we purposely chose to collect data from systems-level buying 
organizations and/or high dollar value contracts. It is important to note that the contracting 
databases currently used in the Department of Defense (DoD) do not automatically collect 
these data. Thus, “scraping” the data from the physical contract files was required.4 
Variables Examined 
In group comparison statistical methods, like the ones used in this study, 
independent variables (IVs) serve as the grouping variables. They are categorical in nature 
(i.e., no single observation can belong to more than one group) and have at least two 
different categories, or groups. We have three IVs for this study: choice of source selection 
method (LPTA or TO), acquisition type (product or service), and service component (Air 
Force or Navy). Each IV is binary, where LPTA, product, and Air Force all equal zero, and 
TO, service, and Navy all equal one. 
Dependent variables (DVs) are variables whose values depend on the IV. For this 
reason, they are often termed “outcome” or “response” variables. The DVs we chose for this 
study are meant to provide answers about how long the contracting process took (a process 
metric) and how well the contractor performed (a performance metric). Accordingly, we 
chose (1) PALT as the measure of time-to-contract and (2) CPARS scores as a measure of 
contractor performance. PALT is measured by the number of days from requirement 
identification to contract award. Consistent with FAR 42.15, CPARS data were collected and 
used for the following reporting categories: (1) cost control, (2) quality, (3) schedule, (4) 
business relationship, and (5) subcontracting. CPARS measures each category using the 
following Likert-style scale: 1 = unsatisfactory, 2 = marginal, 3 = satisfactory, 4 = very good, 
and 5 = excellent. These scores serve as a proxy for contractor performance, with higher 
numbers indicating better performance. Although we have CPARS data for each category, 
the average across the first four categories was used in this research, as the subcontracting 
category had relatively few cases, and the listwise deletion resulted in too few cases to run 
the analyses.  
Covariates are secondary variables that can also affect the relationship of primary 
interest: the relationship between the IV and the DV. For this study, our goal is to parcel out 
the effects of covariates in order to more clearly see the relationship between the IVs and 
the DVs. We identified six potential covariates: (1) contract dollar value (VALUE), (2) 
number of reviews the solicitation and contract were subject to prior to award 
(NUMREVIEWS), (3) number of evaluation factors in the source selection plan 
                                            
 
 
4 While not the focus of this study, we found during the course of our research that a more 
comprehensive database is needed that captures many metrics the DoD should be capturing in order 
to quickly and continuously monitor performance of our contracts and contracting processes. See the 
Areas for Further Research section for more details. 
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(NUMEVALFACT), (4) number of offers received (NUMOFFERS), (5) number of contract 
line items in the contract (NUMCLINS), and (6) number of people on the source selection 
team (NUMPEOPLE). Each of these covariates could potentially affect PALT and/or CPARS 
scores, thus our goal was to parcel out their effect(s) in order to more clearly understand the 
effect of the IVs on the DVs. 
Data Description 
Our sample consists of 139 cases, which is sufficient for accurate analysis. The 
distribution of cases is unbalanced for each IV. There are 61 LPTA cases and 78 TO cases; 
40 product acquisition cases and 99 service acquisition cases; and 52 Air Force cases and 
87 Navy cases. This unbalanced design can cause ambiguity about the mean as the 
intercept and make assignment of sums of squares more difficult. There are, however, 
solutions to these issues. A weighted mean can be used in place of the grand mean and the 
STATA software (v12) we used for these analyses automatically handles the assignment of 
the sums of squares. Thus, we proceed with our analysis despite these limitations.  
Analysis 
Because our intent is to analyze differences in contract outcomes based on source 
selection methodology, acquisition type, and service component, a group comparison 
statistical methodology is necessary. We seek to find if there are differences in contract 
outcomes by group, both excluding and including the effect(s) of covariates.  
MANOVA/MANCOVA 
We use both multivariate analysis of variance (MANOVA) and multivariate analysis 
of covariance (MANCOVA) to assess group differences. Both methods create a new 
dependent variable using the information from the given dependent variables (PALT and 
CPARS scores). This new dependent variable is created in a way that maximizes 
differences between the grouping variable (the IVs).5 Clearly, the only difference between 
the two methods is the use of covariates: MANOVA looks for differences in the DVs using 
the IVs only, while MANCOVA takes into account the effects of covariates when looking for 
group differences in the DVs. We use both methods to gain a better understanding of the 
effects of the covariates on the DVs. We describe the more complex method (MANCOVA) in 
detail. 
MANCOVA addresses the following questions: Are mean differences among the 
groups on a combination of DVs (after adjusting for covariate effects) likely to have occurred 
by chance? Taken from another angle, is there a significant difference between the mean 
value for PALT and CPARS scores in LPTA source selections versus the mean value for 
PALT and CPARS scores in TO source selections, once the effects of the covariates have 
been parceled out?  
If differences in outcomes are found using MANCOVA, we dig deeper to better 
understand the differences using univariate analysis of covariance (ANCOVA). ANCOVA 
                                            
 
 
5 There is much debate as to whether Likert-type items like those used in our DV CPARS are 
considered interval or ordinal (see Carifio and Perla, 2007, for a review). MANCOVA requires the 
items be considered interval; however, we also used the Kruskal-Wallis H test, which considers 
CPARS an ordinal variable, to confirm our results. Due to space limitations, the results of this analysis 
are available from the first author. 
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also assesses group differences, however because it is univariate in nature, this method 
assesses one DV at a time (PALT or CPARS individually, rather than PALT and CPARS 
simultaneously). This method helps isolate where the difference(s) is (are) occurring.  
Assumption Testing 
Like all statistical methods, MANCOVA requires that certain assumptions about the 
data be tested to ensure accurate results. We tested six assumptions before proceeding. 
Beginning with 147 raw observations, we first searched for multivariate outliers using 
Mahalanobis’ Distance. We found four outliers and chose to drop those observations from 
subsequent analyses (n = 143), as outliers are known to significantly affect MANCOVA 
(Tabachnick & Fidell, 2007). Further, we searched for univariate outliers in each cell of our 
design (see Table 1). We found four univariate outliers, which were subsequently deleted (n 
= 139). 
Table 1. Cell Design 
 
Second, we tested multivariate normality among the DVs by examining density 
graphs, determining multivariate skewness and kurtosis in order to identify variables that 
might require transformation. For the DVs, PALT was deemed to be non-normal and was 
normalized via a logarithmic transformation. We also considered the normality of the 
covariates, as covariates are useful in reducing error, but not if they are non-normal and 
thus reduce power (Tabachnick & Fidell, 2007). Several covariates required transformation. 
Specifically, VALUE, NUMREVIEWS, NUMOFFERS, and NUMCLINS all received a 
logarithmic transformation, and to normalize NUMPEOPLE, the square root was taken. After 
these transformations, all variables were deemed to be multivariate normal. All further 
analyses and statistical output use the transformed variables, however the written results 
back-transform the variables into their original form for a better understanding of the effects. 
We use the untransformed variable nomenclature in the text for ease of reading. 
Third, we assessed linearity by examining scatter plots of (1) the paired DVs, (2) all 
pairs of covariates, and (3) all pairs of DV-covariate combinations for each grouping variable 
(a total of 168 plots). The plots revealed that NUMCLINS and NUMPEOPLE were 
consistently not linear, thus those covariates were removed from further analyses. Other 
variables failed linearity sporadically, and we were careful to remove offending pairings. 
Fourth, we assessed homogeneity of regression for each DV and grouping variable 
(a total of 24 assessments). This test was performed using an analysis of covariance 
(ANCOVA) that included the independent variables, each of the remaining covariates 
(VALUE, NUMREVIEWS, NUMEVALFACT, and NUMOFFERS), and the interaction 
between the independent variables and the covariates. When the interaction terms are not 
significant, the relationship between the dependent variables and each of the remaining 
covariates is the same at both levels of the independent variables, and the assumption of 
homogeneity of regression is upheld. There were three violations of homogeneity of 
regression. First, when PALT is the DV, the interactions between service component and 
number of reviews is significant. This means that the number of reviews the contracts we 
examined went through differed significantly between the Air Force (mean = 6.5 reviews) 
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and the Navy (mean = 5.5 reviews). Second, the interaction between acquisition type and 
number of offers is significant when PALT is the DV, meaning that product acquisitions 
(mean = 4.23 offers) receive significantly different number of offers than service acquisitions 
(mean = 4.43 offers). Finally, when CPARS scores is the DV, the interaction between 
service component and value is significant. Again, the value of the contracts differs 
significantly between the Air Force (mean = $52,000,000) and the Navy (mean = 
$32,300,000). We were careful to remove the offending covariates, where appropriate, from 
our analyses. 
Fifth, we checked for multicollinearity by assessing the pooled within cell tolerance 
for each DV. The DVs are not highly correlated in any cell, thus multicollinearity is not an 
issue. 
Finally, we checked for homogeneity of covariance matrices between groups using 
the multivariate test of means provided in STATA (v12). This test checks whether or not 
population variances and covariances of both dependent variables are equal for each of the 
IV groups. The results showed that all grouping cells are homogenous (source selection 
method: Box’s M X2(3) = 1.88, p = .5967; acquisition type: Box’s M X2(3) = 4.12, p = .2484; 
and service component: Box’s M X2(3) = 6.08, p =.1078). 
Table 2 provides the remaining covariates available for each MANCOVA and 
subsequent ANCOVA.  
Table 2. Covariates Available for MANCOVA/ANCOVAs 
 
With all assumptions tested, we performed the MANOVAs and MANCOVAs. The 
results are provided in the next section. 
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Results 
Descriptive Statistics 
Basic descriptive statistics for each variable are shown in Table 3. The table 
presents results for each grouping variable.  
Table 3. Descriptive Statistics 
 
MANOVA 
We begin with a series of MANOVAs to determine the primary effects the grouping 
variables have on contract outcomes. We examine all three grouping variables together, and 
then each individually. Where significant effects are found, ANOVA is used to identify which 
outcome variable(s) is(are) affected. 
Using all three grouping variables, we find the overall model is significant (Wilks’ Λ = 
.7141, F(6, 118) = 3.61, p < .01). Wilks’ Λ is high, suggesting that 71% of the variance in the 
outcome variables is not explained by the three grouping variables. The results suggest that 
the source selection method is driving significance. 
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When source selection method is the only grouping variable, the model is again 
significant (Wilks’ Λ = .7818, F(2, 61) = 8.51, p < .01). Follow-up ANOVAs show that both 
PALT and CPARS scores are significantly affected by source selection method (PALT, F (1, 
131) = 45.34, p < .01, partial η2 = .25 and CPARS scores, F (1, 67) = 6.50, p < .05, partial 
η2= .09). Although source selection method significantly affects both PALT and CPARS 
scores, it has a much more profound impact on PALT than on CPARS scores. The mean 
PALT for TO acquisitions is 67% longer than the mean PALT for LPTA acquisitions, 
whereas the mean CPARS rating for TO acquisitions is 13% higher than the mean CPARS 
rating for LPTA acquisitions. These results support Hypotheses 1 and 2.  
Using only acquisition type as the grouping variable, the model is not significant 
(Wilks’ Λ = .9228, F(2, 61) = 2.55, ns). However, post-hoc ANOVAs indicated that there is a 
significant difference in CPARS scores between product and service acquisitions (F (1, 67) 
= 7.85, p < .05, partial η2 = .10). The mean CPARS score for service acquisitions is 15% 
higher than the mean CPARS score for product acquisitions. These results support 
Hypothesis 3a, but not 3b.  
When service component was used as the grouping variable, the model was not 
significant (Wilks’ Λ = .9876, F(2, 61) = .38, ns). Post-hoc ANOVAs found the same—there 
were no statistically significant differences in PALT or CPARS ratings between Air Force 
acquisitions and Navy acquisitions, supporting Hypotheses 4a and 4b.  
MANCOVA 
With the primary tests of the IVs on the DVs complete, we add covariates to our 
model to determine the impact that related aspects of the acquisition process have on PALT 
and CPARS scores.  
Using source selection method as the grouping variable, we find the model is 
significant (Wilks’ Λ = .5110, F(8, 106) = 5.28, p < .01). The substantially lower Wilks’ Λ 
shows that an additional 27% of the variance in the DVs is captured when the covariates are 
included. Further highlighting the importance of the covariates, the univariate ANCOVAs 
show that when the covariates are included, source selection method is no longer 
significant. Instead, it is the value of the acquisition (F (1, 106) = 9.53, p < .01, partial η2 = 
.08), the number of evaluation factors (F (1, 106) = 6.27, p < .05, partial η2 = .06), and the 
number of offers (F (1, 106) = 7.02, p < .01, partial η2 = .06) that significantly affect PALT, 
while no variables significantly affected CPARS scores. The mean number of evaluation 
factors and number of offers for LPTA acquisitions is 2.13 and 3.85, respectively, while the 
mean for TO acquisitions is 3.07 and 4.78, respectively. These results do not support 
Hypotheses 1 or 2; seeming to disprove popular assumptions about the effects of source 
selection method on contract outcomes. Because MANCOVA represents a more realistic 
view of the acquisition process, we deem these results to be more robust than the MANOVA 
results.  
Using acquisition type as the grouping variable, the model is significant (Wilks’ Λ = 
.5156, F(6, 108) = 7.07, p < .01). With the covariates included, we were able to capture an 
additional 41% of the variance in the DVs. The univariate ANCOVAs showed that it is again 
the value of the acquisition (F (1, 107) = 13.20, p < .01, partial η2 = .11) and the number of 
evaluation factors (F (1, 107) = 7.60, p < .01, partial η2 = .07) that significantly affect the 
PALT. In this analysis, CPARS scores are affected by acquisition type, with services 
acquisitions receiving statistically significantly higher CPARS scores than product 
acquisitions (F (1, 58) = 6.59, p < .05, partial η2 = .10). CPARS scores were 15% higher for 
service acquisitions than for product acquisitions. These results support Hypotheses 3a, but 
not 3b—with the covariates included, there is no difference in PALT between product 
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acquisitions and service acquisitions; but there is a difference in CPARS scores between 
product acquisitions and service acquisitions. 
Next, using service component as the grouping variable, the model was significant 
(Wilks’ Λ = .6839, F(4, 110) = 5.75, p < .01). We were able to capture an additional 30% of 
the variance in the DVs by including the covariates. The univariate ANCOVAs once again 
showed the importance that value (F (1, 120) = 22.54, p < .01, partial η2 = .16) and the 
number of evaluation factors (F (1, 120) = 4.81, p < .05, partial η2 = .04) has on PALT. No 
variables significantly affected CPARS scores. These results support Hypotheses 4a and 
4b—with the covariates included, there are no differences in PALT or CPARS scores 
between the Air Force acquisitions and Navy acquisitions. 
Discussion & Conclusion 
We broke new ground in this research by scientifically testing popular assumptions 
related to source selection methods and their subsequent contract outcomes. Further, we 
empirically showed that contract outcomes are the same between service components, but 
not necessarily between acquisition types. The following practical and managerial 
implications are provided for this research. 
Using a simple MANOVA, we found there are significant differences in contract 
outcomes based on source selection method. The subsequent ANOVAs showed that PALT 
was 67% longer for TO source selections than for LPTA source selections. Further, the 
CPARS scores were, on average, 13% higher for TO source selections when compared to 
LPTA source selections. While these results appear to lend credence to popular anecdotes, 
when the details of the acquisition (i.e., the covariates) were included in the analysis, source 
selection method did not affect PALT or CPARS scores. Instead, it was the value of the 
acquisition, the number of evaluation factors, and the number of offers that affected PALT; 
and no variables affected CPARS scores.  
This is a very interesting finding, as it suggests that it is the details and processes of 
the acquisition itself—some of which are controllable by the acquisition team—that affect 
time-to-contract. Specifically, the more evaluation factors included in the solicitation, the 
more time it takes to evaluate them and award a contract. This is common sense, of course, 
but the finding generates the question of the optimal number of evaluation factors. Is there a 
tipping point at which the number of evaluation factors included in the solicitation 
significantly affects PALT? Finding the answer to this question would help procurement 
teams plan their solicitations accordingly—either reducing the number of evaluation factors, 
or planning for extra time to assess many evaluation factors.  
Further, the number of offers a requirement receives significantly affects PALT. 
Those in the field understand this finding, as more offers require more time to properly 
evaluate before awarding a contract. The number of offers a requirement receives is related 
to how wide the procurement team “cast the net”—how many offerors in the market were 
eligible to receive the contract. A procurement team can cast a wide net by using full and 
open competition solicitation methods, or they can cast a narrower net by limiting eligible 
respondents to small businesses, or even a sole source, when justified. Clearly, there is a 
balance to achieve between inspiring maximum competition and awarding the contract in 
the desired amount of time. Maximum competition often results in lower prices and 
increased quality, but comes with the cost of extended evaluation time, and, thus, a longer 
PALT. Minimizing competition might allow the contract to be awarded faster, but the 
procurement team may not achieve the best business deal. Here, again, the question of the 
optimal number of offers is raised.  
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Finding that there were significant differences in CPARS scores based on the type of 
acquisition is also interesting. We found that service acquisitions receive 15% higher 
CPARS scores than product acquisitions. These results may highlight criticism the DoD has 
received in recent years concerning the department’s failure to properly evaluate/score 
service contract performance (e.g., lack of proper scoring metrics, failure to properly oversee 
and measure service performance, etc.). Higher CPARS scores for service acquisitions 
might reflect these failures. Without adequate justification to downgrade performance, 
scores may be artificially high.  
Finally, we found no significant differences in PALT or CPARS scores between 
service components. This suggests that federal regulations, policies, and practices are 
being applied in a uniform manner across service components.  
In summary, we feel the most important finding of this research is that the covariates 
matter. In other words, it is the details of the acquisition, solicitation document, and source 
selection processes that affect the time-to-contract. Each service component should ensure 
their processes are expedient and supportive, always aimed at producing optimal contract 
outcomes for the customer in a way that is least burdensome for the acquisition team. 
Areas for Further Research 
More data are needed to substantiate the results found in this research. Access to 
more data might also permit more covariates to pass assumptions, allowing for more 
comprehensive analyses.  
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Introduction 
Frank Kendall, then Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and 
Logistics, released the first defense acquisition system performance report in June 2013. 
This report focused primarily on performance related to the collective outcomes of Major 
Defense Acquisition Programs (MDAPs), but additionally explored various descriptive 
dimensions and acquisition approaches of the same (Kendall, 2013). Each annual report 
builds on the work previously conducted, and focuses on data-driven analysis relying on 
statistical techniques to identify trends that improve the defense acquisition community’s 
insights into how contract incentives are motivating better contractor/vendor performance 
(Kendal, 2016). 
Acquisition Research Program: 
Creating Synergy for Informed Change - 24 - 
Nevertheless, large amounts of data (in modern jargon, “Big Data”) are now available 
for research in the area of defense acquisition. Over the past several years, changes in 
electronic commerce have increased the amounts of both structured and unstructured data 
available—both in runtime and archived environments. This electronic data, from a variety of 
different acquisition agencies, can be obtained by a variety of means and used for a 
multitude of purposes (Snider et al., 2014). 
Traditional statistical and trend analysis methods thus far have been primarily relied 
upon to explore trends and test metrics in the sets of acquisition data at hand. Sometimes, 
spreadsheets of linear regression correlation are employed, or, in some more modern 
applications, multivariate structural equation models via scientific applications such as SPSS 
and AMOS are leveraged for their ability to evaluate complex variable relationships, such as 
nested or recursive if-then patterns (Byrne, 2016). 
However, not only are today’s modern datasets large in magnitude, they are also 
large in variety and complexity (Gartner, 2013). Furthermore, to address this state of data, 
new statistical modeling techniques, more powerful than before, have had to be created. 
This is due to the older methods finding difficulty with some of the size problems Big Data 
represents, such as privacy and security concerns (Parms, 2017). Thankfully, computer 
power necessary to employ the modern techniques is less expensive today, the software 
near free, and the storage capacities available now yield bewildering capacities at a 
fingertip, and with amazingly fast access speed. In fact, these performance parameters 
appear to continue along a Moore’s trend line against critical opposition (Magee, Basnet, 
Funk, & Benson, 2015). Presently, one of the more interesting of the new statistical 
modeling techniques is neural network algorithm machine learning. 
Neural network modeling involves utilizing a “powerful computational data model that 
is able to capture and represent input/output relationships.” This model was developed out 
of the desire to create artificial intelligence systems capable of completing functions that 
were previously executed solely by the human brain. One benefit of using neural network 
modeling lies with its capacity to display and comprehend both linear and non-linear 
relationships from the data to which it is supplied (NeuroSolutions, 2015). 
Research Question 
Because “Big Data” is present in the Defense Acquisition Business space, and, 
because the demand to critically understand real cause-and-effect relationships between 
variables within that data is persistent from the Acquisition community, this paper’s research 
question is, Can a neural network modeling technique be confidently relied upon to 
meaningfully explore variable relationships within acquisition business datasets? Because, if 
it is, then any question may be reasonably asked by anyone of such a dataset; and, via the 
neural network-enabled tool, the answers they receive will come with scientific statistical 
confidence as to whether they can be trusted as interesting or useful answers.1 In order to 
explore this research question, the study opted to use business data on contractor 
performance and attempted to isolate predictive variables from past performance 
information predictive of good performance. 
                                            
 
 
1 The role of human judgement of course, notwithstanding. 
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Methodology 
This research uses the Simple Action Research Model (MacIsaac, 1995). Direct 
participation by the researchers went into answering the research question. In accordance 
with the steps of direct action: (1) the problem was defined (i.e., Can neural network 
modeling be applied to Big Data sets in acquisition?); (2) an Action Plan was developed 
(described in detail below, but generally it was to obtain a subset of Big Data, cleanse it for 
use, program a neural network tool, write hypotheses postulating expected correlative 
relationships between variables or variable sets, and execute testing of the hypotheses via 
the neural network for validation); (3) Execution of the Plan (which was a success: the data 
was obtained and cleaned, the hypotheses generated, and the neural network tool coded, 
tested and exercised over several cycles); and (4) Learning and Evaluation, which was 
completed via the documentation of results in this paper. 
It is important to note that the Simple Action methodology employed here is 
evaluating the paper’s research question regarding the applicability of the neural networking 
modeling technique to big data in the acquisition environment; as such, the actual statistical 
correlative output of the hypothesis are of a secondary value only (i.e., they are for the 
purpose of experimenting with the neural network environment itself, as opposed to for 
discovery in their own right). 
Creation of the Cognitive Learning Environment 
To build the data environment for evaluation, multiple sources of acquisition data 
were imported and fused together with iterative slices of multiple groups taken out for 
analysis. Further breakdown of the environment is described in the Study Plan section. 
Multiple open-source data analysis and machine learning tools were used to iteratively 
create models and generate graphs of the data slices. Human evaluation was involved in 
looking for patterns in the data which may have explained best performance across 
programs and portfolio groups in the past in order to produce a testable hypothesis. The 
underlying goal was to find patterns with the best chance of explaining contractor/vendor 
performance improvement.  
The cognitive environment is generated in two phases: a simulation phase and a 
predictive phase. Simulation phase models generated from simple datasets perform 
predictive analytics. The predictive phase models were generated via Predictive Model 
Markup Language (PMML)2 and integrated into a simple prototype for the proof of concept. 
PMML was used as a standard to integrate defined and tested models into the decision 
support toolsets. Once those models were iteratively perfected (i.e., acceptable levels of 
false positives were observed based on training and testing the datasets), we exported the 
PMML from the models and integrated the new capability into our decision support 
components. 
                                            
 
 
2 The Predictive Model Markup Language (PMML) is an XML-based predictive model interchange 
format conceived by Dr. Robert Lee Grossman, then the director of the National Center for Data 
Mining at the University of Illinois at Chicago. PMML provides a way for analytic applications to 
describe and exchange predictive models produced by data mining and machine learning algorithms. 
It supports common models such as logistic regression and feedforward neural networks (Wikipedia, 
n.d.). 
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Building the Cognitive Learning Application Framework depended on a predictive 
model being able to learn from past experiences and make significantly intelligent decisions. 
Thus, bringing together the archived acquisition data and building a model exportable to 
PMML was the main concern of this research. Figure 1 outlines the researchers’ process of 
creating the Cognitive Learning Environment: mining, fusing, and modeling the datasets. It is 
important to note the methodology is iterative in nature, requiring the team to return to 
previous steps during model development. For example, during the Patterns/Analytics step, 
the need to slice the data differently was identified, which necessitated new data, cleaning, 
transformation, and so forth. Also, through the development of reusable components, time 
required for iterations was significantly reduced. Normally, Data Selection and 
Preprocessing are the most time-consuming steps; usually taking around 80% of the total 
effort required to build an analytical model (Baesens, 2014). 
 
 Project Methodology Figure 1.
Hypotheses 
This research observes it is commonly claimed: contracts structured with incentivized 
performance line items (i.e., Cost Plus Incentive Fee, Cost Plus Award Fee, Fixed Price 
Incentive Fee, Fixed Price Award Fee, Cost Plus Fixed Fee, etc.) are associated (or 
expected) to enjoy good or better performance than otherwise structured; shorter duration 
contracts perform better than longer duration ones; competed contracts perform better than 
sole-source awards; negotiated clauses have an impact on performance, either for good or 
ill. 
Recently, a vendor measure of performance has become available for calculation: 
the Superior Supplier Incentive Program (SSIP) composite score. 
Therefore, this paper takes as its set of testing hypotheses, for the purpose of direct 
action experimentation of a neural network environment toolset, the following: 
• H1—Contract structures incentivizing performance (i.e., CPIF, CPFF, CPAF, 
FPIF, FPAF) result in higher Superior Supplier Incentive Program (SSIP) 
composite scores. 
• H2—Shorter contract duration results in better performance outcomes. 
• H3—Contracts that are competed result in better performance outcomes than 
sole-source. 
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• H4—The mixture of negotiated clause inclusions impacts vendor performance 
outcomes. 
Data Collection 
This research began with utilizing an SSIP sample set of contracts from the FY16 
review (i.e., FY13, FY14, and FY15 contracts). This data represents the study source 
boundary. The SSIP master data was derived from the Tri-Service SSIP Selection 
Methodology inclusive of subsets of CPARS3 master data by suppliers4, thus, initially limiting 
the dataset for analysis (Wardwell et al., 2016). 
Analysis proceeded grouping data by similar Product Service Code (PSC) portfolios 
and similar dollar ranges. Performance was indicated by composite SSIP score (ranging 
from 0 to 4). Varying contract structures within the SSIP sample set were investigated for 
potential correlations between contract-type, CLIN mix, contract length, extent-competed, 
and clause inclusions. Subsequently, these relationships were analyzed within vendors or 
specific programs and contrasted against available program metrics aside from CPARS 
metrics. 
Core data inputs were derived or pulled from acquisition data sources to which 
DASN (AP) had access. The following is the comprehensive list of data sources used 
throughout this research: 
• SSIP sample set of contracts from the FY16 Review 
• Army Contracting Business Intelligence System (ACBIS) 
• Standard Procurement System (SPS) 
• FPDS-NG5 
• PDS XML6 
• ITIMP CLIN Data7 
• EDA PDF8 
Initially, the SSIP sample set of contracts from the FY16 review matched 
corresponding ACBIS contracts. This allowed CLIN-level information from SPS and DFARS 
clause inclusions to be included for analysis. Table 1 outlines each attribute and the data 
source from which they were sourced. Some or all of the attributes were used during 
different phases of the research. As an example, during the beginning of the project, 
datasets were limited to the SSIP FY16 Review boundary. This limited research to 1,762 
                                            
 
 
3 Contractor Performance Assessment Reports System 
4 To determine which companies and business segments will be rated in a given FY, the Services use 
USASpending.gov to aggregate Systems contracts’ obligations for the last three FYs by supplier and 
business segment. For each agency, the funding agency can be found by using the funding codes 
DoN (1700), AF (5700), and ARMY (2100). The obligations are maintained for all companies in the 
Air Force Industrial Liaison Office data warehouse. However, only the Top 100 or so (by obligation 
amount) are pulled for SSIP consideration. 
5 Federal Procurement Data System-Next Generation 
6 DoD Procurement Data Standard, Extensible Markup Language 
7 Navy’s Integrated Technical Item Management and Procurement system, Contract Line Item 
8 DoD Electronic Document Access system, Portable Document Format file 
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records. After cleansing and transformation (i.e., matching/fusion) 972 contracts remained. 
Analysis of this dataset led to a determination that using source attributes directly from 
CPARS and including the full set of CPARS data (e.g., 174,138 records), which included 
contracts from the Navy, the Army, and the Air Force, would be a preferable set for testing 
the models. 
Later iterations of the dataset focused on contract-level details and CPARS ratings. 
SPS line item details from ACBIS were suspended. 
Table 1. Data Attribute Sources 
 
Data Selection, Cleansing, and Transformation 
Data selection, cleansing, and transformation of this research was continuous 
throughout, and encompassed a significant amount of the effort in bringing operational data 
together correctly. Initial assumptions changed based on accuracy of data, and cleaning 
what became required. For instance, CPARS data is notoriously inconsistent when it comes 
to referencing IDIQ contracts. Sometimes, the CPARS references the base IDIQ, which is 
meaningless for analysis purposes. In other instances, the task order number is referenced. 
The following outlines tasks performed to conduct preliminary data selection, 
grouping, and fusion between sets with the intent of matching with fusion while mitigating 
issues preventing a dataset: 
1. Load of individual data into a data repository for selection and cleansing. 
2. Determination of which award-value (CPARS) or obligation-amount (FPDS-
NG) would better serve the research objective. 
3. Analysis of the FPDS-NG contract numbers in preparation for matching to 
CPARS data. Contract number formatting varies across different source data 
repositories, thus, care must be taken to ensure data across those sources 
match properly. For instance, non-alphanumeric characters (dashes, spaces, 
etc.) must be removed, and the first 13 characters must be selected, unless 
the contract number starts with “GS,” “HHS,” “LC,” “NN,” or “V.” In those 
cases, the last 13 characters are selected. This method yields a 94% match 
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with FPDS-NG PIID9 or Referenced IDV10 PIID; however, matching 
algorithms are modified and tuned until the highest percentage match across 
the data emerges. 
4. Contract-type, extent-competed, contract-length and PSC were selected from 
the base contract or mod with the highest obligated amount change. 
5. For indefinite delivery/indefinite quantity (IDIQ) contracts with “D” in the 9th 
position of the contract number, the algorithm took into account both the 
“contract-num” and “order-num” values for successful match. Order number 
was parsed from the CPARS contract number and used both contract 
number and order number to match with FPDS-NG data using the highest 
obligated amount change of the mods (28% of the CPARS contracts). IDIQ 
contracts without order numbers were removed from the CPARS data (27%), 
as these would not produce meaningful results. 
6. Portfolio and Portfolio Groups for each contract were identified by matching 
the FPDS-NG PSC code with data from the DPAP Product and Service Code 
(PSC) Selection Tool. 
Analytics & Modeling  
To perform the analytics and modeling of the data itself, different representations 
were built of results (e.g., Excel pivots, scatter plots, graphs, charts, etc.). This first step was 
conducted to steer further neural modeling efforts. Working with defense acquisition subject 
matter experts, iterative evolutions of the dataset were visualized to attempt discovery of 
patterns representing algorithms executable at high levels of accuracy. The iterations 
generated numerous views into the dataset, and participants were successful in coming to 
an understanding of the best way to begin modeling. Visual data exploration proved 
important in supplying initial insights into the data, which researchers then adopted 
throughout the modeling (Baesens, 2014). 
To be useful to the community at large, end users should not have to acquire and 
learn complex analytic software to obtain predictions from these models. To facilitate this 
goal, once models are trained and tested, they’re anticipated to be exported as PMML. The 
PMML can then be fed into a wide variety of systems and programming languages, which 
can be used to run the model(s) against incoming data. A Gartner 2017 Magic Quadrant for 
Data Science Platforms (called in 2016 "Advanced Analytics Platforms") evaluated a new 
set of 16 analytic and data science firms over 15 criteria and placed them in four quadrants, 
based on completeness of vision and ability to execute (Piatetsky, 2017). KNIME11 was in 
the top quadrant with SAS, IBM, and RapidMiner. This study found KNIME to exhibit a 
flexible and extensible design, display an ease of use and verified capability to export PMML 
(essential to support of developing this research’s data modeling and Cognitive Learning 
Application Framework).  
The KNIME platform was selected for this study’s use as the neural network tool. 
The KNIME advanced analytics platform is an open-source analytics platform, and was used 
                                            
 
 
9 Procurement Instrument Identifier 
10 Indefinite Delivery Vehicle 
11 KNIME Analytics platform: https://www.knime.org/products  
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to run computational analysis against the historical dataset to generate various sets of 
predictive models. Numerous models, such as polynomial and logistical regressions, were 
used to predict numerical values for variables, whereas neural networks and decision trees 
were used to predict categorical values for variables. Operational data was loaded into local 
databases (i.e., PostgreSQL) and quickly iterated regardless of it being functional in Excel 
for preliminary analysis or in KNIME for modeling. 
Figure 2 illustrates the modeling process for the paper’s problem set. Significant time 
was spent segmenting the dataset and running the data through models until patterns 
emerged that are relative to the expected results sought (i.e., contract structures 
performance).  
 
 Analytics and Modeling Paradigm Figure 2.
Figure 2’s illustration reveals how data in the study was segmented by PSC Portfolio 
Groups and used CPARS ratings (both by composite SSIP scores and individual ratings 
values) as dependent variables. In contrast, numerous independent variables were inputs to 
the modeling process, only some of which are depicted. 
Data Analysis and Results  
Modeling used contract-type and extent-competed as independent variables with 
composite CPARS ratings as dependent variables. The research goal at this stage was to 
find patterns in the data revealing correlations between contract-type and extent-competed 
to be neural network modeled, and, thus, exercise the paper’s hypotheses via statistical 
correlation testing and address the paper’s research question. Contract-length became 
another independent variable added to the set for modeling and, from that point forward, any 
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attribute available and deemed pertinent to the research hypothesis objective was 
incorporated into operational data or transformed and sanitized. As a result, multiple back 
and forth passages through previous steps of data selection, cleansing, and transformation 
were avoided. Excel pivots were created against the full CPARS dataset, which supplied 
174,138 records for final analysis in the study. No obvious significant pattern emerged from 
observing the pivot tables. Table 2 summarizes initial descriptive data for contract-type in 
the sample. 
Table 2. Pivot of Contract-Type and SSIP12 
 
Table 3 summarizes initial descriptive data for extent competed in the sample. 
Table 3. Pivot of Extent-Competed and SSIP13 
 
Working With the Predictive Analytic Environment 
The pivot table input yielded prima facie evidence against H1 (that incentivized 
contract-types yield greater contractor performance) and H3 (that competed contracts yield 
greater contract performance). With this starting point in hand, the study moved into the 
regression analysis phase and began running polynomial and linear regression models 
                                            
 
 
12 1,237 unmatched records from Table 2 were removed 
13 305 unmatched records from Table 3 were removed. 
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against the data with KNIME software to evaluate how close target measures of interest 
were with hypothesized outcomes. We ran both linear and polynomial regression algorithms 
against the data to attempt to find a mathematical formula that would take the extent-
competed and contract-type as inputs and give a predicted value of the SSIP score. 
Notes on Inputs: The regressions require numeric values for the dependent and 
independent variables. The SSIP score (the dependent variable) is a numeric value; 
however, the independent variables (contract-type and extent-competed) are strings. The 
type was converted to numbers by assigning a unique integer value to each distinct value 
(i.e., firmed fixed price was set to 10). 
Figure 3 illustrates the KNIME’s workspace used for these regressions. Node 1 
utilizes an Excel file as input, and the data is passed into a partitioning node (Node 6) to 
give us a set of data on which to run the regressions, and a small set of data used to test the 
regressions. The data is passed to three different nodes. Node 2 runs the polynomial 
regression (with a max polynomial degree of 2), Node 10 runs a linear regression and Node 
11 generates a 3D scatter plot to assist in visualizing the data. 
 
 Initial Polynomial and Linear Regression  Figure 3.
The results of the linear regression analysis showed no linear correlation existing in 
the dataset between independent variable types of “extent-competed” or “contract-type” and 
dependent variable types of contractor SSIP score. The results of the Polynomial 
Regression were pushed into a Regression Predictor and Numeric Scorer to output the 
model’s statistics. Figure 4 shows all learned coefficients for the contract-type and extent-
competed. 
Regression involves numerous variables. The R² statistic, listed at the bottom of the 
figure, measures the proportion of variability in the SSIP score and CPARS rating 
(dependent variables) that can be explained by the contract-type and extent-competed 
(independent variables). This value is between 0 and 1, and can be negative, with a value 
close to 1 indicating that a large proportion of the variability in the response can be 
explained by the regression. The standard error is the average amount that the response 
will deviate from the true regression line (James et al., 2013). 
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 Statistics on Polynomial Regression Figure 4.
The Numeric Score (Node 8) in the flow computes certain statistics between the 
numeric column’s values (ri) and predicted (pi) values. It computes R²=1-SSres/SStot=1-Σ(pi-
ri)²/Σ(ri-1/n*Σri)² (can be negative!) (“Coefficient of Determination,” n.d.); mean absolute error 
(1/n*Σ|pi-ri|) (“Mean Absolute Error,” n.d.); mean squared error (1/n*Σ(pi-ri)²) (“Residual Sum 
of Squares,” n.d.); root mean squared error (sqrt(1/n*Σ(pi-ri)²)) (“Root-Mean-Square 
Deviation,” n.d.); and mean signed difference (1/n*Σ(pi-ri)) (“Mean Signed Deviation,” n.d.). 
The computed values can be inspected in the node’s view and/or further processed using 
the output table. Table 4 contracts the results from the Numeric Scorer. 
Table 4. Numeric Score Results 
 
Next, we built more complicated predictive analysis algorithms in an attempt to find 
the correlations/predictive capabilities we were expecting (i.e., model contract structures that 
incentivize performance correlated to better performance outcomes). Figure 5 shows the 
training and testing of two different types of neural networks. It initially splits the data into a 
training set, and a validation set: we train the neural network on the training set and 
measure the performance on the validation set. Node 5 partitions the data (i.e., 80% 
Training and 20% Validation) and pushes the sets into both an RProp MLP Learner and a 
PNN Learner (DDA). 
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 Neural Network Model Figure 5.
The RProp algorithm is used for multilayer feedforward networks. RProp performs a 
local adaptation of the weight-updates according to the behavior of the error function 
(Riedmiller & Braun, 1993).  
The PNN Learner (DDA) trains a Probabilistic Neural Network (PNN) based on the 
DDA (Dynamic Decay Adjustment) method on labeled data using Constructive Training of 
Probabilistic Neural Networks (Berthold & Diamond, 1998) as the underlying algorithm. This 
algorithm generates rules based on numeric data. Each rule is defined as a high-
dimensional Gaussian function that is adjusted by two thresholds, theta minus and theta 
plus, to avoid conflicts with rules of different classes. Each Gaussian function is defined by a 
center vector (from the first covered instance) and a standard deviation, which is adjusted 
during training to cover only non-conflicting instances. The selected numeric columns of the 
input data are used as input data for training, and additional columns are used as 
classification targets. Either one column holding the class information, or a number of 
numeric columns with class degrees between 0 and 1, can be selected. The data output 
contains the rules after execution, along with a number of rule measurements. The model 
output port contains the PNN model, which can be used for prediction in the PNN Predictor 
node. 
The KNIME tool was able to create an abstraction layer around the algorithms that 
were being run in the neural network nodes. A basic understanding of what the nodes are 
doing and how to configure them for optimum performance facilitates quicker iterations and 
an overall feasibility study that supports rapid prototyping. 
The MultiLayerPerceptron and the PNN Predictor nodes are used to validate the 
resulting trained model against the test dataset. For the MultiLayerPerceptron Predictor, if 
the output variable is nominal, the output of each neuron and the class of the winner neuron 
are produced. The PNN Predictor is doing a similar test (i.e., using the trained model to 
validate with the test data). In this case, it also outputs predicted data with an additional 
classification column (e.g., CPARS quality attribute). 
Figure 6 and Figure 7 outline the confusion matrix and accuracy statistics for the 
model. An example of what it’s showing is as follows: For the MultiLayerPerceptron 
model/predictor, using 20% of the data to score/validate based on contract-type and extent-
competed, we successfully predicted 271 times Technical/Quality of Product or Service 
would be rated as Satisfactory. As well, 166 times Technical/Quality of Product or Service 
was rated as Satisfactory when it should have been Very Good. We only trained the model 
to predict Quality at this point. The accuracy for the MultiLayerPerceptron was 45.427% and 
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48.018% for the PNN Predictor. Evaluation ratings are defined as: E: Exceptional, V: Very 
Good, S: Satisfactory, M: Marginal, U: Unsatisfactory, and N: N/A. 
 
 MultiLayerPerceptron Predictor Figure 6.
 
 PNN Predictor Figure 7.
Work on finding correlations within the data continued throughout the research. 
Through additional tuning and new independent variables, the study found the model 
accuracy statistics showed positive results. New problem sets with higher accuracy statistics 
should find themselves into a defense procurement toolset soon and/or a sequel to this 
research. 
PMML Integrated Decision Support Tool Kit 
The Java PMML API (GitHub, 2017) is an open-source project that provides a PMML 
producer and consumer libraries for the Java/JVM platform. Using these libraries, a Java 
wrapper is created around each model. These wrappers each take a pre-defined set of 
inputs and provide a predicted output value. These wrappers then become pluggable 
components that can be added to any Java-based tool, such as websites, web services and 
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stand-alone applications. For example, a tool that runs Pre-Validations on PDS XML14 
(Defense Procurement and Acquisition Policy, 2008) files can quickly be updated to take the 
information it parses from the PDS file, and feed it to these various models to augment the 
validation results to include predictive analytics. 
Early in the research project, a simple model prototype was built to export the PMML 
from this model. This PMML was used in a Java application as a Proof of Concept (POC) for 
the ability to use a PMML-defined model and integrated its predictive capabilities into the 
Cognitive Learning Application Framework, thus, having an end-to-end solution for decision 
support capabilities in the application toolsets. 
Future work in this space involves making the models used by these wrappers 
dynamic. The current iteration utilizes static PMML that was generated using a historical 
dataset. It would be desirable to have the ability to update the models in real time as new 
data comes in. 
Conclusion 
This study’s research question was, Can a neural network modeling technique be 
confidently relied upon to meaningfully explore variable relationships within acquisition 
business datasets? This paper’s result was positive to the research question.  
The study’s open architecture framework (i.e., the Cognitive Learning Application 
Framework [CLAF]) for Acquisition Decision Support and Business Intelligence successfully 
integrated and prototyped a neural network model using a PMML standard and explored 
variable relationships using four test hypotheses addressing contract performance data. 
Regarding the study’s test hypotheses, results were inconclusive. Only H1 (incentivized 
contract types correlate with higher vendor performance scores) and H3 (competed 
contracts correlate with higher vendor performance scores) were thoroughly evaluated, and 
proved to be inconclusive via initial standard regression technique. Due to datasets being 
too small for substantive use in big data network evaluation, or, because of time limitations 
preventing necessary dataset concatenation, H2 (shorter duration contracts correlate with 
higher vendor performance scores) and H4 (contract clauses have impact on vendor 
performance score) could not be evaluated. 
The study’s main function went on to explore H1 and H3 as a means of addressing 
the research question via a direct action methodology of research. Experimenting with the 
neural network mode of analysis, the study attempted accurate prediction of vendor 
performance scores given an input of one of the hypothesized independent variables. The 
study’s neural network obtained a maximum accuracy score of 49%. Obtaining this level of 
accuracy required careful, and sometimes tedious, assembly of statistical and logical 
                                            
 
 
14 The Procurement Data Standard (PDS) is a system-agnostic data standard that is adopted and 
implemented DoD-wide for creation, translation, processing, and sharing of procurement actions. It 
defines the minimum requirements for contract writing system output to improve visibility and 
accuracy of contract-related data, to support interoperability of DoD acquisition systems and to 
standardize and streamline the procure-to-pay business process. Further, the PDS will improve 
visibility of contract-related data, enabling senior DoD leadership to make better informed business 
decisions. And finally, this data standard will support future migration to enterprise and federal 
systems and processes where appropriate. 
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components. Although work has stopped, it is anticipated to resume post-publication in 
order for more potential latent variable relationships to be discovered, or, presumed 
relationships tested for the potential to be dispelled.  
The value of discovering through this study’s experience that there’s evidence that 
the neural network modeling technique is applicable to big data sets in acquisition is that, 
now, any question for which there is a discrete data element available, or derivable, within 
those sets, can expect a trusted answer (if interesting and useful) with scientific statistical 
confidence. 
Findings  
The KNIME advanced analytics platform can write to PMML simply by dragging the 
PMML writer to the model. Figure 3 illustrates this capability in Node 5 (PMML Writer). This 
and the Application Frameworks created during this research project will enable future 
researchers to quickly bring new data into the modeling process, as well as integrate 
exported PMML models into Defense Acquisition Decision Support tools. 
Cognitive computing (neural network modeling) solutions promise better-informed 
buying and increased compliance, and may make this faster and easier to accomplish once 
generated. Also, from this experience, the study found that loading more than just enough 
data helps significantly during the modeling phase. 
Given the success of this research, it is recommended that government and industry 
oversight entities build a cognitive learning component for acquisition support that uses 
archived acquisition data from known repositories. The component can then be used as a 
stand-alone tool for the acquisition community and/or integrate into existing acquisition 
community toolsets and contract writing applications.  
Afterwards, the models could be leveraged in decision support or Business 
Intelligence (BI) dashboards by the acquisition community.  
In fact, a simulation tool could even be envisioned that would allow contracting 
officers (KOs) to perform scenario testing surrounding new agreements—one that would, 
given any variables, project performance indices based on purchase type or agreement 
structure, or other discovered latent relationships. 
Areas for Further Research 
The combination of the Cognitive Learning Acquisition Framework and a Big Data 
archive together form a methodology for an Application Framework, enabling a dynamic 
information analysis space to build intelligence into acquisition decision support tools. Future 
practical research into the feasibility and capability of applications leveraging such a 
framework could include the following: decision support for contracting officers and program 
managers surrounding contract structure tied to true historic performance and delivery 
outcomes; modeling of contract incentives, structures, and policies, and their impact on 
performance, delivery, costs, and schedule across major programs; volume of modifications 
and manual and/or late payments tied to contract, clause, and line item structures, as well 
as the overall quality of the contract data and compliance with contracting rules and 
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regulations; EVM15 outcomes correlated to initial negotiated contract terms; award and 
incentive fee payouts tied to EVM and CPARS metrics; vendor past performance within 
specific product service codes correlated to historic contract structure; and Q&A support for 
initial acquisition planning (i.e., “What vendors typically support this product or service?”, 
“What type of contract is most widely used?”, “Is this work typically competed?”, and “What 
clauses above and beyond the typical prescriptions accompany this type of buy?”). Finally, 
the incorporation of additional public and Defense datasets within the financial, logistics, and 
commercial spaces into the Big Data archive is warranted to provide opportunities for further 
exploration of data relationships for use in acquisition decision making. 
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Customizing the Use of TINA (Truth in Negotiations Act) in 
the DoD 
Chong Wang—Associate Professor, Financial Management, Graduate School of Business and 
Public Policy, Naval Postgraduate School 
Introduction 
Wang, Rendon, Champion, Ellen, & Walk (hereafter, Wang et al., 2016) identify the 
incentive problem that is characterized as a “moral hazard” in the DoD’s current use of the 
Truth in Negotiations Act (TINA). One of the examples they concentrated on was the 
ineffective use of TINA in the context of firm-fixed-price (FFP) contracts. Specifically, a 
contractor under an FFP contract that is subject to TINA has the following ill incentive: The 
fear of being held accountable for any significant unfavorable cost discrepancy (i.e., the 
actual incurred cost is significantly below the ex-ante cost estimate negotiated with the DoD 
as the basis for contract fixed-price) would strongly motivate the contractor to shirk (i.e., 
reduce cost-saving effort) or even engage in cost padding (e.g., by opportunistically 
incurring or allocating more costs to the government contracts). Such behavior leads to 
deadweight welfare loss that is ultimately borne by taxpayers. 
This study extends Wang et al. (2016) to a broader scope and greater depth. In 
particular, we propose to customize the use (or disuse) of TINA in the DoD for various 
contracting scenarios involving specific acquisition category (ACAT I through III), stage of 
the cycle (Milestones A, B, and C), and contract type. The bottom line is: we don’t believe 
the TINA policy should be prescribed via a “one-size-fits-all” approach; rather, the use or 
disuse of TINA should be customized to various situations. 
We continue to employ an economics-based, incentive-centric approach that focuses 
on investigation of agents’ (i.e., DoD contractors’) incentives under various settings. Then 
we generate our policy recommendation through a “with” and “without” TINA comparison. 
TINA is a federal acquisition regulation, which goes beyond the DoD and DoN. We 
expect that significant cost savings can be generated for the DoD and DoN, as well as other 
federal government agencies, by providing such a framework described above. 
The remainder of the report is organized as follows. The next section describes the 
DoD acquisition process. Following that is a section that describes how TINA is 
implemented in DoD acquisition via a “one-size-fits-all” approach. Building on those two 
sections, the following one (Customizing the Use [or Disuse] of TINA in the DoD Acquisition 
Process) tailors the use or disuse of TINA (i.e., TINA waiver) to various circumstances. We 
offer a conclusion in the final section. 
DoD Acquisition Process: Category, Cycle, and Contract Type 
The DoD procures goods and services through contracts. Schwartz (2014) interprets 
“acquisition” as “a broad term that applies to more than just the purchase of an item or 
service”; rather, “the acquisition encompasses the design, engineering, construction, testing, 
deployment, sustainment, and disposal of weapons or related items purchased from a 
contractor.” 
DoD acquisition is governed by the Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) along with 
the Defense Federal Acquisition Regulation Supplement (DFARS). Additional regulations 
such as TINA also provide rules.  
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Acquisition Category (ACAT) 
Depending on program costs, DoD acquisition is divided into three categories. The 
biggest ticket purchase is Category I (ACAT I), also called Major Defense Acquisition 
Programs (MDAPs). The Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and 
Logistics (USD[AT&L]) defines MDAPs as programs with more than $480 million (fiscal year 
2014 dollars) in research, development, test, and evaluation (RDT&E) expenditures; or at 
least $2.79 billion (fiscal year 2014 dollars) in procurement funding; or as designated as a 
major defense acquisition program by the milestone decision authority (10 U.S.C., § 2430, 
Major Defense Acquisition Program Defined). A similar Category I definition, namely ACAT 
IA, also called Major Automated Information System (MAIS), with different dollar thresholds, 
exists for DoD acquisition of Automated Information Systems (AIS).  
The next tier procurement is Category II, which is a major system defined as 10 
U.S.C. 2302d (Reference (h)), yet which does not meet criteria for ACAT I or IA. Finally, 
Category III (ACAT III) includes any program that does not meet criteria for ACAT II or 
above, or any AIS program that is not a MAIS. 
The following Table 1, reproduced from DoD Instruction (DoDI) 5000.02, Operation 
of the Defense Acquisition System (USD[AT&L], 2013), details the definitions of each 
acquisition category. 
It is worth noting that as the acquisition category decreases from I to III, so does the 
level of oversight from the DoD and Congress. One should expect that the closest and most 
supervision being applied to MDAPs. Another difference between ACAT I (MDAPs) and 
non-MDAPs is the degree of information asymmetry between the DoD and the contractor. 
MDAPs are inherently more technologically complex than ACAT II and III programs and 
hence information asymmetry is more serious to start with for MDAPs. 
A GAO (2015) report indicates that 
DOD requested $168 billion in fiscal year 2014 to develop, test, and acquire 
weapon systems and other products and equipment. About 40 percent of that 
total is for major defense acquisition programs or ACAT I programs. DOD 
also invests in other, non-major ACAT II and III programs that are generally 
less costly at the individual program level. These programs typically have 
fewer reporting requirements and are overseen at lower organizational levels 
than ACAT I programs, although they may have annual funding needs that 
are just as significant. 
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Table 1. Description and Decision Authority for ACAT I–III Programs  
 
Acquisition Cycle 
Schwartz (2014) identifies  
a three-step process of identifying the required weapon system, establishing 
a budget, and acquiring the system. These three steps are organized as 
follows: 
1. The Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System—for 
identifying requirements. 
2. The Planning, Programming, Budgeting, and Execution System—for 
allocating resources and budgeting. 
3. The Defense Acquisition System—for developing and/or buying the item. 
(Schwartz, 2014, Summary) 
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These three steps (each of which is a system unto itself), taken together, are often 
referred to as “Big ‘A’” acquisition, in contrast to the Defense Acquisition System, which is 
referred to as “little ‘a’” acquisition.” 
Figure 1, reproduced from Schwartz (2014), depicts the three-step process. 
  
 The DoD’s Defense Acquisition Structure Figure 1.
The cycle of the defense acquisition process contains three stages, namely, pre-
acquisition, acquisition, and sustainment, with critical reviews identified by Milestones A, B, 
and C. The following Figure 2, reproduced from Schwartz (2014), describes the acquisition 
cycles. 
 
 Defense Acquisition Milestones Figure 2.
As illustrated by Figure 2, each milestone needs to be passed in order to reach the 
next stage. In particular, three key phases—Technology Maturation & Risk Reduction, 
Engineering and Manufacturing Development, and Production and Deployment—
immediately follow the passage of Milestones A, B, and C, respectively. 
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Schwartz (2014) points out, 
The official responsible for deciding whether a program meets the milestone 
criteria and proceeds to the next phase of the acquisition process is referred 
to as the Milestone Decision Authority (MDA). Depending on the program, the 
MDA can be the Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition, Technology, & 
Logistics), the head of the relevant DOD component, or the component 
acquisition executive. (p. 7) 
Contract Type 
The contract types are broadly classified into two categories: fixed-price contracts 
and cost-plus contracts. One can imagine a spectrum with the firm-fixed-price (FFP) contract 
on one end, under which the contractor assumes all the risks and has the highest incentive 
to save costs. At the opposite end of the spectrum is the cost-plus-fixed-fee (CPFF) 
contract,1 where the government pays the contractor its realized cost and sets a fixed fee 
(profit). The fixed fee is supposed to be independent of actual cost, although its level is 
implicitly related to the size of the project.2 Under CPFF, the government bears all the cost 
risk and hence leaves the contractor little incentive to minimize cost. In between the two 
extremes, FFP and CPFF, are the various forms of incentive contracts including fixed-price-
incentive-fee (FPIF) contracts, cost-plus-incentive-fee (CPIF) contracts, and cost-plus-
award-fee (CPAF) contracts. The following descriptions of each contract type are based on 
the FAR, except for the “budget-based-cost-plus” scheme, which is not defined by the FAR 
and has no application thus far in the DoD. 
Firm-Fixed-Price (FFP) Contracts  
A firm-fixed-price contract provides for a price that is not subject to any adjustment 
on the basis of the contractor’s cost experience in performing the contract. This contract 
type places maximum risk and full responsibility for all costs and resulting profit or loss on 
the contractor. It provides maximum incentive for the contractor to control costs and perform 
effectively and imposes a minimum administrative burden upon the contracting parties.  
Fixed-Price-Incentive-Fee (FPIF) Contracts 
A fixed-price incentive-fee contract is a fixed-price contract that provides for adjusting 
profit and establishing the final contract price by a formula based on the relationship of final 
negotiated total cost to total target cost. A fixed-price incentive contract specifies a target 
cost, a target profit, a price ceiling (but not a profit ceiling or floor), and a profit adjustment 
formula. These elements are all negotiated at the outset. The price ceiling is the maximum 
that may be paid to the contractor, except for any adjustment under other contract clauses. 
When the contractor completes performance, the parties negotiate the final cost, and the 
final price is established by applying the formula. When the final cost is less than the target 
cost, application of the formula results in a final profit greater than the target profit. 
                                            
 
 
1 The CPFF contract is the benchmark case for the cost-plus contract. Put another way, a “cost-plus” 
contract without mentioning whether it is “cost-plus-fixed-fee” or “cost-plus-incentive-fee” or “cost-
plus-award-fee” would refer to a CPFF contract. However, throughout this paper, we reserve the use 
of “cost-plus” contract as a general category including all variations of cost-plus contracts. 
2 The cost-plus-a-percentage-of-cost contract type, which was used sometimes in U.S. DoD 
acquisition practice before the 1960s, is prohibited by FAR 16.102. This particular type of cost-plus 
contract rewards rather than penalizes a firm’s cost inefficiency. 
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Conversely, when final cost is more than target cost, application of the formula results in a 
final profit that is less than the target profit, or possibly a net loss. If the final negotiated cost 
exceeds the price ceiling, the contractor absorbs the difference as a loss. Because the profit 
varies inversely with the cost, this contract type provides a positive, calculable profit 
incentive for the contractor to control costs. 
Cost-Plus-Fixed-Fee (CPFF) Contracts  
A cost-plus-fixed-fee contract is a cost-reimbursement contract that provides for 
payment to the contractor of a negotiated fee that is fixed at the inception of the contract. 
The fixed fee does not vary with actual cost, but may be adjusted as a result of changes in 
the work to be performed under the contract. This contract type permits contracting for 
efforts that might otherwise present too great a risk to contractors, but it provides the 
contractor only a minimum incentive to control costs. 
Cost-Plus-Incentive-Fee (CPIF) Contracts 
A cost-plus-incentive-fee contract is a cost-reimbursement contract that provides for 
an initially negotiated fee to be adjusted later by a formula based on the relationship of total 
allowable costs to total target costs. This contract type specifies a target cost, a target fee, 
minimum and maximum fees, and fee adjustment formula. After contract performance, the 
fee payable to the contractor is determined in accordance with the formula. The formula 
provides, within limits, for increases in the fee above the target fee when total allowable 
costs are less than target costs, and decreases in the fee below the target fee when total 
allowable costs exceed target costs. This increase or decrease is intended to provide an 
incentive for the contractor to manage the contract effectively. When total allowable cost is 
greater than (or less than) the range of costs within which the fee-adjustment formula 
operates, the contractor is paid total allowable costs, plus the minimum (or maximum) fee. 
Cost-Plus-Award-Fee (CPAF) Contracts 
A cost-plus-award-fee contract is a cost-reimbursement contract that provides for a 
fee consisting of (a) a base amount (which may be zero) fixed at inception of the contract 
and (b) an award amount, based upon a judgmental evaluation by the government, sufficient 
to provide motivation for excellence in contract performance. Since the award fee 
determination is made unilaterally by the government, this contract type is only appropriate 
when achievement is measurable by subjective evaluation rather than objective data, which 
is unlikely to be true under significant information asymmetry.  
Budget-Based-Cost-Plus-Scheme (BBCPS) Contracts  
A budget-based-cost-plus-scheme contract is a refinement of CPIF in the following 
sense: (a) Under BBCPS, the job of estimating target cost is shifted from the government to 
the contractor, and (b) moreover, both target fee and cost share coefficient vary with the 
estimated target cost rather than being constants under CPIF. A carefully designed BBCPS 
contract will desirably induce the contractor’s “truth-telling” behavior and hence effectively 
mitigates the agency problem and reduces information asymmetry.  
BCPS belongs to the larger topic of “menu of contracts” discussed in the principal-
agent literature. This body of literature has broad applications in executive compensation 
contracts, regulation, and government procurement contracts (Laffont & Tirole, 1986, 1993; 
McAfee & McMillan, 1987; Melumad & Reichelstein, 1989; Reichelstein, 1992). 
Selecting contract type along with price requires sound judgment. The contracting 
officer also has to consider the implications of the contracting method. For example, FAR 
16.102 (a) states that “contracts resulting from sealed bidding shall be firm-fixed-price 
contracts or fixed-price contracts with economic price adjustment.” Most often a decision on 
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contract type and price is a negotiation process that hopefully will lead to a fair risk sharing 
and price that motivates the contractor to minimize cost and deliver a quality product.  
The Use of TINA in DoD Acquisition 
TINA Defined 
TINA was first enacted in 1962 and has been amended many times since then. 
Wang et al. (2016) states, 
In a nutshell, TINA requires contractors (often sole-source) to submit “cost or 
pricing data” when they negotiate the price of a contract with the federal 
government. The contractors must certify that the information they provide is 
“current, complete, and accurate.” Failing to disclose truthful information 
could lead to civil or criminal investigation. The intention of TINA is to protect 
the government and taxpayers from being ripped off by better informed 
contractors. 
TINA Applicability 
TINA applies to a wide range of procurements that include both fixed-price and cost-
plus contracts. Any negotiated prime contracts or prime contract modifications that exceed 
$750,000 are subject to TINA. In a similar fashion, for any negotiated subcontracts or 
subcontract modifications greater than $750,000, certified cost or pricing data is required. 
 “Cost or Pricing Data” Defined 
TINA defines cost or pricing data as “all facts that, as of the date of price agreement, 
or, if applicable, an earlier date agreed upon by the parties that is as close as practicable to 
the date of price agreement, prudent buyers and sellers would reasonably expect to affect 
price negotiations significantly.” 
In general, pure judgments are not deemed to be “facts” and hence are not cost or 
pricing data. However, Calhoon and Sybert (2012) point out,  
Cost or pricing data includes more than just historical accounting data; they 
are all the ‘facts’ reasonably relevant to evaluate estimates of future costs 
and to the validity of costs already incurred. This may include, but is not 
limited to: 
1. Vendor quotes; 
2. Nonrecurring costs; 
3. Information on changes in production methods and in production or 
purchasing volume; 
4. Data supporting projections of business prospects and objectives and 
related operations costs; 
5. Unit-cost trends such yield rates and labor efficiency; 
6. Make-or-buy decisions; 
7. Estimated resources to attain business goals; and 
8.  Some information on significant management decisions (Calhoon & 
Sybert, 2012, p. 13) 
Although some of the above information is hard facts, estimates and projections also 
can be used as “cost or pricing” data. It is worth noting that for most major weapon programs 
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where technology is unbelievably complex, a big component of a cost estimate is based on 
faithful estimates and educated projections. 
TINA Exemptions 
According to Calhoon & Sybert (2012), TINA can be exempted if one or more 
following situations applies: 
1. Adequate Price Competition 
2. Prices Set by Law or Regulation 
3. Commercial Items 
4. Pricing Actions Less Than $750,000 
5. Exceptional Cases—Waiver by Head of Contracting Activity (p. 7) 
Note that TINA waivers are rarely given; consequently, TINA governs most major 
DoD contracts. 
TINA Is a “One-Size-Fits-All” Approach 
From what is described above, one can see that TINA is a “one-size-fits-all” 
approach. TINA is essentially a blanket application with very limited exception. In particular, 
TINA application does not (at least not directly) vary with acquisition category, cycle, and 
contract type. Intuitively, this approach does not make sense. In the subsequent chapter, we 
detail our arguments against the one-size-fits-all approach and accordingly propose to tailor 
the use of TINA to various combinations of acquisition category, cycle, and contract type. 
Customizing the Use (or Disuse) of TINA in the DoD Acquisition Process 
In this section, we continue our investigation of the role of TINA in the context of DoD 
procurement. The objective is to provide a guideline for the use or disuse of TINA for various 
combinations of acquisition category, cycle, and contract type.  
We employ an economics-based, incentive-centric approach that focuses on 
investigation of agents’ (i.e., DoD contractors’) incentives under various settings. We 
generate our policy recommendation through a “with” and “without” TINA comparison. 
Two key decisions need to be made to answer our research question. Namely, what 
is the right contract type for each combination of category and cycle, and further, given the 
selected optimal contract type, shall we impose or waive the TINA?  
Table 2. Graphical Illustration of the Research Question 
 
Table 2 illustrates the task graphically. On the vertical dimension, as the acquisition 
category descends from I to III, so does the information asymmetry between the government 
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and the contractor. On the horizontal dimension, as the life cycle matures, the technological 
uncertainty gets resolved progressively and the cost vagueness runs down. 
According to the Defense Acquisition Guidebook (DAG) provided by Defense 
Acquisition University, various contracts ranging from CPFF to FFP represent different risk 
allocations between the buyer (i.e., the DoD) and the seller (i.e., the contractor). Figure 3, 
reproduced from the DAG, illustrates this. 
  
 Risk to Contract Types Figure 3.
Moreover, the DAG also provides guidelines for the typical contract type that is used 
at different stages of the acquisition life cycle. Figure 4 is replicated from DAG. 
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 Typical Contract Types by Acquisition Phase Figure 4.
Applying the aforementioned framework of DAG to our Table 2 setting, which has 
one more dimension, acquisition category, we propose the following use of contract types 
for each cell of our Table 2. 
The bottom line is: As the acquisition category descends from I to III, within the same 
life-cycle stage (with the exception of the first and last stage), we gradually shift toward the 
contract type that allocates more risk to the contractor and, in the meantime, takes away the 
risk from the DoD’s shoulders. This induces contractors’ better efforts. 
Table 3. Contract Types 
 
Now our task is to suggest either the use or disuse of TINA for each of the cells in 
Table 3. Let’s first tabulate our recommendations in the following Table 4, followed by 
detailed explanations. 
Acquisition Research Program: 
Creating Synergy for Informed Change - 50 - 
Table 4. Customizing the Use (Disuse) of TINA 
 
Detailed Discussions/Justifications for Table 4: 
1. The most notable part of this table is that it proposes a deviation from the 
current practice of TINA, which is essentially a one-size-fits-all prescription. 
Namely, we recommend varying the use or disuse of TINA with respect to 
acquisition category, acquisition life-cycle stage, and the corresponding 
preferred contract type.  
2. For the red-colored cells, that is, ACAT I (MDAP) starting from Pre-Milestone 
C and continuing through the rest of the acquisition cycle, we propose to do 
away with the use of TINA. The polar case here, that is, the use of FFP in the 
context of MDAP, is thoroughly analyzed by Wang et al. (2016), where the 
authors identify the incentive problem that is characterized as a “moral 
hazard,” that is, a lack of effort from the contractor. Specifically, a contractor 
under an FFP contract that is subject to TINA has the following ill incentive: 
The fear of being held accountable for any significant unfavorable cost 
discrepancy (i.e., the actual incurred cost is significantly below the ex-ante 
cost estimate negotiated with the DoD as the basis for contract fixed-price) 
would strongly motivate the contractor to shirk (i.e., reduce cost-saving effort) 
or even engage in cost padding (e.g., by opportunistically incurring or 
allocating more costs to the government contracts). Such behavior leads to 
deadweight welfare loss that is ultimately borne by taxpayers. 
As shrewdly pointed out by Rogerson (1994), “TINA cannot force 
defense contractors to reveal the lowest possible cost that they could 
produce at if they exerted an optimal effort. Rather, it essentially tells them 
that the price they negotiate must be close to the cost they actually incur.”  
It is worth noting that for ACAT I (MDAP), even at the very late stage 
of the acquisition cycle, due to the extreme complex technology and 
production process, significant information asymmetry nevertheless exists 
between the contractor and the DoD. Consequently, the unverifiable part of 
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the production cost is still significant and there is plenty of room for 
contractors to shirk or engage in cost padding. Hence, it is very essential to 
realize the unintended negative consequence of enforcing TINA in this 
particular setting, and a lax use or even disuse of TINA is preferred here to 
induce the contractors to reveal their best-effort cost. 
The other two red-colored cells, that is, MDAP at Pre-Milestone C 
(Engineering & Manufacturing Development), and Post-Milestone C 
(Production and Deployment), adopt CPIF and FPIF, respectively. Both CPIF 
and FPIF belong to incentive contracts which are designed to induce cost-
saving effort from contractors. To the extent that TINA exposes compliance 
risk to contractors in case of ex-post unfavorable cost variance, imposing 
TINA in these two cells would have similar unintended consequences, as 
discussed in Wang et al. (2015), hence we recommend a similar fix, that is, 
the disuse of TINA. 
3. For the yellow-colored cells, we suggest no changes to the current TINA use. 
These cells include:  
a. ACAT III across all the life-cycle stages 
That is, no additional TINA waiver3 is recommended for ACAT III. The 
primary reason for keeping TINA in place for ACAT III is the modesty 
of information asymmetry between the DoD and the contractor. 
Therefore, the verifiability of the program cost is good. When most of 
the cost information is verifiable, TINA is an effective mechanism to 
deter defective pricing. 
b. ACAT II life-cycle stages up to Pre-Milestone C 
Under this category, CPIF and CPAF are prescribed for Pre-Milestone 
B and Pre-Milestone C, respectively. In general, cost-plus contracts 
inherently suffer from the moral hazard problem. Hence, removing 
TINA does not make the problem go away. However, TINA does 
reduce the “defective pricing” incentive by imposing the litigation risk, 
at least for the verifiable part of the program cost. So the net benefit of 
“with TINA” minus “without TINA” is positive and we suggest a “stay-
put” strategy. 
For the cell that intersects ACAT II and Pre-Milestone A 
(Material Solution Analysis), the prescribed contract type is FFP, yet 
we suggest the use of TINA. This is in contrast to what we suggest for 
the polar case discussed in ACAT I. The major reason is that for Pre-
Milestone A, which is a pre-system acquisition stage, most of the 
conceptual refinement work is performed through analogy or 
parametric estimating methods. To the extent that the estimation is 
based on a similar existing item or mathematical model, a big part of 
the cost is verifiable. As argued before, TINA is an effective way of 
deterring “defective pricing” when the cost information is verifiable. 
                                            
 
 
3 The current applicable TINA waiver still applies, for example, if classified as commercial items 
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c. ACAT I (MDAP) life-cycle stages before Pre-Milestone B 
For the same reason mentioned in the last paragraph, for the FFP 
contract used in Pre-Milestone A MDAP, we propose to keep TINA in 
place. For the cell that intersects MDAP and Pre-Milestone B, TINA is 
also retained to mitigate the incentive of engaging in “defective 
pricing.”  
4. For the purple-colored cells, we recommend the flexible use of TINA. Use or 
disuse of TINA should be dependent upon individual cases. On one hand, 
ACAT II, even at the last two stages of the life cycle, should still demonstrate 
non-trivial information asymmetry between the DoD and the contractor; 
therefore, our worry about the contractor’s ill incentive under TINA and the 
related “moral hazard” problem remains. On the other hand, to the extent that 
ACAT II is much smaller and less complex than ACAT I (MDAP), the degree 
of information asymmetry should be much less severe than under MDAP. If 
the major part of the program cost is verifiable, then enforcing TINA can 
effectively prevent “defective pricing” from happening. Decision makers must 
run a horse-racing between the two offsetting factors and accordingly choose 
the use or disuse of TINA to maximize social welfare. For example, one can 
argue that if Technology Readiness Level (TRL) reaches 8 or above, then the 
use of TINA is preferred.  
Conclusion 
TINA, as it currently stands, is a “one-size-fits-all” prescription. Specifically, TINA 
does not differentiate among various settings involving different acquisition category, 
acquisition life cycle, and corresponding preferred contract type. We propose to tailor the 
use or disuse of TINA to different scenarios by considering the economic incentives created 
by TINA enforcement. In some settings where TINA is misplaced, we propose to drop TINA 
to remove the ill incentives and consequent unintended negative consequences. In other 
settings where TINA brings more benefit than cost, we recommend keeping TINA in place. 
In a few settings where the judgment is not unambiguous, we propose to leave the 
discretion to decision makers. 
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Abstract 
Software is the foundational building material for the engineering of systems, enabling almost 
100% of the integrated functionality of cyber physical systems—especially mission- and 
safety-critical software reliant systems—to the extent that these systems cannot function 
without software. As a result, it is imperative that the DoD has the capability and capacity to 
affordably sustain software-reliant systems and to continually operate and achieve mission 
success in a dynamic threat, cybersecurity, and net-centric environment.  
The Carnegie Mellon University (CMU) Software Engineering Institute (SEI) has been 
performing studies to inform Departmental decisions regarding software sustainment policies 
and programs regarding complex weapon systems. These studies were based on interviews 
and discussions with sustainment centers across all of the Services, case studies on selected 
programs, and a literature review.  
In this paper we present an overview of our initial study regarding the DoD’s organic software 
sustainment infrastructure and its key components related to complex weapon systems, and 
a selection of key themes from our analysis of sustainment practices. There are two key 
takeaway messages. First, software sustainment is not effectively described with a model 
based on hardware (where sustainment can be treated as a discrete series of activities 
intended to restore form, fit, and function). Secondly, software sustainment is really about 
continuous engineering in which the software undergoes a series of engineering activities 
intended to deliver the latest capability to the warfighter, a task which is never “done.” 
Motivation 
Software is the foundational building material for the engineering of systems, 
enabling almost 100% of the integrated functionality of cyber-physical systems—especially 
mission- and safety-critical software-reliant systems—to the extent that these systems 
cannot function without software. There is no plateau in sight for the advancement of 
software technology and its use by the DoD in new systems, as well as to enhance the 
capabilities of legacy systems and extend their operational value far beyond their designed 
service life.  
Software can also be a major a source of defects and potential security 
vulnerabilities with potentially fatal consequences, due to the increased complexity of 
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interactions among embedded software, the hardware platform, and its associated 
subsystems. The dynamics of the cyber environment and the constantly changing nature of 
the cyber threat mean that with software we are never “done.”  
The issues surrounding sustainment become increasingly complex as the DoD’s 
reliance on software increases. For example, the ever-expanding reliance on software 
means that an increasing portion of the acquisition cost as well as the sustainment cost of 
systems is driven by software (NRC, 2010a). There is evidence that it is three to 10 times 
more expensive to mitigate software defects/vulnerabilities in sustainment rather than early 
in acquisition and development. Successfully mitigating this software cost trend, while still 
enhancing warfighter capability, must be an essential element in the DoD’s affordability 
strategy.  
Therefore it is imperative that software sustainment be a priority in defining system 
requirements, design, and development. This means that the software sustainment 
community must be an active participant early in the requirements and engineering process 
and that the Product Support Manager in acquisition programs must be knowledgeable and 
proactive in representing software sustainment equities.  
Another critical challenge is the magnitude of the DoD’s software sustainment 
inventory. The inventory is immense, but there is limited visibility and understanding at the 
enterprise level of the total size, complexity, and characteristics of the DoD’s software 
inventory, which may be trending toward one billion lines of custom developed software 
code or more.1 Additionally, the engineering of systems also relies on an extensive portfolio 
of commercial-off-the-shelf (COTS) software, government-off-the-shelf (GOTS) software, 
and increasingly on free and open-source software (FOSS). The use of non-custom 
development software is pervasive across all DoD system domains and its use comes with 
significant technical and management challenges. The DoD relies on comprehensive and 
complex information systems to provide almost real time visibility and management of its 
wholesale and retail inventory of parts and supplies, but it has no similar capability for 
software.  
It is imperative that the DoD have the capability and capacity to affordably acquire 
and sustain software-reliant systems to continually operate and achieve mission success in 
a dynamic threat, cyber, and net-centric environment. However, the DoD’s ability to produce 
high-quality software more affordably and efficiently across the system life cycle is a 
strategic challenge (NRC, 2010a). The acquisition and sustainment of software, particularly 
for distributed real-time and embedded systems, remains high risk and more problematic as 
system complexity continues to grow.  
Research Goal, Scope, and Methodology 
Our research goal was to characterize the factors that affect the effectiveness and 
cost of software sustainment in the DoD. For this initial step of our research, we did not 
intend to produce value judgments as to the efficacy or cost-effectiveness of different 
                                            
 
 
1 This is an estimate based on the limited data available and expert judgment. However, we note that 
several experts in the DoD software engineering community have expressed the opinion in 
discussions that the number may be even higher. 
Acquisition Research Program: 
Creating Synergy for Informed Change - 58 - 
sustainment choices; rather, we intended to identify and describe the major factors that DoD 
organizations must manage, in order to impact software sustainment performance.  
To provide a manageable focus for our work, we concentrated on describing the 
software sustainment ecosystem as it relates to complex weapon systems. Embedded 
software presents the most technically difficult and resource-intensive software engineering 
challenge because of tightly coupled interfaces, integration with unique hardware, real-time 
requirements, and very high reliability and assurance needs due to life-critical and mission-
critical demands. Of course, the DoD’s software sustainment challenge is broader than the 
software embedded in complex weapon systems. Mission critical non-embedded systems, 
mission support systems (e.g., test equipment, mission planning, engineering models, and 
simulations), and the range of business systems also present significant software 
sustainment challenges. While our initial results can be used to understand the software 
sustainment ecosystem for other types of software intensive systems, a more detailed 
description of how the factors apply to those domains will be a subject of future work.  
Our team leveraged multiple streams of data and information for this study. 
• Literature Search—The body of knowledge related to software engineering is 
extensive. The formal body of knowledge, academic research, and 
practitioner publications has evolved so that there are now various 
communities of interest and professional organizations that focus on software 
engineering.2 However, there has been limited systematic study focused on 
DoD software sustainment, so there is no organized set of literature and 
ongoing study or research agenda to create and refresh a software 
sustainment body of knowledge.  
• SEI DoD Engagements—The SEI has been actively engaged with the military 
services for three decades to provide technical expertise to enhance 
organizational capabilities (processes, practices, and competencies) for 
software engineering across the life cycle and to solve technical challenges 
for specific weapon system and information system programs. This has 
included continuous engagement with the principal Army, Navy, and Air 
Force software sustainment centers to include the provision of knowledge 
and practice to institutionalize CMMI.  
• DoD IPT Report—The SEI had access to the data and results of the DoD 
UAS Software Sustainment Integrated Product Team (IPT) Report. This IPT 
effort, which concluded in 2015, was led by the office of the DASD (MP&P). 
The SEI was invited to serve as an ex officio member of the IPT, which made 
visits to a number of Army, Navy, and Air Force organic software sustainment 
organizations.  
• Interviews with Key Leaders—It was critical that the SEI inform its analysis 
based on the views of decision-makers who influence a range of software 
                                            
 
 
2 For example, the Software Engineering Body of Knowledge (SWEBOK), a community-driven 
approach using an open consensus model to document generally accepted software engineering 
knowledge under the leadership of the IEEE Computer Society 
(https://www.computer.org/web/swebok). A DoD-specific example is the Software Assurance 
Community of Practice. 
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sustainment policies, programs, and resource allocation. To that end, the SEI 
complemented its research with information from meetings with key leaders 
across all three Services, including those in the Senior Executive Service 
(SES), senior managers and staff in OSD, and from industry. This study was 
conducted at the unclassified level, and our interviews with DoD sustainment 
staff were conducted under the conditions of non-attribution to enable an 
open exchange of perspectives with senior leaders, managers, and staff 
engaged in software sustainment. These conversations provided context for 
understanding the evolution of the DoD’s current software sustainment 
posture and enabled the SEI to refine its model of the software sustainment 
ecosystem.  
DoD’s Organic Software Sustainment Organizational Infrastructure 
The DoD’s organic software sustainment organizations successfully respond to a 
range of customer needs and deliver critical software updates and enhancements, often 
under the intense schedule pressure of wartime operations, to deliver critical warfighter 
capability. This organic infrastructure is composed of a number of principal organizations 
and a myriad of other smaller organizations and offices that have not been fully identified 
and characterized. To a large degree, in our view, the critical role and functions of these 
organizations are not well understood or visible. These organic organizations are structured 
and resourced in different ways by each Service, each performing software sustainment 
utilizing a variety of government and contract staffing strategies. The Services employ a 
variety of business model strategies in making decisions about allocating sustainment 
workload across their organic software development capabilities and the defense industrial 
base (DIB), as well as structuring public–private sector partnerships. These decisions are 
made within the context of a number of statutory requirements and DoD policies, such as 
determination of core requirements and the 50% ceiling, measured in dollars, on the amount 
of depot maintenance workload that may be performed by a contract with industry for a 
military department or defense agency during a fiscal year.  
The Nature of Software in Systems 
One of the keys to addressing the software sustainment challenge is to understand 
the nature of software in DoD systems. The characteristics of software relative to hardware 
are generally not well appreciated, especially in relation to how the DoD traditionally uses 
the term maintenance. 
The critically important and growing role of software in defense systems has been 
noted in many prior studies (DSB, 2000; NRC, 2010a, 2010b). This growth is due in many 
ways to the unique characteristics of software, as summarized eloquently in a study by the 
National Academy of Sciences: 
This growth is a natural outcome of the special engineering characteristics of 
software: Software is uniquely unbounded and flexible, having relatively few 
intrinsic limits on the degree to which it can be scaled in complexity and 
capability. Software is an abstract and purely synthetic medium that, for the 
most part, lacks fundamental physical limits and natural constraints. For 
example, unlike physical hardware, software can be delivered and upgraded 
electronically and remotely, greatly facilitating rapid adaptation to changes in 
adversary threats, mission priorities, technology, and other aspects of the 
operating environment. The principal constraint is the human intellectual 
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capacity to understand systems, to build tools to manage them, and to 
provide assurance—all at ever-greater levels of complexity. (NRC, 2010a)  
These aspects of software are not always well understood or at least addressed in 
practice. For example, much of DoD depot policy (and industrial base policy) remains 
hardware-centric, despite software enabling an increasingly large percentage of system 
functionality. Due to its “uniquely unbounded and flexible” nature, the sustainment of 
software operates very differently from that of other building materials of contemporary 
systems.  
Software is not a “physics of failure” domain, which is to say that software itself does 
not wear out or degrade over time. Maintenance at any organizational level for hardware 
typically focuses on returning components categorized as repairable items, such as avionics 
line-replaceable units (LRUs), to their original functional condition and configuration by 
replacing parts, using smaller electronic components, or treating corrosion. This typically 
involves applying standardized processes and procedures for diagnostics and repair. In the 
case of software, sustainment takes the form of making intentional changes to the software 
source code and related work products for many different reasons, not exclusively (or in 
many cases even primarily) driven by correction of failures. These changes are driven by a 
number of goals, such as to correct a flaw, to mitigate a security vulnerability, to make fact-
of-life changes due to systems and system-of-system interface and interoperability impacts, 
and to incorporate system enhancements that deliver greater warfighter capability. 
Demand and funding requirements for software sustainment do not scale with 
operational tempo or the size of the force structure. From a hardware or weapon system 
platform perspective, depot maintenance or sustainment demands and funding are routinely 
forecasted on the basis of the number of reparable units anticipated, taking into account 
certain factors such as reliability, flying hours, miles driven, engine hours, number of 
landings, or calendar time since last overhaul. From a software perspective, sustainment is 
about applying the disciplines of systems and software engineering (knowledge, processes, 
practices, and skills) each time the software is touched.  
Due to the complexity of software, the great majority of the software sustainment 
effort is spent on the analysis of the specific need for a change and then designing, 
implementing, and testing a unique change. Once implemented, it is trivial to make 
additional copies of the new configuration version of the software system, and generally it is 
inexpensive to push out updates for all the instances of the weapon system in the force 
structure inventory. Further, the number of a particular type of weapon system that is in the 
force structure is not the driver of software sustainment. In other words, relying on a “cost 
per asset” analysis can be hugely misleading. Since costs are independent of the quantity of 
a given system in the inventory or force structure, dividing over a fairly small fleet like the B-
2s is a misleading comparison with other systems. Another factor to consider is the 
differences in complexity of systems and the associated complexity of sustainment from 
system to system. Addressing cybersecurity issues is another distinction.  
Software quality is related not only to operational failures but also to technical debt—
that is, the reflection of inadequate attention to the design of the software architecture 
coupled with developers optimizing short-term goals (like the ability to deliver code on time) 
over longer term impacts (such as the need to create clean, well-organized code that is easy 
to maintain). Technical debt, as generally understood, affects the internal quality of the code 
and its extensibility to more easily accommodate change. However, technical debt does not 
necessarily impact behaviors of the software that would be visible to the end user. Technical 
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debt’s impact on architecture and internal software quality directly affects the scope, 
magnitude, and complexity of software sustainment.  
The scope and complexity of the technical debt in an individual program is also 
driven by the complexity of the software supply chain. The number of different suppliers in 
the software supply chain for a weapon system program can be extensive. A program often 
has limited visibility and understanding of the architecture considerations and software 
practices (not only for development but for assurance as well) that each vendor employs 
and the degree to which there is a consistent approach to software development for the 
entire program. From a software sustainment perspective, organic sustainment 
organizations inherit the cumulative technical debt generated from the multiplicity of 
software development efforts on one program.  
An implication of the points highlighted above is that software sustainment is more 
usefully viewed as continuous engineering rather than a set of discrete maintenance 
activities. Software sustainment enables an ongoing evolution of system capability to 
address the changing environments in which DoD systems are deployed, especially related 
to ongoing changes in cyber threats.  
Policy Context  
Software sustainment organizations plan and execute their missions within the 
context of the existing depot maintenance and associated governance environment. As 
highlighted in Figure 1, the DoD, and in turn the Services, promulgate depot maintenance 
policy and guidance based on a number of statutory requirements. These mandates then 
drive decisions relative to planning and executing software sustainment.  
The overall direction and guidance for software sustainment are based on statutory 
requirements in Title 10 USC and DoD policies for depot-level maintenance. Figure 1 
summarizes the relevant Title 10 USC statutes that influence product support and depot 
maintenance decisions. As a result, the legacy of the DoD’s depot maintenance paradigms 
and policies is rooted in a hardware-centric paradigm. In turn, each Service has developed 
its own guidance for implementing the DoD’s policy to address Service software sustainment 
needs within the depot maintenance framework.  
 
 Title 10 USC Laws Influencing Sustainment Figure 1.
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The DoD’s Depot Source of Repair (DSOR) practices also drive software 
sustainment decisions. In practice, the Program Manager conducts a level of repair analysis 
(LORA) to determine if there is a depot level requirement (DAU, 2017). The PM also 
conducts a core logistics assessment (CLA) to determine in accordance with Title 10 USC § 
2464 if there is a requirement to establish an organic (core) depot maintenance capability 
(i.e., government owned and government operated [GOGO]). This practice evolved from a 
focus on hardware and is now applied to software.  
A key factor that drives software sustainment is the program manager-centric nature 
of decisions about sourcing strategies for the sustainment of specific weapon system 
programs. These program manager decisions ripple through and impact virtually every 
component of the software sustainment ecosystem. These program-specific policy 
decisions, in our view, may not be balanced with considerations for optimizing the DoD 
software sustainment enterprise to contribute to greater enterprise affordability and 
productivity. 
The Software Sustainment Ecosystem Factors 
Based on our findings, we believe that the software sustainment infrastructure is best 
described and understood as an ecosystem composed of interrelated elements. We found 
over and over that the factors that drive software sustainment are highly interrelated. For 
example, it is difficult to discuss the workforce needed to perform necessary sustainment 
activities without first understanding the business model in terms of public-private 
partnerships, which activities can be done by contractors, and which activities need to 
remain in the organic DoD workforce. Decisions about the nature and types of these 
business models may also be influenced by the degree to which the government has 
provisioned for and exercised its technical data rights for a given program at the time of 
developing an acquisition strategy and contract. These decisions have implications for the 
scope of the software sustainment system. Because of the high degree of connectivity that 
exists among the drivers and factors, we use the metaphor of an “ecosystem” to describe 
the interdependencies among these elements; decisions made at any point are affected by 
and affect whole series of other decisions. 
There are many variables that are inherent in this ecosystem, not the least of which 
is time. The time variable is one of the key factors that makes this ecosystem dynamic. 
There is a time dependency among and between certain software sustainment demand 
drivers and the critical elements. For example, demands for software changes are frequent, 
and the underlying technology of software changes rapidly. Failure to invest in software 
quality up front during initial system development creates a bow wave of risk and technical 
debt that may continue for decades. Similarly, inadequate investments early in software 
workforce capital, tools, and engineering processes will increase the cost of sustainment. In 
operation, the software sustainment ecosystem is dynamic.  
Based on our research, we created a framework that describes the software 
sustainment ecosystem, depicted in Figure 2. We abstracted the issues raised in our 
discussions with DoD sustainment stakeholders into six demand drivers and 10 ecosystem 
elements.  
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 The DoD Software Sustainment Ecosystem Framework  Figure 2.
These six demand drivers capture the fact that DoD systems exist in an 
environment that is highly dynamic, where there is a need to respond to constantly changing 
threats and mission needs. This dynamism drives many of the system changes that need to 
be made during software sustainment. For many of these changes, the most cost-effective 
way of implementing the new capability relies on the unique flexibility of software. 
Our work with the DoD software sustainment community continually highlighted an 
array of what some called constraints, factors, or “outside the organization influences” that 
directly impact software sustainment planning and execution. We mapped these 
considerations into the six higher level demand drivers. These demand drivers include policy 
(which may include formal guidance such as the Defense Acquisition Guidance and 
standards) and governance, the nature of the mission, the cyber and mission threat 
environment, funding, technology trends, and regulatory/certification requirements. 
The 10 ecosystem elements, shown as interconnected “bubbles” within Figure 2, 
are the tightly interconnected factors that sustainment organizations need to manage in 
order to effectively and continuously engineer the software. The drivers and elements of this 
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ecosystem represent a virtual spider web of linkages and relationships. The ecosystem 
elements shown in the figure are as follows:  
The four infrastructure elements are the basic, fundamental resources that are 
necessary for the sustainment activities to occur. 
• Systems and Software Engineering Process and Tools—The engineering 
practices to be applied to plan and execute the work. 
• Enabling IT Infrastructure—The information technology environment and 
assets upon which the work must be conducted.  
• Test and Evaluation (T&E)—The mechanisms by which changes made 
during software sustainment are verified as ready to be rolled out to users. 
For DoD weapons systems, significant investments in program-specific 
hardware may be required. 
• Systems Integration Laboratory (SIL)—The SIL is a specific type of T&E 
equipment, providing accurate analysis of the impact of changes, and is 
increasingly important to DoD sustainment practice. 
The three knowledge and expertise elements include the factors that describe how 
the necessary skill sets are brought to bear for sustainment activities and how the 
government grows its organic workforce and gets access to necessary technical 
information—perhaps with some level of interaction with the private sector—in order to 
deliver and deploy the capabilities that need to go to the warfighter. 
• Workforce (Competency and Staffing—The means of accessing a 
sufficient organic workforce with appropriate skill sets. 
• Business Model (Incentives, Workshare)—The strategic decision 
regarding which parts of the work will be done by the organic workforce and 
which by contractors, and how the overall work is managed both technically 
and contractually. 
• Technical Data Rights and Licensing—The tactical decisions governing 
what technical information is necessary to be accessed by the organic 
workforce, and the mechanisms by which they have access. 
Three ungrouped elements complete the ecosystem. 
• Facilities—The physical location that meets the needs of the work (providing 
sufficient space, security levels, etc.). 
• Operational Software Deployment—The mechanisms and strategy by 
which new versions of the software under sustainment are delivered to users. 
• Management and Performance Measurement—The management function 
necessary to organize and monitor the work being conducted to ensure that it 
is executing as planned, and to identify any problems that need to be 
resolved. 
Conclusion 
The DoD’s ability to continually evolve warfighter capability to address the dynamics 
of the vulnerability and thread environment is driven more and more by the affordable and 
timely continuous engineering of a system’s software. However, there has been limited 
enterprise visibility and management of the DoD’s critical organic software sustainment 
infrastructure. This paper provides insights into this complex issue, and we expect to provide 
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more detailed information describing the software sustainment ecosystem when our report is 
cleared for broader distribution.  
We also hope that the current summary can be useful for multiple stakeholders in the 
DoD, as a way to understand the unique issues related to the sustainment of software. 
Software is continuing to provide a greater percentage of the capabilities to be found in DoD 
weapons systems—and providing an increasing percentage of system cost as well. For both 
of these trends, no plateau is in sight. The unique flexibility and usefulness of software will 
make it central to sustainment strategies for adapting systems to the ever-changing mission 
needs and cyber-threat environment for the foreseeable future. We hope that the brief 
synopsis in this paper and the discrete ecosystem factors that we identified help to articulate 
many of the software-specific issues that are needed to do that effectively. 
References 
Defense Acquisition University (DAU). (2017.) Level of repair analysis (LORA). In 
Acquipedia. Retrieved from https://shortcut.dau.mil/acq/lora 
Defense Science Board (DSB). (2000, November.) Report of the Defense Science Board 
Task Force on defense software. Washington, DC: Office of the Under Secretary of 
Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics. Retrieved from 
http://oai.dtic.mil/oai/oai?verb=getRecord&metadataPrefix=html&identifier=ADA385923  
National Research Council (NCR). (2010a.). Critical code: Software producibility for defense. 
Washington, DC: National Academies Press. doi: https://doiorg/10.17226/12979  
National Research Council (NCR). (2010b.) Achieving effective acquisition of information 
technology in the Department of Defense. Washington, DC: National Academies Press. 
doi: https://doi.org/10.17226/12823  
Acknowledgments 
During the course of this study, the SEI interacted with a range of senior leaders, key 
managers, and staff across the DoD’s software sustainment organizations. Universally, the 
Services and those we engaged were generally responsive to our data and information 
requests and candidly shared their experiences and perspectives on this critical and 
complex issue. We are exceedingly grateful for the many thoughtful conversations and 
insights we received in the course of this work. 
This material is based upon work funded and supported by the DoD under Contract 
No. FA8702-15-D-0002 with Carnegie Mellon University for the operation of the Software 
Engineering Institute, a federally funded research and development center. 
Disclaimer & Distribution Statement 
The view, opinions, and/or findings contained in this material are those of the 
author(s) and should not be construed as an official Government position, policy, or 
decision, unless designated by other documentation. 
No warranty. This Carnegie Mellon University and Software Engineering Institute 
material is furnished on an “as-is” basis. Carnegie Mellon University makes no warranties of 
any kind, either expressed or implied, as to any matter including, but not limited to, warranty 
of fitness for purpose or merchantability, exclusivity, or results obtained from use of the 
material. Carnegie Mellon University does not make any warranty of any kind with respect to 
freedom from patent, trademark, or copyright infringement. 
Acquisition Research Program: 
Creating Synergy for Informed Change - 66 - 
[DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT A] This material has been approved for public release 
and unlimited distribution. Please see Copyright notice for non-US Government use and 
distribution. 
Internal use:* Permission to reproduce this material and to prepare derivative works 
from this material for internal use is granted, provided the copyright and “No Warranty” 
statements are included with all reproductions and derivative works. 
External use:* This material may be reproduced in its entirety, without modification, 
and freely distributed in written or electronic form without requesting formal permission. 
Permission is required for any other external and/or commercial use. Requests for 
permission should be directed to the Software Engineering Institute at 
permission@sei.cmu.edu. 
* These restrictions do not apply to U.S. government entities. 
DM17-0081 
 
Acquisition Research Program: 
Creating Synergy for Informed Change - 67 - 
Software Vulnerabilities, Defects, and Design Flaws: A 
Technical Debt Perspective  
Robert L. Nord—is a Principal Researcher at the Carnegie Mellon University’s Software Engineering 
Institute (SEI). He is engaged in activities focusing on managing technical debt, agile and architecting 
at scale, and works to develop and communicate effective practices for software architecture. He is 
co-author of Applied Software Architecture and Documenting Software Architectures: Views and 
Beyond and lectures on architecture-centric approaches. Dr. Nord is a recognized leader in the 
software engineering community, both as a thought leader in software architecture and through his 
work helping industry and government customers at the SEI. He is a distinguished member of the 
ACM. [rn@sei.cmu.edu] 
Ipek Ozkaya—is a Principal Researcher and Deputy Technical Lead of Software Architecture 
Practices at Carnegie Mellon University’s Software Engineering Institute (SEI). With her team at the 
SEI, she works to help government and industry organizations improve their software development 
efficiency and system evolution through better use of agile architecting and technical debt 
management. Dr. Ozkaya serves as the chair of the departments of the IEEE Software magazine and 
as an adjunct faculty member for the Master of Software Engineering Program at Carnegie Mellon 
University. She is the co-author of articles on software architecture and technical debt management. 
[ozkaya@sei.cmu.edu] 
Forrest Shull—is Assistant Director for Empirical Research at Carnegie Mellon University’s Software 
Engineering Institute. His role is to lead work with the U.S. DoD, other government agencies, national 
labs, industry, and academic institutions to advance the use of empirically grounded information in 
software engineering, cybersecurity, and emerging technologies. He has been a lead researcher on 
projects for the DoD, NASA’s Office of Safety and Mission Assurance, the Defense Advanced 
Research Projects Agency (DARPA), the National Science Foundation, and commercial companies. 
He serves on the IEEE Computer Society Board of Governors and Executive Committee. 
[fjshull@sei.cmu.edu] 
Abstract 
Technical debt describes a universal software development phenomenon: “Quick and easy” 
design or implementation choices that linger in the system will cause ripple effects that make 
future changes more costly. Although DoD software sustainment organizations have routine 
practices to manage other kinds of software issues, such as defects and vulnerabilities, the 
same cannot be said for technical debt. In this work, we discuss the relationships among 
these three kinds of software anomalies and their impact on software assurance and 
sustainable development and delivery. Defects are directly linked to external quality, and 
vulnerabilities are linked to more specific security concerns, but technical debt concerns 
internal quality and has a significant economic impact on the cost of sustaining and evolving 
software systems. Emerging research results and industry input demonstrate there are clear 
distinctions that call for different detection and management methods for defects, 
vulnerabilities, and technical debt. We draw from concrete examples and experience to offer 
software development practices to improve the management of technical debt and its impact 
on security. 
Introduction 
Software engineers face a universal problem when developing and sustaining 
software: weighing the benefit of an approach that is expedient in the short-term, but which 
can lead to complexity and cost over the long-term. In software-intensive systems, these 
tradeoffs can create technical debt (Kruchten, 2012), which is a design or implementation 
construct that is expedient in the short-term, but which sets up a technical context that can 
make future changes more costly or even impossible. Accumulating technical debt in the 
form of design shortcuts can be a strategic approach for software developers to accelerate 
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development and optimize resource management without impacting overall quality—as long 
as the debt is eventually paid off (i.e., the time is taken to improve the software quality). The 
results of recent practitioner-focused empirical industry studies reveal that most systems are 
also suffering from unintentional technical debt, that is, the quick and dirty choices that 
accumulate with no strategic thought. 
An increasingly important cost driver for DoD systems is the effort that is put into 
developing, acquiring, and sustaining software-intensive systems. Most DoD systems are in 
operation for extensive periods of time—likely for multiple decades—and continue through 
sustainment to evolve to incorporate new functionality. Even in mature systems, ongoing 
sources of software changes may include changing mission profiles, the need to incorporate 
more effective or efficient technologies into the system, or the need to repair newly 
discovered software vulnerabilities. For all of these issues, software tends to be the logical 
and cost-effective way to make the change, meaning that in effect, software is never “done.” 
Consequently, dealing with technical debt is an unavoidable phenomenon for the DoD. For 
systems on which technical debt has been allowed to accumulate (or said another way, 
sufficient emphasis has not been placed on maintaining software quality), dealing with this 
never-ending stream of changes becomes increasingly less cost-effective, as more and 
more effort is required to comprehend and work within a poor quality system rather than on 
focusing on implementing new capabilities. This can result in cost and schedule slippage or 
diminished abilities to field new capabilities for the same amount of effort.  
The conventional approach many organizations take to managing such cost and 
schedule issues is to assess software project and process performance through metrics. An 
important class of these metrics focuses on software defects, since correcting defects 
(especially late in the software life cycle) can represent significant expenditures of 
unplanned effort. Cyber vulnerabilities, once detected, are typically candidates for focused 
effort to repair or mitigate quickly. Our overarching research question is this: Will DoD 
systems see improved outcomes if they manage technical debt explicitly, along with 
these other classes of software anomalies? 
Impacts of Technical Debt 
Indeed, a growing body of research indicates that focusing on defect management 
provides insight to only one perspective of the schedule, cost, and quality management 
problem. Empirical studies have shown that if technical debt is not paid back in a timely 
manner, it correlates with greater likelihood of defects (Falessi, 2015), unintended rework 
(Li, 2014), and increased time for implementing new system capabilities in software 
(Kazman, 2015).  
For example, code quality issues such as dead code or duplicate code add to the 
technical debt. They do not affect the functionality seen by the end user but can impede 
progress and make development more costly over time. Software architecture plays a 
significant role in the development of large systems; flaws in a software system’s design, 
such as a frequently changing interface between two classes (an unstable interface; Xiao, 
2014), can also add significantly to the technical debt. 
Technical debt can have observable adverse consequences on software security as 
well, an issue of high priority for DoD software-intensive systems, meaning that allowing 
debt to accumulate may be even more costly. Some vulnerabilities may be inadvertently 
introduced as the result of technical debt: for example, if a vulnerability is fixed in one 
location but is not fixed in a similar duplicated code fragment, or if overly complex code 
makes it harder to reason about whether a dangerous corner-case condition is feasible or 
not. Alternatively, as we will show, technical debt can also be caused by addressing a 
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vulnerability’s symptoms rather than its root cause. Both of these relationships motivate a 
better understanding of the complex relationship between software vulnerabilities and 
technical debt. Therefore, we advocate that in order to get a better handle on their software 
quality, DoD programs should move toward also tracking their technical debt, similar to how 
they may be tracking defects and vulnerabilities (Figure 1).  
In the remainder of this paper, we review the state of practice in managing technical 
debt and illustrate the need to manage all three types of software anomalies by summarizing 
results from our previous study, looking at the relationship between software vulnerabilities 
(Nord, 2016) and technical debt to address the following question: Are software components 
with accrued technical debt more likely to be vulnerability-prone? We present findings from a 
study of the Chromium open source project that motivates the need to examine a 
combination of evidence: quantitative static analysis of anomalies in code, qualitative 
classification of design consequences in issue trackers, and software development 
indicators in the commit history. Understanding this relationship can provide DoD programs 
with (a) ideas for improving their software engineering practices in better facilitating software 
quality assessment initiatives through data-driven analysis as presented in this work, and (b) 
an approach to better take advantage of existing analysis tools to help them focus what 
areas of their software to improve.  
 
 Software Anomalies Figure 1.
State of Practice in Managing Technical Debt 
The technical debt metaphor is widely used to encapsulate numerous software 
quality problems. The metaphor is attractive to practitioners as it communicates to both 
technical and nontechnical audiences that if quality problems are not addressed, things may 
get worse. It is also very applicable in government sustainment contexts, as often the 
organizations that deal with the debt and those that take on the debt are not the same. 
While there has been significant progress made in creating an empirical and theoretical 
basis for identifying, quantifying, and managing technical debt (Spinola, 2012), there is still a 
lot of opportunity for improvement (Avgeriou, 2016).  
Major software failures—for example, the recent United Airlines failure and New York 
Stock Exchange glitch or the National Security Agency’s call data collection discrepancy—
are being recognized in the popular media as the result of accumulating technical debt 
(Felten, 2014; Tufekci, 2015). In 2012, researchers conservatively estimated that for every 
100 KLOC, an average software application had approximately US$361,000 of technical 
debt, the cost to eliminate the structural-quality problems that seriously threatened the 
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application’s business viability (Curtis, 2012). The undeniable message is that technical debt 
is real and significant. Industry and government organizations have started to respond to 
this message, most significantly demonstrated by increasing initiatives focusing on 
analyzing code quality. Yet repeatable, data-driven studies that can help quantify this 
understanding, especially in the context of government systems, still lag behind.  
The results of our recent, broad practitioner survey of 1,831 software engineers and 
managers, including industry and government participants, demonstrate that they share a 
common understanding of the concept of technical debt (Ernst, 2015). According to 
participants, the lack of proven tool support to accurately identify, communicate, and track 
technical debt is a key issue and remains a gap in practice. More than half of the 
participants of our survey reported using issue trackers to communicate technical debt either 
explicitly (“technical debt” is mentioned) or implicitly (the concept of “technical debt” is 
discussed but not explicitly mentioned). This is consistent with anecdotal feedback from our 
own experiences of working with organizations, as well as case studies represented in 
literature on technical debt (Zazworka, 2013). In the absence of validated tools to concretely 
communicate technical debt and its consequences, developers resort to practices they are 
familiar with. Our work in this paper contributes to closing the gap between system analysis 
and understanding of observed problems of technical debt, demonstrated as security issues.  
Analysis Approach 
To understand whether software components with accrued technical debt are more 
likely to be vulnerability-prone, we need to take into account data from multiple sources: 
quantitative static analysis of anomalies (faults, vulnerabilities, design flaws) in code, 
qualitative classification of design consequences in issue trackers, and software 
development indicators in the commit history. In this paper we present results from our 
analysis with Chromium open source project (Barth, 2008; Camillo, 2015). This is a complex 
web-based application that operates on sensitive information and allows untrusted input 
from both web clients and servers. We use it as a representative test bed of typical technical 
debt issues and types of vulnerabilities. The Chromium open source project released 
Version 17.0.963.46 (referred to as Chromium 17 from here on) on February 8, 2012. This 
release contained 18,730 files. From February 1, 2010, to February 8, 2012, there were 
14,119 bug issues reported as fixed (Chromium 2017). 
A challenge we observe with some DoD programs is that this type of data is not 
always available and different development parties are not incentivized correctly to share 
this information in a timely way with key decision-makers. Therefore, replicating this study 
with a DoD software-intensive system has its challenges, although we expect the underlying 
relationships would hold equally well in the DoD context. 
Our analysis approach is as follows: 
1. Identify software vulnerabilities. 
a. Enumerate issues in the Chromium issue tracker (Chromium 2017) 
that have the security label. 
b. Classify each issue in terms of its Common Weakness Enumeration 
(CWE) using the issue’s description, comments, metadata, and patch. 
c. For each issue, identify the set of files changed by commits that 
reference the issue. 
2. Identify technical debt. 
a. Classify issues for technical debt. 
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b. Classify the type of design problem and rework based on the issue 
description, comments, and metadata. 
c. Detect design flaws that co-exist in the same files changed to fix the 
issues labeled security. 
3. Model the relationships between technical debt issues and vulnerabilities in 
the common artifacts they represent (code files, issues, commits). 
a. Extract concepts related to vulnerability types. 
b. Test whether technical debt indicators (e.g., number and type of 
design flaws, number of traditional bugs, number of bugs labeled 
security, and the lines of code that change to fix a bug) correlate with 
the number of vulnerabilities reported. 
c. Manually investigate how selected vulnerabilities are influenced by the 
correlated technical debt indicators. 
We will show how design knowledge can help identify other related issues and files 
so that developers can more efficiently diagnose the root cause of vulnerabilities and 
provide a long-term fix. 
Analysis Results 
To identify vulnerabilities, we used the issues labeled security. Using the Chromium 
project’s issue tracker, we identified 79 software vulnerability issues, which were related to 
289 files in which we detected design flaws (described in the next section). An issue labeled 
security may have a well-identified security bug, such as a null pointer exception. Such an 
issue may not represent technical debt but could simply be an implementation oversight. On 
the other hand, some issues may manifest themselves with multiple symptoms. This can 
hint that technical debt contributed to the vulnerability. 
Following this exercise we classified whether each issue was technical debt or not 
using the classification approach we developed (Bellomo, 2016).  
To classify source code files, we used the results of a study that analyzed Chromium 
17 and reported 289 files associated with design flaws that can be detected in the code. The 
approach analyzes a project’s repositories—its code and its revisions—to calculate a model 
of the design as a set of design rule spaces (DRSpaces; Xiao, 2014). These DRSpaces are 
automatically analyzed for design flaws that violate proper design principles. Four types of 
design flaws can be identified from the DRSpace analysis: modularity violation, unstable 
interface, clique, and improper inheritance. A modularity violation occurs when files with no 
structural relation frequently change together. This suggests that those files share some 
secret or knowledge and that information has not been encapsulated or modularized. An 
unstable interface occurs when there is an important class or interface that many other files 
depend on, and this class is buggy and changes frequently, requiring its “followers” to also 
change. Clique refers to a cross-module cycle that prevents groups of modules from being 
independent of each other. Improper inheritance occurs when the parent class depends on 
the child or when another file depends on both a parent and its child class. We consider 
these flaws as indicators of technical debt. 
Table 1. Design Flaws and Issues Classified as Technical Debt 
 
Acquisition Research Program: 
Creating Synergy for Informed Change - 72 - 
Table 1 shows our results where we found 15 issues classified as technical debt that 
also demonstrate design flaws. When we analyze these results for correlations using 
Pearson correlation coefficient, we see promising results. Design flaws demonstrate 
correlations with number of bugs (0.921), bug churn (0.908), number of security bugs 
(0.988) and security churn (0.826). Our further analysis shows that for three of the four types 
of design flaws—modularity violation, clique, and improper inheritance—files with 
vulnerabilities are also more likely to have design flaws. The more types of design flaws a 
file is involved in, the higher the likelihood of it also having vulnerabilities. We look at the 
design concepts represented in these issues related to vulnerabilities to better understand 
overarching correlations. Table 2 summarizes the vulnerabilities of those issues that also 
reported design problems from the 79 issues we classified, in the form of CWE categories 
(CWE 2017). 
Table 2. Affinity Groups of Vulnerability Types 
 
Our study revealed that developers are already using concepts related to technical 
debt when investigating security issues, including the following: 
• getting to the root cause 
• understanding the underlying design issues 
• recording symptoms where changes are taking longer than usual or problems 
are reoccurring 
• predicting consequences for the longer term 
• building evidence for a more substantial fix 
Furthermore, when we studied the issues in detail, we observed that finding the true 
design root cause of the problems, i.e., the underlying technical debt, took a substantial 
amount of resources of the developers. DoD software deals with these challenges, where 
many small issues like these add up daily to accumulate to not only jeopardize sustainment 
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resources, but also operational issues such as vulnerabilities that cause significant risks for 
the DoD.  
Conclusions and Future Work 
Software system vulnerability and technical debt are high priority concerns for our 
DoD software base and industry alike, leading us to address research questions such as: 
• Are software components with accrued technical debt more likely to be 
vulnerability-prone? 
• Does understanding the difference and similarities between technical debt, 
defect, and vulnerabilities lead to their better management? 
Our studies on open source, industry, and government software data demonstrate 
that a conscious focus on understanding design issues that accumulate consequences in 
the form of vulnerabilities, extensive rework, and maintenance issues create the most risky 
technical debt items. The state of the practice in industry and the DoD alike is that such 
issues are not explicitly tracked and understood. Our results demonstrate that it is those 
areas that in the long run create both the highest operational and sustainment risks.  
Understanding and calling out similarities and differences between defects, 
vulnerabilities, and technical debt has a direct impact on acquisition practices such as 
software risk management and technical tradeoffs that impact contracting decisions. 
Measurement and analysis techniques for managing technical debt in the long run improves 
sustainability of systems and impacts better buying power. When they address security 
issues, software developers use technical debt concepts to discuss design limitations and 
their consequences on future work. One time-consuming relationship between vulnerabilities 
and technical debt is tracing a vulnerability to its root cause when it is the result of technical 
debt. Introducing technical debt measurement and analysis potentially improves finding such 
root causes. 
Our ongoing and future work focuses on creating intelligent mechanisms to extract 
and analyze this data for software development professionals and provide guidelines that 
DoD decision-makers can use to allocate their scarce resources most appropriately.  
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Abstract 
Historically, software developed under government contracts often does not stand up under 
real-world use, and defects frequently result in cost and schedule overruns. While proposed 
development activities from contractors commonly list measures to improve quality, these 
descriptions cannot be used to select a winning bidder if they are not part of the evaluation 
criteria. By making software quality requirements explicit at the proposal stage, contractor 
selection can be influenced by criteria based on best practices in software development. 
If we want to improve the quality of our software, a “Quality in Depth” approach is needed—
introducing quality-related measures at every stage of software acquisition. In a previous 
article, one of the authors provided recommendations for improving software quality at the 
construction phase (Spiewak & McRitchie, 2008). This article discusses how to apply these 
same principles to the source selection process.  
In order to find a way to include software practices as selection criteria, the authors set out to 
identify and recommend changes to Sections L and M of a government RFP (Request for 
Proposal) or IFPP (Instructions for Proposal Preparation) and EC (Evaluation Criteria) in an 
attempt to improve software and system quality. These changes will enable selection teams 
to identify contractors whose software development processes and compliance with software 
quality standards are more likely to produce the desired results. 
Background 
What Is Software Quality? 
Quality is often thought of as an absence of defects. With many software products 
however, “defect” does not adequately describe the range of phenomena that affects 
software quality as perceived by the customers, end users, and other stakeholders. Using 
Crosby’s philosophy, we define the term “software quality” to mean conformance to the 
requirements of the software product’s users and other stakeholders (Crosby, 1979). The 
more closely a software product conforms to these requirements, the higher its quality.  
We are particularly interested in software quality as it affects the acquisition process 
for defense-related software. While end user requirements are of prime importance, poor 
software development and quality monitoring practices in early- and mid-stage acquisition 
can result in failure to provide the desired results. These failures range from unwanted or 
missing features to cost and schedule overruns to critical flaws in system security or 
reliability. 
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How Do You Measure Software Quality? 
Software quality as an outcome is best measured by the number of defects 
encountered after development is complete as the numerator, divided by the “size” of the 
software as the denominator. One could also argue that if two different products were to be 
compared, some sort of “difficulty factor” could be applied, as well as references to the 
software language used or development environment employed (e.g., assembly code 
versus high order languages, or object-oriented versus functional languages, etc.). 
Metrics exist which can be used to estimate the potential defects in code. These are 
based on the use of function points as the measure of “size.” Function points can also be 
(loosely) correlated with the commonly used measurement SLOC, or Source Lines of Code. 
Approach 
This article is the outcome of a study the authors conducted at MITRE. Our approach 
was to gather information from subject matter experts (SMEs), contracting officers, and 
acquisition experts for recommendations for additions to proposal documents. Part of this 
study was conducted through interviews and SME email group lists. Reference materials 
from the Air Force and Navy were found which provided recommendations from prior work 
(USAF, 2008; Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Navy [ASN(RD&A)], 2008). We then 
adapted the suggestions to Sections L and M to more thoroughly describe software quality 
related criteria for source selection. Some of these criteria are aimed at the technical 
evaluation team, while some can be used by cost evaluators and past performance 
evaluators, as well as the technical team.  
Recommendations for Section L (Instructions for Proposal Preparation) 
1. The offeror’s proposal shall include a proposed Software Development Plan 
(SDP) which describes their approach to software development, including the 
tools, techniques, and standards to be used for development; unit testing and 
component testing; integration tools and techniques (including configuration 
management) used to ensure the integrity of system builds; the number and 
type of reviews that are part of the development process; and the methods 
and tools used to manage defect reports and analysis, including root cause 
analysis as necessary. The proposed SDP will form the basis for a completed 
SDP to be available after contract award as a CDRL (Contract Deliverable 
Requirements List) item, subject to government review and approval. 
2. The offeror shall describe their plan for effective code reuse in order to 
minimize the amount of new code to be developed. Reused code can come 
from any origin, including previous efforts by the offeror or as provided by the 
government in the bidders’ library.  
3. The offeror shall provide a Basis of Estimate (BOE) describing the rationale 
for the proposed staffing. The detail of the BOE shall include labor hours for 
each labor category (e.g., system engineering staff versus software 
engineering staff) for the identified tasks in the Work Breakdown Structure 
(WBS) as it relates to the Statement of Work (SOW).  
4. The offeror shall describe the process for orientation and training for all 
project employees (e.g., certification and training in software best practices 
including Information Assurance [IA] and risk management).  
5. The offeror shall describe related systems experience, including a description 
of previous experience developing software of the same nature, and a 
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description of the extent to which personnel who contributed to these 
previous efforts will be supporting this effort.  
6. The offeror shall describe proposed development practices. For example, if 
spiral / incremental development, they shall describe the number, duration, 
and scope of spirals, as well as how the use of your approach would result in 
improved product quality and user satisfaction over time.1 
7. The offeror shall provide an Integrated Master Schedule (IMS) and 
accompanying narrative that describes all significant program activities that 
are aligned with the proposed program staffing profile. Include a timeline for 
completion of each activity identified in the proposed program. Provide details 
that clearly describe the purpose for and importance of key activities. Identify 
all critical path elements and key dependencies.  
Recommendations for Section M (Evaluation Criteria) 
The proposed SDP shall show a complete and comprehensive software 
development process, which incorporates best practices as well as standards such as IEEE 
12207-2008. The contractor will be evaluated based on how their processes, as described in 
the SDP, incorporate the use of software best practices. 
Evaluation criteria related to the SDP include the following: 
• The number and type of peer reviews 
• The use of automated unit testing including test coverage requirements 
• The use of automated syntax analysis tools and adherence to the rules 
incorporated by them (Jones, 2010) 
• The comprehensiveness of integration and test methods, including 
continuous integration tools if used 
• The use of readiness requirements such as unit test and syntax analysis for 
code check-in 
• Configuration management and source code control tools and techniques 
• The extent to which root cause analysis of defects is part of the development 
process 
• The selection of software source code to be reused, replaced, or rewritten 
from previous implementations or other origins, including a description of how 
it will be ensured that reused code meets or is brought up to the same 
standards as newly developed code. Risks associated with reused software 
shall also be discussed. Such software shall include government rights to the 
source code.  
The IMS and accompanying narrative will be evaluated for level of detail and 
relevance of significant program activities, degree of alignment, the proposed program 
staffing profile, and integration of the proposed SDP into the IMS. Additionally, critical path 
                                            
 
 
1 Note that while not part of the technical evaluation, the government evaluation team will examine 
Contractor Performance Assessment Reports [CPARs] for relevant performance by the respondent 
on other contracts. 
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elements and key dependencies will be assessed for relevance, completeness, and the 
manner and level of risk containment.  
Table 1 delineates a sample rating scale for SDP evaluation criteria.  
Table 1. Sample Rating Scale for SDP Evaluation Criteria 
 
Note. The categories provided in Table 1 were suggested in a conversation with Jeff Pattee, Chief, 
Product Definition, Airspace Mission Planning Division, Electronic Systems Center, USAF. 
Incorporating Software Quality Measures in Contracts 
The contract development process includes several steps at which information can 
be gathered and requirements set to include software quality as a measure of vendor 
performance. 
Sections L & M or equivalent from the RFP 
• Add software quality measures as a discriminating factor in selecting the 
contractor 
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• Enumerate expectations in this area: 
o Types of methods used 
o Evidence to be provided 
TRD (Technical Requirements Document), SOO (Statement of Objectives), and 
SOW (Statement of Work) 
Add requirements in the form of deliverable items—as CDRLs or DAL (Data 
Accession List) items as appropriate. Examples include the following: 
• Output of automated unit tests showing code coverage at or above required 
minimum 
• Output of automated syntax analysis showing conformance to pre-determined 
rules 
• Evidence of accomplishing required peer reviews 
• Itemized list of tools with version numbers used to produce output from each 
source module 
• Programmer’s reference manual with examples 
• Interface definitions  
• List of all software components with the following information: 
o Purpose and function 
o Interfaces provided 
o Language/version for each module 
o Complete source code 
• Source from architectural design tool where available 
• Use cases (text and diagrams) 
• Class diagrams where applicable 
• Complete list of any third-party components with version numbers 
• Contact information for any outside dependencies 
• Build procedures, including documentation for building all software 
components from source code 
• Test procedures—including any automated unit tests with source code, test 
scripts 
Rationale for Incorporating Recommended RFP Language 
The recommended RFP language was derived by the authors from a variety of 
sources including MITRE acquisition subject matter experts, existing guidance documents 
from the Navy and Air Force, and also from the authors’ experience. We’ve tried to provide a 
succinct rationale as to why the language asks for specific information from the contractor in 
the RFP: 
• The Software Development Plan (SDP) is a maturity indicator of the bidder’s 
development process. By evaluating this, and then putting its provisions 
under contract, it becomes possible to select a contractor on the basis of 
development methodology and then obligate them to perform as proposed. 
o Automated unit tests & comprehensive peer reviews are widely used 
best practices. Capers Jones (2008a) has noted that these are among 
the required steps to achieve effective defect removal. 
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o Continuous Integration (CI) often includes the automated invocation of 
tests and code analysis during the build process. CI and static 
analysis expose problems sooner in the development process. The 
sooner problems are discovered, the lower the cost to resolve them. 
o Root cause analysis prevents the introduction of defects and is a 
recognized best practice in all approaches to process improvement. It 
is a Capability Maturity Model Integration (CMMI) Level 5 practice 
area. Prevention is more cost effective than detecting and fixing 
defects after they are introduced. 
• The Basis of Estimate (BoE) helps the evaluator understand the bidder’s cost 
to compare against industry averages and government cost models. By 
examining proposed labor categories, this can be checked against predicted 
labor distributions from government cost models as well. 
• The Integrated Master Schedule (IMS) can be checked for alignment with 
required milestone dates, and it supports an independent estimate. 
Guidance for Evaluation Team Experience 
The government’s evaluation team must have relevant software engineering 
experience. The experience should cover the full life cycle of software development from 
design to development, integration, testing, and delivery. If the proposal is seeking a 
particular style of development methodology (e.g., waterfall, spiral/incremental, agile), then 
the evaluation team should have experience in that methodology in order to evaluate the 
RFP response.  
Since a significant portion of the suggested contract language relates to software 
quality monitoring, the evaluators should be familiar with unit testing, peer reviews, 
continuous integration (CI), static code analysis, and metrics. Finally, evaluators should 
have some knowledge of various practices and approaches of applying these techniques, 
for example, when it comes to test-driven development. 
The field of software engineering is diverse. It is insufficient to simply have general 
software engineering experience on the evaluation team without further having experience 
in the applicable domain(s). Examples of these domains include real-time/embedded, 
kernel/operating systems, numerical/digital signal processing, web applications, SOA, 
information retrieval/search, security, and human-computer interface. 
Finally, the evaluation team should have an understanding of the CMMI process and 
rating criteria. 
Guidance for Evaluating Technical Responses  
The recommended contract language in this article includes Section M of the RFP, 
also appearing as Evaluation Criteria. The language is not very specific so as to elicit 
responses that are more original than simply claiming the ability to do a long list of things 
that the government requires. In this section, we discuss more specific guidance for the 
evaluation team in evaluating the responses. 
In advance, the team should define objectives that are sought after and then define 
measurable criteria. The more objective the criteria, the better, though it is recognized that 
coming up with this criteria can be a challenge. After defining criteria, they are prioritized 
and then weighted in a scheme the team deems appropriate. 
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The following are some general evaluation tips: 
• If key staff are identified in the proposal, how likely are they to be available 
during contract execution? 
• In reference to quality assurance processes, does the proposal language 
favor or at least mention “empowerment” of the QA team over engineering 
processes? 
• Regarding the contractor's approach to Automated Unit Testing, does the 
contractor require that unit tests be passed and cover a reasonable 
percentage of code before code can be checked in? Does the contractor use 
Test Driven Development? 
• Regarding the contractor's approach to automated syntax analysis, does the 
contractor require that syntax analysis be performed and that all required 
rules are followed before code can be checked in? 
• Regarding development build and integration, does the contractor use an 
automated build process which incorporates syntax analysis and automated 
unit testing? 
You can expect that the response is going to claim appraisal at a specific CMMI 
maturity level (commonly at least Level 3). This can be verified with the Appraisal Disclosure 
Statement (ADS) document. Another source is the Standard CMMI Appraisal Method for 
Process Improvement (SCAMPI). For the larger contractors, particularly when work is further 
sub-contracted out, look for further CMMI level compliance information on the specific 
division/unit and sub-contractor(s) as applicable. 
Development Process 
If the proposal declares that a development process will be used that will involve 
multiple iterations/spirals/increments (which is standard practice), then the evaluation team 
should look for further details on the process including the following: 
• What is the duration and scope of each increment? 
• Are lessons and obstacles from one increment reviewed for improvement to a 
subsequent increment? 
• Is user (customer) feedback interaction only up front or do most increments 
incorporate this? And how is that feedback prioritized? 
• Are multiple increments planned in sufficient detail, or are only the present 
and possibly next increment planned? 
Software Engineering 
One key thing to look for in a proposal is the degree to which the contractor has 
experience in the technology the RFP calls for them to deliver. The more complex the 
system, the more important applicable contractor experience is. 
Many DoD systems have a degree of interoperability and integration required of 
them. For integration with particular systems, verify if the contractor has experience with that 
system or has relationships with third parties with integration capabilities that will be used. 
The contractor should also participate in applicable Communities of Interest (COIs). 
Testing processes and technologies that support them are important. Look for 
information on a test plan or strategy. If the proposal is serious about continuous integration 
and use of supporting tools, then listing the software to be used for this is a promising sign. 
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Information on how the tools are used (e.g., by exception and/or monitored on a periodic 
basis—and what period) is also telling. If the proposal includes information on the proposed 
system design, then the evaluators could look to see how “testable” the design is, 
particularly as it is incrementally built.  
Conclusions 
While it is important to implement quality measures in software construction, this is 
undertaken after a contractor has been selected. The authors recommend an in-depth 
approach, beginning with the process of selecting the contractor. It can be easy to overlook 
the importance of including specific language in the proposal documents in order to be able 
to select the right contractor from those responding to a Request for Proposal. In order to 
accomplish this goal, it is critical to specify the instructions in Section L (or the IFPP) and the 
evaluation criteria in Section M (or the EC) so that these can be used to assign strengths or 
weaknesses appropriately. This is an early, but often neglected, piece of the puzzle involved 
in building quality software products for defense applications.  
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Abstract 
This paper is the fourth in a series that examines the association between outcomes of Major 
Defense Acquisition Programs (MDAPs) and changes in acquisition policy and process and 
funding climate. Like an earlier paper in the series, it finds that quantity normalized Program 
Acquisition Unit Cost (PAUC) growth measured from Milestone (MS) B is significantly higher 
in programs that passed MS B in bust climates than in boom climates. The new finding in this 
paper is that among MDAPs that passed MS B in a bust phase, only those that continued into 
a boom climate showed significantly higher PAUC growth than programs that passed MS B in 
a boom climate. This conclusion is important because it implies that much of the observed 
PAUC growth may have causes other than flaws in MS B baselines. The conclusion tells us 
less than might be hoped, however. This is so because the PAUC growth associated with the 
boom climate may reflect the purchase of capability beyond that specified in the MS B 
baseline or, alternatively, may reflect PAUC increases that occur when programs take 
advantage of a boom climate to “get well.” 
Introduction 
This paper examines whether Major Defense Acquisition Programs (MDAPs) that 
entered a boom climate for procurement funding some time after passing Milestone (MS) B 
on average had higher unit cost growth than programs whose acquisition cycles did not 
extend into a boom climate. While this conjecture seems plausible, possibly even obviously 
correct, it has not been recognized in the cost growth literature. 
The topic is worth pursuing because it bears on why unit cost growth was 
significantly higher for MDAPs that passed MS B in bust periods than it was for those that 
passed in boom periods. This observation was reported by the first paper in this series, 
McNicol and Wu (2014; hereafter referred to as P-5126). The explanation offered there was 
a version of the “camel’s nose” hypothesis—that unrealistic cost, programmatic, and 
technological assumptions are made in the hope that, by making the program appear to be 
lower in cost or more capable, they will increase the odds that the program will be 
successful in competing for funds. P-5126 goes further by suggesting that the incentives for 
adopting very optimistic assumptions are stronger for programs that pass MS B in bust 
funding climates than they are for programs that pass in boom periods, and that, 
consequently, unrealistic MS B baselines are more common in programs that passed MS B 
in bust climates. 
For present purposes, the key point to note is that the explanation offered by P-5126 
supposes that most of the growth in unit cost shown by programs that pass MS B in a bust 
funding climate is “baked into” the baselines established at MS B. Other possibilities exist, 
however, one of which is that a significant part of these programs’ cost growth might be due 
to increases in program content made during a post-MS B boom climate, when funding is 
more readily available. To the extent that is the case, we may be mistaking the costs of 
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decisions to improve the capabilities of an existing system for growth in the costs of 
acquiring the capabilities specified in the MS B baseline. 
Framework 
The topic of this paper requires distinguishing between bust funding and boom 
funding climates. The period Fiscal Year (FY) 1965–FY 2009 considered here spans two 
bust-boom cycles in Department of Defense (DoD) procurement funding: (1) The bust 
climate for modernization of weapon systems that began in the mid-1960s (as discussed in 
Appendix A of McNicol, Tate, Burns, & Wu [2016], hereafter referred to as P-5330 
[Revised])1 and lasted until the Carter–Reagan buildup of the early to mid-1980s, and (2) the 
long post–Cold War bust climate followed by the post-9/11 boom. The rationales for the 
break points between the funding climates are provided in P-5330 (Revised).  
A measure of cost growth also is required. One option is based on Program 
Acquisition Unit Cost (PAUC). PAUC is the sum of Research, Development, Test, and 
Evaluation (RDT&E) cost and procurement cost, divided by the number of units acquired. 
For this paper, PAUC growth is computed by comparing the MS B baseline value of 
PAUC—which can be thought of as a goal or a prediction—to the actual PAUC reported in 
the last Selected Acquisition Report (SAR) for the program, normalized to the MS B quantity. 
Both the MS B baseline and the actual value of PAUC are stated in constant dollars. The 
alternative to PAUC growth is growth in Average Procurement Unit Cost (APUC), which 
does not include RDT&E cost.2 The effects of changes in the capabilities procured may be 
more likely to show up clearly in APUC growth, which is an advantage, but it is a less 
comprehensive measure of unit cost growth. We compute the results for both cost growth 
measures, and report the results for APUC only in the one instance in which they differ in an 
important way from those obtained using PAUC. Note that PAUC growth and APUC growth 
are adjusted for quantity but not for changes in the capabilities the program is directed to 
acquire. 
In what follows, the term PAUC growth means PAUC growth from the MS B 
baseline, with the final SAR PAUC normalized to the MS B quantity. Similarly, the term 
APUC growth means APUC growth from the MS B baseline, with the final SAR APUC 
normalized to the MS B quantity. Appendix B of P-5330 (Revised) provides the conventions 
used in assembling the database, the sources of the data used, and the quantity 
normalization computations. The unit cost growth estimates were updated to the most 
recent comprehensive information available, that in the December 2015 SARs. Only 
completed programs (defined as programs with an end date of FY 2016 or earlier) are used 
in this analysis because some costs associated with a program may not be fully reflected in 
its SAR until the program is completed.  
                                            
 
 
1 The DoD budget was high during the years of the Vietnam War, but much of the acquisition budget 
went for munitions and to weapon systems lost in combat. Consequently, funding for major system 
new starts was relatively constrained. 
2 PAUC and APUC growth measures used for purposes of Nunn-McCurdy Act reporting are not 
quantity normalized. The median MDAP that passed MS B in the period FY 1988–FY 2007 acquired 
100% of MS B baseline quantity, and the average program acquired 111%. Compared to the PAUC 
growth measures used in Nunn-McCurdy reporting, quantity adjustment decreased measured PAUC 
growth for about half of the programs in the sample and increased it for the other half. 
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Average PAUC growth reported in Table 1 for programs that passed MS B in bust 
climates is significantly higher (43%) than it is for programs that passed MS B in boom 
periods (15%).3 This observation serves only to confirm, for the data used in this research, 
the result mentioned above from P-5126. 
Table 1. Average PAUC Growth for Completed MDAPs by MS B Funding Climate 
 
Note. Numbers of MDAPs that passed MS B and were completed by the December 2015 SARs are 
shown in parentheses. 
Finally, it is necessary to recognize changes over time in acquisition policy and 
process configurations because they are associated with significant difference in average 
PAUC growth. P-5330 (Revised) distinguished the following six policy and process 
configurations: 
1. McNamara-Clifford (FY 1964–FY 1969) 
2. Defense Systems Acquisition Review Council (DSARC, FY 1970–FY 1982) 
3. Post-Carlucci DSARC (P-C DSARC, FY 1983–FY 1989) 
4. Defense Acquisition Board (DAB, FY 1990–FY 1993) 
5. Acquisition Reform (AR, FY 1994–FY 2000) 
6. DAB Post AR (DAB Post AR, FY 2001–FY 2009) 
Average PAUC growth does not differ significantly among DSARC, P-C DSARC, 
DAB, and DAB Post AR within a budget climate.4 Their statistical similarity permits these 
periods to be combined into a single acquisition policy and process configuration, which will 
be referred to as DSARC/DAB. The main text is concerned only with the DSARC/DAB. P-
5330 (Revised) found that average APUC growth was significantly higher in the McNamara-
Clifford and AR configurations, which for that reason are treated separately.5 Appendix A 
presents results for the McNamara-Clifford and AR configurations. 
                                            
 
 
3 P < 0.001 for the Mann-Whitney U (M-W U) test (U = 1261.5, n1 = 108, n2 = 44) 
4 For bust climates, Analysis of Variance (ANOVA) fails to reject the null hypothesis that APUC 
growth for completed programs in each of these bins has the same normal distribution (P = 0.996). 
Kolmogorov-Smirnov (K-S), Anderson Darling (A-D), and an F-test of the variances indicate that the 
assumptions of ANOVA are satisfied. For boom climates, K-S and A-D find that the observations for 
the boom portion of DSARC and the DAB periods are consistent with a normal distribution, but K-S 
rejects normality for the boom portion of P-C DSARC. The M-W U test does not detect a significant 
difference between the means of the (1) DSARC-Boom and P-C DSARC-Boom (P = 0.968, U = 88.5, 
n1 = 29, n2 = 6); (2) DSARC-Boom and DAB Post AR-Boom (P = 0.317, U = 36, n1 = 9, n2 = 6); or (3) 
the P-C DSARC-Boom and the DAB Post AR-Boom (P = 0.215, U = 94, n1 = 29, n2 = 9). 
5 Appendix C of P-5330 (Revised) provides a Bayesian analysis using APUC growth data. That result 
also probably holds for the PAUC data 
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Appendix A of P-5330 (Revised) provides brief descriptions of the acquisition 
configurations as defined here. Readers who are not generally familiar with the Office of the 
Secretary of Defense (OSD)–level acquisition process and various acquisition reform efforts 
may wish to consult that source or Fox (2011). 
Evidence of a Boom Effect 
The term boom effect is used here to label a feature observed in the unit cost growth 
data—MDAPs that passed through a boom climate post MS B had a higher average unit 
cost growth than those that did not. 
Many MDAPs that passed MS B in one of the bust climates continued into a boom 
climate, and some programs that passed MS B during the Carter–Reagan defense buildup 
continued into the post-9/11 boom. A two-part naming convention is used to label two bins 
of programs: those that did—and those that did not—pass through a boom climate post MS 
B. The first part of the label gives the funding climate prevailing when the program passed 
MS B—bust or boom. The second part—0, 1, or 2—denotes the number of boom climates a 
program passed through post MS B. For example, programs that were completed entirely 
within a single bust phase will be referred to as Bust0—Bust because they passed MS B in 
a bust funding climate and zero because they were completed without entering a boom 
climate. Programs that passed MS B in a bust period and continued into or through a 
subsequent boom period are called Bust1.  
A detailed evaluation of content changes for programs that did and did not 
experience a boom funding climate after passing MS B would be the best approach to 
exploring the importance and character of boom. This type of analysis would require greater 
resources than were available, however. Instead, this paper uses a statistical approach that 
relies on data that are comparatively easy to acquire—PAUC growth from the MS B 
baseline, the year programs passed MS B, and the year the programs were completed. In 
the language of medical testing, the plan is to compare unit cost growth for a treatment 
group—programs that experienced a boom climate post MS B—with that of a control 
group—programs that did not. The question asked in this section is whether the observed 
boom effects are statistically significant. We look first at the two bust climates and then at 
the two boom climates. 
PAUC growth for Bust0 and Bust1 is presented in Table 2 for each of the two bust 
periods of DSARC/DAB. In both periods, average PAUC growth for the treatment group 
(Bust1) is higher than it is for the control group (Bust0)—42% compared to 16% for the first 
period, and 51% compared to 13% for the second. These differences are statistically 
significant.6 For programs that passed MS B in a bust period, subsequent entry into a boom 
period is then associated with higher PAUC growth. 
                                            
 
 
6 K-S and A-D find the PAUC growth data in each of the two bins of the first bust period to be 
consistent with a normal distribution. An F-test found the two variances to be significantly different. A 
two-tailed t-test assuming unequal sample variances found the means of Bust1 and Bust0 for the first 
period to be significantly different (P = 0.011). K-S and A-D also find the PAUC growth data in each of 
the two bins of the first bust period to be consistent with a normal distribution. Again, an F-test found 
the two variances to be significantly different. A two-tailed t-test assuming unequal sample variances 
found the means of Bust1 and Bust0 for the first period to be significantly different (P = 0.004). 
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Table 2. Average PAUC Growth for Completed MDAPs in DSARC/DAB Bust by 
the Number of Boom Periods Experienced 
 
Bust2 does not follow this pattern: Average PAUC growth for Bust2 is slightly higher 
than that of Bust0 but less than that of Bust1. The number of programs in this bin (N=3), 
however, is so small that there is no point in speculating about why it does not fit the 
pattern.7 While no attempt is made to explain the observation for Bust2, it is included in an 
analysis discussed below that includes all of the MDAPs that passed MS B during the two 
DSARC/DAB bust periods. 
APUC growth also does not entirely follow the pattern of PAUC growth for Bust0 and 
Bust1 of the two DSARC/DAB bust periods. In particular, APUC growth for programs 
initiated in the first DSARC/DAB bust period does not show a statistically significant boom 
effect in APUC growth. (The six programs of Bust0 have an average APUC growth of 21%, 
which is not significantly different from the 42% average APUC growth for the 39 programs 
of Bust1.8) APUC growth in the second bust period does follow the pattern—43% for Bust1, 
which is significantly higher than the 17% average APUC growth for Bust0.9 
Table 3 presents data on PAUC growth for the two DSARC/DAB boom periods. The 
nomenclature used for the boom periods parallels that used for bust periods. Boom0 
programs passed MS B in a boom climate and were completed in that boom or the 
succeeding bust climate. Boom1 programs passed MS B during the Carter–Reagan defense 
buildup and were completed during the post-9/11 boom or during the following three years. 
There is no treatment group (i.e., Boom1) for the second boom period and hence no 
experiment to examine. 
Table 3. Average PAUC Growth for Completed MDAPs in DSARC/DAB-Boom by 
the Number of Boom Periods Experienced 
 
                                            
 
 
7 The programs in Bust2 are the CNV 68, with a PAUC growth of 7%; the NAVSTAR GPS (85%); and 
ATCCS-MCS (-34%). 
8 K-S and A-D find the APUC growth data in each of the two bins of the first bust period to be 
consistent with a normal distribution. An F-test found no significant difference between the two 
variances. A two-tailed t-test of the APUC data found the means of Bust1 and Bust0 for the first 
period not to be significantly different (P = 0.241). 
9 M-W U P = 0.041 (U = 32.5, n1 = 17, n2 = 8). 
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Average PAUC growth for the Boom1 programs of the first boom period (45%) is 
significantly higher than that for the Boom0 programs (12%).10 This finding is somewhat 
unexpected, since the relevant programs passed MS B in a boom funding climate and 
presumably had realistic baselines and were robustly funded at least initially. In fact, the 
finding may be spurious. Average PAUC growth for the Boom1 bin of the first boom period is 
dominated by three MDAPs, each of which had PAUC growth of more than 40%: C-17 
(57%), T-45 Goshawk (70%), and JSTARS (123%). These programs had the essential 
features of Total Package Procurement (TPP; McNicol, 2004). Acquisition reforms adopted 
in mid-1969 ruled out use of TPP and fixed-price development contracts because they 
typically resulted in severe cost growth and schedule problems (McNicol, 2004; McNicol et 
al., 2016; Tyson et al., 1992; O’Neil & Porter, 2011). During the Reagan Administration, 
however, TPP-like contracts were used for a few MDAPs, including the three programs 
noted here. (The other four of the seven programs in Boom1 had conventional cost plus 
incentive fee contracts for Engineering and Manufacturing Development [EMD].) The PAUC 
growth of the C-17, T-45, and JSTARS programs was on a par with that of TPP programs 
that passed MS B during FY 1965–FY 1969 and did not continue into the Carter–Reagan 
boom. Their contracting strategy, not their continuation into a boom funding climate, could 
then account for their high PAUC growth. If the three programs are excluded, the average 
PAUC growth for Boom1 is 17%, which is not significantly higher than the average for 
Boom0.11 
Table 4 combines data from Table 2 and Table 3. The 73 MDAPs of the 
DSARC/DAB bust climates had an average PAUC growth of 38%, which was significantly 
higher than the 9% average of the 41 MDAPs in DSARC/DAB that passed during boom 
climates.12 Average PAUC growth of MDAPs in Bust0 is not significantly different from the 
average PAUC growth of DSARC/DAB boom, and therefore has little effect on this result.13 
Instead, the higher average of DSARC/DAB bust is mainly due to the programs in Bust1. 
This adds an important point to the narrative of P-5126: The higher PAUC growth of MDAPs 
that passed MS B in bust climates largely reflects a subset associated with those 
programs—those that passed MS B in a bust climate and continued on into a boom climate. 
Table 4. PAUC Growth for the Combined Bust and the Combined Boom Phases 
of DSARC/DAB 
 
* Excludes C-17, T-45, and JSTARS. 
** Includes the three programs in Bust2, which have an average PAUC growth of 19%. 
                                            
 
 
10 K-S found the distribution of APUC growth of the 28 Boom0 programs that passed MS B in the first 
bust phase to be non-normal. M-W U found the difference between average APUC growth of Boom0 
and Boom1 for the first boom phase to be significant (P = 0.007, U = 164.5, n1 = 28, n2 = 7). 
11 M-W U P = 0.117 (UA = 83.5, UB = 28.5, n1 = 28, n2 = 4). 
12 M-W U P < 0.001 (U = 633, n1 = 73, n2 = 4). 
13 M-W U P = 0.121 (U = 367.5, n1 = 41, n2 = 14). 
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Funding Climate, Program Duration, and the Boom Effect 
This section takes an additional step towards explaining why the data show boom 
effects. Table 5 presents rearranged data from Table 2 and Table 3 and, in addition, shows 
average program duration for each bin. Average PAUC growth is greater in Bust1 than in 
Bust0 for each of the two bust periods and greater for Boom1 than for Boom0 for the first 
boom period. (The second boom period is excluded because there are no programs in 
Boom1.) The programs in Bust1 and Boom1, however, also had a longer average duration 
than the programs in the corresponding Bust0 and Boom0 bins. Consequently, we need to 
examine the extent to which longer average duration in addition to an encounter with a 
boom period account for their higher PAUC growth. Note that including the three programs 
of Bust2 (of the first bust period) and the three programs excluded from Boom1 would not 
change this conclusion. 
Table 5. Average PAUC Growth and Average Program Duration by Number of 
Boom Periods Encountered for Completed Programs in DSARC/DAB 
 
† From MS B through the year in which the program’s last SAR was filed. 
‡ Excludes the three programs of Bust2. 
§ Excludes C-17, T-45, and JSTARS. 
We approach this problem by dividing the duration of the program into two parts: 
1. Tboom = number of years post MS B spent in boom climates 
2. Tbust = number of years post MS B spent in bust climates 
These two variables are hypothesized to have distinct linear relationships to PAUC 
growth (abbreviated as PAUC): 
PAUCi = a0 + a1Tboomi + a2Tbusti + ei 
In this equation, the subscript i denotes the ith MDAP in the sample and ei is the 
error term, which is assumed to be a normally distributed random variable. The coefficient a1 
is the change in PAUC for each year the program spends in a boom climate. Similarly, a2 is 
the change in PAUC per year in a bust climate. The estimated intercept term a0 is the 
average net effect of excluded variables. The coefficients of the model are estimated (using 
multiple regression) separately for programs that passed MS B in bust periods of 
DSARC/DAB and those that passed MS B in its first boom climate. (The second boom 
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climate is excluded because it has no programs.) The estimates obtained are presented in 
Table 6.14 
Table 6. Years in Bust Climates and Years in Boom Climates and PAUC Growth 
for MDAPs in the DSARC/DAB Acquisition Policy and Process 
Configuration 
 
** Statistically significant at less than the 5% level. 
*** Statistically significant at less than the 1% level. 
† R-Square = 0.22 F = 9.445 (P < 0.001) N= 70. Estimated by Ordinary Least Squares (OLS).  
 Excludes the three MDAPs in the Bust2 bin of DSARC/DAB. 
‡ R-Square = 0.20 F = 5.563 (P = 0.002) N= 32. Estimated by OLS. Excludes C-17, T-45, and  
 JSTARS. 
Programs that passed MS B in a bust climate characteristically experienced PAUC 
growth of 1.6% for each year spent in a bust climate. PAUC growth for each year spent in a 
boom climate post MS B was three times that level—about 5% per year. Each of these 
estimates is statistically significant.  
The effect of boom years for programs that passed MS B in boom periods is smaller 
(about 3.7% per year). This is reasonable, as we expect programs that passed MS B in 
boom climates to have realistic baselines and to be adequately funded (at least initially). The 
estimated effect per bust year on PAUC growth for programs that passed MS B in boom 
periods is very small and statistically not significant, which also seems reasonable.  
A sense of the importance of the boom periods entered into post MS B is provided by 
Table 7. The table shows the estimated relationship evaluated at the sample means for 
TBoom and TBust for Bust0 and Bust1, respectively. Programs in Bust0 have an average PAUC 
growth of about 14%. Of this, about 11.4 percentage points are associated with years spent 
in bust climates, and, of course, none for continuation into a boom climate. For Bust1 
programs, boom years post MS B account for about 26 percentage points of the Bust1 
average PAUC growth of 45%; the years spent in bust climates account for 15.2 percentage 
points. 
 
                                            
 
 
14 An alternative to the model above posits two categories of MDAPs, one that tends to short duration 
and low unit cost growth and another that tends to long duration and higher unit cost growth. 
Modifications and upgrades would seem to be examples of the first category and major platforms an 
example of the second. The “short duration” and “long duration” programs were defined, respectively, 
as the 20% of programs in the bin with the shortest durations, and the 20% with the longest durations. 
The results for all of the forms of this model considered rejected the hypothesis that shorter vice 
longer duration is a statistically significant factor in PAUC growth. 
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Table 7. Amount of PAUC Growth in Boom Climates and Bust Climates for 
MDAPs in DSARC/DAB That Passed MS B in Bust Climates 
 
Note. Evaluated at the sample means for TBoom and TBust 
Conclusions and Limitations 
This paper, like earlier papers in the series, finds that PAUC growth measured from 
MS B is significantly higher in programs that passed MS B in bust climates than in boom 
climates. Moreover, among MDAPs that passed MS B in a bust phase of DSARC/DAB, only 
those that continued into a boom climate showed PAUC growth significantly higher than that 
of programs that passed MS B in a boom climate. This conclusion is important because it 
implies that much of the observed PAUC growth may have causes other than flaws in MS B 
baselines. The conclusion tells us less than might be hoped, however. This is so because 
the PAUC growth associated with the boom may reflect the purchase of capability beyond 
that specified in the MS B baseline or, alternatively, PAUC increases that occur when 
programs take advantage of a boom climate to “get well.”  
The Global Broadcast System (GBS) provides an example of a program whose 
content was increased early in the post-9/11 boom: 
The current GBS architecture is based on Asynchronous Transfer Mode 
(ATM) technology. … In December 2002, DoD directed GBS’s migration to a 
more sustainable commercial and standards-based open architecture, based 
upon the Internet Protocol (IP). Also, the GBS program received FY03 Iraqi 
Freedom Funds (IFF) supplemental funding for IP Acceleration of production 
units to replace deployed ATM units. Based upon extensive warfighter inputs, 
the accelerated IP production effort included design and development of a 
new, single case version of the Receive Suite (88XR) for the Army, Navy, and 
Marine Corps. (Selected Acquisition Report, 2003) 
Space Based Infrared Satellite-High (SBIRS-High) is a convenient and useful 
contrast to GBS, even though it passed MS B in 1997 and hence is not included in 
DSARC/DAB. As of the December 2015 SARs, funding for the Baseline SBIRS-High 
program was expected to end in FY 2018. A large portion of the growth in SBIRS-High unit 
procurement cost for the baseline program—roughly one-third—occurred before FY 2003, 
while most of the other two-thirds occurred during FY 2003–FY 2009. This increase was not 
driven by increased capability, however, but by the unrealistic cost estimate in the MS B 
SBIRS-High baseline (Kim et al., 2015; Porter et al., 2009; Younossi et al., 2008).  
In the GBS example, it seems clear that capabilities beyond those in the MS B 
baseline were added to the program. While unit cost did increase, that was a matter of 
paying more for more. For SBIRS-High, in contrast, it appears that the advent of a boom 
funding climate provided a program experiencing severe problems an opportunity to “get 
well.” In effect, in such cases, what otherwise would have been capability shortfalls were 
converted into cost growth and, relative to MS B, the DoD eventually paid more for the MS B 
capability than had been anticipated. The boom effect includes both of these cases. So does 
accretion of PAUC growth during bust years.  
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The average PAUC growth of all DSARC/DAB bust programs is 38%. Without 
making a specific estimate, P-5126 suggested that most of this PAUC growth stemmed from 
flawed MS B baselines. In the language of the present paper, if all of the unit cost growth 
actually is a matter of “getting well,” the PAUC growth due to flawed MS B baseline 
problems remains at 38%. It is less than 38% to the extent that PAUC growth of MDAPs in 
Bust1, in the years they spent in both bust climates and boom climates, is due to decisions 
to acquire capabilities beyond those of the MS B baselines. Parts of PAUC growth in years 
spent in both boom and bust climates post MS B very probably do reflect acquisition of 
capabilities beyond that of the MS B baseline. Unfortunately, we do not have a way to 
differentiate between PAUC growth due to acquisition of additional capability and that due to 
an increase in the actual costs of the MS B capability. Further statistical analysis along the 
lines of that presented here seems unlikely to be useful in untangling these two elements. 
Instead, progress on the question of why some programs but not others in Bust1 
experienced a boom effect probably will require detailed examination of changes in the 
relevant programs post MS B.  
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Appendix A: Boom Effects for McNamara-Clifford, Acquisition Reform (AR), 
and the Bust Phase of the DAB Post AR 
Table A-1 presents average Program Acquisition Unit Cost (PAUC) growth and 
average program duration data for the McNamara-Clifford and the Acquisition Reform (AR) 
periods.  
Table A-1. Average PAUC Growth and Program Duration for Completed Programs 
for McNamara-Clifford and AR 
 
In contrast to what was found for the DSARC/DAB-Bust period, for McNamara-
Clifford, average PAUC growth for Bust0 programs is about two and one-half times that of 
Bust1 programs. The difference is statistically significant.15 This may be due to the fact that 
the Bust1 programs continued into at least the early 1980s and therefore presumably were 
more strongly influenced by the 1969 Packard acquisition reforms, which are associated 
with a significant reduction in PAUC growth. 
The cost growth data for AR are not useful for statistical analysis because only one 
program that passed MS B during that period (AV-8B Remanufacture) had been completed 
by the December 2015 SARs. 
Appendix B. RDT&E Cost Growth for the DSARC/DAB Period 
Table B 1 presents data on Research, Development, Test, and Evaluation (RDT&E) 
cost growth and duration in the DSARC/DAB period that parallel the PAUC and duration 
data presented in Table 2, Table 3, and Table 4. The number of observations in some cells 
differs from that given for PAUC because the database does not have an RDT&E estimate 
for all programs for which there is a PAUC growth estimate. 
                                            
 
 
15 K-S and A-D find the distributions of PAUC growth in Bust0 and Bust 1, respectively, to be 
consistent with a normal distribution. P = 0.048 for a two-tailed t-test with correction for unequal 
variances. 
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Table B-1. Average RDT&E Growth and Average Program Duration by Number of 
Boom Periods Encountered for Bust and Boom Climates 
 
a Quantity APUC from the MS B baseline 
b From MS B through the year in which the program’s last SAR was filed 
The pattern of growth in RDT&E in the first bust period is consistent with that 
observed for PAUC growth: (1) Average RDT&E growth for programs in Bust1 is significantly 
higher than the average for Bust0; and (2) the proportion of programs of Bust1 that fall into 
the right tail of the distribution also is significantly higher than it is for Bust0.16 
Average RDT&E growth in the second bust period is noticeably higher in Bust1 than 
in Bust0, but the difference is not statistically significant. The proportion of programs with 
RDT&E cost growth of more than 40% also is not significantly higher in Bust1 than in 
Bust0.17 
In the first boom period, average RDT&E cost growth is significantly higher for 
MDAPs in Boom1 than for those in Boom0, and the proportion of MDAPs with RDT&E 
growth of at least 40% also is significantly higher in Boom1 than in Boom0.18 
 
                                            
 
 
16 M-W U P = 0.025 (U = 35.5, n1 = 38, n2 = 5). P = 0.051 for Fisher’s Exact Test (FET) using the 
number of programs in Bust0 and Bust1 with an RDT&E growth of at least 40%. 
17 M-W U P = 0.308 (U = 43, n1 = 17, n2 = 7). P = 1.000 for FET using the number of programs in 
Bust0 and Bust1 with an RDT&E growth of at least 40%. 
18 M-W U P = 0.075 (U = 132, n1 = 26, n2 = 7). P = 0.027 for FET using the number of programs in 
Bust0 and Bust1 with an RDT&E growth of at least 40%. 
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Abstract 
The presence of a technologically superior defense industrial base has been a foundation of 
U.S. strategy since 1945. While the implementation of the budget cuts in the Budget Control 
Act of 2011 has caused concerns for the industrial base, the resulting debate has been 
lacking in empirical analysis. The purpose of this research is to measure the impact of the 
current defense drawdown across all the tiers of the industrial base. The technical approach 
analyzes prime and subprime DoD contract data to measures the impacts of the drawdown 
by sector to better understand how prime and subprime contractors have responded to this 
external market shock. 
Introduction 
The United States has long recognized the importance of supporting and sustaining 
an advanced defense industrial base to maintain global technological superiority. 
Maintaining a technologically superior industrial base requires a wide vendor pool from 
which to produce products, conduct research and development, and provide services for the 
Department of Defense (DoD). This vendor pool includes both the defense contractors 
awarded prime contract obligations but also the lower subcontracting tiers of the industrial 
base.  
However, since the implementation of the 2011 Budget Control Act’s (BCA’s) 
mandatory reductions to the federal budget, Congressional, DoD, government oversight, 
and industry officials have all expressed concerns over the health and future of the defense 
industrial base. These cuts affect not only the top tier of the industrial base (the prime 
contractors), but also the more numerous lower-tier suppliers (subcontractors) that are so 
often the sources of critical technological advances. Heavily dependent on subcontract 
awards from the prime contractors, some of these subcontractors face the risk of going out 
of business due to the drawdown. Funding associated with the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq 
has also declined steeply since 2011, further reinforcing and magnifying the effect of the 
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BCA reductions. The combined effect of these reductions is what is referred to as the 
current defense drawdown, or the drawdown, for purposes of this project. 
The current public discussion surrounding the impact of the drawdown on industry is 
largely based on anecdotes lacking empirical support. Through analysis of publicly-available 
contract data, this research effort measures the impacts of the drawdown by sector to better 
understand how prime and subprime contractors have responded to this external market 
shock.  
Literature Review 
As stated previously, the public discussion surrounding the impact of budget 
drawdown trends on industry is often based on anecdotes, absent of empirical evidence. To 
better assess the validity of some of these claims, the study team looked to the academic 
literature to help ground the analysis in general historical principles of industrial base 
evolution. Where similarities exist, the academic literature permits comparing whether the 
challenges of sequestration, and subsequent responses, are like similar historical external 
market shocks seen in the private sector. Reviewing the academic literature further 
illuminates research variables that, while present in business and academic journals, have 
been underexplored in the defense context. 
DoD Component 
The DoD faced the largest overall reductions of any department in the U.S. federal 
government during sequestration. These reductions had significant but uneven effects on 
DoD spending and affected each service in differing ways. Though the defense industrial 
base is effectively a monopsony in which the U.S. federal government is ultimately the only 
buyer, many acquisition decisions are not made by a singular decision-making organization, 
but by the major DoD components. While a topline budget and overall/cross-department 
acquisition trends are somewhat out of the components’ control, lower-level trends are likely 
to reflect the component’s top priorities and not just standardized cuts across the board. For 
example, given these dynamics, it would not be surprising to see the Navy limit, to the 
extent possible, cuts to its shipbuilding budget even if it meant taking sharper cuts 
elsewhere. 
The policy guidance for responding to budgetary cuts coming out of the components 
leading up to and throughout the defense drawdown reflects this dynamic. Each of the 
different components had its own set of priorities and varied plans for addressing the 
budgetary challenges. For example, the Navy’s choices are seen in this 2014 Quadrennial 
Defense Review statement: “To sustain investment in critical force structure and 
modernization, the Navy will reduce its funding for contractor services by approximately $3 
billion per year to return to 2001 levels of contractor support” (DoD, 2014b). Meanwhile, the 
Air Force planned to address the budgetary challenge by making “near-term capacity 
reductions in mission areas such as lift, command and control, and fighters” to prioritize its 
top three modernization programs: F-35 Fighter, B-21 Bomber, and KC-46A Tanker (DoD, 
2014b). Furthermore, the Army announced that it would take an approach different from 
either the Air Force or the Navy, electing to protect funding for readiness at the expense of 
modernization and force structure. 
Vendor Size 
A critical question asked prior to and throughout sequestration and the drawdown 
was whether smaller defense contractors would be able to survive the sequestration and 
continuing drawdowns (Samuelsohn, 2013). Furthermore, Sen. Mary Landrieu, Chairwoman 
of the Small Business and Entrepreneurship Committee, speculated that “small businesses 
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are going to be the ones that feel the most immediate effects” of spending cuts originating 
from the BCA (Samuelsohn, 2013). Due to the number of contracts held by smaller defense 
contractors and their specialized niche capabilities, some argued that it seemed almost 
inevitable that the negative impacts of sequestration will “disproportionately” affect smaller 
contractors (Eaglen, 2012). Without having a large and diversified portfolio of defense 
contracts that reduce the impact of spending cuts in one line of business, small defense 
contractors looked to be unable to withstand the reductions in military spending (Homan, 
2014).  
Within the academic literature, the relationship between vendor size and its success 
during a downturn is less clear. Even though commentators tend to give credit to larger 
businesses having more success than small business during an economic downturn, the 
literature suggests that success is more dependent on strategies available to a company, 
not its size alone (Sivy, 2012). The role of vendor size is indirect but can still be critical; the 
size of a vendor influences what business strategies are available for pursuit. Vendors of 
different sizes pursue different strategies during periods of market shock, such as economic 
downturns.  
Smaller businesses and non-profits may have their strategic options limited because 
they face significantly higher obstacles to other strategies, like raising money, during an 
economic downturn (Banjo & Kalita, 2010). Due to their associated risk, small businesses 
were often denied needed external financing from banks during the 2008 recession (Guo, 
2014). Without the revenue of a growing market and no access to external financing, small 
business were left with higher rates of unemployment compared to large businesses (Guo, 
2014). Additionally, during the recent recession, it was common for organizations to 
immediately seek the means to reduce their operating costs in order to stay afloat (Gulati, 
Nohria, & Wohlgezogen, 2010). Larger companies typically rely on their ability to consolidate 
and reduce significant amounts of operating costs to survive an economic downturn (Kambil, 
2008). While this option may be available to larger companies who have multiple lines of 
business and substantial reserves to pull from, small businesses do not have the same 
quantity of cash flow or large reserves available (Bossaller & Kammer, 2009).  
Although small businesses generally faced increasingly more difficult challenges 
during the downturn, they also retained certain benefits that large companies did not have 
access to (Lai et al., 2016). When reducing operating costs, large companies often undergo 
substantial structural changes that force larger lay-offs (Lai et al., 2016). Small firms, on the 
other hand, have a notable strength in flexibility and adaptability to a rapidly changing 
market (Lai et al., 2016). Without the levels of bureaucracy in a large company, small 
companies retain a shorter timeline for decision-making which allows them to respond 
quickly and efficiently to their customer base (Bossaller & Kammer, 2009).  
Vendor Count: “Consolidation Theory” 
Both the academic literature and historical examples suggest that the DoD should 
expect to see consolidation within the defense industrial base under sequestration and the 
subsequent drawdown. Since the end of the Cold War, defense contractors have resorted to 
consolidation amid budgetary drawdowns (Gholz & Sapolsky, 2000). As the defense budget 
fell sharply throughout the 1990s, defense contractors turned to horizontal mergers, 
acquisitions, and divestitures in order to prevent themselves from going under, setting off “a 
wave of consolidation” that reduced the number of American-based large prime defense 
contractors from 16 in 1993 to only six in 2000 (Alfieri et al., 2014; Kovacic & Smallwood, 
1994).  
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After the BCA was enacted in 2011, and with the prospect of sequestration looming 
on the horizon, many defense contractors were worried about their imminent future (Scully, 
2011). Although history suggests that we would expect to see an increase in consolidation in 
such circumstances, this may not be the case at the top tier of defense contracting, given 
that the already high-level of consolidation during the post–Cold War drawdown left little 
room for the large prime defense contractors to acquire additional market share (Thompson, 
2010). Nonetheless, in the period leading up sequestration, large primes such as Lockheed 
Martin, L-3, and Exelis were vocal about seeking the means to consolidate and waiting to 
“take any available piece of a shrinking pie” (Banham, 2013). 
The academic literature supports the argument that we might expect to see further 
consolidation within the defense industry under market shocks such as sequestration and 
the defense drawdown. One strategy for improving profit and revenue during a recession 
has been to effectively consolidate certain aspects of a business (Kambil, 2008). A 
recessionary period offers a unique opportunity for businesses to capitalize on competitors’ 
vulnerabilities and increase value through consolidation (Rhodes & Stelter, 2009). In a 
recession, consolidation through a merger has been shown to generate 15% more value 
than in “normal conditions” (Rhodes & Stelter, 2009). Furthermore, the relationship between 
market shocks such as recessions to higher rates of consolidation was also recently 
demonstrated by the higher rate of consolidation in the banking industry during the 2008 
recession.  
Competition 
An evergreen top DoD priority is the presence of a competitive defense industrial 
base. In the “Guidelines for Creating and Maintaining a Competitive Environment for 
Supplies and Services in the Department of Defense,” the DoD lays out seven different 
reasons competition is important in the defense marketplace (DoD, 2014a): 
1. Competition creates an incentive for contractors to provide goods and 
services at a lower price (economic efficiency);  
2. Competition spurs innovation of transformational technologies, which allows 
the Department to field the best weapon systems for our warfighters quickly; 
3. Competition yields improvements in the quality of products delivered and 
services rendered (firms that turn out low quality are driven out of the market 
and are unable to effectively compete); 
4. Competition affords the Department the opportunity to acquire performance 
improvements (e.g., faster, lighter, more sustainable) by using “best value” 
source selection criteria; 
5. Competition provides opportunities for capable small businesses to enter new 
markets; 
6. Competition enhances (or maintains) a strong defense industrial base which 
provides an operational surge capability to handle demand spikes, and;  
7. Competition curbs fraud by creating opportunities to re-assess sources of 
goods and services reinforcing the public trust and confidence in the 
transparency of the Defense Acquisition System. 
Given the importance of competition, the DoD tracks and publishes the share of 
contract obligations in its annual “Competition Report.” In the DoD’s FY 2015 Competition 
Report, it reported that the share of contract obligations awarded after competition had been 
falling, with the exception of FY 2014, each year since FY 2009. Whereas 60.7% of FY 2009 
contract obligations had been awarded after competition, only 55.4% of FY 2015 contract 
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obligations were awarded after competition (Defense Procurement and Acquisition Policy, 
n.d.). However, CSIS analysis, supported by data contained in the FY 2015 Competition 
Report, shows that the declines in the overall competition rates are a result of policies 
reducing conditions in which contracts are awarded after an open competition, but receive 
only offer. Therefore, while the overall rate of competition may have technically fallen, the 
rate of effective competition has remained relatively steady (Hunter et al., 2017).  
The academic literature on consolidation is also relevant here as market shocks can 
further reduce competition by encouraging consolidation. In a consolidated market, a 
smaller number of firms have a greater market share, which reduces the number of potential 
competitors for any given project. While the decline in competition predates sequestration, 
its continuation during most of the drawdown years seems to show that at the Department-
wide level, the literature and the DoD’s metrics are aligned. 
However, while the annual DoD competition report provides important data at the 
topline, it insufficiently measures the rate of competition at lower levels, particularly sector-
by-sector. Beyond the topline, the annual competition reports provide data on the rate of 
competition within the major DoD components, but each service reports its data differently, 
and these reporting frameworks do not always align for comparative purposes.  
Methodology & Study Design 
This report leverages and builds upon the methodology used in previous CSIS 
reports on federal contracting. 1 To measure the impact of sequestration and the defense 
drawdown on different sectors of the defense industrial base, the study team first created a 
dataset of prime and sub-prime contract awards from 2010–2015 using the Federal 
Procurement Data System (FPDS) and Federal Subaward Reporting System (FSRS). From 
this dataset, the CSIS study team separated the defense industrial base into 10 distinct 
“platform portfolios.”2 To create these platform portfolios, the study team first classified 
contract obligations by their listed DoD Claimant Program Code. Second, for instances 
where the “DoD Claimant Program Code was missing or not platform specific (e.g., Services 
or Subsistence) obligations were classified using the Product or Services Code” (Berteau, 
McCormick, & Sanders, 2014). 
Having created these 10 unique platform portfolios, the CSIS study team decided to 
focus its analysis in this paper on the three sectors of the defense industrial base that Frank 
Kendall, former Under Secretary of Defense (AT&L), had previously identified as of the most 
concern: ground combat, high-performance aircraft, and surface combatant ships (Bertuca, 
2014). These three sectors largely align to the Aircraft and Drones, Land Vehicles, and 
Ships and Submarines platform portfolios respectively. In the final technical report, the CSIS 
study team will expand its analysis to include the other platform portfolios beyond these 
initial three sectors.  
                                            
 
 
1 For the full CSIS FPDS methodology, see: http://csis.org/program/methodology  
2 The 10 unique CSIS platform portfolios are as follows: Aircraft and Drones; Ships and Submarines; 
Land Vehicles; Missiles and Space Systems; Weapons and Ammunition; Other Products; Electronics 
and Communications; Facilities and Construction; Other Services; Other R&D and Knowledge Based; 
Unlabeled 
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For these three platform portfolios, the CSIS study team focused on the four 
variables identified in the literature review that are observable through FPDS data: 
• DoD Component: Did the DoD components respond differently to 
sequestration and the defense drawdown? 
• Vendor Size: How did the share of contract obligations change among 
vendors of differing sizes, particularly small businesses? 
• Vendor Count: How did the number of vendors change? 
• Competition: Did the share of contract obligations awarded after effective 
competition change? 
Finally, the study team sought to evaluate the availability and quality of 
subcontracting data across the different sectors of the defense industrial base. This effort 
builds off a 2014 study conducted by Nancy Moore at RAND, which concluded for FSRS 
data from FY 2010 to FY 2012, FSRS data was often incomplete or missing, but was 
improving each year (Moore, Grammich, & Mele, 2014).  
Did the DoD Components Respond Differently? 
Across the DoD, the response to the market shock imposed by sequestration and the 
budget drawdown differed among the various major DoD components, both in magnitude 
and response strategy. At the top line, average overall DoD annual contract obligations from 
2012–2015 fell by 21% compared to the pre-down period. Of the major DoD components, 
the Army bore the brunt of these cuts, suffering a 39% decline in average annual contract 
obligations over that same period while the Air Force (-15%) fell at rates below the overall 
DoD rate of decline. Finally, the Defense Logistics Agency (DLA) (-7% decline), Navy (-
12%), and Other DoD (-6%) fell at rates significantly slower than the overall DoD rate of 
decline, while the Missile Defense Agency (MDA) grew 12% over that same period.  
Within the major DoD components, their response to sequestration and the defense 
drawdown differed. The Air Force, more so than any other component, balanced the 
distribution of the cuts but still elected to fund certain platform portfolios over others. As 
annual average Air Force contract obligations declined 15% during the drawdown, most Air 
Force platform portfolios fell at rates similar to the overall rate. For example, average annual 
Air Force contract obligations for Aircraft and Drones, Missile and Space Systems, and 
Electronics and Communications fell by 11%, 20%, and 14% respectively. The Air Force 
made cuts greater than the overall rate of decline to its Facilities and Construction (-26%) 
and Other Products (-42%) allowing for the 11% increase in Weapons and Ammunition.3 
The Army made cuts to every platform portfolio, but those cuts were not distributed 
evenly across the platforms. The Army Aircraft and Drones platform portfolio saw the 
smallest cut (-8% decline in average annual contract obligations), followed by Missiles and 
Space Systems (-22%), and Other R&D (-27%). To limit the cuts made in these platform 
portfolios, more severe cuts were made to Land Vehicles (-67%), Other Products (-51%), 
Other Services (-49%) and Weapons and Ammunition (-49%).  
                                            
 
 
3 Air Force Ships & Submarines (44%) and Land Vehicles (61%) platform portfolios experienced 
growth in average annual contract obligations during the drawdown, but represent just 0.2% of total 
Air Force contract obligations. 
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Finally, similar to the Army, the Navy elected to protect certain platform portfolios 
over others. However, unlike the Army, the Navy increased funding over previous levels for 
certain platform portfolios. As overall average annual Navy contract obligations decreased 
by 12%, average annual Navy contract obligations for Aircraft and Drones and Missiles and 
Space increased by 11% and 0.1% respectively. Additionally, average annual Navy Ships & 
Submarines contract obligations decreased just 4% during the defense drawdown. Funding 
for these three platform portfolios was offset by more severe cuts in Electronics and 
Communications (-23%), Facilities and Construction (-24%), Other Products (-41%), Land 
Vehicles (-79%) and Other R&D (-36%). 
 
 Platform Portfolio by Major DoD Components, 2010–2016 Figure 1.
(Source: FPDS; CSIS analysis) 
Platform Portfolio Case Study 1: Aircraft and Drones 
For the first platform portfolio, Aircraft and Drones, average annual contract 
obligations during the defense drawdown declined 4% as compared to pre-drawdown 
average contract obligations. The predominant source of that decline was the 41% decline 
in annual average contract obligations for Aircraft and Drones R&D contract obligations. 
Annual average contract obligations for Products remained steady, and Services (10%) 
grew over that period.  
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Aircraft: Vendor Size 
Under sequestration and the defense drawdown, the Big 5 have only further 
increased their market share of this sector at the expense of other large contractors.4 Prior 
to the drawdown, the Big 5 accounted for 57% of total Aircraft and Drones contract 
obligations, compared to 30% for Large vendors. Between 2012 and 2015, the Big 5 
increased their market share to 61% of total Aircraft and Drones contract obligations as 
Large vendors fell to 26%. These trends continued into the reversal of the contracting 
drawdown in 2016 with Big 5 vendors rising to 64% and Large vendors falling to 24% of total 
Aircraft and Drones contract obligations.  
The share of contract obligations going to Small and Medium vendors remained 
relatively steady. Before the drawdown, small and medium vendors were awarded 5% and 
8% of total Aircraft and Drones contract obligations respectively and remained at that rate 
throughout the drawdown period. This outcome is in line with the finding from the literature 
that business strategy more than business size drives results. 
Figure 2 shows Aircraft and Drones by Vendor Size from 2010 to 2016. 
 
 Aircraft and Drones by Size of Vendor, 2010–2016 Figure 2.
(Source: FPDS; CSIS analysis) 
Aircraft: Competition 
Under sequestration and the defense drawdown, the historical trends for increasing 
contract obligations awarded without competition in the Aircraft and Drones sector 
accelerated. Between 2000 and 2010, only 26% of Aircraft and Drones contract obligations 
were awarded after effective competition, while 67% of contract obligations were awarded 
after no competition.5 Between 2012 and 2015, the share of annual average contract 
obligations awarded after effective competition fell to 18%, while the share of annual 
average contract obligations awarded without competition increased to 79%. Throughout the 
                                            
 
 
4 CSIS defines the Big 5 as Lockheed Martin, Boeing, Raytheon, Northrop Grumman, and General 
Dynamics. 
5 CSIS uses the term effective competition to refer to competition with two or more offers. 
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2012 to 2015 period, annual average contract obligations awarded without competition grew 
from $51.9 billion prior to the drawdown, to $53.6 billion, a 3% increase even as overall 
Aircraft and Drones contract obligations fell 4%. 
When the contract drawdown began to reverse in 2016, these trends only further 
continued as the share of Aircraft and Drones contract obligations awarded after no 
competition increased to 81%. Only 18% of Aircraft and Drones contract obligations were 
awarded after effective competition in 2016.  
Figure 3 shows Aircraft and Drones by competition classification from 2010 to 2016. 
 
 Level of Competition for Aircraft and Drones Contract Obligations, Figure 3.
2010–2016  
(Source: FPDS; CSIS analysis) 
Aircraft: Vendor Count 
As shown in Figure 5, the number of vendors in the Aircraft and Drones sector 
increased over the course of the defense drawdown after initially declining. This result is 
somewhat surprising given that since 2005, except for 2008, the number of vendors in the 
Aircraft and Drones sector had been declining compared to the previous year, reaching 
approximately 6,100 vendors in 2010. This decline continued until 2014, when there were 
under 5,700 vendors in 2014, a 7% decline from 2010. However, beginning in 2015 and 
continuing into 2016, the number of vendors in the Aircraft and Drones sectors increased 
from the previous year. In 2016, there were approximately 6,250 vendors in the Aircraft and 
Drones sector, a 10% increase as compared to 2014. The speed with which the number of 
vendors rebounded and the steady market share for small and medium vendors is 
consistent with the observation in the literature that smaller players can prove nimble in 
response to market shocks. 
Acquisition Research Program: 
Creating Synergy for Informed Change - 107 - 
Figure 4 shows the number of vendors in the Aircraft and Drones platform portfolio 
from 2005 to 2016. 
 
 Aircraft and Drones by Vendor Count, 2005–2016 Figure 4.
(Source: FPDS; CSIS analysis) 
Aircraft and Drones: Subcontract Data Availability 
In analyzing FSRS data, the CSIS study team found a large discrepancy in the 
availability of subcontracting data for the Aircraft and Drones platform portfolio between the 
major DoD components. Shown in Figure 5, of the major DoD components, the Navy and 
Other DoD had the greatest share of prime contract obligation dollars in FSRS, both near 
approximately 45%. Comparatively, both the Air Force and the Army lag the Navy and Other 
DoD, reporting less than one-third of prime contract obligations in FSRS annually. 
 
 Aircraft and Drones FSRS Data Availability by SubCustomer, 2010–2015 Figure 5.
(Source: FPDS; CSIS analysis) 
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Platform Portfolio Case Study 2: Land Vehicles 
In recent years, the Land Vehicles platform portfolio underwent greater percentage 
declines than any other platform portfolio as average annual contract obligations fell -65% 
compared to before the drawdown. The collapse reflects not just that the components 
priorities were elsewhere, but also a fall from favored status during the period of large scale 
contingency operations and rapid acquisition of highly protected tactical vehicles such as 
mine resistant ambush protected vehicles. The 65% decline was nearly double the next 
closest percentage decline (Weapons and Ammunition; -34%), and significantly higher than 
the 21% overall DoD decline.  
Land Vehicles: Vendor Size 
As shown in Figure 6, throughout the 2013–2015 period, the Land Vehicles sector 
experienced significant change in the share of contract obligations awarded by vendor size. 
Prior to the start of the defense drawdown, Land Vehicle contract obligations were awarded 
as follows: 58% to Large vendors, 14% to the Big 5, 20% to Medium vendors, and just 7% to 
Small vendors. Throughout the drawdown, the Big 5 and Small vendors saw increased 
market share at the expense of Large vendors. During this period, the share of annual 
average contract obligations going to Large vendors fell to 45%, while the share going to the 
Big 5 and Small Vendors increased to 23% and 14% respectively. The increased share of 
contract obligations going to the Big 5 (-44%) and Small (-34%) vendors can be accounted 
for by their slower average annual contract obligation decline than the overall rate of decline 
(-65%). 
 
 Land Vehicles by Size of Vendor, 2010–2016 Figure 6.
(Source: FPDS; CSIS analysis) 
Land Vehicles: Competition 
Throughout the defense drawdown, the Land Vehicle sector saw a decline in the rate 
of effective competition and increase in the share of contract obligations awarded without 
competition. As shown in Figure 7, at the start of the drawdown, 32% of Land Vehicle 
contract obligations were awarded after effective competition, and 52% were awarded with 
zero competition. During the drawdown, the share of contract obligations awarded after 
effective competition fell slightly to 30%, as the share of contract obligation awarded without 
effective competition increased to 69% from 65%.  
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 Level of Competition for Land Vehicles Contract Obligations, 2010–2016 Figure 7.
(Source: FPDS; CSIS analysis) 
These trends began to reverse themselves in 2016 as the share of contract 
obligations awarded after effective competition increased to 30%, and the share of contract 
obligations awarded without competition fell to 62%. New contracts appear to be driving the 
increasing share of effective competition; the sector saw a 9% rise in contract obligations in 
2016, as compared to average annual contract obligations during the drawdown period. 
Land Vehicle contract obligations awarded after effective competition rose from an average 
of $2.0 billion from 2013–2015 to $2.2 billion in 2016.  
Land Vehicles: Vendor Count 
At the start of this defense drawdown, the downward trend in the number of vendors 
in the Land Vehicles sector continued declining before eventually flattening out and slowly 
rebounding near the end of the study period. After spiking in 2009 at approximately 5,900 
vendors, 2010 marked the start of the decline in the number of Land Vehicles vendors as 
the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq and subsequent war-related vehicle funding declined. This 
trend continued until 2013, when there were just under 3,950 vendors, a 33% decline from 
2009. However, that trend began to slowly reverse in 2014, with the number of Land 
Vehicles vendors growing on average, 1.5% per year since 2014, as shown in Figure 8.  
 
 Land Vehicle by Vendor Count, 2005–2016 Figure 8.
(Source: FPDS; CSIS analysis) 
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Land Vehicles: Subcontract Data Availability 
The FSRS data show that the subcontracting data for Land Vehicles is more 
available than Aircraft and Drones, but significant gaps exist. At peak data availability in 
2014, over 40% of prime dollars was available in FSRS. However, as prime contract 
obligations for Land Vehicles increased in 2015, FSRS data availably fell. 
The Land Vehicle data validate Nancy Moore’s findings on the manner in which old, 
large contracts drag down the availability rate of FSRS subcontract data. Given the 
requirement to report subcontract awards to FSRS is relatively new and not retroactive, 
many large older contracts will never show up in the database. Therefore, as those 
contracts are canceled, expired, or not renewed, one should expect to see FSRS data 
availability go up, as in the case of Land Vehicles during the defense drawdown.  
Figure 9 shows the share of prime dollars available in FSRS compared to the share 
of prime dollars not available in FSRS from 2010 to 2015. 
 
 Land Vehicles FSRS Data Availability, 2010–2015 Figure 9.
(Source: FPDS; CSIS analysis) 
Platform Portfolio Case Study 3: Ships & Submarines  
During the recent defense drawdown, the Ships & Submarines platform portfolio saw 
the smallest decline of all the platform portfolios, falling just 3% from the pre-drawdown 
levels. During the drawdown, average annual Ships & Submarines R&D contract obligations 
declined by 49%, compared to the 3% decline in Products and 2% increase in Services 
contract obligations.  
Ships & Submarines: Vendor Size 
Over the study period, the Ships & Submarines platform portfolio saw a significant 
shakeup in the share of contract obligations awarded by vendor size as the Big 5 saw 
significant decreases in market share. However, this trend was largely driven by Northrop 
Grumman’s decision to spin off its shipbuilding sector into Huntington Ingalls Industries (HII) 
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in 2011. Given shipbuilding’s low profit margins and then-uncertainty about future defense 
budgets at that time, Northrop decided to re-prioritize investment in other sectors of the 
defense industrial base and spin off its shipbuilding assets, creating HII effective halfway 
through FY 2011 (Drew, 2011). 
Figure 10 shows that at the start of the drawdown and prior to the formation of HII, 
the Big 5 accounted for 58% of all Ships & Submarines contract obligations. However, by 
the end of the defense drawdown, the Big 5 accounted for just 37% of contract obligations, 
as the share of contract obligations awarded to Large vendors increased from 20% to 41%. 
Both the share and sum of contract obligations awarded to Medium-sized vendors. As a 
share of contract obligations, Medium-sized vendors increased from 9% to 11%, while total 
contract obligations increased by 13%, rising from an annual average of $2.2 billion pre-
drawdown, to $2.5 billion during the drawdown. The share of contract obligations going to 
Small vendors fell slightly, but remained relatively steady going from 12% to 11%.  
 
 Ships & Submarines by Size of Vendor, 2010–2016 Figure 10.
(Source: FPDS; CSIS analysis) 
Ships & Submarines: Competition 
During the most of this recent drawdown, the Ships & Submarines platform portfolio 
saw an increase in the share of contract obligations awarded after effective competition as 
shown in Figure 11. In the years prior to the start of the drawdown, 32% of contract 
obligations were awarded after effective competition. Throughout the drawdown, the 
percentage of contract obligations awarded after effective competition rose from 32% to 
38%. As the share of contract obligations awarded after effective competition increase, the 
share of contract obligations awarded without competition and the share of contract 
obligations awarded with just one offer fell from 61% to 56% and 7% to 6% respectively. The 
rise in shipbuilding competition contrasts with the fall in harder hit sectors, suggesting that 
rates of competition may be one of the consequences of the shock. 
Of note, the increase in the share of contract obligations awarded after effective 
competition was not from declines in average annual contract obligations awarded without 
competition (-10%), but by increasing average annual contract awarded after effective 
competition as the overall platform portfolio decreased. Prior to the drawdown, annual 
average Ships & Submarines contract obligations awarded after effective competition 
totaled $7.7 billion. During the drawdown, that number increased by 14%, rising from $7.7 
billion to $8.8 billion.  
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 Level of Competition for Ships & Submarines Contract Obligations, Figure 11.
2010–2016 
(Source: FPDS; CSIS analysis) 
Ships & Submarines: Vendor Count 
In the years leading up to the defense drawdown, the number of vendors in the Ships 
& Submarines sector had been slowly increasing after a previous decline, peaking at 
approximately 5,300 in 2011. After peaking in 2011, the number of vendors in the Ships & 
Submarines sector declined slightly, approximately 1%, for two years until 2013. Since 
2013, the number of vendors in this platform portfolio has increased by 2.7% annually, 
totaling an approximately 5,600 vendors.  
Figure 12 shows the number of vendors in the Ships & Submarines platform portfolio 
from 2005 to 2016. 
 
  Ships & Submarines by Vendor Count, 2005–2016 Figure 12.
(Source: FPDS; CSIS analysis) 
Ships & Submarines: Subcontract Data Availability 
Of the platform portfolios analyzed, the Ships & Submarines FSRS data was the 
most incomplete. As shown in Figure 13, after continual increases in data availability from 
2010 to 2013, the share of prime dollars available in FSRS peaked around 25% in 2013. 
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Since 2013, the share of prime dollars available in FSRS has continued to fall and sits at 
approximately 13% in 2015.  
 
 Ships & Submarines FSRS Data Availability, 2010–2015 Figure 13.
(Source: FPDS; CSIS analysis) 
Conclusion  
The results of this preliminary data analysis show that sequestration and the broader 
defense drawdown have made a measurable impact on the defense industrial base. 
Furthermore, the data show that the impact of sequestration and the defense drawdown has 
not been uniform across the entire defense industrial base, with each sector analyzed in this 
paper responding differently. 
DoD Component: Did the DoD components respond differently to sequestration and 
the defense drawdown? 
The results of the CSIS analysis demonstrate that the Army, Navy, and Air Force 
each took a different approach for responding to the challenges imposed by sequestration 
and the defense drawdown. The Army, facing the most significant budgetary declines, 
elected to distribute uneven cuts across all platform portfolios. In the Army’s contracting 
account, the Aircraft and Drones and Missile and Space Systems platform portfolios saw 
smaller cuts than the overall rate of Army decline, at the expense of other platform portfolios 
such as Land Vehicles and Weapons and Ammunition. The Air Force took a more 
distributed approach with only a few platform portfolios seeing cuts larger than the overall 
rate of decline. Finally, the Navy prioritized three platform portfolios (Aircraft and Drones; 
Missiles and Space Systems; Ships & Submarines) at the expense of more severe cuts in 
five other platform portfolios.6 
                                            
 
 
6 These five Navy Platform Portfolios that experienced more severe cuts were: Electronics and 
Communications; Facilities and Construction; Other Products; Land Vehicles; and Other R&D. 
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Vendor Size: How did the share of contract obligations change among vendors of 
differing sizes, particularly small businesses? 
The data show that the changes in the share of contract obligations among vendors 
of differing sizes depended on the sector of the defense industrial base. In the Aircraft and 
Drones sector, the Big 5 vendors maintained and expanded their market share during the 
recent defense drawdown at the expense of Large vendors. Small vendors maintained their 
pre-drawdown, albeit small, share of this sector market seeing little change in either 
direction throughout the study period.  
In the Land Vehicles sector, the Big 5 and Small vendors increased their share of the 
market throughout the defense drawdown at the expense of Medium and Large vendors.  
Finally, in the Ships & Submarines platform portfolio, the Big 5’s decreased market 
share throughout the defense drawdown is attributable to the spinoff of HII from Northrop 
Grumman. Contract obligations that had previously been going to Northrop were now being 
awarded to HII, a Large vendor. Throughout the study period, Small vendors remained 
relatively steady around 12% of overall Ships & Submarine contract obligations. 
Vendor Count: How did the number of vendors change? 
Across all three platform portfolios analyzed, the data show that at the start of the 
defense drawdown the number of vendors in these sectors was decreasing, before starting 
to rebound near the end of the defense drawdown. For example, the Aircraft and Drones 
sector experienced a 7% loss in vendors from 2010 to 2014, before growing by 10% from 
2014 to 2016. This is similarly matched by the 1.5% and 2.7% annual growth in the number 
of vendors in the Land Vehicles and Ships & Submarines platform portfolio respectively. 
Competition: Did the share of contract obligations awarded after effective competition 
change? 
The data show two very different results across the three platform portfolios analyzed 
here. In both the Aircraft and Drones and Land Vehicles platform portfolios, the rate of 
effective competition declined throughout the course of the defense drawdown. In both 
cases, the rise in the share of contract obligation awarded without effective competition was 
driven by increases in the share of contract obligations awarded without competition.  
Meanwhile, the Ships & Submarines industry is often anecdotally referred to as one 
of the least competitive sectors of the industrial base. However, the data show that share of 
contract obligations awarded after effective competition increased during the drawdown. 
This trend was driven by two separate factors. First, throughout the drawdown, annual 
average contract obligations awarded without competition increased at a rate higher than 
the overall rate of decline. Second, annual average contract obligations awarded after 
effective competition increased by 14% as the overall platform portfolio decreased by 3%. 
The rise in shipbuilding competition contrasts with the fall in harder hit sectors, suggesting 
that declining rates of competition may be one of the consequences of the shock. 
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Figure 14 summarizes the CSIS platform portfolio analysis results.  
 
 Summary of CSIS Platform Portfolio Analysis Results Figure 14.
Is the FSRS Data Available?  
The data show that the FSRS database remains too incomplete to draw top-level 
trends across every platform portfolio category. Alarmingly, the rate of reporting also 
appears to be plateauing after early years of steady improvements. Of the three platform 
portfolios analyzed above, Aircraft and Drones and Land Vehicles had roughly the same 
availability at around 25 to 30% of prime contract obligations dollars appearing in FSRS in 
recent years. For Ships & Submarines, only 10 to 20% of contract obligation dollars 
appeared in FSRS in recent years. These three platform portfolios also represent three of 
the more complete platform portfolios with regards to data availability. Only the Missile and 
Space Systems and Weapons and Ammunition platform portfolios have relatively similar 
shares of prime contract obligations in FSRS. 
The data show that the FSRS database is inadequate for top-level trend analysis; the 
data presented above show that certain sub-sectors are more mature than others, even 
within the same platform portfolio. For example, in the Aircraft and Drones platform portfolio, 
the Navy had much better coverage in FSRS than either the Air Force or the Army. While 
FSRS data may be inadequate for the top-level analysis, the maturity of certain sub-sectors 
makes analysis of the subcontracting trends in that sub-sector possible. When combined 
with data from FPDS, other mature sub-sectors, and qualitative interviews, it is possible to 
glean important insights into the sub-contracting dynamics in action in various parts of the 
defense industrial base.  
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Abstract 
Contracts relying on crisis funds (including emergency funds) may bypass many safeguards 
built into normal spending processes. This study examines the literature on how these 
contracts are fulfilled for both civilian and defense crisis funds, primarily focusing on the 
American Recovery and Reinvestment Act (ARRA), disaster funds, and Overseas 
Contingency Operations (OCO) funds, beginning with contracts awarded in 2012 and using 
publicly available data.  
This paper discusses the challenges and contradictions that make identifying OCO-funded 
contracts difficult and then presents a methodology for classifying them. The paper then 
analyzes trends in contracting from the post-Iraq withdrawal period. This analysis focuses on 
three areas where the literature review showed that crisis contracting diverges from 
conventional contracting: noncompetitive awards, undefinitized contract actions, and 
reachback contracts. The dataset created for this study will be made publicly available to 
allow for analysis of this data by other researchers and to close an important transparency 
gap. 
Introduction 
Contracting during a crisis is replete with challenges. Speed and flexibility are 
essential because delay means that urgent needs go unmet. However, uncertainty is 
commonplace, whether the crisis is prompted by natural disasters, military conflicts, or 
economic disturbances. These conditions are vulnerable to the infamous trifecta of waste, 
fraud, and/or abuse, but even setting those extremes aside, many justifiable crisis contracts 
cannot or should not be sustained in ordinary times.  
This century has already seen a range of high-profile crisis contracting: contingency 
contracting during the invasion and subsequent occupation in Afghanistan and Iraq, the 
American Recovery and Reinvestment Act (Recovery Act) pursuit of shovel-ready projects in 
response to the global financial crises, and government responses to range of disasters 
such as Hurricane Katrina. Important work has been done to provide oversight and 
transparency by the Government Accountability and Transparency Board and the 
Commission on Wartime Contracting, as well as inspectors general (IGs) and others.  
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However, when the news moves on to a new set of crises and the final reports are 
filed, lessons identified in one domain may never be transferred to another. Worse yet, as 
attention fades, there is risk of backsliding because it becomes increasingly challenging to 
determine whether recommendations were followed and whether they succeeded in 
mitigating the risks that drove reform efforts. This paper is focused on Overseas 
Contingency Operations (OCO) funded contracting after the initial withdrawal from Iraq, a 
period that benefits from efforts by the DoD to improve data transparency; this situation is 
also comparatively understudied, in no small part, because of the opaqueness and 
ambiguity surrounding the OCO budget. 
While this portion of the project is focused specifically on Department of Defense 
contracting, the study team has conducted a literature review that also includes studies of 
civilian efforts, such as the Recovery Act and disaster response efforts. Despite their 
differences, the many concerns about crisis contracting apply across domains. Likewise, the 
publicly available Federal Procurement Data System (FPDS) provides a common window 
through which these distinct crisis contracts cases can be observed and compared.  
Following the literature review, this paper discusses the challenges and 
contradictions that make identifying OCO-funded contracts difficult and then presents a 
methodology for classifying them.1 The paper then analyzes trends in contracting from the 
post-Iraq withdrawal period. This analysis focuses on three areas where the literature review 
indicated that crisis contracting diverges from conventional contracting: noncompetitive 
awards, undefinitized contract actions, and reachback contracts. The paper concludes by 
summarizing initial findings from the contingency contracting dataset. 
What Is Contingency Contracting? 
Handling crises is an important part of the job of the United States military, so it 
comes as no surprise that there are explicit legal categories for crisis contracting. McMillon 
(2000) provided a helpful glossary, including contingency contracting itself:  
Direct contracting support to tactical and operational forces engaged in the 
full spectrum of armed conflict and Military Operations Other Than War, both 
domestic and overseas. It includes Major Regional Conflicts, Lesser Regional 
Conflicts, Military Operations Other Than War, and Domestic 
Disaster/Emergency Relief. (pp. 5–7).  
This paper also includes a similar category of operations that fall under a different 
portion of the U.S. legal code: “humanitarian or peacekeeping operations.”2  
The U.S. government extensively relied on contingency contracting after the 9/11 
attacks and the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq. This was not a new phenomenon; with the 
move to an all-volunteer military, contractors had an important role to play from the Gulf War 
                                            
 
 
1 The study team has published a dynamic web tool for visualizing OCO-funded contracts starting in 
2012. For researchers wishing to replicate the results of this study or conduct their own research, the 
study team is sharing a complete list of the procurement identifiers and key characteristics of 
contracts in the dataset. 
2 For the full definition of contingency operations, see 10 U.S.C. 101(a)(13). For the full definition of 
humanitarian operations and peacekeeping, see 10 U.S.C. 2302(8). 
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to the war in Kosovo.3 Nonetheless, the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq and the subsequent 
occupations prompted steady increases in spending on contingencies. From 2002 until 2008 
approximately, $159 billion in contracts were awarded in contingency contracts (GAO, 
2012). Specifically, emergency supplemental appropriations, which later evolved into the 
OCO budget, rapidly grew and focused on difficult to predict wartime expenses including 
contingency contracts. As Sharon Pickup and Asif Khan (2009) noted, this growth continued 
in 2007 when the “DOD revised its Financial Management Regulation, expanding the 
definition of acceptable maintenance and procurement costs and directing the military 
services to begin including ‘longer war on terror’ costs in their OCO funding requests” (p. 
11). 
The tide turned as the Iraq war wound down and President Barack Obama took 
office in 2009. The GAO had already encouraged the DoD to “shift certain contingency costs 
into the annual base budget to allow for prioritization and trade-offs among DoD’s needs and 
to enhance visibility in defense spending” (Pickup & Khan, 2009, p. 7). The changes are 
described in Table 1. The Budget Control Act, implemented by Congress in 2011, reversed 
the trend of transferring OCO funds into the base budget request (Epstein & Williams, 
2017). The BCA caps limited the funds available in the base budget, but OCO funds were 
not subject to caps. As a result, there was an opportunity and temptation to use OCO 
spending to supplement the forced decreases in the base budget (Epstein & Williams, 
2017). While the OCO budget has de facto not always been limited by these definitions, the 
study team employs the Fiscal Year (FY) 2010 guidelines as part of contract labeling 
because they are compatible with a specific focus on crisis-funded contracts, rather than 
longer term and more persistent efforts. 
                                            
 
 
3 See McMillon (2000, pp. 13–23) for a summary of contracting operations in the 1990s and some of 
the challenges encountered. 
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Table 1. Fiscal Year 2010 OMB Guidance on What Qualifies as OCO Spending 




With crisis funding continuing to grow to compensate for BCA caps, it is important to 
conduct a thorough review of the positive and negative aspects of crisis contracting. Both 
civilian and military crises covered by this paper share a key trait: time is of the essence. 
When a national emergency is present, or an impending military conflict requires rapid 
acquisition, the typical procedures defined by regulation can become a hindrance. Without 
the ability to bypass them, the regulations could prevent many solutions from being 
implemented within the time frame driven by the crisis (Britt & Miles, 1985). In anticipation of 
this problem, acquisition regulations offer a range of exceptions to allow for the speed of 
acquisition called for by crisis situations. However, this approach inherently leads to 
concerns that contingency contracts do not operate in the same environment of the standard 
federal contracting process (McMillon, 2000). 
Regulatory Exemptions 
Competition has been longstanding in its presence within federal procurement 
practices. The Competition in Contracting Act of 1984 (CICA) requires that procurements 
must enter into a full and open competition (Manuel, 2011). However, CICA also designates 
specific exemptions to competition requirements. CICA establishes seven instances when a 
contracting officer may engage in a noncompetitive procurement process (Manuel, 2011). 
Included within these exemptions are circumstances for unusual and compelling urgency, 
national security, and contracts necessary for the public interest (Manuel, 2011). Likewise, 
during a natural disaster, funds for procurement of services may disregard competition in 
cases of “urgent and compelling” situations (GAO, 2015). 
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In addition to the option to bypass full and open competition, contingency contracts 
are currently exempt from the requirement restricting undefinitized contracts and from 
having to wait until a protest is resolved to award emergency requirements (McMillon, 2000). 
Other exemptions simply involve raised thresholds. In 2000, the simplified acquisition 
threshold was twice as high for contingency contracts, increasing from $100,000 to 
$200,000 (McMillon, 2000, pp. 9–10). For other parts of government, crisis measures may 
allow for greater use of forms of contracting that the DoD already regularly relies on, such as 
cost-based contracts. Within the first reporting to Recovery.gov, the Recovery Act spent 
$7.8 billion on contracts that were noncompetitive or were not fixed price (Lipowicz, 2009).  
Limitations on Crisis Contracting 
However, while crisis contracting may employ a range of regulatory exemptions, it 
faces heightened scrutiny in other areas, particularly time frames. Certain crises may have 
even shorter time frames, depending on their expected duration. During Operation Restore 
Hope in Somalia, contracts were limited to 90 days (McMillon, 2000, pp. 16–18). These 
limitations are a measure to reduce the period that the United States is committed to deals 
that are hastily made by necessity. Without the competition requirements, crisis funding runs 
the risk of being unable to validate presented contract data with competitors or government 
sources (Dodaro, 2009). In 2009, time limitations were extended to all contracts using the 
urgency exemption: 
In 2008, the Duncan Hunter National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal 
Year 2009, Pub. L. No. 110-417, § 862, amended certain laws to require that 
contracts awarded using the urgency exception not exceed the time 
necessary to meet the unusual and compelling requirements and for the 
agency to enter into another contract, and may not exceed 1 year unless the 
head of the agency determines exceptional circumstances apply. (Marvin, 
2014, p. 13) 
An area of dispute within the policy literature is whether these restrictions should be 
further institutionalized. The Commission on Wartime Contracting (2011) was severely 
critical of non-competed contracts extended without competition, even if the original contract 
was competed:  
$36.3 billion Defense (Army) LOGCAP III contract—The Army has awarded a 
number of contracts under its worldwide Logistics Civil Augmentation 
Program (LOGCAP). Of these contracts, the largest is the LOGCAP III 
contract supporting the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. The base contract for 
LOGCAP III was awarded competitively, but lasted for 10 years without 
competition on any of its task orders. … As sole provider, without the 
discipline of task-order competition, KBR proposals included large amounts of 
questioned and unsupported costs identified by the Defense Contract Audit 
Agency (DCAA). (p. 75) 
The Contingency Contracting Reform Act did not become law, but it usefully 
illuminates arguments on these issues. Section 201 of that bill sought to limit the duration of 
contingency contracts across the board by default. The bill would have limited contingency 
contracts that were not competed or that received only one offer to one year and competed 
contracts to three years (GAO, 2012). The Professional Service Council, a government 
services industry association, objected to the proposal on multiple grounds. Their primary 
point was that even in contingency contracting, shorter does not necessarily mean better: 
Primarily, the limitation on contract length fails to recognize the benefits and 
efficiencies that can be achieved by longer contract lengths. One of the key 
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lessons learned from the Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction 
was that short periods of performance significantly increased the contract 
price and added to the government’s burden to award new contracts and 
administer existing ones. (Professional Services Council, 2012, p. 6) 
Negative Outcomes of Crisis Contracting 
Regulatory exceptions and limitations on contracting officers are worth studying, but 
it is the outcomes of crisis contracting that have drawn so much negative attention to the 
area. The first challenge is that the circumstances and requirements limit the ability to 
confirm contract, grant, or loan information prior to the disbursement of funds (Dodaro, 
2009). The Commission on Wartime Contracting (2011) also raised this issue with 
recommendation 11 which cited a need to “improve contractor performance-data recording 
and use” (p. 10). 
This challenge can extend over the entire life of these contracts. Crisis funding for 
natural disasters can lead to increased levels of incomplete documentation, a lack of 
contract closeouts, and little to no evidence of higher level contract reviews (GAO, 2015). An 
example of this is when hotels received contracts to house those affected by the disaster 
during Hurricane Sandy. The hotels received noncompetitive contract awards through the 
urgent need justification, but the joint field contracting offices were often left unaware of 
these contract awards until the contract was closed out and they received the vendor 
invoices (GAO, 2015). 
Due to the urgency and need for a significant number of contracts in a short period of 
time, the contract closeouts can often become backed up and delay the documentation from 
being properly completed (GAO, 2015). A portion of these contracts require further approval 
from a level above the contracting officer. Of the nine contracts reviewed that required this 
approval, the GAO found only one that had received the appropriate justification (GAO, 
2015). The Recovery Act, with its emphasis on oversight and considering the comparatively 
straightforward operating environment of an economic crisis, gives a sense of what the 
baseline failure rate may be for crisis contracting. Within the grants and contracts awarded 
to broadband services under the Recovery Act, 14% were terminated before they were 
completed (Goldstein, 2014). When these contracts and grants are terminated or sustained 
with cost overruns, the lost funds can present a larger issue to the efficiency of crisis funds 
being awarded for stimulus purposes (Goldstein, 2014). 
Worse yet, as Comptroller Gene Dodaro (2009) succinctly put it, “experience tells us 
that the risk for fraud and abuse grows when billions of dollars are going out quickly” (p. 6). 
Compounding the challenges of gaps in documentation, staff are exposed to higher rates of 
fraud without the ability to conduct system edit checks or time to identify problems prior to 
disbursement of funds (Dodaro, 2009).  
Specifically within contingency contracting, fraud has been a very present issue 
(Gordon, 2014). Operating under a time-stressed environment where the need for a solution 
is overwhelming can create many opportunities for fraud (Gordon, 2014). Citing specific 
numbers for waste and fraud is always controversial, and subjective determinations of what 
constitutes waste can easily overshadow cases of outright corruption or criminality. 
Nonetheless, the magnitude of these challenges is tremendous, as the Commission on 
Wartime Contracting (2011) argued that “at least $31 billion, and possibly as much as $60 
billion, has been lost to contract waste and fraud in America’s contingency operations in Iraq 
and Afghanistan” (p. 1). 
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Past Reform Efforts Have Led to Increased Transparency 
Due to its inherent challenges, crisis contracting is an area where regulation and 
practice steadily evolve in reaction to past challenges. As with defense acquisition writ large, 
there will likely be no final equilibrium solution, but instead the system will evolve and 
reprioritize in response to the successes, or more often the failures, of past efforts. However, 
ongoing challenges do not mean that reform efforts were fruitless. This richness of data that 
enables this study is possible in no small part because of past reforms. The Recovery Act 
set a high standard for transparency, with President Obama insisting “every taxpayer dollar 
spent on our economic recovery must be subject to unprecedented levels of transparency 
and accountability” (Gaffney & Berger, 2009, p. 1). While disagreements about the Recovery 
Act persist, after stimulus funds were dispersed, Sam Rosen-Amy of OMB Watch argued, “I 
think it helped show Congress that there is a use for and a need for more information on 
where federal money is going and how it’s being used” (Holeywell, 2012, p. 2). 
The DoD has also made great strides in tracking crisis contract data, with financial 
tracking systems and contingency contract databases such as the “Synchronized Pre-
deployment and Operational Tracker (SPOT)” (Swan, 2012, p. 17). However, unlike FPDS 
or the Recovery Act dataset, those tools are not available to the public. Improving the ability 
of contracting officers and others within the government to make more informed award 
decisions and track contract performance plays an important role in mitigating the data gaps 
that can mask problems. However, in Laura Dickinson’s (2011) book on wartime contracting, 
she explained why the benefit of transparency regarding contracts is of direct interest to the 
public: 
As this example [regarding a Dyncorp Police Training Contract] illustrates, 
foreign affairs contracting raises serious concerns about public participation 
and transparency (which for simplicity’s sake I will often refer to collectively 
as public participation). Significantly, public participation is simultaneously a 
value in and of itself—reflecting the view that people affected by an activity 
should have some input into how that activity is carried out—and a 
mechanism for either accountability or constraint. For example, if various 
populations are able to participate in the formulation and critique of future 
plans of action, such participation may well impact the actions ultimately 
undertaken. Just as contractual arrangements may be structured to protect 
and promote public law values, so too public participation may be harnessed 
to restrain governments from abuses and help to protect other public values, 
such as human dignity and anticorruption. (p. 104) 
There are logical reasons for the different levels of public transparency between the 
Recovery Act’s public dataset and the restricted tools such as SPOT. First and foremost, 
sharing too much data when operating in conflict environments could reveal operational 
details that place U.S. personnel, vendors, or the civilian population in danger. In addition, 
this public participation role is partially fulfilled by Inspector Generals, and the Special 
Inspector General for Afghanistan has remained active during the study period. 
Nonetheless, Dickinson’s argument suggests that there is value in making the vetted and 
sometimes anonymized contingency contracting data more accessible, in no small part 
because “governments may outsource foreign affairs precisely to avoid oversight” 
(Dickinson, 2011, p. 105). 
Factors That Aggravate or Mitigate the Risk of Crisis Contracting  
The prior sections have touched on a range of the ways in which crisis contracting 
operates in a unique operational and regulatory environment. During the review, the study 
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team evaluated various factors apparent in regular contract reporting that aggregate or 
mitigate the inherent risks of crisis contracting. Three key criteria were applied: do multiple 
sources, ideally in multiple domains, point to this factor as a significant source of risk; is this 
factor something at least partially under the U.S. government’s control; can it be tracked 
using FPDS? By these criteria, three factors stood out: the risks of noncompetitive awards, 
the risk of UCAs, and the opportunity for expeditionary contracting offices to support home 
contracting offices, called reachback contracting. 
Noncompetitive Awards 
The option to bypass competition for urgency reasons is one of the better 
documented aspects of crisis contracting. From 2010 until 2012, only 3% of the DoD’s 
contracts were awarded in a noncompetitive environment under the urgency exception, but 
this 3% still accounts for $12.5 billion worth of funds. During this same time, State’s 
contracting efforts under contingency contracting accounted for 12.5% of contract awards 
(Marvin, 2014). An early report after the Recovery Act debuted reported that at least $7.8 
billion was awarded to noncompetitive contracts (Lipowicz, 2009). That said, this use of 
noncompetitive contracts in part was a result of relying on existing contracts. Of the 32% of 
new contracts that were awarded through the Recovery Act, 11% were awarded without 
competition (Needham, 2010). That said, these numbers should be put in context of the 
range of other forms of noncompetitive contracting employed by the government. In 2013 
alone, 36% of funds for procurement of goods and services, approximately $164 billion, 
were not competed (Marvin, 2014).  
Trade Off Between Speed and the Benefits of Competition 
The rate of competition for crisis-funded–contracting is not unusually high; instead, 
critics emphasize noncompetitive contracts because competition is often more important in a 
crisis. Higher prices can qualify as reasonable in disaster relief contracting, due to the 
significant and immediate increase in demand for a product offered by a contractor. Relief 
items in a natural disaster experience such high demands that prices significantly increase 
on goods such as water, lumber, and generators (Gordon, 2014). Marvin (2014) extended 
this finding to other forms of crisis contracting, arguing that “promoting competition—even in 
a limited form—increases the potential for quality goods and services at a lower price in 
urgent situations” (p. 1). In addition to the risk of higher prices or lower quality, 
noncompetitive contracts are also at greater risk of misconduct when compared to the 
standard procurement process (Manuel, 2011). 
Of course, the challenge is that competition does not necessarily create quickly. For 
contingency contracting, delays can undermine a unit’s effectiveness, morale, and ability to 
complete its mission (McMillon, 2000). Likewise, for the sake of the affected population in a 
natural disaster, the need to provide goods and services as soon as possible is of utmost 
importance (Mackin, 2015). While economic recession presents an easier operating 
environment, considering the primary goal of Recovery Act was to act quickly on high priority 
needs, contracting officers relied heavily on avenues that presented the fewest opportunities 
for competition to arise (Needham, 2010).  
Urgency is also not the only constraint on competition. Built into the Recovery Act 
were guidelines specific to small business programs, which effectively encouraged the use 
of noncompetitive contracts to ensure they had equal opportunities to receive assistance. In 
May 2010, approximately 80% of the noncompetitive contracts were awarded to small 
businesses through these guidelines (Needham, 2010). Similarly, natural disaster 
contracting further allows a preference in noncompetitive contracts for local area firms in the 
affected area which can aid in economic recovery (Gordon, 2014). Bontjer, Holt, and Angle 
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(2009) applied this idea to contingency contracting when they studied the impact of such 
measures in Afghanistan:  
Using local goods and services to carry out project work, for instance, allows 
a development dollar to be spent twice—providing much needed services to 
Afghan citizens and communities while simultaneously creating jobs, 
generating revenue, and promoting a more sustainable marketplace—all of 
which can ultimately reduce the likelihood of a relapse into conflict. (p. 39)  
Competition advocates do acknowledge competing needs, but given the benefits of 
even limited competition, they nonetheless urge prioritizing maximizing competition within 
those constraints (Office of Inspector General, 2016). This approach is mandated by the 
Federal Acquisition Regulations (FAR) which allows for urgency exceptions but still requires 
contracting officers to solicit responses from as many contractors as possible under these 
circumstances (Gordon, 2014). In the case of disaster relief, such regulations are not always 
followed. After a new competitive requirement was enacted, FEMA contracting officers 
reported that they were still instructed to treat every disaster relief contract as urgent and 
could therefore award contracts without competition. This problem created an opportunity for 
$32 million of procurement costs going unreported in noncompetitive disaster relief contracts 
in FY2013 (Mackin, 2015). The Commission on Wartime Contracting (2011) similarly 
believed that there was room for more competition, and it proposed the government should 
“set and meet annual increases in competition goals for contingency contracts” (p. 10).  
Duration Limits on Noncompetitive Contracts 
As was discussed in the section Limitations on Crisis Contracting, noncompetitive 
contracts that use the urgency exception are limited only one year to reduce the risk of 
overspending (Marvin, 2014; Office of Inspector General, 2016). With that said, the cost and 
benefits of a shorter contract are disputed (Professional Services Council, 2012). Reform 
efforts after Hurricane Katrina resulted in an even stricter 150-day limit to disaster relief 
contracts awarded in a noncompetitive environment (Mackin, 2015). Contingency 
contracting, on the other hand, is allowed to award contracts for up to a year in a 
noncompetitive environment (Office of Inspector General, 2016).  
Upon the GAO’s review of noncompetitively awarded contracts, more than half 
exceeded the 150-day time limit. This is not necessarily a problem; the agency can waive 
that requirement under certain conditions. However, in each of these contracts that violated 
the time limit, FEMA did not approve the extension, and some went beyond the regulation 
by a year and a half (Mackin, 2015).  
Undefinitized Contract Actions 
Undefinitized contract actions (UCAs) are a type of contract that differs from 
standard procurement methods in allowing the production to start without defining all the 
terms of the contract (Actions, 2017).4 In crisis funding situations, these contracts can be 
seen as advantageous because they allow the production of goods or the allocation of 
services to be immediately received (Federal Audit Executive Council, 2010). Circumstances 
created by crisis funding certainly qualify as circumstances of urgent need that can allow for 
                                            
 
 
4 Letter Contracts are a subset of UCAs in that they specifically seek to start production of the goods 
immediately (Calvaresi-Barr, 2007). 
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UCAs (Marvin, 2014). Contingency contracts often utilize UCAs, and they can be coupled 
with the risk of awarding them without competition. Contingency contracts often utilize UCAs 
which can be coupled with the risk of awarding them without competition (Federal Audit 
Executive Council, 2010).  
UCAs are entered under cost reimbursement contracts until later defined. This allows 
the vendor to be reimbursed for all reasonable costs within the procurement up until the 
point of defining the contract terms (Federal Audit Executive Council, 2010). While the initial 
award of the contract can be obligated without the terms set, the FAR still requires that 
within 180 days or when 40% of the work has been completed that the contract terms must 
be defined (Federal Audit Executive Council, 2010).This allows the vendor to be reimbursed 
for all reasonable costs within the procurement process up until the point of defining the 
contract terms (Federal Audit Executive Council, 2010). The vendor, not the customer, is 
responsible for determining a “reasonable” price for this initial work (Calvaresi-Barr, 2007). 
UCAs are to have, at the least, a “not to exceed” price amount stated at the beginning. 
However, upon awarding the UCA, up to 50% of the “not to exceed” amount can be paid 
without any approval or review (Calvaresi-Barr, 2007).  
Unfortunately, UCAs also create a very high risk of overpaying for goods and 
services and at times make the contracting officer beholden to the vendor (Commission on 
Wartime Contracting in Iraq and Afghanistan, 2011). In cases of disaster relief contracting, 
they present an even higher risk of cost overruns. Gordon (2014) mentioned that when 
natural disasters occur, the price of needed materials significantly increases as the demand 
for these products skyrocket. Entering into a UCA through a noncompetitive award furthers 
the risk of the government overpaying for needed goods and services to provide relief to the 
affected areas (Gordon, 2014). 
Historically, the use of UCAs presented high risk with contingency contract awards 
and led to schedule delays coupled with high cost overruns. The GAO reviewed 77 UCA 
awards for contingency contracting within the DoD and in 10 cases found that other 
contracting methods would have sufficed and promoted cost savings. In 2007, 60% of these 
cases DoD contracting officers failed to definitize contract award terms by the 180-day FAR 
regulation (Calvaresi-Barr, 2007). By 2008, although still a concerning number, the amount 
of cases failing to meet the definitize timeline decreased to 51%. Furthermore, the GAO 
found that out of 83 reviewed UCAs, 66 resulted in paying the awardee 45% or more of the 
not to exceed estimate at the award (Hutton, 2010). 
From 2001 to 2005, obligations awarded under UCAs increased from $5.98 billion to 
$6.53 billion (Calvaresi-Barr, 2007).5 UCA data collection was not centralized within the 
DoD, leading the DoD to have a significant lack of data to properly evaluate how much is 
truly being spent under UCA conditions (Calvaresi-Barr, 2007). Since 2007, the DoD has 
taken measures to require centralized reporting of UCAs, but in 2010, the GAO found that 
many UCAs are not being properly reported to the centralized offices (Hutton, 2010). On 
average, DoD UCA contracts overran the 180-day definitization requirement by two months 
(Calvaresi-Barr, 2007). The Air Force was the only branch at the time to have requirements 
to report UCAs, but despite reporting requirements, the GAO found nine UCA contracts in 
                                            
 
 
5 It is important to note that these costs do not include obligations awarded to undefinitized task order 
contract or UCA modifications (Calvaresi-Barr, 2007). 
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the Air Force that overran the 180-day requirement by at least a full year (Calvaresi-Barr, 
2007). A majority of the UCA contracts were awarded to maintain program schedules and 
directly and indirectly support war efforts (Hutton, 2010). While there is the opportunity to 
waive the 180-day requirement, the GAO found only two of the contingency contracts that 
met the requirements necessary to waive the regulation in 2007 (Calvaresi-Barr, 2007).  
The Office of the Inspector General had similar findings to the GAO on UCAs in 
2012. Out of 251 UCAs reviewed, the Inspector General’s Office found that 132 cases failed 
to meet the timeline for definitization (Office of Inspector General, 2012). 118 of the cases 
highlighted noncompliance with requirements on the impact of allowable profit on the 
undefinitized period (Office of the Inspector General, 2012). 64 of the cases resulted in an 
obligation of funds significantly above the allowable amounts (Office of the Inspector 
General, 2012). 
Reachback Contracting  
At least as important as the methods used in contingency contracting are the 
contracting officers charged with managing the system. McMillon in 2000 reviewed four 
different military contingencies since the end of the Cold War and found that “consistent 
problems for all components during contingencies have been the lack of experienced 
personnel, restrictive regulations, and a lack of proper supplies such as computers and 
contracting SOPs and forms” (McMillon, 2000, p. 23). The 9/11 attacks and the subsequent 
wars in Afghanistan and Iraq were dramatically different operating environments than the 
prior decade’s humanitarian operations or even the first Gulf War. Nonetheless, in 2011, the 
Commission on Wartime Contracting (2011) reached similar conclusions, recommending 
that the government “provide adequate staffing and resources, and establish procedures to 
protect the government’s interests” (pp. 4, 11).  
Given the inherent challenges of deploying people and resources to the field, one 
straightforward approach to this problem is to rely on those not on the battlefield. One 
prominent implementation of this idea is reachback contracting, a unique method that allows 
contracting officers in the field to “reachback” to domestic contracting offices for contracting 
support in contingency operations (Dunn, 2016). In 2007, the Reachback Division was 
originally set up to offer contracting support to those in theater in Kuwait (Adrian, 2010). This 
idea was not entirely novel, particularly in the later stages of an operation. McMillon (2000) 
noted that the Air Force instructed contracting officers to “consider support from the unit’s 
home base” in addition to a range of other options outside of the deployment area (p. 34). 
Within three years, the division grew to a team of 62 people supporting contracting officers 
in the field in Afghanistan, Iraq, Kuwait, and Qatar (Adrian, 2010). After years of successful 
trials and results, the Reachback Division grew to include the Air Force and then added 
members from the Expeditionary Contracting Command Contingency Contracting Team 
(Adrian, 2010).  
Reviews of this approach were positive. Commanding General Michael Hoskin of 
U.S. Army Expeditionary Contracting Command referred to reachback as a “very effective 
tool” in the contracting officers’ arsenal (Dunn, 2016). Reachback contracting can result in 
fewer deployed contracting officers because the workload is shifted back to domestic 
contracting offices (Dunn, 2016). Utilizing reachback methods, contracting officers could 
improve their strategic buying and develop greater expertise within their source selection 
(Ausink, Castaneda, & Chenoweth, 2011). Furthermore, reachback contracting can provide 
continuity to workflow management and create better standardization for contingency 
contract reporting (Dunn, 2016).  
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Reachback’s intention was to help ease the challenges faced by field contracting 
officers in attempts to support the warfighter (Calhoun & Larssen, 2013). Reachback is able 
to provide support in the Financial Services Division, Contracting Policy, Property Expertise, 
and the Army Sustainment Command Counsel (Calhoun & Larssen, 2013). Specializing in 
logistics, warehousing, transportation, base operations, security, counterinsurgency, 
telecommunications service, and supply acquisitions, reachback provides needed support to 
contingency contracting (Calhoun & Larssen, 2013). 
In its review of reachback capabilities, RAND found that most contingency 
contracting officers cared more about the advantages in workflow, standardization of 
requirements, and concentration of contracting expertise then the reduction in deployments 
(Ausink et al., 2011). Reachback contracting has the potential to lower costs and reduce 
risks by not having to incur the same transportation and hazardous duty pay (Ausink et al., 
2011). Workflow continuity could help increase the efficiency as well, since the contracting 
officers do not experience the same amount of turnover that deployed CCOs experience 
(Ausink et al., 2011). Reachback has been used in a multitude of ways. From small 
commodity purchases to cradle-to-grave large contract support, reachback methods have 
been successfully implemented (Ausink et al., 2011).  
Although reachback methods can be used in various applications, the RAND study 
noted that reachback provides the greatest benefit when used for commodities, highly 
technical items, the use of a government-wide purchasing card, theater-wide purchases, 
and long-term contracts (Ausink et al., 2011). Each of these areas received multiple sources 
of agreement and near universal government-wide support of benefitting from reachback 
practices (Ausink et al., 2011). In the case of urgent and local projects, many turned away 
from the benefits that reachback practices could offer (Ausink et al., 2011). Limitations can 
also arise from policies applied to specific contingencies: the Iraqi first and Afghan first 
policies prevented field contracting officers from utilizing reachback practices due to the 
local requirements (Ausink et al., 2011).  
If reachback had been utilized for the areas mentioned above in FY2008, 40 field 
contracting officers would not have needed to have been deployed (Ausink et al., 2011). 
Beyond reducing deployments, reachback methods provide greater concentrations of 
contracting expertise and continuity of the contracting officials maintaining the contracts 
(Ausink et al., 2011). The RAND study concludes that when used in the appropriate 
categories, reachback can mitigate risk, save cost, and provide greater efficiency in 
contingency contracts (Ausink et al., 2011).  
Identifying Contingency Contracts 
The Commission on Wartime Contracting (2011) reported that spending on contracts 
and grants performed in Iraq and Afghanistan in support of operations in those countries 
was expected to exceed $206 billion through the end of FY2011 (p. 2). During that same 
period, transactions directly labeled as contingency contracts could only account for less 
than $30 billion in obligations. The study team identified three different ways that data fields 
available in FPDS could be used to classify contingency contracts.  
• The Contingency, Humanitarian, or Peacekeeping Operation column, which 
has better coverage in earlier years and makes explicit reference to the 
relevant statutes. 
• The National Interest Action field, which has seen more frequent use in 
recent years and includes designators for natural disasters as well as 
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contingencies. Only those Actions pertaining to contingencies by the U.S. 
military were considered labeled as contingency contracts. 
• Some transactions indirectly label themselves by employing a waiver to 
Central Commercial Registry reporting requirements that are only available to 
deployed contracting officers deployed into a contingency. As a result, FPDS 
lacks Registry information for these transactions, but we do learn that they 
were conducted in a contingency environment. 
Perhaps the most surprising characteristic of these data fields is how little they 
overlap with one another. Both identify tens of billions of contracts, yet less than a quarter of 
contracts are considered contingency efforts by both criteria. While these fields are 
contradictory and only captured a portion of the universe of contingency contracting, they 
were a valuable launchpad for creating the heuristic score by which other contracts were 
classified. This study uses a 10-point scale to label contracts, based on a range of 
contingency-related characteristics. For each of the criteria below, when the history of 
officially labeled contingency contracts being referenced covers the period from 2000 to 
2016 and all obligation amounts are in constant 2015 dollars. 
OCO Funding (Maximum 4 Points) 
• 0 to 4 points: corresponding to the percent of the contract’s funding account 
that was made up by enacted OCO spending. A funding account with no 
OCO funding would receive 0 points, a funding account with full funding 
provided through OCO would receive 4 points, those in between are rounded 
to the nearest whole number.  
The study team relied on spreadsheets provided by the DoD comptroller to classify 
the percentage of OCO appropriation in each DoD funding account for each year. This data 
was then linked to the FPDS using treasury account fields, which have been reliably 
available in FPDS since 2012. These funding accounts are only partially standardized, 
requiring the team to make judgment calls on classification when treasury account symbols 
did not align. 
Place of Performance and Contracting Office (Maximum 4 Points) 
Table 2. Contracting Office and Place of Performance 
 
These two criteria work in tandem to overcome one of the main sources of ambiguity 
in the contract data. Bases in neighboring countries are often key to contingency efforts, but 
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without proper labeling, it can be challenging to identify what activity any given contract is 
supporting. Past CSIS research efforts have also uncovered major expenditures being 
classified as performed far away from the battlefield. Specifically, a surprising amount of 
contracting obligations were “performed” in Switzerland to deliver supplies to Afghanistan. 
The Product or Service Being Purchased (Maximum 2 Points): 
• 2 points: Product or service codes with at least 25% of obligations labeled as 
contingency contracts. 
• 1 point: Product or service codes with between 10 and 25% of obligations 
labeled as contingency contracts. 
• 1 point: Product or service codes with at least $1 billion in labeled OCO 
expenditures from. 
• -1 point: Product or service codes with at least $1 billion in total expenditures, 
but no OCO labeled obligations. 
• -1 point: Contracts funded by Procurement or RDT&E accounts with an 
anticipated contract duration of more than 1 year. Such contracts are 
excluded from OCO funding by OMB guidance (Pickup & Khan, 2009, p. 14). 
Many of the items categorized through this process are consistent with McMillon’s list 
of “Examples of supplies … include bottled water, food, office and field supplies, 
construction items, repair parts, and medical supplies. Contracted services may include 
construction, laundry, food service, transportation, billeting, utilities maintenance, and 
sanitation services” (McMillon, 2000, p. 9). Unexpectedly, security services were not 
captured by these automatically generated lists. Private security contractors have been 
among the most controversial recipients of contingency contractors, and the Commission on 
Wartime Contracting (2011) recommended that they be “phased out for certain functions” 
(2011, p. 4). 
Initial Results 
After assigning scores to transactions during the study period, the team found that 
entries scoring 6 points or more reliably shared traits with contingency contracts. As the 
above graph shows, these contracts have reduced in their prevalence during the downturn 
but have also continued to shrink in value even as total contracting began to rebound in 
2016. 
One of the larger drivers of this decline has been the continued reduction in contract 
spending, first due to the withdrawal from Iraq and then to a lesser degree reinforced as the 
footprint of U.S. operations in Afghanistan was reduced. OCO spending has not gone away 
during this period, and U.S. operations in Iraq have resumed. However, Figure 1 shows the 
same pattern reduction with confirmed OCO contracts and those identified via the heuristic 
method. 
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 Contract Spending by OCO Evaluation and Place of Performance Figure 1.
Analysis of competition trends within the contingency dataset confirms findings from 
the literature review. While competition is an area of concern for contingency contracts, 
crisis-funding has not prevented contracting officers from already achieving higher rates of 
competition than across facility-related services and constructions (FRS&C), other services, 
and supplies in most years. The finding that most noncompetitive contracts employ an only 
one source exception in contrast to the urgency exception (which is reported in the no 
competition (other) category) departs from the literature review. 
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 Competition Across Facility-Related Services and Construction, Other Figure 2.
Services, and Supplies 
While competition is more prevalent in contingency contracting, the trend has 
changed for the worse. Figure 2 also shows that noncompetitive contracting has become 
more prevalent in all three categories. The trend is most alarming in FRS&C where 
competition rates have cratered, which is particularly troubling because this is classically a 
sector where a range of different vendors can easily enter to provide services. The trend for 
other services involves a slow decline, which is typical in contracting markets. However, the 
rise in noncompetitive contracts in supplies is not necessarily as problematic as it first 
appears. Much of the decline has been in competition that results in only a single offer. 
Noncompetitive procedures do have tools to help when only one vendor is available, so 
going directly to these arrangements may be preferable to competitions that only ever attract 
one vendor. Nonetheless, the goods acquired in contingency contracting are often simpler 
than the advanced weapon systems acquired domestically. There may be an opportunity in 
this sector for greater use of competition. 
When it comes to UCA contracting, the concerns raised in the literature appear to 
have been addressed. Usage is declining across the board and in recent years there are no 
reported UCA contracts in FRS&C or for supplies. The takeaway here is that perhaps the 
acquisition community should be less concerned about UCAs in contingency contracting 
and more focused on ensuring that they do not return to the past prevalence level in the 
category of conventional supply contracting.  
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 Undefinitized Contract Actions Across Facility-Related Services and Figure 3.
Construction, Other Services, and Supplies 
Closing Thoughts 
Competitive trends appear to be in keeping with past results, but it does show the 
risk of relapse as contingency contracts are less used and are further from the public eye. 
While the sums being discussed are much smaller than in prior years, there may be room to 
regain previous rates of competition. By comparison, the dramatic reduction in UCA contract 
usage in recent years is a laudatory trend and may mean that reformers should focus on the 
remaining pockets of UCA elsewhere, although the study team will watch this space 
carefully in the next steps of this project, which consider the civilian forms of crisis 
contracting. The strongest signal from this research is the increasing divergence between 
the spending on OCO budget accounts and related contingency contracts. Future iterations 
of this study will examine this discrepancy and what it means for this challenging form of 
contracting. 
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Abstract 
Performance-based logistics (PBL) contracts, which have been used by private industry for 
decades, (particularly in the airline industry as a way to manage complex fleets) have only 
relatively recently begun to be used in the public sector worldwide. Research on PBL 
application indicates that PBLs can be successful in lowering costs and improving 
performance in both government and private contracting. In both cases, PBL contracts 
depend on the ability of the customer to properly structure and implement contract incentives 
to promote vendor behavior that reduces costs and improves performance while delivering 
the customer’s desired outcomes. 
This report examines how such incentives are used in PBL contracting and looks further 
towards how incentives can best be utilized in a PBL contracting environment. This report is 
structured in three parts: a review of the available literature on the use of incentives in PBL 
contracting, a data analysis of where and how PBL contracts are used in the DoD, and a 
summary of initial findings from the experts CSIS has interviewed on the subject. 
Introduction 
Performance-based logistics (PBL) contracts, which have been used by private 
industry for decades, (particularly in the airline industry as a way to manage complex fleets) 
have only recently begun to be used in the public sector worldwide. Research on PBL 
application indicates that PBLs can be successful in lowering costs and improving 
performance in both government and private contracting. In both cases, PBL contracts 
depend on the ability of the customer to properly structure and implement contract 
incentives to promote vendor behavior that reduces costs and improves performance while 
delivering the customer’s desired outcomes. 
In order to examine the question of incentive use in PBL contracts, CSIS has 
undertaken a research effort focused around interviews with PBL experts among 
Department of Defense (DoD) PBL vendors, private sector PBL vendors, and government 
customers (both domestic and foreign). The objective of this research effort is to better 
understand how incentives are used in PBL contracting and how incentives can best be 
utilized in a PBL contracting environment. 
Acquisition Research Program: 
Creating Synergy for Informed Change - 140 - 
This report is structured in three parts: a review of the available literature on the use 
of incentives in PBL contracting, a data analysis of where and how PBL contracts are used 
in the DoD, and a summary of initial findings from the experts CSIS has interviewed on the 
subject, which are primarily focused on the experiences of DoD PBL vendors at this stage of 
the research effort. 
Literature Review 
In the current resource environment, the DoD has become increasingly interested in 
performance-based logistics (PBL) contracts due to their potential for cost saving and 
improved outcomes. PBLs are a form of performance-based contracting, something that the 
DoD has had an interest in since the 1960s (Hildebrandt, 1998). At the most basic level, 
PBLs alter the normal incentive and risk structure of a contract to more strongly incentivize 
improvements in performance and quality of service from a contractor. This report uses the 
broad economics definition of the term incentives, which is not limited to fee structure but 
includes approaches like longer contract periods to incentivize up front investments or 
granting the contractor more control over process as an incentive to also take on more risk. 
While PBLs are currently in use broadly in the private sector, and to a more limited extent in 
the DoD, the effect of the incentives built into PBLs needs to be better understood. This 
review will examine incentives based on time, cost, and scope, and will discuss other 
potential incentives and challenges to designing incentives. 
Performance-Based Contracting and Performance-Based Logistics 
Performance-based contracting is a type of contracting that calls for contracts to be 
structured in such a way as to enable and reward better performance on the part of the 
service provider or contractor. PBLs are the DoD’s performance-based contracts and are 
specifically agreements that are “usually long term, in which the provider … is incentivized 
and empowered to meet overarching customer oriented performance requirements … in 
order to improve product support effectiveness while reducing” total ownership costs 
(Estevez, 2011). While definitions do vary between sources, the DoD’s PBL Guidebook 
states that PBL is “synonymous with performance-based life cycle product support, where 
outcomes are acquired through performance-based arrangements that deliver Warfighter 
requirements and incentivize product support providers to reduce cost through innovation” 
(Assistant Secretary of Defense for Logistics and Materiel Readiness, 2016a). This type of 
performance-based contract has been used in the private sector for decades, particularly in 
the aviation industry (Assistant Secretary of Defense for Logistics and Materiel Readiness, 
2016a; A. Hunter et al., 2015). Its popularity is due to its design, which aligns incentives 
between customers and suppliers (Guajardo et al., 2012). PBLs differ from other forms of 
contracted support because the contracted outcomes are logistical and because a PBL must 
include a service component (A. Hunter et al., 2015). 
Traditionally, product acquisition and sustainment have been treated as separate 
considerations, with the government granting a greater priority to acquisition. The recent 
shift to placing a greater emphasis on sustainment has helped to increase the value of 
systems purchased by the DoD (Berkowitz et al., 2005). The DoD began using PBLs in 
1999 when the Air Force reached an agreement with Lockheed Martin to provide support for 
the F-117 Nighthawk. While initially intended as a way to improve readiness, the DoD has 
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since begun using PBLs to “deliver needed reliability and availability, reduce total cost, and 
encourage and reward innovative cost reduction initiatives” (Assistant Secretary of Defense 
for Logistics and Materiel Readiness, 2016a).1 While the DoD’s PBL Guidebook does not 
specify the difference between “reduc[ing] total cost” and implementing “innovative cost 
reduction initiatives,” for the purposes of this report, the former is interpreted as taking 
known steps to reduce costs and the latter is finding new ways to reduce costs. Currently, 
the DoD describes PBLs as “the Department of Defense’s preferred product support 
strategy to deliver improved weapons systems readiness at the same or lower total cost” 
(Center for Executive Education, 2012). Since PBLs came into use, they have helped the 
DoD achieve both cost reductions and higher availability rates for systems (A. Hunter et al., 
2015). 
In a guide to best practices regarding PBLs, the Center for Executive Education from 
the University of Tennessee (2012) identified three success factors that define good PBL 
contracts. The first success factor is “alignment,” which can be best understood as ensuring 
that the government and the contractor have both embraced PBLs as a new way of 
structuring the provider-client relationship and not just a variant of business as usual. The 
second success factor is “contract structure.” The report defines a good contract structure as 
one that appropriately balances risk and asset management, establishes an environment 
that allows for creativity and shared success, and uses a pricing model that takes incentive 
types into account. These incentive types can take many forms, as discussed in the next 
section. The final success factor is performance management, which involves establishing 
and aligning desired outcomes and establishing metrics for reporting and improving. These 
points are all echoed in the DoD’s PBL Guidebook (Assistant Secretary of Defense for 
Logistics and Materiel Readiness, 2016a).  
This paper focuses on incentives as the key to achieving good contract structure. 
Incentives 
Every business arrangement involves incentives. An incentive can be defined as a 
“stimulus to a desired action” or “anything that encourages or motivates somebody to do 
something” (Assistant Secretary of Defense for Logistics and Materiel Readiness, 2016a; 
Office of the Under Secretary of Defense, 2016). In the context of PBLs, an incentive is a 
“term or condition that encourages the desired product support integrator and/or provider 
behavior to deliver the relevant Warfighter outcome” (Assistant Secretary of Defense for 
Logistics and Materiel Readiness, 2016a). While incentives can be a part of any type of 
contract, they are particularly integral to PBLs. In fact, the DoD considers the “key to a 
successful PBL arrangement [to be] the use of incentives to elicit desired behaviors and 
outcomes” (Assistant Secretary of Defense for Logistics and Materiel Readiness, 2016a). 
When articulating the PBL business model, Kleemann, Glas, and Essig (2012), like 
the Center for Executive Education (2012), included incentive payments as one of the three 
                                            
 
 
1 Some recent examples of DoD programs that include PBL contracts are the C-17 Globemaster III 
Sustainment Partnership, the T-45 Goshawk Contractor Logistics Support, the High Mobility Artillery 
Rocket System Life Cycle Contract Support I/II, the E-8 Joint Surveillance & Target Attack Radar 
System Total System Support Responsibility, the F/A-18 Hornet F/A-18 Integrated Readiness 
Support Teaming, and the F-117 Nighthawk Total System Performance Responsibility & Total 
System Support Partnership (Gardner et al., 2015) 
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key components of the compensation part of the model. After reviewing the literature on the 
experiences of organizations that implemented PBLs, Sols and Johannesen (2013) found 
broad consensus in the existing literature that aligning incentives with performance 
achievements is a main factor for PBL success. Therefore, while incentives are not required 
for a PBL, they are an integral component of contract structure and often make it work better 
(Kleemann, Glas, & Essig, 2012; Straight, 2006). Their importance was highlighted by the 
Proof Point study, which found that incentives “drive the behavior, actions, and investment 
decisions” of product support providers (Assistant Secretary of Defense for Logistics and 
Materiel Readiness, 2016a). It follows that the appropriate use of incentives can lead to 
preferable outcomes for the government.  
Yet effective incentives are not as simple as just offering money in exchange for 
desired behavior. As recently as the early 2000s, the DoD was found to be giving firms 
award fees that were not linked to outcomes (GAO, 2005). This finding potentially calls into 
question the efficacy of incentives. In other words, if a firm knows it will be paid its award fee 
regardless of whether it achieves its performance targets, the award fee is no longer an 
incentive. A more recent report from the Government Accountability Office (GAO) found that, 
although incentives are a key part of PBLs, many of the contracts they reviewed lacked 
“effective incentives,” a circumstance that both lowers the ability of firms to reduce support 
costs and lowers their incentive to do so. For example, of the 29 PBL arrangements GAO 
reviewed, only four contained incentives intended to control or reduce costs (GAO, 2008). 
This finding by the GAO suggests that a better understanding of the effects of incentives 
could improve the outcomes of PBLs. 
When included in contracts, incentives “encourage contractors to meet specified 
objective and subjective outcome metrics, resulting in explicit … or implicit … financial 
benefits to industry” (Assistant Secretary of Defense for Logistics and Materiel Readiness, 
2016b). With traditional contracts, a contractor profits from selling increasing numbers of its 
given product or service and has little incentive to improve that product beyond staying 
ahead of a competing contractor, and even less incentive if the contractor has a monopoly 
on the product or service. With PBLs, the focus is on performance, not on the quantity 
produced, meaning that contractors are incentivized to provide products and services that 
perform well regardless of potential competition. If done well, PBLs can increase profits for 
the contractor, but they do shift risk from the government to the contractor when compared 
to more traditional contracts. In a traditional contract, the government purchases a number 
of components and thus risks having to pay in spite of a higher than anticipated failure rate 
or even equipment becoming obsolete. With PBLs, the government is purchasing a 
performance output, meaning that these risks are shared between the government and the 
firm (Gardner et al., 2015; Gupta, et al., 2010). This is part of their appeal to the 
government. However, while firms are certainly willing to enter into PBL contracts, this 
change in the balance of risk means that firms must have the capacity to attain a greater 
reward in return for greater risk. In the case of PBLs, this is through incentives, with the 
caveat that those incentives must promote behaviors and outcomes that benefit both the 
DoD and the firm (Assistant Secretary of Defense for Logistics and Materiel Readiness, 
2016a). Incentives can take multiple forms, each of which is discussed subsequently.  
When considering incentives, it must be remembered that contractors and the 
government have different priorities when it comes to risk. Vendors care primarily about 
financial risk, meaning concern about their return on investment. In contrast, the DoD is 
primarily concerned with operational risk, meaning its ability to meet mission objectives. In 
the face of these competing interests, PBLs strike a balance between risk to the vendor and 
risk to the government, with vendors accepting higher risks (i.e., having to make 
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expenditures to react to the DoD’s use of equipment, which is outside the control of the 
vendor) in return for the premium of higher potential profitability (Doerr, Lewis, & Eaton, 
2005; Gardner et al., 2015). A further complication is that, in addition to aligning incentives 
for the government and the contractor, incentives must sometimes align with the 
components of the contractor or subcontractors that will be working on the project (Boyson 
et al., 2008). This potentially leads to an increase in the complexity of creating effective 
incentives. 
Time-Based Incentives 
Time-based incentives involve the initial length of a contract and altering contracts 
with a given contractor to extend their life. After conducting a series of interviews, Gupta et 
al. (2010) found that the main incentive for contractors is the continuation of the contract. 
The authors recommend that initial contracts should be for at least five years, which allows 
contractors to recover their initial investment in a project and solidifies expectations for 
needed employees and equipment. For example, the contract for support for the F-117 was 
for five years with the option to extend for an additional three, a feature that was considered 
a key to the success of the program (J. Hunter, n.d.). However, it should be noted that 
contracts for relatively simple subsystems or arrangements can be shorter, as they require 
less investment (Assistant Secretary of Defense for Logistics and Materiel Readiness, 
2016a). In practice, the Navy specifies that its PBL contracts are long term, as is the case 
with the Consolidated Automatic Support System (Klevan, 2008; Stailey, n.d.).  
In comparison, the UK’s Ministry of Defense negotiates through-life capability 
management contracts that are similar to PBLs, but can be much longer. These lengthier 
contracts incentivize more long-term investments than shorter contracts and have been 
credited with billions of pounds saved for the UK government (Gansler, Lucyshyn, & 
Harrington, 2012). However, as is discussed in the Cost-Based Incentives section, lengthier 
contracts are not currently an option for the U.S. government under the current Federal 
Acquisition Regulation (FAR) and various related statutes. Another comparison can be 
made to the Australian approach, which involves using contract duration as the primary 
incentive. While a contract may initially be for a period of five years, the government can 
begin review in the second year to determine whether to add to the length of the contract if 
vendors can demonstrate that they have met performance benchmarks. This would face the 
same challenges as the UK approach, but potentially could be done through the use of 
indefinite contract vehicles, which have previously been used by the DoD (A. Hunter et al., 
2015). 
For the contract to be continued, and thus have the benefit of the incentive realized, 
the contractor must meet certain requirements related to cost, quality, or delivery. As should 
be evident, if a contractor cannot meet the requirements specified in the contract, the 
contractor runs the risk of not having the contract extended. In this case, either the incentive 
could be inadequate or the contractor could be incapable of reaching the agreed-upon goal. 
Gardner et al. (2015) conducted a survey of six existing PBL programs and 
conducted interviews with PBL experts from both the DoD and industry. Like Gupta et al. 
(2010), they found that there was a “high level of satisfaction” with contracts that lasted five 
years with the option for continuation. Those interviewed said that the length ensured that 
risks were shared in an acceptable manner. The authors found that the ability to continue 
the contract past its initial period strengthened the relationship between a contractor and the 
government because it allowed for flexibility to make changes to the contract.  
In addition, among those interviewed by Gardner et al. (2015), those who were party 
to a contract with multiple guaranteed years felt the most satisfied with their incentive to 
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invest. One interviewee also told the authors that long-term contracts are one of the most 
important factors for contractors to accomplish weapon systems affordability improvements. 
In determining the optimal length of contract, the report from the Center for Executive 
Education (2012) found that the best practice was to have the contract last as long as the 
payback period for the contractor’s investments. 
Another question Gardner et al. (2015) sought to answer was whether the limits on 
contract length set by the Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) and related statutes limited 
the desired contract length for projects. The FAR regulates the acquisition of supplies and 
services by all federal executive agencies (GSA, DoD, & NASA, 2005). Generally, the 
individuals interviewed did not think the limits set by FAR were a major problem and the 
issue was secondary to other concerns, though some did express a desire for the ability to 
negotiate longer contracts. The authors did find that one of the main concerns among those 
they interviewed was that funding was not guaranteed over the years of a contract due to 
the nature of the congressional appropriations process (Gardner et al., 2015). As noted 
previously, one way to mitigate these challenges is to use indefinite contract vehicles such 
as IDVs, which do not make future work automatic but do ensure that a mechanism is 
already in place to allow it (A. Hunter et al., 2015).  
Cost-Based Incentives 
Cost-based incentives are those that are focused on contractor profits. When 
thinking about cost incentives, the most important consideration is the type of contract and 
types of fees the government will offer the contractor (Gupta et al., 2010). The FAR 
identifies a spectrum of contract types that fit into these categories based on the fee-type of 
the contract. The fees include fixed fees, incentive fees, and award fees. The primary 
difference between these different contract types and fee types is what criteria are used to 
adjudicate contractor fee and the resulting profits or losses (GSA et al., 2005).  
One important factor when considering contract types is profit sharing. Typically, if 
there was an increase in efficiency in a cost-plus contract, the government would use this as 
an opportunity to lower costs, meaning that the DoD would enjoy all of the return and the 
contractor would not be incentivized to improve performance. In fixed-price contracts, the 
contractor receives the financial benefit of any gains in efficiency without the DoD cutting 
costs. The area of the spectrum between these two ends is filled by various types of 
contracts with incentive fees. 
PBLs have typically been either firm-fixed-price or fixed-price incentive firm, but can 
also take the form of other types of fixed-price contracts (Assistant Secretary of Defense for 
Logistics and Materiel Readiness, 2016a). While fixed-price is not required, it is the DoD’s 
preferred type of contract (Assistant Secretary of Defense for Logistics and Materiel 
Readiness, 2016a). Other forms of PBLs, such as fixed-price incentive fee, allow for profit 
sharing, so that both the DoD and the contractor benefit from cost reductions and increases 
in efficiency (Gardner et al., 2015). However, a firm-fixed-price contract may be picked 
deliberately to further strengthen the incentive for the firm to save money and thus come in 
below budget (Gupta et al., 2010). 
Another approach is to use cost-based incentives that are based on performance 
metrics. And just as there are different types of PBL contracts for various circumstances, 
each type of performance-related incentive makes sense in different contexts. For example, 
the DoD’s PBL Guidebook (2016) says that “shorter-term cost-type incentive arrangements 
are appropriate” until sufficient information has been collected on the program. In an 
instance where there is a single metric for defining success, the government and firm can 
adopt a model described by Sols, Nowick, and Dinesh (2007). The authors described a 
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model with a “dead zone” at its center. They defined this as normal system performance, 
with the bottom edge and top edge of the dead zone representing the lower and upper limits 
of normal system performance respectively. If performance remains in this zone, the 
contractor will receive no reward and will not be assessed a penalty. If performance falls 
below the dead zone, then a penalty should be incurred by the contractor. If performance 
rises above the dead zone, the contractor should be awarded a bonus for exceeding normal 
performance. The key consideration, according to the authors, is that the contractor and 
government must agree on linking awards and penalties to given performance parameters. 
An example of a performance metric that could be used is average number of backorders 
and average total downtime of a system. Mirzahosseinian and Piplani (2011) found that a 
compensation model based on the time average of backorders leads to lower amounts of 
both backorders and downtime. Sols et al. (2007) also note that this could be harder if 
several metrics are needed, a scenario that they consider more likely than having a single 
parameter. Their model for a single metric is represented in a two-dimensional space. Two 
metrics would require a three-dimensional space. The DoD has five parameters for 
assessing logistic performance (operational availability, mission reliability, logistics response 
time, logistics footprint, and cost per unit usage), which would require a six-dimensional 
representation. This presents challenges when designing metrics for a contract. 
When used, cost-based incentives appear to have a positive effect. In one analysis, 
the DoD found that performance increased for 12 out of 14 PBL projects with cost reduction 
incentives (Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense Materiel Readiness, 2011). 
A commonly cited example of this is the set of F-117 sustainment contracts. These were 
cost plus incentive fee/award fee contracts. The performance incentive fee was awarded 
based on seven objectively measured metrics. The award fee was based on four 
subjectively evaluated categories. This number of metrics is mostly in keeping with the PBL 
Guidebook’s suggestion that three to five is the “effective number” of metrics (Assistant 
Secretary of Defense for Logistics and Materiel Readiness, 2016a). In total, 80% of the 
contract dollars were incentivized (J. Hunter, n.d.). The contracts are also Total System 
Performance Responsibility (TSPR) contracts, which raises the concern that within any 
given year they are “must-pay” obligations for the Air Force. TSPR contracts entail the 
government obligating the agreed-upon funds at the start of each year, which ensures that 
funding is stabilized. This means that the funds must be paid, even if operations 
requirements were to change (GAO, 2000; Gardner et al., 2015). In spite of these concerns, 
the operating cost for the F-117 increased minimally. In other words, the contracts largely 
controlled costs to the government (J. Hunter, n.d.). 
Scope 
Scope-based incentives take advantage of the inherent profit structure of PBL 
contracts. Whether there is a firm-fixed-price contract or a fixed-price incentive contract, that 
firm-fixed price will be based on government estimates of cost plus an allowance for 
contractor profits. The contractor generates additional profits by providing the agreed-upon 
outcome for a lower cost than was achieved in the past. A contractor’s ability to wring out 
further efficiencies is theoretically proportional to the portion of the process it controls. 
Because of this, greater scope means greater revenue and greater chance for profits for the 
contractor, and it means increased efficiency for the DoD (A. Hunter et al., 2015). Gupta et 
al. (2010) argued that another way to approach scope-based incentives is to use them as a 
mechanism for giving the contractor both more responsibility and larger incentives through 
changes in the contract based on performance. In other words, an increase in scope can be 
a reward for good performance.  
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However, Gupta et al. (2010) noted that, because of the government’s requirement 
for a competitive procurement process, it is challenging to employ scope-based incentives. 
While it may make sense for the same contractor to cover multiple responsibilities for a 
system, if another contractor can perform some of those functions for a lower price then it 
will receive the contract. In addition, even without this concern, it can be challenging to 
determine the appropriate scope of a project. For example, A. Hunter et al. (2015) examined 
the Industrial Product-Support Vendor contract, which provides support for several Air Force 
Air Logistics Centers. The authors found that the scope of the contract was very narrow, 
creating the potential for duplicative efforts on the part of the contractor, the Defense 
Logistics Agency, and the Air Logistics Center, and limiting the contractor’s ability to provide 
improved support by restricting its ability to leverage usage information to achieve 
efficiencies. Because increased scope for the contractor means reduced scope for 
government organizations, there are inherent limits to how easily scope can be shifted 
between the two. Although this situation has been improved over time, it does illustrate the 
difficulty in determining the appropriate scope of a contract, never mind scope-based 
incentives. 
Other Incentives 
The literature on other types of incentives for PBLs is limited. Other types of 
incentives that could be considered are those based on scale of the contract, flexibility of the 
contract, and prestige accrued by the contractor. 
Challenges to Designing Incentives 
One of the main challenges to adopting any form of performance-based contracting 
(the more generic term for what the DoD calls PBL) is achieving what Selviaridis and 
Norrman (2015) call a joint intent between the two parties involved in the contract. Their 
research found that customers were reluctant to offer extra rewards and providers were 
concerned about agreeing to performance-based incentives, perceiving them to be risky. 
While the authors were not examining defense contractors, the same challenges apply to 
PBLs.  
Another potential issue arises when more than one contractor is involved in fulfilling 
the contract, such as when a contractor uses subcontractors (Selviaridis & Norrman, 2014). 
As noted previously, each contractor may react to incentives differently or incentives 
designed for the main contractor may not incentivize changes in behavior by the 
subcontractors. Yet another issue is that if incentives are poorly designed and overseen, 
they can also lead to unintended behavior that is beneficial for the contractor but detrimental 
to their client (Koning & Heinrich, 2013). The authors of this study found that in some 
contexts, such as when the risk of failing to meet contract expectations is greater, 
contractors can exhibit gaming behavior to avoid losing out on funding. However, it should 
be noted that the authors found this behavior to have little impact on outcomes. 
An additional concern is that it is possible for a system to exceed expectations based 
on one parameter while underperforming based on another parameter (Sols, Nowick, & 
Verma, 2007). This creates a challenge when designing incentives, as the award of the 
benefits of incentives is based on measurable metrics. This scenario creates some 
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complexity in determining whether the award should be given.The Current State of DoD PBL 
Contracting2 
This section of the report examines how PBL contracts are currently used within the 
DoD to provide context for the analysis that follows. Data for this analysis is drawn from the 
publicly-accessible Federal Procurement Data System. 
The use of PBL contract structures within the DoD grew steadily through much of the 
2000s. From less than $400 million in 2000, obligations under PBL contracts rose to over $2 
billion by 2004, and just under $6 billion by 2010. Use of PBL contracts has surged since 
then, reaching a high of nearly $9 billion in 2014, before falling off since. Figure 1 shows 
total DoD contract obligations under PBL contracts, broken out by major DoD component. 
 
 DoD PBL Contract Obligations by Component, 2000–2016 Figure 1.
(Source: FPDS; CSIS analysis) 
Overall DoD PBL contract obligations were nearly four times higher in 2016 than they 
were in 2005, indicative of the degree to which acceptance of the utility of PBL contract 
structures has grown within the DoD. As a share of overall DoD contract obligations, PBL 
contracts have risen from just over 1% in 2009 to nearly 3% between 2013 and 2015, before 
declining slightly in 2016 to 2.3%. 
                                            
 
 
2 The Federal Procurement Data System, which CSIS uses as its primary source for government 
contract data, does not have a field that can be used to broadly identify PBL contracts, CSIS has 
attempted to fill this gap with a number of data sources, including reviews of contract solicitations. 
While some smaller PBLs may not have been captured in this effort, CSIS is confident that it has 
identified a sufficient share of DoD PBL contracts to meaningfully inform an analysis of trends. 
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Army, which had less than $100 million in PBL contract obligations in 2005, saw PBL 
contract obligations rise to a high of over $1.8 billion by 2012, driven by large PBL contracts 
related to the UH-72A light utility helicopter and the RQ-7 Shadow tactical UAV.  
Navy, meanwhile, was at the forefront of the adoption of PBL contract structures in 
the early- to mid-2000s, with nearly $1.3 billion in PBL contract obligations in 2004, spread 
among a number of PBL programs not readily identifiable in FPDS. Obligations peaked in 
2010 at nearly $2.2 billion and remained near that level until 2013. Air Force, meanwhile, 
saw significant obligations for PBL contracts as early as 2000, related to the B-2 bomber 
platform, and steady growth between 2003 and 2010, due to increasing obligations related 
to that same platform. Air Force PBL contract obligations more than tripled between 2011 
and 2012, primarily driven by $2.2 billion in obligations in 2012 under a PBL contract related 
to the C-17A transport aircraft.  
Since DoD PBL contract obligations peaked in 2013, total obligations have declined 
by 26%, over three times as steeply as the decline in overall DoD contract obligations 
between 2013 and 2016. Both Army (-27%) and Air Force (-24%) have seen declines 
roughly in line with the overall rate of decline for DoD PBL contract obligations, but Navy has 
declined at more than double that rate (-55%), with significant declines across the range of 
platforms and systems that the Navy maintains under PBL contract structures. 
Notably, despite what seems to be the end of a period of decline for DoD contracts, 
with overall DoD contract obligations rising by 7% in 2016 after sustained declines between 
2009 and 2015, DoD PBL contract obligations fell by 10% in 2016.  
What the DoD Uses PBL Contracts For 
Because PBL contracts often involve purchasing a mix of multiple products and 
services, the usual FPDS categorization schema that CSIS uses to track what is being 
contracted for—Product or Service Code—is less useful here. Instead, Figure 2 looks at 
platform portfolios, a categorization schema developed by CSIS, using a combination of the 
ProductorServiceCode and ClaimantProgramCode fields in FPDS, that aggregates all 
product, service, and R&D contracts by the type of platform the contracts are associated 
with. 
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 DoD PBL Contract Obligations by Platform Portfolio, 2000–2016 Figure 2.
(Source: FPDS; CSIS analysis) 
Unsurprisingly, the Aircraft & Drones platform portfolio has been the biggest driver of 
growth in PBL contracting over the 2000 to 2016 period. Aircraft & Drones accounted for 
over 54% of DoD PBL contract obligations in every year from 2000 to 2009, and have 
accounted for at least 43% in every year since. That decline is largely maintained by the 
growth in obligations under the “Other R&D and Knowledge Based” category, but further 
investigation by CSIS into the individual contracts has revealed that much of the growth in 
that category is for PBLs that are related to Aircraft & Drones platforms, but are not 
identifiable as such using the ProductorServiceCode and ClaimantProgramCode fields. 
CSIS is presently testing ways to improve the accuracy of the Platform Portfolio 
categorization schema based on this discovery, and will integrate that revision into the final 
analysis of this research effort. 
Despite that minor data issue, the available data does show Aircraft & Drones PBL 
contract obligations returning to prior levels after a notable spike in 2012 and 2013, driven 
heavily by the growth of the C-17A PBL program. The decline since 2013 has been broad-
based, with a number of PBL programs seeing reduced contract obligations. 
Electronics & Communications has consistently been one of the larger categories of 
PBL contract obligations, accounting for more than 10% in every year from 2007 to 2015. 
Land Vehicles, meanwhile, have only accounted for more than 1% of DoD PBL contract 
obligations in a single year (2% in 2010) during the 2000 to 2016 period. Missiles & Space 
Systems had never accounted for more than 1% until 2012, but have accounted for between 
2% and 4% since. Similarly, Weapons & Ammunition, which had never accounted for more 
than 1% of PBL contract obligations from 2000 to 2006, accounted for between 4% and 7% 
in every year from 2007 to 2015. 
Interestingly, there have been almost no PBL contract obligations for Ships & 
Submarines, with total PBL contract obligations of less than $40 million over the entire 2000 
to 2016 period. While the maintenance and repair needs of ships and submarines differ 
greatly from those of most other platforms in the DoD’s inventory, it is nonetheless surprising 
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to see that virtually no PBL work has been tried, even for smaller surface ships or shipboard 
systems. 
How the DoD Structures PBL Contracts 
Unsurprisingly, the vast majority of DoD PBL contracts are structured as Firm Fixed 
Price contracts, which follows generally accepted best practices for PBL contracting. Since 
2000, 68% of DoD PBL contract obligations have been awarded under Firm Fixed Price 
contract, as seen in Figure 3. 
 
 DoD PBL Contract Obligations by Contract Pricing Mechanism, 2000–Figure 3.
2016 
(Source: FPDS; CSIS analysis) 
Aside from a brief dip in the early- to mid-2000s, when the share of obligations 
awarded under Fixed Price Incentive, Cost Plus Incentive, and Cost Plus Award Free briefly 
surged. While both Fixed Price Incentive Fee and Cost Plus Award Fee contract types have 
not been a significant factor in DoD PBL contracting since those brief spikes in usage, a 
surprisingly large share of PBL contracts are still structured as Cost Plus Incentive; between 
8% and 13% of PBL contract obligations were structured as Cost Plus Incentive in every 
year since 2006. Cost Plus Fixed Fee, which was not used significantly for PBL contracts in 
the early 2000s, grew to account for between 3% and 7% of DoD PBL contract obligations 
from 2004 to 2011, and between 7% and 12% from 2012 to 2016. Both Cost Plus contract 
types seem to be primarily used for PBL contracts that are more transactional in nature, but 
CSIS is consulting with experts to better understand how and why the decision is made to 
structure some PBLs as Cost Plus, rather than Fixed Price. 
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Competition for DoD PBL Contracts 
While about half of overall DoD contract dollars in recent years have been awarded 
after effective competition,3 DoD PBL contracts are far less competitive, as seen in Figure 4. 
 
 Level of Competition for DoD PBL Contract Obligations, 2000–2016 Figure 4.
(Source: FPDS; CSIS analysis) 
For the 2000 to 2016 period, 78% of DoD PBL contract obligations have been 
awarded without competition. This is not surprising, since most PBLs for platforms and 
systems go to the original manufacturer for a number of reasons, including the following:  
• Most manufacturers retain the technical data rights to their platforms and 
systems, without which it is impossible for another vendor to perform the 
functions under a PBL. (Even in cases where the original manufacturer might 
be willing to sell those data rights, the cost is likely to be more than the DoD 
is willing to pay.) 
• Original manufacturers have supply chains already developed, whereas 
anyone competing to take over a PBL would have to build a new supply chain 
from scratch. 
• In discussion with experts, some mentioned their hesitance to try to compete 
to take over an existing PBL even when one was potentially going to be put 
up for competition, due to the large advantage that the incumbent vendor is 
perceived to have. 
                                            
 
 
3 CSIS defines “effective competition” as a competitively-sourced contract which receives at least two 
offers, and which excludes competitions where only one offer is received. 
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Nonetheless, there has been a significant increase in the share of PBL contract 
obligations awarded after effective competition since the early 2000s. While only 1% of PBL 
contract obligations were awarded after effective competition in 2004, that share rose to 
between 23% and 25% between 2007 and 2011, with competitions receiving five or more 
offers making up the largest portion of those effectively competed PBL contracts. That share 
has declined in recent years, mostly hovering in the mid to high teens, but nonetheless 
remains notably higher than in the early 2000s.  
For both the Navy and Air Force, the share of PBL contract obligations awarded on a 
sole source basis has remained in the low to mid 80% range in recent years, which, while 
higher than the overall DoD PBL rate, is an improvement over the rates seen in the early- to 
mid-2000s. The Army and DLA, by contrast, have always seen lower rates of sole source 
awards, with 52% and 62%, respectively, awarded on a sole source basis since 2000. This 
difference is primarily a factor of the fact that DLA and the Army spend a greater share of 
their PBL contract obligations on subsystem- and component-level PBLs, which are more 
likely to have multiple vendors able to potentially perform. 
Who Performs DoD PBL Contract Obligations 
The industrial base that performs PBL contracts for the DoD is heavily concentrated, 
which is not surprising, given that many of the large PBL contracts are tied to major 
platforms and systems, which are in turn produced by a small number of the largest defense 
vendors. Table 1 shows the top 15 DoD PBL vendors between 2009 and 2016, with both 
their respective contract obligations and their shares of overall DoD PBL contract obligations 
for that period. 
Table 1. Top 15 DoD PBL Vendors, 2009–2016 
(Source: FPDS; CSIS analysis) 
 
The top five DoD PBL vendors accounted for 64% of the total DoD PBL contract 
obligations between 2009 and 2016, and the top 15 accounted for 93%. Both of those 
figures have increased significantly over the 2009 to 2016 period: The share going to the top 
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five PBL vendors has increased from 55% in 2009 to a high of 71% in 2015, before falling 
back to 66% in 2016, while the share going to the top 15 has risen from 87% in 2010 to 95% 
in 2016. 
Northrop Grumman accounted for the largest shares of DoD PBL contract obligations 
in 2009 through 2011, but since 2012, Boeing has received nearly 75% more obligations 
than the second-ranked vendor, L3 Communications.  
Initial Interview Findings 
The core of this research effort is a series of interviews with experts on PBL 
contracting within vendors who perform PBLs for the DoD, vendors who perform PBLs for 
the private sector, and government entities (both foreign and domestic) that contract for 
PBLs. At this stage of the research effort, CSIS has conducted interviews with multiple 
experts that manage PBLs for the DoD, covering the range of PBL projects, from 
component-level PBLs to system-level PBLs to full platform PBLs. While CSIS plans to 
conduct more interviews in the coming months, to gain the broadest range of perspectives 
on the issue of incentives in PBL contracting, the experts that CSIS has already spoken to 
have provided a few key insights into how they approach the issue of incentives in PBLs. 
There are three key initial findings from discussions with these experts: 
• Contract length is the most powerful incentive. 
• Negative monetary incentives are effective, even down to the subcontractor 
level. 
• Positive monetary incentives are not seen as effective or desirable. 
Contract Length Is the Most Powerful Incentive 
Virtually every expert that CSIS has interviewed thus far has cited contract length as 
the most powerful incentive in a PBL environment. This consistency is likely the result of the 
nature of how vendors operate in a PBL environment. As discussed briefly in the literature 
review section, PBLs generate savings and performance improvements because vendors 
are incentivized to invest up-front in equipment and process improvements that allow them 
to meet performance targets and reduce costs. In theory, these up-front investment costs 
will be offset by profits in later years, but that assumes that there are later years to the 
contract. 
In some cases, vendors performing PBLs for the DoD have found themselves on 
year-to-year contracts, and those experts cited the uncertainty in those structures as a 
powerful disincentive to invest in equipment and process improvements. After all, if the basic 
business model for PBLs is for up-front costs to be justified by long-term profits, and there is 
no guarantee that the contract will still be active long-term, it is difficult to make a business 
case to justify the up-front investments. Longer-term contracts also allow vendors to fund 
their suppliers long-term, which can help generate significant savings. In a year-to-year 
contract environment, or any one with particularly short contract terms, the risk to vendors is 
likely to be too high for them to tolerate in order to make the sorts of investments necessary 
for a successful PBL. 
Even in cases where the contract length is at least five years, which experts cited as 
the bare minimum necessary in order for them to feel that the risk inherent in up-front 
investments is justified by the long-term rewards, the experts that CSIS spoke with cited 
other factors that disincentivize investment. Even with a five year contract, which many 
contracting entities within the DoD are hesitant to award, the single year nature of federal 
budgeting means that a contract is no guarantee of future work. If a vendor has a five year 
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contract to ensure availability of a platform, invests money up-front to improve availability 
and drive down costs, and then, two years into the contract, Congress decides not to 
appropriate the funds necessary to conduct work on the platform at the previously 
understood levels, the vendor can find themselves in a bad situation. Even if the contract 
isn’t outright cancelled, if the work level is scaled back significantly in a PBL where payment 
is based on the volume of work (as happened to some programs during the budget 
drawdown and sequestration), a vendor can find themselves without enough profit over the 
course of the contract to offset the up-front investments. (That same dynamic can act as a 
disincentive to government customers as well; experts cited cases where firm-fixed-price 
PBLs based on assumptions of workload ended up with lower workloads than expected, 
which left the government customer feeling like they had significantly overpaid.) 
Experts that CSIS spoke to cited 10 years as an ideal length for a PBL contract; 
while contracts of that length are not an option under U.S. federal contracting regulations 
and related statutes, other countries such as the UK and Australia have had positive 
experiences with longer-term PBL contracts. In the UK, they have also used triggered option 
year contract structures, where a contract is awarded for a base length, and then future 
years are triggered as long as performance metrics are continually met. Australia also uses 
a rolling contract extension approach. A contractor performing well may receive a sixth year 
of performance during year three of the contract as a reward. A contractor not performing to 
the government’s satisfaction may receive a warning in year three but have a chance to turn 
around their performance and still earn the extension in year four. 
Experts among DoD PBL vendors indicated that these sorts of arrangements helped 
mitigate some of the risk and uncertainty of shorter-than-desirable base contract lengths, but 
they noted that these triggered option year arrangements have notable limitations. Most 
significantly, according to industry experts, they are most effective in competitive 
environments, which are a distinct minority of the PBL market; in a sole-source environment, 
where there is no threat of losing the contract to another vendor, the option years don’t 
alleviate the fundamental concerns about future-year funding and workloads. This 
skepticism of length as an incentive in a sole-source environment has also been expressed 
by other U.S. experts in discussion of earlier CSIS work on this topic. This discrepancy 
between U.S. and international views of the efficacy of extensions merits further study in 
subsequent interviews. 
Negative Monetary Incentives Are Effective, Even Down to the Subcontractor Level 
Just as there was broad agreement about the efficacy of contract length as both a 
positive and negative incentive in a PBL environment, there was consensus among the 
experts that CSIS has spoken to about the effectiveness of negative monetary incentives. 
These sorts of incentives can take a number of forms, but at their core, they are fairly 
simple: if a vendor fails to meet a contractually-mandated performance metric over a 
particular period of time, the amount of money they receive under the contract is reduced by 
a pre-determined amount. The experts agreed that this sort of incentive was effective, 
primarily when it was something that was within their ability to control, and was something 
they could plan around. To the degree that negative performance incentives were tied to 
metrics that the vendor had less control over, or were harder to predict, the risk level 
inherent in those negative incentives would be greatly increased. 
Some of the experts mentioned that these sorts of negative monetary incentives 
were effective even down to the subcontractor level. In a PBL environment, some vendors 
hold their larger subcontractors responsible for their role in meeting performance metrics, 
such that if they are responsible for the vendor not meeting the metric, they also share in the 
penalty. It was emphasized that, when this sort of shared responsibility is implemented, it 
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only extends to the largest subcontractors, who have the ability to weather the potential 
penalties without it threatening their stability as a business. In some cases, penalties might 
not flow down to the subcontractor level in the initial years of a PBL project, but would start 
to be enforced later in the contract. The interviewees also noted that, in a well-constructed 
supply chain, the subcontractors should already exist as part of a team with the prime 
vendor, and that a sense of shared responsibility for meeting performance metrics should 
already be assumed, even absent shared penalties. 
Positive Monetary Incentives Are Not Seen as Effective or Desirable 
One common theme among the experts that CSIS had not seen any indication of, 
either in the literature or in prior research on PBLs, is the consensus that positive monetary 
incentives are neither effective nor desirable for vendors. Most positive monetary incentives 
take the form of additional money for meeting performance metrics targets above the 
contractual baselines, but the experts within DoD PBL vendors expressed a number of 
concerns about these contract structures. Most fundamentally, there was broad agreement 
that the additional money was rarely worth the cost of meeting the higher metric target. In 
cases where the experts had managed or worked on PBL contracts with positive monetary 
incentives, they had rarely seen cases where the work to meet the higher metric target 
resulted in a net profit. One aggravating factor was that these positive incentives were 
sometimes combined with cost sharing measures such as fixed-price incentive fee 
contracts. In these cases, the cost sharing mechanism proved more important towards 
driving contractor decisions than the possibility of receiving a performance reward. 
Interviewees noted that it was particularly difficult to predict the cost of meeting those 
higher targets at the start of the contract, which meant that properly pricing the positive 
monetary incentive was a challenge. Additionally, in cases where the vendors could properly 
price the higher metric target, it was difficult to get the government to agree to incentive 
levels high enough to make hitting the increased target potentially profitable.  
Other Findings of Note 
In addition to those three key findings from the experts that CSIS has spoken to thus 
far, the following are points of interest that have been raised by one or two experts, but 
which are interesting enough that CSIS will pursue them in future interviews: 
• the government incentive to keep a certain percentage of work in-house; 
• hesitancy of vendors to try to compete for existing PBLs because of the 
perceived difficulty of dethroning incumbents; 
• control as an incentive and a risk factor—government-furnished equipment, 
requirements to use depots (which the vendor has minimal ability to manage) 
as subcontractors, and other features that lessen the scope of what factors of 
a PBL the vendor can exert influence over; and 
• skepticism of “power-by-the-hour” PBL arrangements, due to the number of 
hours frequently coming in below projections. 
Final Thoughts 
In the final stages of this research effort, CSIS will continue to interview experts from 
across the spectrum of PBL contracting experience. This will help CSIS gather the broadest 
possible picture of how incentives are currently used in PBLs and how incentives should be 
used. Additionally, CSIS will identify specific PBL contracts as case studies and examine the 
incentive structures (both contractual and implicit) of those contracts to illustrate the real-
world consequences of the choices made in structuring those PBL contracts. The final report 
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under this research project will provide lessons learned on using incentives in a PBL 
environment. 
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Introduction 
Over the last decade, the federal acquisition workforce has had to adapt to the need 
for new skill sets. Procurement reforms in the late 1990s required contracting specialists to 
have a greater knowledge of market conditions, industry trends, and market prices. Using 
market forces to determine reasonable prices has required an increase in both market 
research and price analysis methods. Most contracts pricing of acquisitions required cost 
analysis before these reforms became part of contracting regulations. These new 
regulations dictate a skill set for conducting price analysis that is largely missing from both 
the workplace and Defense Acquisitions University (DAU) existing curriculum. Since 2001, 
the Department of Defense Inspector General (DoDIG) and the Government Accountability 
Office (GAO) have issued several reviews of selected agencies discussing concerns about 
commercial and noncommercial prices of spare parts and services. Most of these reports 
have identified situations in which contracting officers failed to obtain adequate pricing 
information for justifying price reasonableness. In conclusion, both the DoDIG and the GAO 
have found that the contracting officers need improved expertise in both understanding and 
conducting price/cost analysis. The current gap in knowledge contributes to agencies 
missing cost saving opportunities as well as ventures to improve acquisition outcomes. 
Exercising appropriate price analysis methods that come from adequate price analysis 
guidance and training would address this gap. 
Purpose 
The purpose of this research is to identify the price analysis techniques being used 
and documented in the contracting file, and to explore potential improvements in conducting 
price analysis within the Defense Logistics Agency (DLA). This project builds on research 
previously conducted on Department of Defense (DoD) contracts (Redfern, Nelson, & White, 
2013; Gera & Maddox, 2013; Maddox, Fox, & Gera, 2014). 
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Findings and Analysis 
1a. Do Pricing Memoranda Deviate From Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR), 
Defense Federal Acquisition Regulation Supplement (DFARS) Requirements, and 
DFARS Procedures, Guidance, and Information (PGI) Procedures? 
We look specifically at how the contract file pricing memoranda deviated from 
Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR), Defense Federal Acquisition Regulation Supplement 
(DFARS) requirements and DFARS Procedures, Guidance, and Information (PGI) 
procedures. 
This question generated multiple findings. Rather than grouping our findings into one 
answer, the authors have addressed them individually below: 
1a(i). Inadequate Documentation Finding 
A number of contract files that we reviewed did not demonstrate that prices paid 
were reasonable due to inadequate FAR price analysis methods, as depicted in Table 1: 
Summary of Inadequately Justified Price Analysis Documentation in the Files by FAR Price 
Analysis Technique. 
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Table 1. Summary of Inadequately Justified Price Analysis Documentation in the 
Files by Price Analysis Technique 
 
1a(i). Analysis 
We noted that the file review verified the type of price analysis documented. Poor 
documentation in the files influenced our decisions to rate a pricing memo as justifiable or 
not. From this data, we determined that the personnel involved in performing these contract 
actions did not include sufficient documentation to support the price analysis method used 
as required by FAR and DFARS. Considering the number of inadequate price analysis 
justifications found in the memos sampled, it appears that contracting personnel do not 
know how to appropriately perform and document price analysis. In particular, two types of 
price analysis—references to market research and IGCEs—were performed and 
documented incorrectly more than 50% of the time. Previous price documentations were 
unjustified 43% of the time and 40% of price competition was found to be inadequate.  
1a(ii). Comparison of Current Offered Pricing Findings 
In 10 cases of the 25 currently offered prices, evidence showed that the proposed 
prices were not truly competitive. 
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Five pricing memorandums included some comparisons of current proposed 
(offered) prices when the lowest price was less than 80% of the next lowest price. For 
example, if the prices are $10, $50, and $55, respectively, then less than 80% would be 
anything lower than 80% x $50, which equals $40. So, the lower quote of $10 would be 
considered smaller. 
In two files, a price from a technically unacceptable offeror was nonetheless used to 
make a price comparison. 
There were nine instances in the sample of 66 where factors other than price 
determined the source selection, but price remained a substantial factor in 100% of those 
cases. Three contracts in this category were awarded to an offeror that was not the lowest 
offeror; however, two of the three had a statement of price reasonableness that did not 
justify the choice of the higher offer in the file.  
The inappropriate comparisons certainly raise the issue that although competition is 
present and sought, is there actual price competition? 
1a(ii). Analysis 
Proposed prices that are not within 20% of the next lowest price raise questions 
about the reliability of the proposed prices, and the existence of actual price competition. 
This could indicate a mistake in the offered price, a misunderstanding of the contract 
requirements, etc. In few cases, documentation included some determination of why such a 
large gap separated the lowest price from the next valid price or a price verification request 
by the CO to the lowest offeror. 
According to the FAR Part 6, the award of a contract to a supplier based on the 
lowest evaluated price alone can be a false economy if there is subsequent default, late 
deliveries, or other unsatisfactory performance resulting in additional contractual or 
administrative costs. While it is important that Government purchases be made at the lowest 
price, this does not require an award to a supplier solely because that supplier submits the 
lowest offer. The price from any offer that would not be considered for contract award such 
as technical unacceptability should not be used as a basis for price analysis. According to 
FAR 15, in awarding to any source other than the lowest priced offeror, the perceived 
benefits of a higher priced proposal shall merit the additional cost, and the rationale for 
tradeoffs must be documented in the file. Adequate price competition does not necessarily 
in of itself make a price reasonable. 
1a(iii). Comparison of Proposed Price to Previous Price (Historical) and Sole Source 
Commercial Findings 
Fourteen contract actions compared proposed prices to previous (historical) prices 
paid. In the six instances that had an invalid previous price documented in the file, a 
previous price could not be validated for one or more of the reasons displayed in Figure 1 
(some had multiple disqualifying reasons). In two of the six, the previous price had a 
significant time lapse between the current and previous price. In three cases of the six, 
significant changes affected the terms and conditions. In four of the six cases, the 
reasonableness of the previous price seemed uncertain.  
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 Contract File Data—Prior Price Disqualifiers Figure 1.
We found 26 items that were both Commercial and considered a sole source (see 
Figure 2). Of the 26, 10 had sufficient data to determine price reasonableness. In the 16 in 
which data did not substantiate price reasonableness, the CO requested data from the 
offeror only four times. Offeror provided the requested data all four times. In one case, the 
requested data had not been reviewed for contract award.  
 
 Commercial Sole Source Figure 2.
1a(iii). Analysis  
If using invalid previous prices, then price reasonableness has not been determined. 
For example, it would not be sufficient to use price(s) from a database paid for by another 
contracting officer without understanding the type of analysis that was performed to 
determine the price. The DoD strengthened guidance on this subject in PGI 215.403–3(4) 
per below: 
Reliance on prior prices paid by the Government. Before relying on a prior 
price paid by the Government, the contracting officer must verify and 
document that sufficient analysis was performed to determine that the 
prior price was fair and reasonable. Sometimes, due to exigent situations, 
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supplies or services are purchased even though an adequate price or cost 
analysis could not be performed. The problem is exacerbated when other 
contracting officers assume these prices were adequately analyzed and 
determined to be fair and reasonable. The contracting officer also must 
verify that the prices previously paid were for quantities consistent with 
the current solicitation. Not verifying that a previous analysis was 
performed, or the consistencies in quantities, has been a recurring 
issue on sole source commercial items reported by oversight 
organizations. Sole source commercial items require extra attention to verify 
that previous prices paid on Government contracts were sufficiently analyzed 
and determined to be fair and reasonable. At a minimum, a contracting officer 
reviewing price history shall discuss the basis of previous prices paid with the 
contracting organization that previously bought the item. These discussions 
shall be documented in the contract file. 
Since previous price comparison is one of the two preferred price analysis 
techniques, contracting personnel often use it in determining price reasonableness. This 
method is effective, provided the validity of the comparison (similar items, categories, 
quantities, quality, qualifications, and/or circumstances), and the reasonableness of the 
previous price(s) can be established. 
In this sample, more than 40% of the previous price comparisons made were invalid 
since the previous price was not verified. This illustrates why the authors determined that 
the contracts sampled do deviate from FAR/DFARS/PGI requirements and procedures. 
Further, If COs are not diligent in validating previous prices prior to using them for current 
pricing actions, then unreasonable prices can continually perpetuate themselves into future 
contracting actions.  
Adding to the 43% previous price comparisons we found that were invalid, all six 
were identified as sole source commercial. Current guidance requires extra attention to 
verify previous prices paid in looking at Sole Source Commercial Items, as stated from PGI 
215.403–3(4):  
Sole source commercial items require extra attention to verify that previous 
prices paid on Government contracts were sufficiently analyzed and 
determined to be fair and reasonable. At a minimum, a contracting officer 
reviewing price history shall discuss the basis of previous prices paid with the 
contracting organization that previously bought the item. 
Of the six comparisons to previous price that were Sole Source Commercial and 
were considered unjustified, the CO requested and reviewed additional sales data in only 
one case. These six were part of the 16 total Sole Source commercial found to have 
insufficient data to determine price reasonableness. 
1b. Do Pricing Memoranda Document the Type of Price Analysis Used in Determining 
Price? What Price Analysis Methods Are Being Used? 
Findings 
All of the pricing memos documented some type of price analysis used in 
determining that the price was reasonable. The research findings show that 25% of files 
used current competitive prices as a price analysis method (which is 24% of the total files). 
Comparison with the IGCE was documented in 38 pricing memos out of the 66 files, namely, 
36% of the files. Comparison to Competitive Price Lists and through market research were 
present in 23 of the 66 files, totaling 35%. Previous prices (historical) documentation were 
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present in 14 of the 66 files, totaling 13%. Comparison to another name was present in two 
of the 66 files representing 3% of the files, as seen in Figure 3. 
 
 Contract File Data—Price Analysis Techniques Used Figure 3.
Analysis 
According to the contract files sampled, comparison with the IGCE led the price 
analysis techniques used, with current offered prices ranking closely behind. IGCEs are not 
as reliable as current offered prices, therefore, their usefulness is questioned. Further price 
analysis techniques should supplement an IGCE. 
The application of price analysis techniques is notable. Contracting personnel within 
the offices sampled recognize the importance of price analysis in determining price 
reasonableness. However, as discussed in 1ai. (Inadequate Documentation), contracting 
personnel did not include sufficient documentation to support the price analysis method 
used as required by FAR and DFARS. Without the proper supporting documentation, the 
value of the techniques is questionable. 
1c. Do Pricing Memoranda Refer to Market Research?  
1c. Market Research Findings 
Seven contract pricing memoranda reviewed in the contract files used market 
research to establish price reasonableness, and a majority of the files in the sample 
contained market research reports as shown in Figure 4. Of the 32 market research reports, 
17 (53%) of those contracts addressed the type of pricing data collected, as shown in Figure 
5. Fifteen contracts in the sample did not address the type of pricing data collected in the 
market research report, and 23 contracts in the sample did not have a market research 
report that should have. In several files, the IGCE and market research report were 
combined into one document. Note: 11 samples were delivery orders without a requirement 
for market research, so only 55 files would have required a market research report. 
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 Contract File Data—Market Research Reports Figure 4.
 
 Contract File Data—Market Research Reports That Address Price Figure 5.
Notable Incomplete Statements Based on References to Market Research 
• A few memos referred to Market Research as to the type of price analysis 
used; however, information came from a competitive price list for the price 
analysis comparison. COs seemed confused on the difference between 
market research and a competitive price list comparison. 
• In using this comparison, buyer stated that he used partner agreements for 
justifying price. No evidence of partner agreements in file or reference to what 
specific information from the partner agreement proved useful.  
• Buyer makes a price comparison and states that the basis of price 
justification is through market research. However, no information related to 
the market since the price used for comparison came from the IGCE. The 
IGCE was based on GSA schedule labor rates, but no support given for labor 
hours/mix or travel costs. So, a somewhat confusing PNM with unjustified 
price comparisons. 
• A market survey had been conducted and one quote had been received from 
the same offeror who won the contract. The buyer used the market survey to 
justify the price by saying it was a fair market price obtained through 
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comparison of prices obtained through market research. No other price 
analysis had been used to justify the price. Three options were exercised 
from this contract and the buyers state the option prices were based on 
competition and therefore reasonable. There was no competition on the initial 
contract. Note: No IGCE appeared in the file.  
1c. Analysis 
Knowledge of marketplace suppliers and prices can be critical to the government’s 
ability to negotiate a reasonable price. Poorly done market research lessens an activity’s 
ability to achieve fair and reasonable prices. The authors found that market research 
appeared in a majority of the files we reviewed and were generally customer/requirements 
personnel generated. Market research does improve the buyers’ understanding of pricing in 
the marketplace. The authors didn’t look in depth at the quality of the market research 
reports but did note that market research reports addressed price in 53% of those 
examined. So, we conclude that the market research reports that examined pricing should 
have improved the buyers’ understanding of pricing in the marketplace.  
1d. What Are the Validity of the IGCEs and Contracting Officer’s/Specialist’s 
Interpretation and Use of the IGCEs in Pricing Memoranda? 
1d. IGCE Findings 
The IGCE has two roles: First, it supports what the customer and contracting offices 
believe is the “should price” and should be completed before the receipt of the price 
proposal and second, as a price analysis technique per FAR, parts 13 and 15. We will 
examine both here since they work together.  
Developing and documenting an IGCE by its creator is a critical phase in the 
planning of the acquisition. The customer in the requiring activity is responsible for these 
actions. It must be substantiated with valid supporting documentation in order to be useful 
as a “should price,” or a pricing technique, or both. The COs must be concerned with the 
reliability of the IGCE since it can be used as a proposal analysis comparison to determine a 
proposed price as fair and reasonable according to IAW 15.404–1(b)(v). When the IGCE is 
not substantiated, it should not be used as a pricing technique in validating a proposed 
price.  
e looked at each of the IGCEs and concluded whether the “should price” was 
substantiated. In determining substantiation, we looked primarily at the source of data and 
the estimator’s assessment of that data. We also looked at how the CO or buyer assessed 
the reliability of the IGCE. Just because we found an IGCE substantiated didn’t absolve the 
CO from determining its reliability. Lastly, we assessed the validity of the COs’ comparison 
of the IGCE to the proposed price. The number of substantiated IGCEs are not comparable 
to whether the CO assessed the reliability of the IGCE. In looking at the reliability of the 
IGCE, we only looked at IGCEs fulfilling the second role as a pricing technique. 
The documentation stated that an IGCE was in 63 of the 66 contracts sampled 
(95%). Forty-two IGCEs were substantiated (63.6%) by previous purchase, catalogs, 
published price lists, contact with a vendor, or other, typically a government technical report 
as seen in Figures 6 and 7. Essentially, the developer of the IGCE explained the sources of 
information used to make the estimate. Fifty-seven of the 58 service contracts had an IGCE 
in the file; one of the supply contracts had an IGCE in the file, and all six construction 
contracts had an IGCE in the file. 
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 Number of IGE/ IGCEs Substantiated in the Contract Files Figure 6.
 
 Source of IGCE Substantiation in the Contract Files Figure 7.
Notable Findings From Unsubstantiated IGCEs Reviewed  
Lack of justification of labor hour estimates in the following: 
• Only a statement that an engineer with experience estimated them.  
• Several estimates of labor hour efforts based on historical contracts, but no 
historical data in the file as back up or even a contract number for reference.  
• Task orders reviewed lacked evidence of estimates for labor hour effort. 
Since labor rates were already agreed to in the base ID/IQ contract, no 
perceived need to estimate labor mix and effort.  
• Labor hour estimate based on a reference to non-identified historical work 
and a reduction of that historical effort based on a consolidation. No details 
about what is meant by consolidation. From reviewing the file, it appears that 
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tasks in the SOW has been reduced from previous efforts that should have 
been explained in the IGCE. 
Lack of justification in estimating the labor rates as follows: 
• Statements that historical rates were used without reference to any contract 
or data in file to back it up.  
• Escalation rates were applied to future years with no reference to the source 
of the escalation rate.  
• One escalation factor used was simply based on a quote in the DoD COTR 
handbook that stated “escalation between 2 and 3% is generally considered 
reasonable.” 
• IGCE creator used rates from a schedule with similar job titles, not similar 
services. 
• Unusual quantitative method used to determine an acceptable range of labor 
rates. Estimator took 4 quotes, averaged them, and then created a range by 
adding 20% to the average price, and subtracting 20% from the average 
price. No details why estimator used a +/- 20%. Made the range too large and 
not useful. 
• Only provided an estimated total dollar amount without a break down of labor 
mix, hours, or rates.  
Thirty-eight of the 66 files highlighted in Table 2 used IGCEs as the basis for the 
price reasonableness of current prices more frequently than any other technique, essentially 
37% of the contract actions reviewed. However, we found that only 13 of the 38 IGCEs used 
for determining price reasonableness could be determined reliable for use as a comparison.  
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Table 2. Answers to the Question: “What was the Documented Justification for 
Price Reasonableness?” 
 
Examples of the incomplete comparison with IGCE or use of unreliable IGCEs found 
in the file reviews: 
• Though a construction contract used RS Means to substantiate the IGCE, the 
winning price came in at $265k versus the IGCE estimate of $452K. The 
winning price only represents 58% of the IGCE. No documentation in the file 
justified why the IGCE was so high, despite plenty of offers alongside the 
winning price to justify the lower price. 
• The source of data in the IGCE is the sole source vendor’s quote and 
referred to no history. Buyer used the unsubstantiated/unreliable IGCE for 
justifying price reasonableness. 
• Documentation stated that price reasonableness was based on the 
comparison of the proposed price to an independent government estimate, 
but did not include any comments that would indicate the reliability of the 
IGCE in several pricing memos. 
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• Price justification relied on a weak IGCE. A quote from the previous offeror of 
the same services formed the basis of the IGCE. The IGCE was not 
substantiated; therefore, not reliable for comparison. 
• Pricing memo mentioned that the IGCE was based on market research and 
historical data, but none of that was referenced in the IGCE. 
• Though an IGCE was substantiated and could be used in justifying the 
reasonableness of the offered price, it had not been used. In the pricing 
memo, the IGCE is incorrectly stated as RS Means. 
• A pricing memo discussed how the IGCE justifies the reasonableness of the 
offered price; however, it is incorrectly stated in the memo as pursuant to 
15.404–1(c)(2)(iii)(D) and not to 15.404–1(c)(2)(v). 
• Though the IGCE was substantiated and considered reliable to use, the 
offered price of $217k was only 40% of the IGCE, which was $553k, or 
essentially 60% lower. No other price analysis supported this lower price. 
Offeror negotiations took place. The buyer’s objective was based on lowering 
the offered price by 10%, though it was well under the IGCE. The contractor 
conceded 1%. Some other data for comparison should have been sought.  
• The PNM contains a statement, “In addition, the offeror’s price was below the 
IGCE” as one of the justifications that the price is reasonable. No mention as 
to whether the IGCE was used for comparison or determined reliable or even 
why just being lower was a justification. 
• A substantiated IGCE was used as the sole technique for price comparison. 
The buyer did not discuss why there was a 23% (significant) difference 
between the IGCE and the price and/or why other price analysis techniques 
had not been done to determine the reasonability of the price.  
1d. Analysis of IGCEs 
The use of an IGCE to determine price reasonableness is frequent, and the 
documentation of the reliability of IGCEs is not consistent. In contrast, only 24% of the 
IGCEs in the contract files identified as a price analysis technique in determining a fair and 
reasonable price could be validated as reliable; see Figure 8. Having more than 76% of a 
customer’s IGCEs used without documentation for reliability is discouraging because it 
creates doubt about the price reasonableness determination. 
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 Contrast between IGCE Reliability and IGCE Substantiated Figure 8.
1e. If Pricing Memoranda Show Deviations, Do They Differ by the Same 
Characteristics and/or by Different Characteristics?  
1e. Findings 
In 45.5% of the files, deviations in pricing memoranda do exist as depicted as 
inadequate justification in Table 3. The files reviewed contained some consistent deviations 
and other unique ones. 
Table 3. Contract File Data—Adequate vs. Inadequate Justification for Price 
Reasonableness 
 
A majority of the pricing memoranda do deviate by two consistent characteristics: the 
lack of supporting documentation to justify the techniques used to establish price 
reasonableness based on previous prices and IGCEs. See findings that support the 
acceptance of prior prices without establishing their reasonableness and/or appropriate 
adjustments made for differences under the answers to 1a(iii) and findings behind the 
incomplete comparison with IGCE in the answers to 1d in the previous section. 
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The pricing memoranda in the sample reviewed established that the contracting 
officer determined price reasonableness as well as listed the technique used; however, 
substantiating documentation (e.g., calculation sheets, reference materials such as catalog 
data found online, copy of previous price documentation, and methodology) are not always 
included to support the source of their recommendations. A very small percentage of the 
IGCEs in the contract files used as a price comparison for price reasonableness included a 
statement of reliability or sought additional information from the IGCE creator to support the 
reasonableness of the offered price. Contracting personnel listed the IGCE as justifying the 
price of 38 contracts. Only 15 of the 38 were judged as reliable. 
Some of the files reviewed contained unique deviations in the pricing memos. The 
following notes the assortment of unique problems uncovered in the pricing memos: 
Notable Findings From Unjustified Pricing Memos Reviewed  
1. Offeror sales data requested, received, but not reviewed. 
2. Pricing memos that do not discuss the types of proposal analysis used in 
justifying price. 
3. Despite an acceptable total evaluated price, unbalanced pricing involved the 
price of one or more contract line items being significantly over or 
understated, as indicated in the price analysis techniques applied.  
4. The actual pricing memo left out details that had to be found under other 
tabs. The efforts made to justify price appeared adequate but were not 
recorded accurately in the PNM. 
5. Buyer accepted a discount off a vendor’s price as the justification for 
accepting the price. The discount of 12% off the commercial sales price was 
the same as the price given the vendor by the manufacturer. The vendor has 
no commercial sales, making it difficult to determine whether the government 
received the best price. Though the offeror has multiple sales within the 
government, it has no commercial sales to the public. No comparison made 
as to whether the commercial priced items are fair and reasonable. No 
comparison to other vendors providing pricing for similar items to see whether 
the discount is reasonable. Nothing to say manufacturer prices are 
reasonable, other than to say they are commercial items sold in substantial 
quantities. 
6. Offered price was reasonable because it was in line with competitive offers 
from recent years, yet no specific data provided justification. 
7. The buyer used the IGCE and competitive price lists for price justification. 
However, the IGCE was the vendor’s quote, and the price list was simply a 
price list from the vendor. No adequate comparisons made. Also confusing is 
the use of MFR based on FAR 13.106–3(a) (2) statements for determining 
price reasonableness. Then in award summary, COR quotes FAR 15.404 IV 
and V (competitive price lists and IGCE) for determining price 
reasonableness. Should be either FAR 13 or 15, not both. Though in either 
case, COR still would not have justified the price adequately. 
8. A buyer stated that an IGCE appeared in the PNM, but did not use it for the 
price comparison to the proposed price. The IGCE was substantiated and 
could have been used as an appropriate comparison. Unfortunately, the 
buyer used an invalid previous price for price analysis, instead of the IGCE. 
Had he done both, at least the IGCE would have supported the price 
reasonableness determination. Possibly buyers are not aware that more than 
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one price comparison is appropriate and sometimes necessary to justify price 
reasonableness. Three memos with similar issue. 
9. Though an adequate price competition, the buyer only stated price was 
reasonable as it conformed with GSA schedule pricing, and included the 
application of discounts. 
10. Very confusing: Buyer used a determination of an FMP as the basis for use in 
negotiating a final price, which was then considered fair and reasonable. The 
PNM did not specify the type of price analysis used for price comparison. A 
price analyst assisted the buyer and used competitive price lists of similar 
vendors to build the fair market price. Nothing was documented about how 
the labor effort or labor categories used in the FMP estimate were determined 
by the buyer or price analyst.  
 
In the researcher’s review of the IGCE, the IGCE estimator used a DISA 
contract to estimate the hours/categories. However, the buyer did not discuss 
that the IGCE was used in determining the FMP. Then, the FMP, which was 
built solely by the price analyst upon competitive price lists, was used to 
negotiate the final price. 
 
The justification for price reasonableness was the negotiated price. The 
researcher believes the data available support the price, but it was not written 
up correctly, so the price was not justified. The statement in the PNM said 
only the following: “FMP based on a GSA schedule;” “Based on 15.405 a, 
price negotiations, the CO determined price fair and reasonable based on the 
negotiation that met the FMP.”  
 
Researcher concludes that CO believed that the negotiations of an FMP 
allowed the CO to justify price without conducting or documenting price 
analysis since other information that helped justify the price was missing from 
file. 
 
Researcher notes some confusion on fair market pricing, especially for 
services. Not only does FMP need to determine the rates are fair and 
reasonable, but also evaluate the hours and labor mix, except for historical 
8(a) as noted in the FAR citation that follows. Also as a type of analysis, fair 
market prices still need to be justified. 
 
According to FAR 19.807, in estimating the fair market price, “The CO shall 
estimate the fair market price of the work to be performed by the 8(a) 
contractor. In estimating the fair market price, the CO shall use cost or price 
analysis and consider commercial prices for similar products and services, 
available in-house cost estimates, data (including certified cost or pricing 
data) submitted by the Small Business Administration (SBA) or the 8(a) 
contractor, and data obtained from any other Government agency. In 
estimating a fair market price for a repeat purchase, the contracting officer 
shall consider recent award prices for the same items or work if there is 
comparability in quantities, conditions, terms, and performance times. 
Comparison of commercial prices for similar items may also be used.” 
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1f. What Are the Most Predominant Price Analysis Techniques Used in Purchasing 
Services? 
Figures 9 and 10 depict responses to the question by percentages, then numbers for 
Contract File Data–Answers to the Question: “What Was the Documented Justification for 
Price Reasonableness for Services?” This offers insight into the predominant type of price 
analysis techniques exercised in purchasing services. 
 
 Contract File Data—Price Analysis Techniques Used, Services  Figure 9.
(Pie Chart) 
 
 Services—Price Analysis Techniques Used Figure 10.
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Findings 
According to the contract file data sampled, the services reviewed compared 
previous prices and competitive price lists equally as price analysis techniques. 
Services were very dependent on IGCEs. Thirty-six of 98 cumulative techniques 
used for services, or 37% of the time, service contracts tapped IGCEs as a primary price 
analysis technique. The next highest was current offered prices with 22 documented cases 
in the service files, or tapped 23% of the time. 
Analysis 
Out of the 58 service files we reviewed, 36 (62%) of the files used the IGCE for 
comparison. For services, there is more dependence on IGCEs to make price comparisons 
since IGCEs generally include an estimate of labor hours by the type of effort required. 
IGCEs are more effective for justifying the price of services than other price analysis 
techniques outside of two or more currently offered prices. 
Summary 
Overall, the use of price analysis techniques is common, but serious deficiencies 
hamper the correct use of those techniques and limit proper supporting documentation. Poor 
documentation to support the price reasonableness determination was the biggest 
weakness in the files examined. Competition was limited in establishing price 
reasonableness. The most frequently used techniques for determining price reasonableness 
within the files reviewed were comparisons to competitive price lists, comparison through 
market research, comparison to previous pricing, and comparison to IGCEs. The use of 
indexing and a statistically stratified sample appeared in a couple of files, but not regression 
and parametric analysis or other quantitative methods; however, contracting professionals 
interviewed know the techniques and have been trained to use them.  
Consistent with DoDIG report findings, it appeared DLA contracting activities are 
concerned with high workloads and shortages of qualified personnel. The reviewers can 
appreciate how the workload and shortages may compound pricing inaccuracies and poor 
IGCEs. However, the number of unjustified pricing memos we reviewed is worrisome. Table 
4 shows that over $61 million in services were not adequately justified for price 
reasonableness. 
Table 4. Summary of Unsubstantiated Pricing Memos by Service, Supply, and 
Commercial Value 
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Overall Recommendations 
In a sole-source environment, determining commercial item prices for services to be 
fair and reasonable can be very challenging. However, contracting personnel should be able 
to obtain enough information to determine price reasonableness. If not through data 
available, then from each offeror. The limited technical evaluations reviewed under the 
auspices of cost analysis were not an evaluation, but more of acceptance. The following 
overall recommendations may be considered for implementation: 
• A well-written checklist would be helpful to both contracting personnel and file 
reviewers. It would improve consistency by defining exactly what needs to be 
in the pricing documentation. A checklist should include a section on pricing. 
Reviewers saw other checklists provided to contracting personnel as a 
means to check off any FAR/DFARS/DLAD requirements, pre-award 
administration policies and procedures, but little on price analysis. The use of 
a checklist makes it easier for contracting personnel to at least identify the 
type of price analysis used in an award decision and pricing memo, instead of 
just writing it in.  
• Consider examining what is preventing contracting personnel from performing 
price analysis properly, such as the following: 
o Determine whether current assessment methods consistently follow 
price reasonableness standards in accordance with the FAR/DFARS-
PGI. 
o Train and retrain contracting personnel on price analysis techniques in 
determining price reasonableness along with what is proper support 
documentation for pricing. 
o Determine why offeror data is not requested more often. Only four 
files contained data requests from the offeror. 
• Eliminate or reduce the challenges that contracting personnel have in 
executing proper price reasonableness as discussed in the interviews. 
• Provide guidance to contracting personnel on how to assist and guide their 
personnel in preparing IGCEs and market research reports. This should be in 
line with any guidance provided to IGCE personnel, such as the IGCE Memo 
for distribution in the DLA entitled “Documenting the Independent 
Government Cost Estimate.” 
• Confusion about the use of GSA Federal Supply Schedules and compliance 
with FAR 8.404. Contracting personnel did not seem to follow 13 March 2014 
DPAP policy directing COs to make price reasonableness determinations 
using FAR 15 in lieu of FAR 8.404. See 
http://www.acq.osd.mil/dpap/policy/policyvault/USA001004-14-DPAP.pdf  
• Author suggested solicitation language to request additional price data that 
will help contracting personnel make a fair and reasonable determination 
when competition is not expected.  
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Abstract 
The current emphasis on innovation in the DoD and the imperative to maintain our 
technology edge in DoD weapons and vehicle systems requires that all avenues to meet this 
objective be reviewed. In this paper, we look in the DoD research labs and, specifically, the 
Tank Automotive Research, Development Engineering Center (TARDEC), to understand the 
challenges and successes of integrating and transitioning promising technologies into fielded 
programs. The paper examines several core activities and TARDEC’s role in bringing new 
technologies into programs. The paper describes the successes and challenges of 
technology integration and transition, and abstracts the systemic issues in the process. The 
objective is to identify process changes to address these issues, thus providing another path 
to maintaining, and in some cases, establishing the DoD advantage in various performance 
aspects of weapon and vehicle systems. 
Introduction 
The DoD and the Army are focused on technology innovation, especially with respect 
to weapons systems, to maintain the overwhelming superiority we have achieved over the 
past 75 years. There is concern that our technology superiority is decreasing and that new 
cyber and other threats are emerging, thus driving the urgency to maintain superiority in 
systems with a focus on driving innovative technology into programs. Innovative solutions 
might originate from basic research conducted at universities, the Defense Advanced 
Research Projects Agency (DARPA), and the Army laboratories. These are then refined and 
further developed in the Research and Development Engineering Centers (RDECs). The 
developments from the RDECs are transitioned to programs via requirements and 
prototypes to program offices, which are then reflected in solicitations to OEMs and prime 
contractors to be realized in programs. 
This topic has been studied over the years, and many best practices have emerged 
and are in use across the systems and technology enterprise. In this paper, we are focused 
on the Tank Automotive Research, Development Engineering Center (TARDEC) and have 
used TARDEC and RDEC interchangeably. TARDEC supports the PEO Ground Combat 
Systems (GCS) and PEO Combat Support and Combat Service Support (CS&CSS) and is 
focused on combat and tactical vehicles and systems. In this paper, we have studied and 
are reporting on experiences of personnel from TARDEC and program offices to understand 
best practices that have been used and challenges encountered in innovation and 
transitioning technology to programs.  
Methodology 
The approach included a questionnaire that covered several topics:  
• Current state of technologies developed in labs 
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• Technology development in universities and other organizations 
• Changes required to drive technology from labs to programs 
• Program success in technology transition 
• Participation in technology transfer programs 
• Management practices in technology integration 
• Aids and barriers to successful integration 
• Integration issues 
• OEM/Contractor dependencies 
• Communication and organizational alignments 
• Crossing the chasm from technology development to programs 
The interviewees included senior-level leaders or directors, chief engineers from 
PEO offices, mid-level systems engineers, and integration engineers with significant 
experience in RDEC and program offices. Traditional studies have focused on measuring 
results by, for example, the number of programs transitioned. In this study, we attempted to 
capture from the practitioners what has worked and issues they have encountered to get an 
unfiltered view of technology innovation and technology transitions. 
This is a very broad field, and we have tried get an in-depth view of a small portion of 
the enterprise. As such, we make no attempt to broadly generalize these results to other 
RDECs even in the Army because programs and underlying technologies can vary 
significantly across PEOs and RDECs. However, some of the communication, planning, and 
alignment aspects discussed in this study should be applicable to other organizations as 
well. 
Discussion of Interview Results 
Current State of Technologies Being Developed in Labs  
To establish a baseline on the usefulness and utility of technologies being developed 
in the labs, we attempted to understand the interview subjects’ views on the value of these 
technologies with specific examples.  
The consensus view was that significant technology is being developed in the labs 
and that many specific technologies are tied to programs of record (POR). Examples include 
lithium ion batteries in the form factor required by army vehicles, light weight track, transport 
armor on JLTV, combat transmission systems, advanced combat engines, active 
development of a combat vehicle prototype, lightweight armor, integrated modular occupant 
protection, manufacturing techniques for welding improvements, and composite armor. 
One view is that labs and TARDEC in particular are very good at niche technologies 
such as armor, but that they place less emphasis on the development and integration of 
emerging technologies such as mobility solutions in the commercial industry automotive 
industry. That said, recent initiatives suggest that technologies from the automotive industry 
are being explored for prototype development.  
Innovation and Development in Universities and Other Organizations  
We next compared innovation and development in the labs with innovation and 
development in other organizations such as universities, non-governmental labs, and 
defense contractors.  
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Some views stated that basic research and some level of applied research originated 
from universities but development and effort was required to transition this research to 
RDECs. Others noted that universities supported science and technology in other ways, for 
example, by providing tools for systems engineering. An example of a tool is the Vehicle 
Health Management capability at Wayne State University that was supported by the 
program office. 
Visibility into IRAD spending by defense contractors is limited, so it is not clear 
whether innovation is coming from defense contractors. In addition, it appears that defense 
contractors’ spending on IRAD was focused on requirements in programs of record and not 
specifically on innovation. Therefore, unless innovation was reflected in the requirements, it 
would not make it to programs of record. Some interviewees suggested following up the 
requirements development with prototypes or demonstrators by the labs to further inform the 
requirements. Another point of view suggests that, in some instances, it is difficult for 
TARDEC to take innovation risk. To accelerate innovation, then, TARDEC has had to use 
non-traditional defense partners under non-Federal Acquisition Regulations (FAR).  
Another factor that impedes innovation is cost, both for development and unit cost of 
production. This also leads to risk minimization both by the program office and the defense 
contractor.  
One conclusion that can be drawn from these responses is that universities, Army 
research labs, and DARPA provide basic research. Applied research, however, must come 
from RDECs, which must also oversee early phases of the acquisition cycle, while program 
offices manage engineering and development in the later phases of the acquisition cycle via 
defense contractors. In this way, RDECs would provide the valuable input to programs with 
well-informed requirements derived from advanced development and prototypes. Program 
offices would then be better positioned to solicit solutions from contractors.  
Changes Required to Drive Technology Developed Into Programs  
A recommended strategy to drive technology from the RDECs to programs is by 
getting the Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) to drive requirements to both 
the RDECs and program offices. This would allow the development of technology and 
prototypes in the RDECs, and, because program offices would be working to the same 
requirements, the transition from the RDECs to programs would be easier. A second 
potential feature of the above approach would be to get results from RDEC efforts to feed 
requirements in RFPs. 
There are other systemic issues however. First, PMs are focused on incremental 
changes to programs managing risk and cost and shorter term EMD goals, while the RDECs 
are focused on technology goals and revolutionary changes, and the Army is focused on 
strategic initiatives. These viewpoints need to be aligned to enable an efficient approach to 
innovation. Second, funding requests need to be aligned. Currently, PMs’ Program 
Objectives Memoranda include funding requests for what they know now and not for what 
may be coming down the pike. However, on occasion, PMs also require technology 
upgrades or better “gizmos” to address threat and priority changes and need a quick 
turnaround; while the RDECs are willing to respond, the technology maturation can be a 
lengthy process. This is especially true of technology changes to the underlying vehicle 
platform.  
So with little coordination and no targeted funding, transitioning from the RDECs to 
programs presents serious challenges. 
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Program Success in Technology Transition 
This topic revealed several views on transitioning technology. One view is that there 
is no discernible trend in the rate of successful integration. This then leads to a question 
about the availability of metrics that measure successful integration, the lack of which makes 
it difficult to understand the roadmap to successful integration. Another view is that 
integration success has been opportunity-driven, especially over the last two years, 
exemplified by the Armored Fighting Vehicle, which has seen several integration efforts that 
have informed the requirements process. A different approach to measuring the success of 
integration must start with the definition of success. For example, with respect to armor 
capability, the integration efforts in TARDEC informed the requirements for final design, 
which led to an improved vehicle. Thus RDEC provided a feasible solution, which drove to a 
better product even though the specific work effort may not have transitioned.  
The strategy of modernizing rather than initiating new development programs led to 
modernizing at the lower level subsystems rather than the system level. The focus on the 
subsystems has led to successful integration efforts; however, when contingency 
requirements drive modernization, the enhancements are fielded, but sustainment efforts 
are challenged due to lack of program ownership. This lack of program ownership also limits 
additional quantity buys and further improvements. Finally, there is the view that integration 
efforts are hampered by the level of oversight at various leadership levels and contribute to 
lower success rates in technology integration. 
The summary of the above discussion leads to several conclusions: 
• Successful integration needs to be defined to include informing requirements 
in addition to transitioning specific development into programs.  
• Appropriate metrics to capture all the value of RDEC efforts need to be 
defined and captured.  
• Integration and transitions must have a program owner identified even for 
efforts driven by contingency requirements.  
Aids and Barriers to Successful Integration  
Successful integration has been driven by demand from the acquisition or PM 
functions for risk-reduction efforts or capability improvements. Several examples of 
successful integration include armor protection, Victory architecture, throttle control 
software, and lightweight track among many others. In addition, contingency requirements, 
urgent fielding requests, and a focus on controlling sustainment costs also drive integration. 
Natural conflicts exist between RDEC leadership and PEO/PMs, as they operate in different 
environments with different objectives, but strong personal relationships can overcome 
these conflicts and lead to successful integrations. 
Challenges to successful integration include an understanding of the technology 
development effort as either being exploratory in nature, which would require close 
cooperation between the RDEC and program office to mature and succeed, versus a 
specific deliverable that can be driven by a transition agreement. Transition agreements 
ensure that the RDEC capability meets schedule and functional requirements and that the 
program is ready to accept the deliverable. Another challenge to integration, expressed by 
one interviewee, was that PMs focus on thresholds and “do not lose sleep on objectives,” 
while TARDEC focuses on objectives. With limited interaction between PM engineers and 
TARDEC, technology is not incorporated into programs. If PMs can focus on objectives and 
drive the process, TARDEC can help reduce the risk in programs; so, while a specific 
technology integration may not be the final result, informed requirements and risk mitigation 
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might be the benefits that need to be recorded. Finally, several interviewees articulated that 
limited funding was a common challenge and a significant barrier to integration.  
To summarize, lack of funding can be a significant barrier to integration and 
transitioning of RDEC efforts to the programs. PM demand for improvements, risk mitigation, 
and contingency requirements are the primary drivers for successful integration. In all cases, 
a thorough understanding of the specific technology development and integration effort 
versus conceptual deliverables must be defined and agreed to between the RDEC and the 
program office.  
Participation in Technology Transfer Programs  
Several technology development and transfer programs have been in existence 
along with various funding avenues. The following are some of the programs:  
• Joint Concept Technology Demonstration 
• Foreign Comparative Testing 
• Quick Reaction Fund 
• Rapid Reaction Fund 
• Small Business Innovative Research (SBIR)/Small Business Technology 
Transfer(STTR) 
• Agile Integration and Development 
• Collaborative Technology Alliances 
• Technology Transfer Initiatives 
• Technology Enabled Capability Demonstration (TECD) and Army Technical 
Objective (ATO) 
All of the above programs have been used on different technology development 
efforts; SBIR and STTR have been used extensively. The JCTD was used for the Trailer 
program; Foreign Comparative Testing was used on the Howitzer program; and Agile 
Integration and Development was used on the lightweight track development. Several 
Technology Transfer Initiatives have been used at TARDEC.  
These initiatives are a necessary condition for technology innovation and transition to 
be successful, and their widespread use must be viewed as an advantage for TARDEC and 
the PMOs.  
Management Practices in Technology Integration  
Management practices also bear on the possibility of technology transition. The 
following are some of the common practices: 
• Roadmap reviews of technology plans between organizations 
• Technology requirements and alignment with program requirements 
• Formal collaboration between TARDEC and Program Offices 
• Technology Transfer Agreements or equivalent 
• Metrics to measure success of technology integration  
We determined that several of these practices are in use, including requiring twice-a-
year requirements reviews, a 30-year plan review, strategic engagement at the leadership 
level, and soliciting long-range input from TRADOC. Systems agreements are another 
mechanism to align TARDEC and PMO offices. One caution was sounded on TTA 
(Technology Transition Agreements), which are binding on the RDEC to deliver and on the 
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PM to implement except when PMs are not sure of the risks and challenges of integration. 
TTAs can be signed without guarantees, which can impact future transition efforts. 
These practices are necessary conditions for successful transitions but need a 
greater emphasis on the alignment to ensure PMOs and RDECs are working towards the 
same program goals. In some instances, these efforts will focus on emerging requirements 
and may not result in capabilities that can be transferred to programs. In other instances, 
specific technologies are ready to be integrated into programs of record. The key factor in 
successful transitions is the agreement and alignment between the RDEC and the program 
offices. 
Integration Issues 
A discussion on integration issues identified that a propensity for low risk drives both 
RDEC and PMOs. PMs focus on low technical risk to ensure programs can meet objectives, 
while the S&T manages to a TRL 6, resulting in few game changers and fewer revolutionary 
improvements. In some instances, a 5% improvement in combat vehicles can take up to 10 
years. A second issue that arises in integration is the lack of clarity around the integrator’s 
role and who plays this role. Informal requirements communicated to the RDECs can lead to 
technology demonstrators, but the work effort to convert these technology demonstrators to 
a capability with specific platform-integration goals is a gap that needs to be filled to facilitate 
successful transitions. The lack of alignment of RDEC strategic priorities with PM 
requirements results in funding issues to integrate and transition technology from the RDEC 
to programs. The lack of coordination results in some efforts getting funded and in other 
instances the PM turning to the OEM or prime contractor to meet the requirement. 
OEM/Contractor Dependencies  
Innovations from RDECs go through multiple development efforts and eventually 
require integration by OEMs or prime contractors. The TARDEC prototype integration facility 
and systems integration lab have led to clearer requirements and informed the integration 
efforts by the prime contractors. The efforts on the Active Protection System and double V 
hull based on an open systems architecture resulting in transition specification are examples 
of TARDEC development efforts that have or will result in a handoff to the contractor or 
OEM for integration into a vehicle platform for production. Integration into vehicle platforms 
will require knowledge and expertise in manufacturing and high-volume production. The 
OEM or prime contractor is the appropriate resource. This discussion highlights the 
interdependencies between the program office and the RDEC in ensuring that funding is 
available for the RDECs to develop the technology and prototypes for integration. 
Solicitations can then reflect the design requirements that emerged from the RDEC efforts, 
and funding can be programmed for development and production to include these transition 
efforts.  
The consensus opinion of the interviewees was that 90% of the transition efforts in 
the RDECs will require integration by the prime contractors and the OEMs, and funding and 
resources must therefore be planned.  
Communications and Organizational Alignments  
Organizational changes such as reorganizing TARDEC research groups to focus on 
programs and the appointment of CIEs (Chief Integration Engineer) have supported 
technology transition efforts. Formal communications between PMO and TARDEC are also 
critical for continued integration success. The Active Protection System is an example of 
how significant input from the PMO has influenced the project’s development in TARDEC. 
Senior leadership summits, review of 30-year planning documents, subject-matter-expert 
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communications, and formal exchanges supplemented by personal relationships reinforce 
the importance of communication in supporting technology transitions.  
Crossing the Chasm 
In this section, we cover the changes that are required to successfully cross from the 
RDECs to programs. Greater interaction between subject matter experts in the labs and 
program offices on an ongoing basis, including participation in preliminary and critical design 
reviews should benefit the technology transition process. The use of TRADOC to drive 
requirements to both the RDECs and PMOs with a short, medium, and long-term horizon 
should assist in directing RDEC efforts appropriately, and when coordinated with PMOs, 
should support the development of a strategic and tactical plan. 
There is a recognition that mobility initiatives in the commercial automotive and 
transportation industries are driving innovation that should be explored for use in programs 
and by TARDEC. TARDEC is using an innovative business approach to allow a consortium 
consisting of small technology companies, larger defense companies, and automotive 
companies to develop prototypes based on technologies emerging in the auto industries, 
such as autonomous vehicles. These prototypes can then inform requirements, capabilities, 
and designs for future solicitations. Similar consortiums are also being used to explore other 
technology prototypes in areas such as sensors and robotics that have more immediate 
applicability to ground vehicles, both combat and tactical. These consortia respond to 
requests for technology prototypes under Other Transaction Authority (OTA) provided by 
Congress to the DoD specifically to attract nontraditional defense and technology 
companies. The OTA provides more flexibility in dealing with smaller companies in the areas 
of intellectual property rights and speed to market when compared to contracting under the 
FAR regulations. 
Funding program transitions explicitly is a key driver of ensuring transfer of RDEC 
efforts to programs. Leadership plays a key role in the realization of successful integration 
efforts by supporting the successes and challenges of technology transitions and stressing 
the importance of these efforts. 
Current Literature on Technology Transitions  
A limited survey of literature on technology transitions suggests similar views to 
those discussed in this paper. In The Future of Army Science and Technology Requires 
Punctuated Equilibrium, Col. John R. Cavedo (n.d.) describes a broad strategy for 
reorganizing and managing Army Science and Technology with a new business model. One 
of the key recommendations from this paper is that S&T should “focus less on technology 
transition and more on proving the value of technology through prototyping and 
requirements validation. This will require additional 6.4 funding.” The paper also refers to the 
Deputy Assistant Secretary Research and Technology (DASA RT) goal of “Align S&T and 
develop strategies which provide technology insertion points to Programs of Record.” The 
paper posits that “by focusing too much on technology transition there is a high probability 
that S&T managers will avoid risk and won’t push the boundaries of technology 
advancement,” and that “transitioning an S&T effort to a program of record is fraught with 
blind spots.”  
DASA policy on Transition Agreements (TA) for Army Science and Technology 
Projects requires TAs be developed for all Advanced Technology Development (6.3), 
Advanced Component Development and Prototypes (6.4), and Manufacturing Technology 
(6.7) executed projects. The TA captures RDEC responsibilities and deliverables, PEO or 
Recipient responsibilities and mutual responsibilities. This template provides the basis for an 
organized formal process for transition agreements that should lead to success.  
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In “Bridging the Valley of Death,” Anthony Davis, Director of Agile Acquisition for U.S. 
Special Operations Command, and Tom Ballenger, aviation systems analyst with JHNA Inc., 
have outlined a Transition Confidence Level Scale from 1 to 9 similar to the Technology 
Readiness Level model to track the steps for transition from uncertainty to a completed 
transition (Davis & Ballenger, 2017). “Like the TRL chart, the steps enable status scoring for 
a project, and form a roadmap for progress and coordination typically needed for transition 
success.” This promising approach enables a data-driven standardized approach to 
measuring the progress of technology transitions. Similar models have been recommended 
in the RDECs, and these models allow for agreements with program offices on metrics to 
support the transition, and these can also be added to the TA template from DASA RT. 
This study and the above literature have focused on the Army S&T enterprise, but 
future studies should review the best practices in the Air Force and Navy for possible use by 
Army RDECs. 
Conclusions 
• Universities, laboratories, DARPA, and defense contractors play a role in 
technology innovation, but primarily RDECs support the realization of the 
innovation and its transfer to programs. 
• OEM contractors perform best when requirements are informed by advanced 
development and prototypes from RDECs developed internally or through 
non-traditional technology development organizations. There exists a 
significant interdependency between the RDECs and OEM contractors, with 
PMO offices interfacing with both; 90% of integration efforts will require OEM 
contractor participation.  
• RDECs need to extend their reach by partnering with non-traditional 
companies to drive technologies and capabilities from smaller companies or 
large non-defense contractors into programs. 
• Integrated efforts by TRADOC, RDECs and program offices to coordinate a 
view of the future both in the short term and medium term would benefit 
innovation and transition efforts.  
• POM funding requests should be aligned so that they include not only the 
short- to medium-term requests but also include funding to translate 
innovation into prototypes and transitioning into programs. 
• RDEC value is realized via many different avenues: transitioning technology 
prototypes to programs, informing requirements to improve solicitations, and 
engineering or manufacturing process improvements. Appropriate metrics to 
measure this value must developed. Transition Confidence Levels or other 
similar measures are a valuable tool to assess transition efforts and direct 
resources. 
• Lack of funding is an obvious roadblock to technology innovation and 
transition, while risk-mitigation-based demands from program offices, 
contingency requirements, and threat changes seem to be significant drivers 
of innovation. 
• Technology Transfer programs like SBIR, STTR, JCTD, TECD, and ATO are 
a necessary condition to foster innovation. 
• OTA can be used to engage non-traditional companies to access the latest 
technology from smaller companies and the commercial marketplace.  
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• Integration and transitions must have program owners in both the RDEC and 
program offices who are aligned and in agreement to deliver successful 
transitions. 
• Communications at the strategic level, communication of long range plans, 
senior leadership summits, and exchanges between subject matter experts 
are all important activities to support effective transitions.  
Crossing the chasm from technology innovation and development to programs 
successfully requires many organizations and activities to come together. The conclusions 
above reflect many practices that are currently in place. The challenge, however, is to align 
the practices and operate them as part of a system for effective transition of innovations. 
Figure 1 depicts an operational view of a process for technology transfers  
 
 Technology Innovation and Transition: A System View Figure 1.
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Abstract 
A challenge faced by organizations globally is a workforce reluctant to use collaboration tools. 
Leaders invest large percentages of their budgets in information technology (IT) solutions, but 
often see little in return (Tirgari, 2012). The purpose of this grounded theory study was to 
explore how employee perceptions about organizational policies that mandate the use of 
technology affect the acceptance, use, and perceived productivity thereof. Eighteen 
participants of a major IT command responded to nine open-ended interview questions. Data 
analysis involved open, axial, and selective coding of the participants’ responses, which 
produced three major themes and 13 sub-themes. The three major themes were leadership, 
policy, and mandated tool. The findings from this study offer leaders a theory that proposes 
numerous ways to more effectively implement organizational policies that mandate the use of 
technology. By following the recommendations of this study, leaders can expect gains in 
compliance and worker productivity. 
Introduction 
In today’s global economy, organizations are becoming increasingly geographically 
dispersed and, therefore, have come to rely on technology for communication and 
collaboration (Kirkman et al., 2002; Saraswat, 2012). Interest and research have shifted 
specifically to knowledge management (KM) and collaboration tools for effective information 
sharing within organizations (Hew & Hara, 2007; Kim & Lee, 2006). Leaders must 
understand how their policies affect employees’ use of these tools and their resultant 
perceived productivity (Garicano & Heaton, 2010). Although information technology 
implementations may by themselves increase productivity, if they are not complemented by 
organizational policies, these productivity gains are less significant (Garicano & Heaton, 
2010). Conversely, IT implementations have been shown to hinder productivity if 
complementing policies are not in place (Thielst, 2007). Therefore, organizational policies 
play an important role in how productive employees will be when using technology (Tirgari, 
2012). 
In the organization that was studied, a large Department of Defense (DoD) IT service 
provider pseudo-named ITCOM (IT Command), leaders established formal policies that 
require employees to use the collaboration tool Microsoft SharePoint for specific tasks such 
as routing documents, sharing intellectual property within the community, daily check-ins, 
and posting announcements. This study explored, qualitatively, how these policies affected 
employee use of technology and the workforce’s perceived productivity. Understanding how 
policies affect their workforce will provide leaders with the necessary insight to implement 
policies for maximal effectiveness. This knowledge will allow leaders to adapt how they 
                                            
 
 
1 This paper is a summary of Dr. Drennan’s dissertation. 
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structure their policies and implement them in a manner that will improve worker 
receptiveness and, thus, increase worker productivity. 
Background of the Problem 
To become more efficient, organizations are continually automating tasks that were 
once accomplished manually, often in a face-to-face fashion (Austerberry, 2011; Reichley, 
1997). For example, instead of routing a form through a lengthy approval process by 
carrying it to each approving individual’s desk for signature, workflows can be implemented 
in SharePoint that automatically route forms electronically in a more efficient matter. 
Introducing technology into every day work results in a significant change for employees, not 
just in how they do their work, but also in their organizational culture (Borck, 2001; Malik & 
Danish, 2010; Nunamaker, Reinig, & Briggs, 2009; Walsh & Maloney, 2007). People have 
difficulty with accepting change, and changes that involve technology are even more 
complex to manage (Sun & Zhang, 2005; Yi et al., 2005). 
Because of people’s inherent resistance to change, employees are not likely to 
embrace newly automated processes (Long & Spurlock, 2008). To ensure that employees 
do, in fact, make use of new technologies, some employers are forced to mandate the use 
of newly implemented tools (Sun & Zhang, 2005). After making significant investments in 
technology, leaders expect to see a return on their investment, such as increases in 
efficiency or productivity (Reichley, 1997; Sun & Zhang, 2006). However, employers who 
mandate the use of technology can expect to be faced with further resistance (Sun & Zhang, 
2005). Therefore, leaders may create organizational policies that require employees to use 
technology for specific job functions (Garicano & Heaton, 2010; Nyström, 2006). 
These policies may be distributed via technology, such as e-mail or a notification 
portal like SharePoint, or be shared face-to-face. The manner in which these policies are 
implemented can significantly impact employees’ use or refusal to use technology (Sun & 
Zhang, 2005). If employees feel that they were not involved in the change, or do not see the 
value in automating a process, they will likely resist the implementation (Chin, 1998). 
However, if policies were implemented in a more effective manner, employees will likely 
perceive them more positively and will be more likely to comply with them (Tirgari, 2012). 
Purpose of the Study 
The general problem that created the need for this study was the desire to 
understand the role that policy plays in technology usage. Organizations worldwide rely on 
collaboration tools for both knowledge management and knowledge sharing, and although 
the correct technology may be implemented in an organization, employees do not use these 
systems effectively, if at all (Germain, 2011; Nyström, 2006; Qureshi, Liu, & Vogel, 2006; 
Workman, 2007; Zivick, 2012). A number of hindrances contribute to this situation, such as 
a lack of management commitment, the employees’ expectations, reward systems, and 
training (Kim & Lee, 2006; Nyström, 2006). Although previous studies have thoroughly 
explored a number of these obstacles, very little research exists on the relationship between 
organizational policies and IT implementations. To fill the gap in the body of knowledge, this 
grounded theory study explored how organizational policies that mandate the use of 
technology impact employees’ use of said technology and information sharing and whether 
employees perceived themselves to be more productive.  
Significance of the Study 
To achieve the maximum benefit from technology implementations and to be globally 
competitive, leaders must understand how their policies affect employees’ usage of tools 
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and resultant perceived productivity. Every year organizations spend a large amount of their 
budgets on IT, but they do not get the expected return on investment (Tirgari, 2012). The 
results of this study may help in the recovery of some or all of this investment. 
Previous studies have examined obstacles to the use of technology (Zawawi et al., 
2011), but they have not explored how employees’ perceptions of policies can affect their 
use of technology and resultant productivity. Existing research has identified that employees 
may be reluctant to use the tool for a variety of reasons. Employees may not have been 
involved in the implementation, fear losing their job, or lack the skills necessary to interact 
with the system (Kotter & Schlesinger, 2008; Nyström, 2006). These studies have also 
identified that management support is essential for employee buy-in, but they have not 
examined the employees’ perceptions of implemented policies or how those perceptions 
affect productivity (Garicano & Heaton, 2010; Kotter & Schlesinger, 2008; Long & Spurlock, 
2008; Malik & Danish, 2010; Nyström, 2006). Previous studies also have not used a 
grounded theory approach to study this particular phenomenon. The grounded theory (GT) 
method has become more relevant to IS research in recent times and should be the likely 
choice when researchers see truths as socially constructed and when representation is 
depicted as a distributed systems phenomenon (Bryant, 2002; Urquhart, Lehmann, & Myers, 
2010). 
A literature review revealed that previous studies fail to provide a deeper 
understanding of the role that organizational policies play in the interaction with and use of 
technology. Individual perceptions about policies, whether positive or negative, may impact 
the effective use of tools. Understanding the relationship between perceptions of policies 
and perceived productivity is critical to better managing employees. Leaders must create 
policies that effectively encourage the use of technology and, more specifically, 
collaboration tools (Tirgari, 2012). Thus, this study contributed to the body of knowledge by 
developing a theory about how leaders can create and implement organizational policies 
that will achieve a high level of compliance and encourage the productive use of 
collaboration and knowledge management tools (Tirgari, 2012). 
Literature Review 
The literature review is divided into the following sections: globalization, information 
technology, and virtual collaboration; global virtual teams (GVTs); barriers to IT 
implementations and information-sharing; successfully implementing collaboration tools; and 
factors for successful policy implementations.  
Globalization, Information Technology, and Virtual Collaboration 
As organizations have become increasingly globally dispersed, work team structures 
have changed from being co-located to being virtual and thereby reliant on technology for 
communication and collaboration (Germain, 2011; Qureshi et al., 2006; Workman, 2007; 
Zivick, 2012). Instead of traditional face-to-face meetings, colleagues use video 
teleconferencing to meet virtually, independent of time and space (DeRosa et al., 2004; 
Lomas, Burke, & Page, 2008). Fifty to 80% of organizations have teams and at least 61% of 
employees within large organizations have been part of a virtual team (Germain, 2011).  
Team members must collaborate to share information and produce quality work 
(Durugbo et al., 2011). Collaboration changes the structure and behavior of organizations as 
a result of pooled expertise and standardized work patterns (Durugbo et al., 2011). Instead 
of solving problems individually, employees must work together to solve a problem or 
achieve a common goal (Durugbo et al., 2011; McShane & Von Glinow, 2004). For example, 
to successfully launch global products, prices, associated services, and technical support, 
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as well as the development of the products themselves, must be coordinated amongst 
distributed teams (Harvey & Griffith, 2007). The most effective way to do this is through 
virtual global teams (Harvey & Griffith, 2007). Because these teams consist of culturally 
diverse, geographically dispersed members, they have a globally diverse perspective 
(Harvey & Griffith, 2007). However, they have to think in concert to achieve their goals 
(Harvey & Griffith, 2007). Global virtual teams allow organizations to respond quickly to 
changes in the marketplace (Beagrie, 2005; Zivick, 2012). Since GVTs are geographically 
independent, the most skilled workers can be assembled to solve problems (Zivick, 2012). 
Organizations also save significantly on travel costs by implementing GVTs (DeRosa et al., 
2004; Zivick, 2012). 
Thus, the way information is shared has also changed significantly. Although e-mail 
is still a common form of communication, collaboration tools have become widely used for 
sharing and distributing information (Lomas et al., 2008). Collaboration tools offer a number 
of benefits to globally dispersed teams. Teams may easily share documents, enforce 
versioning control, communicate via instant messaging and receive instant feedback, and 
access their tools from any place at any time (Lomas et al., 2008). Lomas et al. found that 
collaboration tools, such as instant messaging and video chat, can lead to an increase in 
sharing personal information amongst students, which can enhance their ability to work 
together effectively as a team and increase productivity. In virtual business environments, 
team building can therefore also occur through use of these tools, leading to more effective 
teams.  
Turban, Liang, and Wu (2010) found that social tools, which are composed of wikis, 
blogs, social networking platforms, and discussion forums, are also used by virtual teams 
within businesses for decision-making. When using these tools, no team member has to be 
physically present, and, thus, the decision-making process is expedited, compared to 
decision-making in traditional settings, where discussions are held in a conference room 
(Turban et al., 2010). Turban et al. confirmed that collaboration tools do indeed provide 
numerous benefits for group decision-making, such as expedited information sharing, 
increased individual input, accelerated decision making, prioritizing and analyzing of 
solutions, and greater participation.  
In a series of in-depth studies of students’ perceptions and use of technology, 
Conole et al. (2008) found that when multiple types of technology are available in learning 
environments, students will choose the technology most appropriate to their learning needs. 
Distributed collaborations available from mobile devices, the Internet, and social software 
changes the way students interact and learn, as well as how they consume and share 
knowledge (Conole et al., 2008). As these students enter the workforce, they will 
communicate and collaborate much differently than will their older counterparts (Conole et 
al., 2008). For these individuals, the time it takes to train on how to use collaboration tools 
will be significantly shortened; however, they may not be as effective in communicating with 
their colleagues who are from an older generation (Conole et al., 2008).  
Tang and Austin (2009) determined that different types of technologies have varying 
effects on individuals. In a study of business students, video offered the greatest level of 
enjoyment, Microsoft PowerPoint improved motivation and learning, and Internet usage was 
most applicable to future jobs. Further, individual preferences vary by age (Tang & Austin, 
2009). Younger generations prefer video, while older generations prefer lectures (Tang & 
Austin, 2009). By using a mix of technologies, professors can reach the widest audience 
and increase motivational and learning levels (Tang & Austin, 2009). Although this study 
was conducted at a university, it is relevant to business leaders. Understanding how 
different types of technologies affect workers’ perceptions can help them address problems 
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in the use of technology and its effectiveness (Tang & Austin, 2009). For example, if 
instructional videos are used to train users on technology, managers may find that 
instruction through PowerPoint might be more effective (Tang & Austin, 2009). Being aware 
of technology preferences by age groups can also help leaders better understand resistance 
to technology and address employees’ needs in a more meaningful way (Tang & Austin, 
2009). 
Global Virtual Teams 
Challenges for GVTs 
GVTs face a number of challenges, from creating trusting relationships (Germain, 
2011) to general confusion, employee isolation, cultural differences, language barriers, and 
technological breakdowns (Holland, Malvey, & Fottler, 2009). Some of the ways that 
managers can address these challenges are through building team identity with an initial 
face-to-face meeting; promoting open lines of communication with all team members; being 
easily accessible during working hours; building individual and team trust; developing a 
sense of team community by identifying and recognizing cultural differences; becoming 
familiar with the background and experience of each team member; and offering one-on-one 
meetings with team members, if necessary (Holland et al., 2009).  
Although technology seems to offer numerous benefits to virtual teams, there are 
more than a few disadvantages. Galleta and Zhang (2006) found that technology can be an 
impediment to good communication if team members do not understand how to use a tool 
correctly. Additional studies show that employees may lack the proper training or skills to 
successfully use technology (Bergiel, Bergiel, & Balsmeier, 2006; Chong, 2005), or their 
personalities may not be amenable to this type of work environment (Bergiel et al., 2006). 
They may also be resistant to its use because they consider it a threat to their livelihood or 
because their buy-in to the technology was never obtained, according to Long and Spurlock 
(2008).  
Borck (2001) discovered that because knowledge management tools significantly 
change employees’ work habits, their implementation may be unwelcome. Further, older 
business leaders may not understand technology well enough to truly make it useful within 
their organizations (Bergiel et al., 2006). Lanubile et al. (2010) found that new tools must 
address concerns for incompatibility, be introduced stepwise, and need to be well-supported 
to be effective.  
According to Bushnell (1999), incorrect implementations or functionality problems 
can hinder the use of technology. Configurations may be wrong or availability may be 
limited. Based on a survey of IT engineering managers, only 15% were satisfied with their 
tool’s performance, largely due to incomplete implementations of capabilities (Chin, 1998). 
Brown et al. (2002) found that ease of use and overall usefulness are the primary reasons 
for users to adopt technology. However, Brown et al. (2002) determined that the mandated 
use of technology changes the employee/technology relationship, affecting the underlying 
reasons for technology acceptance. In voluntary-use environments, technology’s perceived 
usefulness is the primary reason for adoption (Brown et al., 2002; He, Fang, & Wei, 2009). 
When technology use is mandated, individual feelings are irrelevant (Brown et al., 2002). 
Johnson and Howell (2005) found that when students were required to use a specific type of 
technology tool, they had a more favorable attitude towards technology and were more likely 
to use other types of computer-based applications. 
Elmholdt (2004) criticized KM tools because he found them to be incompatible with 
normal knowledge and learning activities. He believed that tacit knowledge cannot be 
explicated through the application of IT (Elmholdt, 2004). Elmholdt posited that KM 
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technology lacks content-rich information that is present in collegial networks. Further, he 
believed that the control and ownership associated with this type of technology subjectifies 
employees as replaceable resources (Elmholdt, 2004). Employees will therefore resist the 
implementation and use of KM technologies (Elmholdt, 2004). 
Creating Successful GVTs 
Brake (2008) discovered that because collaborating online is very different from 
collaborating in person, certain rules for procedures and purpose must be established and 
agreed upon for teams to work as cohesive units. The way people express themselves in 
writing has different requirements than do in-person interactions. Team members must also 
be aware of cultural differences to ensure a respectful relationship exists (Brake, 2008). For 
example, when addressing someone from Germany, a more direct approach is effective. 
That same approach would be disrespectful if used when communicating with an Arab.  
A study by Rahmati, Darouian, and Ahmadinia (2012) showed that the organization’s 
culture, consisting of values, beliefs, practices, and behavior, shape the behavior of team 
members. The behavioral norm within an organization directly relates to the norm within 
teams, dictating which types of behaviors are acceptable. Numerous studies have shown 
that proper management of organizational cultures is critical for teams to succeed (Brake, 
2008; Chong, 2005; Nemiro et al., 2008).  
Dubé and Paré (2001) found that different cultural backgrounds and communication 
styles of individuals in global virtual teams often clash with organizational management 
styles. To address this problem, the researchers recommended that cultural diversity 
training be a requirement for GVT members and believe that this training is essential for the 
success of GVTs (Dubé & Paré, 2001). The training should include many basic elements, 
such as accountability, expected behaviors, normal working hours, level of involvement, and 
performance requirements (Dubé & Paré, 2001). Further, trainees must learn how decisions 
are made, how conflicts are resolved, and how work will be reviewed and approved (Dubé & 
Paré, 2001). Leaders must also address language and IT proficiency, as well as the 
technology’s accessibility, reliability, compatibility, and its appropriate use (Dubé & Paré, 
2001). Distributed teams cannot function effectively if they rely on technology and said 
technology is only available during limited hours (Galleta & Zhang, 2006). Virtual teams 
need 24/7 availability of tools to function effectively.  
Workman (2007) determined that the differences between the culture in virtual teams 
and the local organizational culture can also challenge team members. While trying to 
address situations in their local organization, team members have to work on global 
problems (Workman, 2007). Formalizing their process structure by making it means-focused 
versus ends-focused increases both the quality and quantity of work performed by virtual 
teams (Workman, 2007). Political structures only mildly increased quantity but did not affect 
quality, but teams that sought information/clarification about their roles and responsibilities 
improved on both quality and quantity (Workman, 2007). Further, when interpersonal 
relationships were closely linked to the teams, they had higher quality and quantity output 
(Workman, 2007). Finally, more tightly controlled teams outperformed loosely controlled 
ones (Workman, 2007). 
Zivick (2012) posited that leaders need sufficient resources to fund their teams and 
all their requirements to include technology, training, and support. Further, leaders must 
establish a clear linkage from the teams’ goals to the organizations’ goals and missions 
(Zivick, 2012). Doing so gives teams legitimacy and lessens confusion amongst team 
members (Zivick, 2012). Managers must empower their team members, provide regular 
feedback, and create a positive, trusting, and structured work environment (Zivick, 2012). By 
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establishing standardized work practices, team socialization norms, and explicit roles and 
responsibilities, managers can further ensure the success of their teams (Zivick, 2012).  
Barriers to IT Implementations and Information Sharing 
As with any organizational change, the implementation of collaboration tools will 
encounter employee resistance. The biggest barriers to IT implementations are not their 
cost or problems with the technology itself, but rather user resistance, according to Chin 
(1998). Long and Spurlock (2008) discovered that when implementing IT, leaders face 
additional challenges. Numerous studies stressed the importance of clear communication 
and training as being key success factors in managing the acceptance of technology-driven 
change (Borck, 2001; Chin, 1998; Cogburn & Levinson, 2008; Long & Spurlock, 2008). Long 
and Spurlock posited that, as with any communication, each worker will interpret any given 
message differently, based on his or her frame of reference. To effectively communicate, the 
sender must understand how to best approach the receiver of the message (Long & 
Spurlock, 2008). According to Long and Spurlock (2008) and Yu (2009), good leaders will 
learn how to build relationships with their employees, and this relationship must be based on 
trust. From these relationships, leaders can gain insight into individual preferences, 
motivations, and resistances to change which they can then address appropriately (Long & 
Spurlock, 2008).  
Hew and Hara (2007) identified that different types of knowledge exist and are 
shared and that motivators and barriers to information sharing vary amongst career fields. 
Previous studies have explored online knowledge sharing, but failed to categorize the types 
of knowledge shared (Hew & Hara, 2007). In their case study, Hew and Hara found that the 
types of knowledge shared, as well as the barriers and motivators to knowledge sharing, 
differed by the three professions they studied: Web development, advanced nursing, and 
literacy education. By observing their study’s participants while they were engaged online 
and by using semi-structured interviews, the researchers found that practical knowledge 
was most commonly shared (Hew & Hara, 2007). Hew and Hara also identified the most 
common motivator to knowledge sharing to be reciprocity; the six other motivators were 
personal gain, collectivism, altruism, respectful environment, personal interest, and 
technology. The eight barriers were lack of time, a negative attitude, technology, 
unfamiliarity with the subject, confidentiality concerns, not wanting to cause a fight, and the 
perceived inability to make use of knowledge (Hew & Hara, 2007). Surprisingly, technology 
was both a motivator and a barrier to knowledge sharing. By understanding how their 
employees are affected, what motivates them to share, and what causes them to withhold 
from sharing, leaders can address these factors so that successful collaboration will occur. 
Further, as IT matures, user satisfaction and service quality increase and a more positive 
team-oriented culture results (Hartman et al., 2009). Nevertheless, Mohd and Mohamed 
(2009) noted that users’ resistance to technology does not affect their performance. 
Paghaleh, Shafiezadeh, and Mohammadi (2011) identified cultural and political 
perspectives as impediments to knowledge sharing. They stated that although technology 
may be readily available in organizations, it may not be used at all (Paghaleh et al., 2011). 
Therefore, simply implementing it without properly addressing the motives for resistance is a 
worthless endeavor. Paghaleh et al. found that workers guard knowledge closely because it 
can be used to gain a competitive advantage. Further, even though technology makes 
knowledge sharing easier by crossing hierarchical boundaries, informal individual and social 
networks dictate what is shared and with whom (Paghaleh et al., 2011). By creating an 
organizational culture that encourages cooperation and sharing and instituting motivational 
programs that reward team achievements rather than individual efforts, organizations can 
overcome resistance to information sharing (Paghaleh et al., 2011).  
Acquisition Research Program: 
Creating Synergy for Informed Change - 196 - 
Successfully Implementing Collaboration Tools 
As work environments change as a result of IT implementations, organizational 
cultures must change accordingly. Research shows that organizational cultures must 
become learning cultures that embrace change (Alcantara, 2009; Malik & Danish, 2010). 
Workers must be open to new ways of communicating, learn new ways of performing work 
through the use of technology, continue to develop new skills, and not live in fear of 
technology. Organizational cultures that support these elements must then be 
complemented by organizational policies that reflect a changing culture, according to 
Alcantara (2009) and Garicano and Heaton (2010).  
Borck (2001) posited that employees must feed knowledge management solutions to 
make them useful, and the enterprise KM (EKM) will infuse an organization’s culture with 
knowledge. EKMs control and consolidate data into intellectual assets that bridge the flow of 
intellectual capital within an organization (Borck, 2001). Yukl (2006) found that 
transformational leadership inspires followers to act morally and ethically. Transformational 
leadership also nurtures innovation and makes virtual teams thrive, according to Senge 
(1998). Cogburn and Levinson (2008) determined that the most effective teams all trust one 
leader who is culturally sensitive. However, even if a leader is ineffective, virtual teams can 
still achieve some level of success as long as the teams are cohesive and each member 
makes contributions (Cogburn & Levinson, 2008). In such instances, work is independent 
instead of interdependent, and the team’s success-level is significantly limited (Cogburn & 
Levinson, 2008). 
According to Bergiel et al. (2006), when leaders implement collaboration tools, they 
also need to be aware of how both older workers and their younger counterparts will react to 
and interact with them. The system needs to be accessible and useful to the entire 
workforce to be effective within an organization (Bergiel et al., 2006). Igbaria and Guimaraes 
(1994) also found that user involvement during implementation, as well as technology 
friendliness, led to successful implementation efforts.  
Smart and Desouza (2007) discovered numerous ways that managers of small to 
medium-sized organizations can best address technology resisters and gain their 
acceptance. For employees who only see how technology affects them on an operational 
versus a strategic level, managers should create success metrics that apply to the 
operational level (Smart & Desouza, 2007). This will help employees understand the value 
of IT from their own perspectives. Managers must, of course, understand the underlying 
reasons for employee resistance, which varies by employee (Long & Spurlock, 2008). 
Further, implementations should not be rushed, timing must be appropriate, and leaders 
must help employees understand the labor-saving value IT brings to the workforce (Smart & 
Desouza, 2007). Managers can also use social awards and feedback from those employees 
who embrace technology to make the implementation effort more successful (Smart & 
Desouza, 2007).  
Upon investigating how employed MBA students used collaboration tools, Westerfelt 
(2010) found that they indeed benefited from using them at work. In her study, Westerfelt 
had participants use three different online collaboration tools, then gathered feedback about 
their preferences via questionnaires. Students liked the tools to varying degrees, depending 
on their practical applications, whiteboard features, document sharing capabilities, and user-
friendliness (Westerfelt, 2010). The participants felt that time-savings were the biggest 
advantage of using collaboration tools, while technological illiteracy, technical issues, and 
personal comfort level were major impediments (Westerfelt, 2010). Similar to some of the 
previously discussed studies, Westerfelt also identified user-friendliness as a significant 
participant concern. When leaders select a collaboration tool, they must remember that 
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regardless of how many special features a tool may offer, if it is not easy to use, it will not be 
accepted by the user community. Lomas et al. (2008) also found that tools that are the most 
user-friendly and natural feeling are more likely to be used. Additionally, if a tool is released 
before its time or is too radically different from previous tools, it will not be adopted (Lomas 
et al., 2008).  
Factors for Successful Policy Implementations 
As organizational cultures evolve and begin to embrace the changes resulting from 
technological implementations, organizational policies must be updated accordingly to 
reflect the current culture. Research shows that when leaders develop policies, they should 
involve employees and seek their input throughout the process (Boer, 2012; Kapsali, 2011). 
Employees must clearly understand the intent and meaning of policies to accept and comply 
with them (Boer, 2012; Kotter & Schlesinger, 2008; Long & Spurlock, 2008; Nyström, 2006). 
Kapsali (2011) also found that managers must be flexible when implementing policies, 
customizing them to specific systems thinking constructs, user groups, and local realities. 
Further, by including the workforce in the development of policies, managers can ensure 
that the policies will achieve their intent (Alcantara, 2009; Tirgari, 2012). For example, 
policies could prescribe a minimum requirement for training and organizationally-funded 
continued education (to reflect a learning culture) and for changing which former manual 
tasks must gradually be performed using technology, according to findings by Malik and 
Danish (2010) and Witte (2002). This could be a phased approach, where either certain 
tasks or a specific number of tasks must be accomplished using IT. By having prior 
knowledge of the technology, employees will be better able to determine which changes can 
be achieved within a specific time period. 
Nyström (2006) found that as organizational policies continue to evolve, managers 
must ensure that they clearly communicate changes or revisions to policies to their 
workforce. If possible, managers should continue to involve employees in the development 
of policies to ensure their acceptance. According to Peckover, Hall, and White (2009), as 
both culture and policies must stay aligned with each other, managers must ensure that 
collaboration and knowledge sharing are supported by both entities. The organizational 
culture must be reflective of the open sharing of ideas, and policies should align with 
collaboration through electronic means. Managers could offer incentives for those 
departments that notably reduce their consumption of paper and, instead of printing items, 
use collaboration tools to share knowledge. Further, departments with well-organized and 
easily accessible sites could also be rewarded, and the winner’s site could become the new 
standard for the organization. Additional policies could be created that prescribe the 
development of sites using only a minimal number of components, specifically ones that 
have shown to be effective and time-saving. 
Policymakers must use a process-oriented organizational approach when developing 
policies and investing resources into training (Alcantara, 2009; Maier & Remus, 2003; Witte, 
2002). Policies and implementations must be closely connected, and those using technology 
must clearly understand organizational policies and be involved in the implementation 
process (Boer, 2012; Spetz, Keane, & Curry, 2009; Thielst, 2007). Finally, Witte (2002) 
determined that mandatory training should be addressed as a separate requirement within 
policies to ensure that end-users can gain maximum benefits and efficiencies from the 
implementations. 
Garicano and Heaton (2010) found that if IT implementations are studied in isolation, 
they may not reflect productivity gains. To truly increase productivity, both organizational 
policies and management practices must be aligned with IT implementations (Garicano & 
Heaton, 2010). Once IT is integrated in an organization, the quality and type of data 
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available to be studied changes, which has obscured the findings of some studies on 
productivity (Garicano & Heaton, 2010). Thus, when attempting to study productivity gains, 
researchers must change the way they measure them in an electronic versus a manual 
environment (Garicano & Heaton, 2010).  
Research Method and Design 
This study focused on how individuals use technology, how organizational policies 
affect that usage, and the resultant perceived productivity. Because this study focused on 
perceptions, personal experiences, and perceived productivity, a qualitative approach was 
appropriate (Cheseboro & Borisoff, 2007). Data were gathered from interviews about 
individual experiences, personal views, and details of situations; data did not consist of 
generalizations made from standardized questionnaires (Cheseboro & Borisoff, 2007).  
Grounded theory designs are popularly used for IT studies because data are 
systematically gathered and analyzed (Bryant & Charmaz, 2007; Matavire & Brown, 2013; 
Urquhart et al., 2010). GT studies allow researchers to develop and build theories about 
phenomena when either none exist or when existing ones are inadequate (Goulding, 2002). 
The aim of this study was to understand the perceptions of individuals and to generate a 
theory about how leaders can implement more effective policies that mandate the use of 
technology. No other qualitative design was suitable for achieving this goal. 
Unlike other qualitative studies, grounded theory studies are the only ones in which 
researchers do not work from existing theoretical frameworks. The collected data guide the 
research and lead to the development of categories, relationships, attributes, and ultimately, 
a theory. Because limited research exists on the topic under investigation, a grounded 
theory approach allowed for the development of a theory about a phenomenon which is 
currently not well-understood. This theory will help global leaders more effectively manage 
their organizations. 
This study was conducted in the natural setting in which the phenomenon occurred, 
not in a laboratory or otherwise sterile facility (Pratt, 2007). When asking questions, the 
interviewer used a semi-structured format of open-ended questions and developed theories 
as data were collected (Cheseboro & Borisoff, 2007). Data were analyzed and compared as 
they were collected via constant comparison. As categories began to emerge, they drove 
theory generation (Bryant & Charmaz, 2007). 
Using initial observations and one-on-one interviews of 18 participants, data were 
collected and analyzed through the constant comparative method. This method revealed 
emerging themes and conceptual patterns about how organizational policies can be 
implemented to obtain the desired outcome and achieve maximum effectiveness (through 
maximal compliance).  
Research Questions 
Several research questions guided this study; however, one was central: How can 
leaders more effectively implement organizational policies that mandate the use of 
technology? Four sub-questions assisted in answering the main research question: 
1. How do employees’ perceptions of ITCOM’s organizational policies affect 
their use of technology and perceived productivity? 
2. How can leaders adapt the manner in which policies are worded to best 
reach organizational goals; i.e., what policies would be perceived as 
encouraging to employees in increasing their use of technology to become 
more productive? 
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3. How should policies best be implemented to gain maximum receptiveness; 
for example, should a phased approach be used? 
4. What other factors (intrinsic and extrinsic) might affect employees’ inclination 
to use technology/comply with policy? 
Population and Sampling Frame 
All of the study’s participants were of grades GS-12 to GS-14 and non-supervisors. 
The objective was to address only this category of employees to understand the effects of 
policies on the workers instead of on the senior leaders who participated in implementing 
the policy. To be eligible to partake in the research, individuals must also have a 
requirement to use Microsoft SharePoint at least weekly in performing their jobs. Each 
candidate was asked about his or her GS civilian grade, weekly usage of SharePoint, and 
an awareness of the requirement to use SharePoint. Once subjects were identified as 
meeting the requirements for participation in the study, they were informed about their rights 
as participants. In addition to the informed consent form, each participant received a 
detailed explanation of the contents of the form to avoid any potential misunderstanding. 
The grounded theory sampling strategies used were snowball and convenience 
sampling, which both fall under the purview of purposeful sampling. The participants who 
were interviewed are all employees of ITCOM who used Microsoft SharePoint daily as part 
of their jobs. Participants responded to nine open-ended questions addressing their reaction 
to the released organizational policy that required them to use the new enterprise tool, 
Microsoft SharePoint, to accomplish at least part of their daily work activities.  
Because of the organization’s military status, each candidate was informed that 
senior leadership had approved that the study be conducted at ITCOM and that his or her 
time away from normal duties was authorized. This was important information to share, as 
some participants were worried about whether they could partake in interviews during the 
work day.  
Grounded theory studies do not have a stated required number for sample sizes or 
data saturation (Glaser & Strauss, 1967; Corbin & Strauss, 1998). A number of factors drive 
the required number of samples, such as the sensitivity of the phenomenon, the scope of 
the study, the experience and skill of the researcher, and the participants’ familiarity with the 
phenomenon (Corbin & Strauss, 1998; Morse, 2000). Because data drive the study and 
sample size, the study is complete when theoretical saturation has been reached. 
Researchers cannot know ahead of time when this will occur, but by choosing participants 
that are very familiar with the phenomenon, they can limit the number of required interviews 
(Glaser & Strauss, 1967; Corbin & Strauss, 1998). If subject matter experts are interviewed 
initially, researchers can use these initial interviews as a guide to narrow the focus of the 
study (Corbin & Strauss, 1998).  
When interviews begin producing the same data, theoretical saturation has been 
reached. Researchers must collect enough data to clearly discern concepts, patterns, 
categories, and properties (Glaser & Strauss, 1967; Strauss & Corbin, 1998). Researchers 
will know that they have reached data saturation when no new data emerge on a category, 
the category is well-developed, and category relationships are established and validated 
(Corbin & Strauss, 1998).  
Data Collection 
Data collection began with a pilot study to validate the adequacy and clarity of the 
interview questions and the value of the observations. Resultantly, a supplemental question 
(#5) was added to the list for the purpose of eliciting from the participants additional 
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thoughtfulness and potential solutions, versus only an identification of associated problems. 
The observation portion of the study entailed watching participants as they used Microsoft 
SharePoint. After being observed, these individuals were interviewed about their 
experiences when using the tool and how their perceptions of organizational policies 
affected their use of the tool and resultant productivity. The observation period of the pilot 
study identified that observations were far less useful than the interviews themselves, and 
were, thus, excluded from the study. 
After participants were identified, interviews were scheduled and conducted in an 
empty office space within the departments in which the individuals worked. Some of the 
participants found the interview to be a welcomed break from their work day and desired to 
have short, informal discussions either before or after the formal interview. The interviews 
were recorded using a tape recorder to ensure the accuracy of the notes taken during the 
sessions. Participants were guaranteed that no one within their chain of command would be 
able to access the notes or the tapes. Anonymity was maintained by assigning a number at 
the top of each interview sheet. The numbers corresponded to their sequence amongst the 
participants; i.e., the third subject received a “#3” at top of his interview questionnaire. 
During the interviews, the goal was to understand how organizational policies 
affected the use of the technology. For example, if in the past individuals were able to 
submit documents through manual processes, but now policies mandate automated 
processing via SharePoint, how did this change affect productivity? More importantly, how 
did the subjects’ perceptions of the policies affect their use of the technology, their 
performance, and their resultant productivity level? During the interviews, the participants 
were asked a number of questions about how they reacted to the policies (see Appendix A), 
including how they believed policies could be better implemented to encourage the effective 
use of technology.  
Interviews were conducted until saturation was reached. Saturation occurs when 
additional data collected does not add anything new to the existing categories (Goulding, 
2002). In this study, data saturation appeared evident after 14 interviews, at which point 
responses duplicated the previously emerged categories; i.e., no new categories emerged 
as the interviews continued. However, additional interviews had already been scheduled, 
and to ensure that no new categories would emerge, data collection continued until the 18th 
interview. Data were reviewed and re-analyzed for meaning and implications until no new 
categories were discovered, at which point theoretical saturation had been reached (Glaser 
& Straus, 1967; Rubin & Rubin, 1995).  
Besides the interviews relevant to the participants’ use of technology, data were also 
gathered from policy documentation (Fraser, 2008). Participants were asked about the 
content of these documents and how they perceived their messages. The intent was to 
capture the participants’ views and perceptions about policies and how they affected their 
willingness to use technology (Fraser, 2008). At the end of the interview sessions, the 
interviewees had the opportunity to review their responses and modify them to more 
accurately represent the intended meaning. 
Additional data were collected via a thorough review of existing, scholarly literature in 
the field. For example, peer-reviewed studies about how to best implement policies and 
technology within organizations and how to manage change effectively were significant in 
understanding best practices. Using data gathered from existing literature in combination 
with the observations and interviews provided a more holistic understanding of the problem 
and aided in the generation of a theory. 
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Data Analysis 
GT researchers use the following methods for data analysis: open coding, axial 
coding, and selective coding (Goulding, 2002). Open coding involves condensing data into 
meaningful units (West, 2007). Goulding advocates that open coding involve analyzing 
transcripts (of interviews, for example) line-by-line to identify all possible codes. This 
process continues until a pattern emerges across data sets (Goulding, 2002). Once 
categorized, data sets are examined for specific attributes and subcategories for each 
category (Goulding, 2002). Axial coding entails making interconnections between categories 
and subcategories. During axial coding, various aspects of categories are more clearly 
defined, which refines them and their interconnections. Data collection, open coding, and 
axial coding are iterative processes in GT research (Goulding, 2002). Selective coding 
consists of unifying all categories around core categories and adding descriptive detail 
(Corbin & Strauss, 1990) and usually occurs in the later phases of the study (Corbin & 
Strauss, 1990). The end result is a theory that is based on the collected data. The theory 
may be a statement, model, or hypotheses about the phenomenon (Goulding, 2002). 
As in any grounded theory study, data collection and analysis occur simultaneously 
in this study. As data were gathered through interviews, they were analyzed concurrently 
and concepts began to emerge (Fraser, 2008). As concepts emerged, they drove further 
data collection (Fraser, 2008). Categories and attributes of categories were defined during 
the data analysis process (Goulding, 2002). As more data were collected and analyzed, 
these categories were modified and refined (Cheseboro & Borisoff, 2007).  
The notes taken during the interviews were typed in and printed from Microsoft 
Office. To organize the vast amounts of data collected and analyzed during the initial 
analysis, the responses to interview questions were aligned under each research question. 
This approach provided a systematic way to understand the collected data, categorize them, 
and examine their relationships. Subsequent analysis procedures involved re-organization, 
review, and re-analysis of the data by themes, corresponding sub-themes, attributes, and 
interrelationships amongst categories and attributes.  
Data were further analyzed through the use of open coding, which involved analyzing 
text line-by-line to discover key phrases and words (Goulding, 2002). By doing so, concepts, 
or units of related data, developed. Each transcript from the observation and interview 
underwent this type of analysis to identify codes, causing patterns and group-related codes 
to become visible (Goulding, 2002). By linking codes together, categories emerged. 
Categories are higher order codes that consolidate concepts into a theoretical framework. 
As data continued to be analyzed until saturation, groupings were also verified and 
corrected, as necessary (Goulding, 2002).  
Further, each interview was compared to the previous one(s), answer by answer. 
Individual word and line analyses offered a way of providing insight to the meaning behind 
the participants’ responses. Some comments and recollections were examined separately to 
assess their relevance to the participants’ answers, interview questions, and research 
questions. As text was constantly compared and reviewed via open coding, several 
patterns, or common themes, began to emerge. The various subcategories that emerged 
from the data review and comparison were assigned to corresponding themes. 
Using axial coding, categories were reviewed and reassembled to identify the 
relationships amongst them. Related themes were then placed under higher level concepts 
(Goulding, 2002). Open and axial coding are methods used to condense data into 
categories, or themes, and to understand the relationships amongst the categories and 
subcategories (Goulding, 2002).  
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Subsequent coding phases entailed continuous analysis, refinement, and review as 
data surfaced from additional interviews. A constant comparison of data ensured that 
relationships were recognized, as were new themes that developed from the analysis. 
Selective coding involved using the previously identified categories, defining, developing, 
and refining them further, then assimilating them to tell a story. 
Validity and Reliability 
Researchers strive to perform valid and reliable studies, but perfect validity and 
reliability are impossible goals (Neuman, 2006). Reliability refers to the repeatability and 
consistency of the study and its findings (Neuman, 2006). In other words, if the study were 
repeated and the measurement instruments are reliable, the findings should be similar. 
Validity questions the truthfulness of the measurements—do instruments measure what they 
were intended to measure (Fraser, 2008)? 
In qualitative studies, validity and reliability are addressed in terms of the 
trustworthiness of the study (Lincoln & Guba, 1985). Trustworthiness is comprised of four 
criteria: credibility (internal validity), transferability (external validity), dependability 
(reliability), and confirmability (researcher objectivity; Lincoln & Guba, 1985). To be credible, 
the study’s results must be believable. Credibility was established by testing the 
measurement instrument, or the interview questions, via the pilot study to ensure that they 
measured what they were intended to measure. Additionally, participants’ responses were 
verified with the individuals to ensure that their intended meanings were accurately 
captured. Transferability addresses the degree to which results can be generalized (Lincoln 
& Guba, 1985). Generalizability is not a goal in qualitative studies, but qualitative studies 
can be made more transferable if researchers address specific elements of the context, or 
environment, in which the study occurred, as well as thoroughly describing the limitations 
and assumptions of the study. 
Dependability refers to reliability—if the study were repeated, would the findings be 
the same (Lincoln & Guba, 1985)? Confirmability relies on the researcher’s objectivity 
(Lincoln & Guba, 1985). Dependability and confirmability were addressed by mitigating 
potential researcher bias. Researcher bias can be mitigated if one constantly questions 
oneself and one’s objectivity. In this particular case, the researcher was very familiar with 
the organization and with the subjects, so a sense of self-awareness and self-questioning 
became especially important in mitigating possible instances of bias. Additionally, by 
ensuring that only the study’s collected data were used during analysis, in lieu of any 
personal opinions held by the researcher, potential bias was further eliminated. In this study, 
a significant amount of data were collected. Since a GT design was used, these data drove 
the study, which helped address both the dependability and confirmability criteria of 
trustworthiness. Finally, data were checked and rechecked to ensure that analysis was 
performed correctly, that data were categorized correctly, and that nothing was accidentally 
omitted or overlooked. By documenting, checking, and re-checking data collection and 
analysis procedures, researchers can further increase confirmability. Dependability is 
enhanced if researchers describe changes that occur in the environment and how those 
changes were addressed. 
Researchers constantly attempt to discover new categories of evidence until data 
saturation is reached (Jones, Kriflik, & Zanko, 2005). Data saturation is what makes GT 
studies robust—researchers do not stop collecting data until saturation is reached (Jones et 
al., 2005). Interviews are often complemented by observations to strengthen a study 
(Goulding, 2002), but, ultimately, data saturation, the constant comparative method, and the 
diligent data analysis procedures are what make GT studies rigorous. 
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Results 
Three primary categories, or common themes, emerged from the data analysis 
process and are listed in no order of significance: leadership, policy, and mandated tool (see 
Appendix B).  
Theme 1: Leadership  
The leadership theme consisted of five sub-themes, indicative of what leadership 
responsibilities were most important to the study’s participants in regard to gaining their 
acceptance of the new organizational policy: communications strategy, involvement with and 
commitment to the policy, policy enforcement, training, and stakeholder involvement. 
Communications Strategy 
Seventy percent of the participants felt very strongly about senior leadership not 
having adequately communicated a plan for change, addressed the policy, and distributed 
the policy. Based on the number of times participants referenced this sub-theme, it can be 
considered one of the most significant problems faced in regard to employee acceptance of 
the new organizational policy. One-third of the participants felt that both acceptance of the 
mandated tool and the policy, in general, would have significantly increased if leadership 
had just informed them about what was going to happen and why the change was 
necessary. Twenty-two percent believed that being informed in the very beginning instead of 
at the end would have also made a difference, while one-third expressed concern about how 
the policy was published. They felt that the policy should have been easy for anyone to find 
and that senior leadership had a responsibility for ensuring that the policy was received by 
all employees, at every level. Because policy distribution was performed inadequately, 22% 
of the participants said they had never even seen it. One individual mentioned that he knew 
of the policy’s existence, but was unaware of its content, while another felt that the policy 
should have been shared via all available communication channels, such as town hall 
meetings, e-mail notifications, and a posting on the portal. Using more than one 
communication channel would have ensured that individuals who missed e-mail 
notifications, for instance, would have received the information through another channel, 
according to the participant. Further, he stated that direct supervisors should have taken 
responsibility for ensuring the dissemination of the policy to their employees. 
Involvement With and Commitment to the Policy 
One-third of the participants believed that the changes encompassed by the policy 
were not supported by senior leadership. Besides keeping everyone informed, senior 
leaders should have led by example and used the tool first, they stated. Further, senior 
leaders should have been advocates for the tool that was prescribed for use.  
According to 17% of the participants, management commitment and involvement 
entails changing the organization’s culture. In order for the workforce to be receptive to the 
proposed changes, these participants felt that their organizational culture needed to reflect a 
more open-minded and flexible attitude. The traditional views that employees held were 
neither conducive to change nor to accepting and using modern technology. Eleven percent 
believed that by offering change management courses, leadership could have helped 
individuals adapt to the new way of doing things. 
Policy Enforcement 
Twenty-two percent of the participants thought that without enforcement, many 
individuals would fail to comply with the current policy. Non-compliance would result in 
redundant processes and numerous inefficiencies, due to either improper usage or simply 
non-usage of the tool. According to one participant, improper use would not only affect 
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individual productivity, but also any general productivity gains that he believed leaders were 
seeking to achieve through the new policy. 
Training 
Next to communication problems, training was the most heavily cited concern by 
nearly 80% of the participants. The respondents felt that if leadership did not provide proper 
training for the new and complicated tool, they could never be truly efficient or effective at 
using it. Also, without a proper understanding of the functionality and the tool’s benefits, tool 
acceptance would be reduced and resistance would increase, turning it into a time-waster. 
Nearly half of the participants believed that training via small groups would have been the 
most effective way to teach employees what they needed to know. They suggested that 
different levels of training were necessary, based on individual job roles. Some employees 
were chosen to fill the role of content manager for their team. Participants believed that 
these individuals should have received specialized training to address the additional 
responsibilities they would have in managing specific group sites and resolving issues. 
According to one individual, the absence of specialized training for content managers 
delayed trouble-ticket resolutions and site management duties that these individuals were 
required to make daily as part of their assigned role. Further, another participant explained 
that content managers lost important departmental data because “they didn’t know what 
they were doing.” According to the interviewee, training should have occurred before the 
tool’s use was made mandatory via the policy, and training should have been staggered. 
Stakeholder Involvement 
This sub-theme differs from the communications strategy sub-theme in that it 
addresses involving employees in the change process from the start, versus communicating 
changes that they are not involved in making at the end.  
Nearly 40% of the participants believed that their involvement in the decision-making 
process would not have changed their attitude toward the practice, independent of whether 
they liked or did not like the mandated tool. One individual believed that he would have been 
more prepared and supportive of the tool and the policy had he been involved from the 
beginning. Seventeen percent stated that the need to be involved and acceptance of the tool 
and the policy depended mostly on an individual’s familiarity with the technology. For 
example, if someone already knew SharePoint, then being told to use the tool would not be 
as challenging as its usage would be for someone who lacked IT skills or familiarity with the 
tool. Eleven percent of the participants believed that being involved in the policy’s 
development and having an understanding of the change would have increased its 
acceptance. Finally, one participant would have chosen a different tool, based solely on 
personal preference, had he been involved in the decision-making process. 
Theme 2: Policy  
In addition to the distribution problems, those who had seen the policy felt that it was 
lacking significant elements. The four sub-themes for policy are general content, diction, 
compliance, and time to comply. The policy theme is comprised of answers provided in 
response to all of the research questions. 
General Content 
This sub-theme developed mostly from responses to SRQ3. Seventeen percent of 
the participants criticized the policy for being unclear and wordy. Another 22% felt that 
explaining the necessity of the change (i.e., the policy) was extremely important for its 
acceptance. In doing so, the policy would have also explained the benefits of the tool, which 
half of the participants believed to be a critical missing element.  
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The policy should have contained rules and guidelines for structured use, as well as 
processes and procedures, according to almost 40% of the participants. Further, 17% of the 
participants believed that downloadable standard operating procedures (SOP) on tool usage 
and system functionality would have been especially helpful in providing guidance on tasks, 
such as moving old data to the new system. Roles and responsibilities also needed to be 
defined, according to several participants; one individual believed that the inclusion of 
definitions would have led to increased acceptance of the policy. Seventeen percent 
suggested that including a meaningful measurement of effectiveness, or metrics, would 
have provided a means for measuring potential efficiencies gained, tangible results for 
monetary savings, and productivity gains. 
More importantly, the policy should have established a training requirement for the 
workforce, according to more than half of the participants. In doing so, employees would 
have been guaranteed to receive training that would have helped them learn to use the 
newly mandated tools. One individual thought that keeping the policy updated was 
important, as the organization’s needs/requirements changed, while another stated that the 
policy needed to match the readiness or availability of the tool: “Upon the policy’s release, 
SharePoint was far from being operational. Thus, we were forced to use a tool with limited 
functionality that could not be used to perform our work functions.”  
Diction 
Responses to interview question #7, How did the wording of the policy affect you? 
For instance, how would you have reacted differently if the policy had been phrased in a 
different way, perhaps in a more positive fashion?, were mostly responsible for producing 
this sub-theme. Responses to these questions were quite varied. For instance, half of the 
participants felt that directive wording was very much appropriate for an organizational 
policy and that word choices themselves were irrelevant. Two individuals stated that they 
were used to being told what to do. Because they had worked for military organizations as 
both civilians and soldiers, being directed to comply was a normally occurring event for 
them. Others (17%) stated that word choices should have been more positive or consensual 
in nature to improve employee receptiveness to and acceptance of the policy. Another 
participant added that the policy, “Should sound intelligent,” and two others stated that a 
value-added perspective versus a directive tone would have been more appropriate. Finally, 
one participant felt that diction was irrelevant, but later added that he would have reacted 
more favorably if he were given some choices within the policy’s requirements. 
Compliance 
When participants were asked interview question #2, Why do you think the 
SharePoint policy was created?, their responses varied widely. Nearly one-third of the 
participants believed that policies were a necessary means to achieve compliance. Eleven 
percent posited that employees would only use new tools if they were forced to do so and 
that the way to force people to comply is by issuing a policy. One individual added that 
employees would be reluctant to use SharePoint because they were unfamiliar with the tool. 
Therefore, leadership had to create a policy to ensure compliance. A different participant 
believed that the policy was a way to move the organization toward data consolidation, 
regardless of the tool selected for accomplishing this goal, while a third individual thought 
that standardization was a goal. A total of 22% of the participants thought the goal was 
collaboration. Some (11%) felt the policy’s intent was to do both.  
Reducing storage, administration, and software licensing costs were other 
management goals that 22% of the participants believed the policy was intended to achieve. 
One participant also thought that the policy was created purely from a management 
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perspective, intended to achieve managerial goals. Alternate views were expressed by 
participants who believed that the policy was created to mandate a new and better tool, 
which would increase performance and lead to efficiency gains, reduce network bandwidth 
requirements, provide a greater data storage capacity, and improve accessibility. Eleven 
percent of interviewees felt that the policy adequately provided guidelines for a more 
structured use of the new tool. 
Time to Comply 
When asked interview question #6, At what point in time between the policy release 
and its enforcement did you comply with the policy? What affected your acceptance of the 
policy?, responses were much less varied. More than half of the participants stated that they 
complied immediately because they were mandated to do so. Some stated that their 
understanding of the value of and familiarity with the tool also affected their compliance. 
One individual explicated that change is a necessary part of progress, which increased his 
willingness to comply with the policy, in addition to having been mandated to do so. Other 
participants faced some intervening forces that slightly delayed their compliance. For 
example, although one participant complied quickly, he had to research the tool himself, 
which delayed his ability to use it effectively. Because he had not received training, it was a 
trial and error exercise. The lack of a customer support forum or published help desk 
numbers further delayed his usage of the tool. Another participant stated that in the absence 
of training, his ability to use the tool was significantly limited. Finally, one participant 
complied as quickly as he could, but competing priorities contributed to a slight delay. He 
stated, “We have so many competing priorities. Nothing ever falls off the plate. Everything 
just becomes a number one priority in this command.” 
According to 17% of the participants, some of the previous tools were disabled 
immediately, which left them no choice but to use SharePoint. In other words, their 
compliance was forced. One individual complied after attending training, which gave him a 
better understanding of the value of the new tool. Twenty-two percent did not comply 
immediately because of the lack of functionality encountered when using the new tool. 
Unable to move data from the previous tool due to file type and file size restrictions, one 
participant felt forced to use both tools to do his job. This created redundant data and 
workflows, as well as additional work for him. Others continue to avoid using SharePoint 
because they find the tool difficult to use. However, one participant believed that a better 
layout and organization of the tool would lead to increased general compliance. 
Theme 3: Mandated Tool  
This category repeatedly emerged from responses to multiple interview questions 
related to research questions 1, 3, and 4. The mandated tool theme was referred to more 
than any other category or subcategory during the study’s procession. Four major sub-
themes emerged under mandated tool: perceptions of tool functionality, initial reactions to 
the requirement, phased implementation, and effect on productivity.  
Perceptions of Tool Functionality 
Numerous participants felt strongly about the limited functionality of SharePoint at 
the time its use was mandated by the organizational policy. They believed that at least the 
major problems should have been resolved by the time they were required to use the tool. 
Nearly one-third of the participants mentioned performance issues that made the tool slow 
and cumbersome, discouraging their use of SharePoint. These issues also led to redundant 
sites being used (some on the old system), the creation of unnecessarily complex 
workflows, permissions issues that prevented them from modifying sites, and accessibility 
problems. One participant referred to these problems as “pilot pains.” He thought that 
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because ITCOM was the first organization to implement SharePoint at an enterprise-level, 
the organization’s employees were the guinea pigs who were made to suffer through the 
problems. 
The tool should have been easy to use, and sites should have been well-organized—
this would have increased tool acceptance, according to 22% of the participants. The tool 
also should have had greater functionality than the tool it replaced. Having full functionality 
would have increased the acceptance rate, according to 17%. Conversely, 22% of the 
participants believed that previous knowledge and understanding of the tool’s capabilities is 
what would have most affected acceptance. They felt that because they had past 
experiences with SharePoint, they were much more receptive to using the tool than were 
their peers. One individual commented that the tool should have been more carefully 
selected, then evaluated later to ensure that it met its intent. 
Because the tool was administered at the wrong level and by an external 
organization, additional problems arose, stated 45% of the participants. As functionality 
problems were identified, the time to resolve them became extraordinarily long. Further, the 
way the tool was configured and implemented significantly decreased the number of 
available features. Seventeen percent of the participants would have been much more 
receptive to using SharePoint had the tool been installed “straight out-of-the box.”  
Initial Reactions to the Requirement 
When the policy to mandate the use of SharePoint was first released, employee 
reactions varied notably. Nearly 40% of the participants were happy and excited about 
receiving a new tool with which to perform their duties. A number of participants commented 
on the positive features of the tool, such as improved processes, better collaboration, better 
standardization, better overall functionality than the previous tool, efficiency increases, 
centralized storage and better security, reduced waste, the ease of finding documents and 
no longer having to rely on email, and not having to use the old tool anymore. Others felt 
dread and fear. They were worried about the tool not being user-friendly, losing control, and 
not having defined processes, procedures, roles, and responsibilities. One participant was 
also distraught by the bad performance of the tool, while two others complained about bad 
or limited functionality. Another individual expressed concern about users’ readiness to use 
such a complex tool and the resultant user resistance. Some participants were also 
displeased about the amount of time they would have to invest in learning to use the new 
tool. Finally, one participant stated that he did not know about the policy or the requirement 
to use SharePoint. 
Phased Implementation 
When asked whether their perception and acceptance of the policy would have 
improved if the tool had been implemented using a phased approach, 56% of the 
participants stated, “Yes.” They felt that a phased approach would have limited disruptions, 
while offering many benefits to the workforce, such as more time: to adapt to the change, for 
administrators to resolve initial problems with the tool and provide better functionality, and 
for training. Using a phased approach would have encouraged the use of the tool and 
increased compliance, according to 11% of the participants. One individual stated, “This tool 
is too big to roll-out all at once.” Nearly 40% of the participants felt that a phased approach 
would have led to greater acceptance. One participant believed that the implementation was 
phased and that this approach did not help reduce the number of problems the workforce 
encountered. The remaining ca. 40% of the participants felt that a phased implementation 
would have led to more problems. They believed that a phased approach would have 
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decreased user acceptance, tool functionality, compliance, and would have led to duplicate 
data and confusion.  
Effect on Productivity 
Interview question #8 addressed perceived productivity gains that resulted from 
using the new tool. The responses to this question varied—45% of the participants felt that 
there were definite productivity gains, but 40% believed that gains were limited. Seventeen 
percent of participants stated that a lack of metrics meant that there was no way to measure 
actual increases in productivity. For one-third of the participants, documents were easy to 
find and share, both externally and internally—that alone was a significant efficiency gained 
through the new tool. Some participants welcomed not having to carry an external storage 
device to access data, and centrally located data led to better collaboration, according to 
others. Seventeen percent believed that productivity was further improved through better 
accessibility and standardization.  
Those who believed that productivity gains were limited cited training and 
functionality problems as the main reasons. The way the sites were organized made 
information difficult to find. Seventeen percent thought that once the layout improved, 
productivity gains would rise significantly. One participant noted that too many people are 
still relying on e-mail to share files and that the resultant limited use of the tool is hampering 
organization-wide productivity gains. Further, leaders are not using SharePoint or enforcing 
the use of the tool, which is why the usage problems persist. 
Discussion 
Theme 1: Leadership 
This theme addresses those things that are important for leaders to do when 
implementing organizational policies. As presented in the Results section, 70% of ITCOM 
employees desired their leaders to better communicate with them, inform them of upcoming 
changes early on, and explain why changes are necessary. According to some participants, 
communication should occur via a number of venues to ensure that everyone receives the 
message. If possible, leaders should schedule town hall meetings, send e-mails, and post 
information to collaboration portals. Once a policy is published, leaders should ensure that 
they distribute it to everyone. Again, leaders should use any means necessary to inform 
their employees of a policy, according to participant responses. Copies could be printed and 
distributed during meetings, they could be disseminated electronically, or they could be 
posted to a centralized location to which everyone has access. 
As indicated by one-third of the study’s participants, ITCOM’s organizational policy 
was not well-distributed. This is not an uncommon problem for the organization. Although a 
specific department exists that has the responsibility for distributing policies throughout 
ITCOM via e-mail, policies often do not reach the entire workforce, as evidenced by 
participant responses. By using every means of communication available to them, leaders 
can ensure that their workforce is in receipt of the policy. 
In addition to conquering distribution issues, leaders should also enforce what is 
mandated within a policy. According to some participants, ensuring compliance will work 
toward the general good of all, as it prevents employees from using previous tools and 
creating redundant data repositories and workflows.  
Training was found to be an important component of tool use not only in this study, 
but in previous studies conducted by Nyström (2006) and Dubé & Paré (2001). By providing 
training, leaders give employees the opportunity to understand a new tool and all of its 
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features. Training also gives employees insight into how a tool could help improve their work 
processes, thereby increasing acceptance. Demonstrating the functionality of the tool could 
show how it will create efficiencies and reduce workloads, instead of becoming an 
impediment.  
Theme 2: Policy 
This theme addresses those things that make a policy effective. It covers policy 
content, diction, compliance, and the timeframe within which to comply. In order for 
employees to perceive a policy with a positive and responsive attitude, the policy must be 
structured in a specific way, as evidenced by participant responses. Polices should be 
succinct and clear and explain why a transition to a new tool is necessary. This finding 
corresponds with studies about policy acceptance conducted by Boer (2012), Kotter and 
Schlesinger (2008), Long and Spurlock (2008), and Nyström (2006). Some of the 
participants believed that in addition to explaining the necessity of the change, the policy 
should be explicit in describing the benefits of the new and mandated tool. They believed 
that an explanation of user benefits was critical for acceptance. 
Further, the policy should contain the following sections: detailed rules and 
guidelines for structured use of the tool, processes and procedures, roles and 
responsibilities, and metrics. Participants identified the inclusion of standard operating 
procedures as a preferred means of explaining how to use the new tool, addressing specific 
tasks such as how to move data from the old tool to the new tool, as well as general 
instructions for use. Finally, outlining roles and responsibilities helps clarify who is 
responsible for which tasks.  
The establishment of metrics in the policy provides a way for leaders to assess the 
effectiveness of a new tool. Several employees felt that being able to provide tangible 
means of measuring improvements, such as gains in productivity or monetary savings, 
would help leaders demonstrate the utility of the tool. Finally, the most important item to 
include in the policy is the establishment of a training requirement. A training requirement 
ensures employees will learn how to properly use a tool, which would accelerate acceptance 
and reduce the employees’ time to comply with the policy. Conducting training prior to a 
tool’s implementation also ensures familiarity with a tool, which a number of participants felt 
was paramount to acceptance. 
Theme 3: Mandated Tool 
Acceptance of both the policy and SharePoint were strongly affected by perceptions 
of the tool’s functionality. Many participants felt that the lack of functionality at the time that 
SharePoint’s use was mandated discouraged employees from using the tool. They faced a 
number of problems, such as gaining access, permissions issues, broken links, slow 
response times, and disorganized site layouts. If these initial problems had been resolved 
prior to employees using the tool, the workforce would have had a much more positive 
experience and perception of SharePoint, according to many of the participants. The tool 
should have been easy to use and offer better functionality than the previous one. This 
finding corresponds with previous studies that addressed the factors behind technology 
acceptance in voluntary-use environments, but differs from findings when use is mandated 
(Brown et al., 2002; He et al., 2009). This incongruence might be explained by the 
differences in organization types and cultures. Unlike the referenced studies, this study took 
place in a military organization where employees are used to receiving orders. The 
differences in culture between private industry and military organizations may explain the 
inconsistent perceptions regarding the mandated use of technology. Finally, SharePoint 
should have been administered at the right organizational level, either internally or 
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externally, via outsourcing to an organization capable of quickly resolving technical 
problems. The number of problems that arose were unnecessarily high because of 
administration issues, according to 45% of the participants. 
Nearly 40% of the participants were excited when they were told that they would get 
a new and better tool with which to do their jobs. This positive attitude could have been 
prolonged if SharePoint had functioned correctly. Ensuring proper functionality leads to 
greater use and acceptance of tools and compliance with policies, according to the study’s 
participants, as well as findings from previous studies (Bushnell, 1999; Chin, 1998). 
When implementing new tools, a phased approach was preferred by over 55% of the 
workforce. This finding also corresponds to discoveries made in previous studies (Malik & 
Danish, 2010; Witte, 2002). Phased implementations give administrators more time to 
resolve initial problems, employees more time to attend training, and is less disruptive to the 
workday. Again, proper adherence to these factors would have led to greater acceptance of 
the tool, according to approximately 40% of the participants. 
Nearly 45% of the study’s participants felt that they became more productive by 
using SharePoint. This finding is supported by previous studies about productivity increases 
gained from collaboration tools (Lomas et al., 2008), especially when they are 
complemented by organizational policies (Garicano & Heaton, 2010). Productivity increased 
as tool functionality problems were resolved and, potentially, could continue to increase as 
the tool is improved and sites become better organized. Finally, if leaders enforced the use 
of SharePoint and more people used it, some participants believed that productivity would 
increase not only for those individuals but for the entire workforce, as redundant processes 
would be eliminated. 
Limitations 
Because this study was conducted in a military organization, some of the employees’ 
perceptions may differ from what one would find if the study were conducted in the private 
sector. For example, ITCOM employees are used to receiving orders. This may not be true 
for individuals who have not worked for military or government organizations. Some 
perspectives are unique to this demographic. 
Further, private industry may not use formal policies to mandate the use of 
technology. Although about one-third of the study’s participants felt that policies were 
necessary to ensure compliance, the private sector may not follow the same procedure. 
Thus, the results from this study may only be applicable to organizations that use policies to 
mandate technology use. 
Finally, this study’s participants included non-supervisory employees between the 
grades of 12 to 14. The intent was to understand how the general workforce at ITCOM 
perceived the organizational policies, not those who were involved in mandating the policy. 
Had the latter group been included, the responses likely would have changed notably.  
Implications for Leaders 
The way that ITCOM currently implements policies is ineffective in achieving 
compliance, as evidenced by participant responses. Leaders must change how policies are 
written, distributed, implemented, and communicated. Currently, employees are displaying a 
high level of resistance to the policies, based on all of these factors. The presence of 
resistance indicates that policies are ineffective because they are not meeting their intent. 
Leaders must show that they are committed to their policies and develop measures to 
enforce compliance. Kim and Lee (2006) and Nyström (2006) found that a lack of leadership 
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commitment to technology implementations and training hinder the use of and acceptance 
of tools.  
Participants believed that leaders must make appropriate training available to the 
workforce to ensure that employees understand how to best use newly mandated tools. 
Previous studies by Bergiel et al. (2006) and Chong (2005) also found that employees often 
lack the proper training or skills to successfully use technology, which leads to increased 
resistance (Cogburn & Levinson, 2008; Long & Spurlock, 2008). Zivick (2012) identified how 
important it is for leaders to have enough funding to properly train their work teams on 
technology. Alcantara (2009), Maier and Remus (2003), and Witte (2002) corroborated this 
view, especially in situations where new technologies are linked with organizational policies. 
Analogous to participant responses, Witte (2002) found that training should be a 
requirement addressed within the policy itself. Optimally, training will occur prior to the 
mandated use of the tool.  
Another important point to recognize is that organizational cultures must be ones that 
are adaptive to change. Some of the participants posited that the existing organizational 
culture is not flexible, which makes the workforce less receptive to proposed changes. 
Previous studies corroborate that when policies do not align with organizational cultures, 
they can be counter-productive in their attempt to reach organizational goals (Alcantara, 
2009; Boer 2012; Calhoun 2002; Spetz, et al., 2009; Thielst, 2007). According to Alcantara 
(2009) and Witte (2002) organizational cultures must be learning cultures that support the 
use of technology. Nemiro et al. (2008) and Rahmati et al. (2012) identified the criticality of 
cultural management in establishing behavioral norms for successful collaboration. 
Paghaleh et al. (2011) and Hartman et al. (2009) added that cultures must be ones that 
encourage teamwork and cooperation to enable employees to overcome their resistance to 
information sharing via collaboration tools. In light of the findings from this and previous 
studies, leaders would do well to develop an organizational culture that encourages open-
mindedness and flexibility. By doing so, policies that mandate changes will receive less 
resistance from the workforce, according to participants. 
Leaders must also ensure that policies contain the critical elements identified in this 
study and that they are clear and concise. Again, this finding corresponds with those of 
previous studies about policies being clear in intent and meaning to be accepted by the 
workforce (Boer, 2012; Kotter & Schlesinger, 2008; Long & Spurlock, 2008; Nyström, 2006). 
Kapsali (2011) also found that if leaders are flexible when implementing policies, 
customizing them to specific user groups, acceptance will increase. Alcantara (2009) and 
Tirgari (2012) posited that by including the workforce in the policy development process, 
policies will be more effective. This finding is contradictory, as 40% of ITCOM participants 
believed that their involvement in the policy’s creation would not have changed their reaction 
to it. An additional 16% of respondents felt that the need to be involved in the policy’s 
creation is directly linked to individual knowledge about the technology that is being 
implemented. The different type of culture that exists within a military organization may 
account for the incongruous finding. 
Leaders should take measures to ensure that the tools for which they mandate use 
are fully functional and appropriate for the employees in performing their work. This finding 
aligns with Bushnell’s (1999) study, in which he identified a lack of functionality as a 
hindrance to technology acceptance. Dubé and Paré (2001) and Galleta and Zhang (2006) 
would agree, adding that proper functionality is especially important in virtual environments. 
Further, Brown et al. (2002) and He et al. (2009) attributed usefulness or perceived 
usefulness as primary reasons for technology acceptance, which also correspond to the 
findings of this study. 
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Leaders should consider using a phased implementation approach and creating 
metrics to measure cost savings and productivity increases. Studies by Malik and Danish 
(2010) and Witte (2002) also found a phased implementation approach to be more effective. 
By following all of the aforementioned guidelines, leaders will be able to more effectively 
implement their policies, according to participants. 
Conclusion 
The purpose of this grounded theory study was to develop a theory about how 
leaders can implement organizational policies that mandate the use of technology with 
maximum effectiveness. This study provided invaluable insight into employees’ perceptions 
about policies and the resultant impact on the use of collaboration tools and perceived 
productivity, giving leaders the insight and understanding to effectively implement policies to 
achieve the following organizational goals: encourage the use of technology, increase 
productivity, and stay competitive in a global economy. 
Recommendations for Future Research 
The findings and theory of this study created a foundation for future research on the 
topic of how perceptions of policies affect compliance of the use of mandated technology 
and perceived productivity. Future researchers could explore the same phenomenon in the 
private sector, performing an equivalent study and comparing the results. Additionally, a 
quantitative study could be conducted to test the theory generated in this study, using a 
larger population. By doing so, researchers could test the strengths and weaknesses of this 
theory using a different research methodology and potentially increase the generalizability of 
the theory. 
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Appendix A: Interview Questions 
1. What was your reaction when you were told that your organization had 
released a policy that would require you to use SharePoint to do your normal 
every-day work processes? Why? 
2. Why do you think the SharePoint policy was created? 
3. How would your reaction have been different if you had been involved in the 
decision-making process to make the practice mandatory? 
4. How would you have reacted differently if the process change had been more 
gradual/incremental?  
5. How would you have done things differently? 
6. At what point in time between the policy release and its enforcement did you 
comply with the policy? What affected your acceptance of the policy? 
7. How did the wording of the policy affect you? For instance, how would you 
have reacted differently if the policy had been phrased in a different way, 
perhaps in a more positive fashion? 
8. What other factors affected your response to the policy? 
9. What effect do you feel SharePoint has had on your productivity? 
Appendix B: Table 1 
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Abstract 
Today, rapid innovation in product development is essential to be competitive in any field. It is 
true for DoD acquisition as well as everyone else. To investigate the potential for 
computational prototypes and High Performance Computing (HPC) to enable product 
innovation in DoD acquisition programs, the U.S. Department of Defense HPC Modernization 
Program (DoD HPCMP) Office initiated the Computational Research and Engineering 
Acquisition Tools and Environments (CREATE) Program in 2006 (Post et al., 2016). The 
CREATE goal is to develop and deploy physics-based HPC software applications for the 
design and analysis of military air craft, ships, and radio frequency antenna systems (and 
more recently ground vehicles) to enable DoD acquisition programs to improve acquisition 
outcomes through the construction and analysis of virtual prototypes for those systems. 
Development of the software applications began in 2008. Ten years later, the CREATE 
software tools are already beginning to enable DoD engineering organizations (government 
and industry) to accelerate the rate of innovation in major defense systems, and reduce the 
cost, time, and risks of acquisition programs for those systems. One aspect of this paradigm 
is that it enables the DoD to employ features of the Silicon Valley culture that facilitate rapid 
product innovation. 
Introduction 
The enabling, disruptive technology that enables accelerated innovation through the 
use of virtual prototypes is the rapid growth of high performance computing over the last 60 
years. Since the end of World War II, the calculating power of computers has grown 
exponentially from ~1 Floating Point Operation/second (FLOP/s) to over 1016 FLOP/s 
                                            
 
 
1 The CREATE Team consists of Douglass Post, John N. D’Angelo, Saikat Dey, Larry N. Lynch, 
Robert L. Meakin, Richard L. Vogelsong, S. Morton, A. Wissink, J. Livingston, A. Mackenna, J. 
Gorski, E. Moyer, Robert Keane, Richard P. Kendall, L. Votta, P. Gibson, D. Borovitcky, L. Miller, S. 
Allwerdt, Oscar A. Goldfarb, Nathan S. Hariharan, Kevin P. Newmeyer, and approximately 160 other 
CREATE scientists, engineers, and staff. 
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(http://www.top500.org/). This means that—for the first time in history—it is possible to make 
accurate predictions of the behavior of many, many complex physical systems (e.g., the 
weather, chemical systems, airplanes, ships, automobiles, etc.). We can now develop and 
deploy science-based software applications for high performance computers that 
1. Include the major physical effects that determine the performance of the 
system, 
2. Utilize highly accurate mathematical and numerical solution algorithms, 
3. Are verified and experimentally validated, 
4. Can predict the performance of a full-scale system (e.g., an entire ship or 
airplane),  
5. Enable multidimensional design of experiments to generate large trade-
spaces for a full scale system, and 
6. Can complete a high-fidelity, time-dependent, three-dimensional multi-
physics calculation for a maneuvering system in a few days that took weeks 
in 2005, and months (if even possible at the same level of fidelity) in 1995. 
This capability enables design engineers to construct realistic virtual prototypes of 
physical systems (ships, microprocessors, earth moving equipment, etc.) and make 
accurate predictions of their performance by solving the physics equations that govern their 
behaviour.  
In the past, it was necessary to construct real prototypes for these systems and use 
live tests to assess their performance and find the design flaws. With simple systems, and 
incremental changes, there was time in the past to follow the traditional product 
development paradigm of “design, build, test, fail, re-design” iterated cycles that had proved 
so successful since the beginning of the industrial revolution. For the standard system 
engineering product development process (Kossiakoff & Sweet, 2003; see Figure 1), the 
design of new products is based on “rule of thumb” extrapolations of existing products. Sub-
system physical prototypes are developed and experimentally tested during the engineering 
design phase, and full system physical prototypes are developed and tested just before and 
during full scale production. With today’s more complex weapon systems such as fighter 
airplanes, aircraft carriers, tanks, submarines, and so forth, these live tests occur too late to 
provide timely data on design defects and performance shortfalls. Expensive and time-
consuming rework is required to fix the problems uncovered by live testing. The DoD 5000 
acquisition process (Carter, 2013) is very similar to the standard systems engineering 
product development process depicted in Figure 1.  
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 System Engineering Product Development Life Cycle Model  Figure 1.
(adapted from Kossiakoff & Sweet, 2003) 
The effective use of virtual prototypes requires a high performance computing 
ecosystem consisting of the appropriate software applications, supercomputers, and a high 
speed network to connect the users to the supercomputers. For the DoD, that ecosystem is 
provided by the U.S. DoD HPC Modernization Program (HPCMP) Office, which supplies 
high-performance computing resources to the Science and Technology, Test and 
Evaluation, and Acquisition Engineering communities of the Armed Services and DoD 
agencies. The HPCMP Office provides continuous modernization of five DoD 
Supercomputing Resource Centers (DSRCs), the network that connects them (DREN), and 
the associated physics-based simulation software applications in response to prioritized 
needs of the Services. Recognizing the need to help spur innovation for major defense 
systems, the HPCMP Office in 2006 launched the Computational Research and Engineering 
Acquisition Tools and Environments (CREATE) Program. CREATE was chartered to reduce 
the cost, time, and risks of DoD acquisition programs by developing and deploying multi-
disciplinary, physics-based software applications for the design and analysis of military air 
craft, naval ships, and radio frequency antenna systems by DoD engineering organizations. 
In 2012, the scope of CREATE was expanded to include ground vehicles. 
Using the CREATE tools, engineers can construct virtual prototypes and 
computationally analyze product performance at any stage of the development process, 
supplementing or substituting for data from live tests. For conceptual design of new 
systems, “rule-of-thumb” extrapolations of existing designs can be replaced with physics-
based generation of design options allowing extensive trade-space exploration, and rapid 
assessment of the feasibility and advantages of all the design options with physics-based 
analysis tools. These engineers can consider many thousands of design options instead of a 
few. For detailed design development, high-fidelity analysis of virtual prototypes can replace 
“failure data from live tests” with “physics-based accurate predictions of virtual prototype 
performance” to drive design iteration and innovation. As the design matures, the digital 
model can be matured accordingly in terms of completeness of geometry and governing 
physics. Live tests can then be used to validate the final designs. This provides timely 
decision data that enables engineers to identify design flaws and performance shortfalls 
early, allowing problems to be fixed before metal is cut and minimizing rework that cause 
schedule delays and cost growth. The tools can be applied at all stages of the product 
development process, from early concept design through operation, support, sustainment, 
and modernization (Figure 1).  
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CREATE code development began in 2008, and 10 years later, CREATE is 
beginning to accomplish those goals. The CREATE tools are being used by more than 160 
DoD engineering organizations (50% government, 40% industry, and 10% other) for the 
assessment of more than 70 DoD acknowledged weapon systems and platforms. There are 
over 1,400 active CREATE user software licenses, and the number of users is continuing to 
increase. 
The CREATE tools can also help make the testing process more productive, more 
effective, and more efficient. The tools can be used to identify the most sensitive and 
uncertain operating conditions so that testing programs can concentrate on those areas, 
allowing the total test data requirements to be reduced a factor of five or more with a 
concomitant reduction in the required testing time (Kraft, 2010). In addition, it frees the 
testing community to address the basic scientific and engineering issues that determine 
weapon system performance as well as enabling a much greater number of test events with 
the existing test facilities. The software allows the DoD Test and Evaluation (T&E) 
community to rehearse testing events and design the test experiments.  
Many industries and federal agencies have successfully adopted the virtual prototype 
paradigm (Council on Competitiveness, 2010; Francis, 1995; Miller, 2010) to obtain a 
competitive advantage in their market place. Until recently, however, there has been little 
public information on the value of the paradigm, chiefly because it gives organizations that 
use it a significant competitive advantage, and their use of the paradigm is considered a 
trade secret. A few examples are publically available. The Partnership for Advanced 
Computing in Europe (PRACE) established an Automotive Simulation Center (ASC) in 
Stuttgart, with projects in vehicle drive, vehicle structure, vehicle physics, and so forth. ASC 
director, Alexander Walser, noted in 2014 that “numerical simulation made its way in the 
design phase of automotive development and productions (as) a useful tool for faster 
problem analysis and reduction of cost and product design time” (Walser, 2014). Specific 
benefits, however, were not detailed. In an aerospace industry example, however, Doug 
Ball, then Boeing’s chief engineer for enabling technology and research, stated, “When we 
were designing the 767 back in the 1980s, we built and tested about 77 wings. By using 
supercomputers to simulate the properties of the wings on recent models such as the 787 
and the 747-8, we only had to design (and test) seven wings, a tremendous savings in time 
and cost” (Ball, 2009).  
Starting in 1992, Goodyear developed a physics-based design tool for tires that 
became the core of their “innovation engine” (Miller, 2010). Goodyear CEO Richard Kramer 
noted in the Q4 2010 Earnings Call, “Our innovation engine again delivered in 2010. The 
percentage of new products in our overall lineup is the highest ever. … Our innovative new 
products continue to accumulate an impressive list of test wins and third-party 
endorsements” (Kramer, 2011). In the 2009 Annual Report, then Goodyear CEO Robert 
Keagan stated that “Our new product engine is poised to take advantage of the demand for 
high-value-added tires and to do so with unmatched speed to market” (Keagan, 2010, pp. 
2–3). With this approach, Goodyear reduced its product development time from three years 
to as little as eight months and reduced its new product prototyping and testing costs from 
40% to 15% of the R&D budget, an annual savings of $100 million (Engardio, 2008). 
The CREATE Program 
CREATE code development began in 2008 as a set of four projects (Air Vehicles, 
Naval Ships, Radio Frequency Antennas, and Meshing and Geometry). A fifth project was 
added in 2012 for Ground Vehicles. Combined, the projects are developing and deploying 
11 individual software applications (Table 1). The choice of the projects was dictated by the 
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relative size and importance of major defense acquisition programs and the potential for 
HPC and physics-based software applications to predict the performance of associated 
systems.  
The CREATE projects have two types of software products: (1) concept development 
tools (viz., DaVinci, RSDE/IHDE, a module of SENTRi, and MAT) to generate conceptual 
designs and analyze their feasibility and performance using fast, but lower-fidelity analytics; 
and (2) high-fidelity, multi-disciplinary tools (Kestrel, Helios, NESM, NavyFOAM, SENTRi, 
and Mercury) to provide accurate predictions of the system performance. The Meshing and 
Geometry project is subordinate to the other four CREATE projects and provides capability 
for concept design tools to generate numerical representations of the platform and then to 
generate the meshes needed for computational analysis. The Meshing and Geometry tool 
(Capstone) can also produce meshes from geometry representations generated by the most 
commonly used commercial CAD tools. Capstone provides a numerical representation of 
the geometry of the weapon system of interest, a digital prototype of the weapon system.  
The CREATE tools have been developed, deployed, and supported by the DoD 
(DoD employees and contractors). They are validated with DoD experimental data for DoD 
use cases, and are “owned” by the DoD. The DoD has government purpose distribution 
rights to all of the CREATE software. The CREATE tools give DoD acquisition program 
engineers the ability to make independent assessments of proposed designs and contractor 
deliverables. In this role, the tools are directly helping the DoD acquisition engineering 
community grow its organic engineering capability, a DoD priority for technical workforce 
development. 
The Eleven HPCMP CREATETM Software Applications 
CREATE Air Vehicles 
DaVinci—Concept Design Tool for Air Vehicles 
DaVinci will allow engineers to populate design option spaces of fixed and rotary 
wing aircraft and provide an initial assessment of the performance of the design. Choosing 
from previously engineered components, the tool will allow engineers to select and modify 
wings, fuselage, and propulsion components. Aircraft designers then can select, adjust, and 
rearrange internal components in aircraft designs. It is “Model Centric.” It will support highly 
efficient construction and maintenance of air vehicle models, including geometry that is 
parametric and includes water-tight external geometry, internal structure, subsystem layout, 
volumes, and mass properties. It will provide a multi-disciplinary, physics-based analysis 
capability that is variable fidelity, but is consistent across disciplines. It provides the ability to 
persist design data and intent throughout acquisition and program life. The virtual model can 
be tested virtually through its flight envelope to assess basic performance characters, 
including mission performance, and decision support with uncertainty quantification and 
sensitivity analysis.  
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Table 1. CREATE Projects and Products 
 
The current version of DaVinci (V3.1) has the capability to build parametric designs 
for fighter, transport, and surveillance aircraft that include the Outer Mold Line (OML) and 
structural envelope. It supports geometric analysis including areas, volumes, centroids and 
moments, and high fidelity aerodynamic analysis using the high-fidelity tool Kestrel. It can 
design and build a geometric model of a platform, and build a mesh that captures this 
geometry with Capstone for high fidelity analysis with Kestrel. Surrogate geometry models 
have been built for the support of the KC-46, the new Air Force Tanker based on the Boeing 
767, and the Joint Surveillance and Target Attack Radar System (JSTARS). 
Kestrel—High-Fidelity Tool for Fixed Wing Air Vehicle Performance Prediction 
Kestrel has the capability to provide accurate predictions of the performance of DoD 
air vehicles, with a specific focus on the fixed-wing community. It integrates computational 
fluid dynamics, structural dynamics, propulsion, and control for sub-sonic through 
supersonic aircraft operation. In detail, the capabilities available in Kestrel v5.0 include (1) 
Aerodynamics (Navier-Stokes solvers and a full suite of boundary conditions and turbulence 
models), (2) Structural Dynamics (Modal models or Finite Element Analysis for aero-
structure interactions), (3) Flight Control Systems (Control surface movement—deforming 
geometry or overset), and (4) Propulsion (Engine “cycle-decks” for propulsion effects, or 
direct engine simulation including inlet and rotating machinery, nozzle, and moving walls). 
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This set of capabilities is unique in the international aerospace community. It provides the 
capability to develop major innovations in the design of next generation aeronautical 
weapon systems. With Kestrel, engineers can verify designs prior to key decision points 
(and prior to fabrication of test articles or full-scale prototypes), plan and rehearse wind-
tunnel and full-scale flight tests, evaluate planned (or potential) operational use scenarios, 
perform flight certifications (e.g., airworthiness, flight envelope expansion, mishap 
investigation, etc.), and generate response surfaces usable in DaVinci, flight-simulators, and 
other environments that require real-time access to performance data. Kestrel has been 
applied to the analysis of over 30 fixed-wing DoD aviation systems including store 
separation, A-10, F-18E, F-15, B-52, E-2D, P-3, and many others. Dr. Theresa Shafer, an 
engineer at the Patuxent River Naval Air Station, was awarded the American Society of 
Naval Engineers (ASNE) 2014 Rosenblatt Young Naval Engineer Award for her career 
accomplishments, including her work using Kestrel to produce flight certification and 
airworthiness data for seven small unmanned aerial vehicles that enabled seven small 
aerospace companies to bid on NAVAIR development contracts. 
Helios—High-Fidelity Tool for Rotary Wing Air Vehicle Performance Prediction 
Helios is a high-fidelity, full-vehicle, multi-physics analysis tool for rotary-wing 
aircraft. Helios v5.0 can calculate the performance of a full sized rotorcraft, including the 
fuselage and rotors. It can handle arbitrary rotor configurations (e.g., conventional main 
rotor/tail-fan, co-axial main rotor/pusher propeller, tandem main rotors, tiltrotors, quad-
tiltrotors, etc.). It has the capability to analyze and predict prescribed maneuvers with tight 
coupling of rotor aero-structural dynamics. A highly accurate treatment of the vortex 
shedding from the rotor blade tips using adaptive mesh refinement gives Helios a unique 
capability to assess the interaction of these vortices with the fuselage and nearby rotor 
blades. Helios can provide all the benefits for rotary-winged aircraft that Kestrel can for 
fixed-wing aircraft.  
There have already been important examples of the use and value of Helios. The 
Army Rotorcraft Program (AMRDEC/AED) used Helios with Boeing to generate early design 
stage predictions of helicopter performance for a proposed rotor blade upgrade for the CH-
47F helicopter (Chinook) to achieve up to an estimated 2,000 pounds improved hover thrust 
for 400+ Chinooks with limited degradation of forward flight performance. The Army Joint-
Multi-Role Technology Demonstrator (JMR-TD) Program used Helios to provide decision 
data on the proposals from four vendors for the JMR-TD program. Helios enabled 
government engineers to provide the government the ability to conduct an independent 
analysis of the contractor proposals. The Army Rotorcraft Program (AMRDEC/AED) is using 
Helios to assess the H-60 tail rotor effectiveness for providing directional control of aircraft in 
combination with increased engine power and main rotor performance. 
CREATE Ships 
RSDE—Rapid Ship Design Environment (Rapid Concept Design for Ships) 
RSDE is a concept design tool that allows engineers and naval architects to assess 
the tradeoffs inherent in designing ships to meet a spectrum of competing key performance 
parameters. Employing the concept of design space exploration, engineers and naval 
architects can provide data for decision makers on the impact of tradeoffs in range, speed, 
armament, aviation support, etc. on the size and, in large measure, the cost of a proposed 
ship concept. RSDE can generate tens of thousands of candidate ship designs with varying 
hullforms, subdivision, and machinery arrangements. An initial assessment of the intact and 
damaged stability and resistance, and an initial structural design and analysis is done for 
each candidate ship design. RSDE has been used to enable set-based design (Singer, 
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Doerry, & Buckley, 2009) on Navy acquisition programs. This design method allows down-
selection of a ship design to occur later in the process when the tradeoffs are more fully 
understood. It has been applied to numerous ship design studies including the Amphibious 
Landing Craft LX(R) Analysis of Alternatives, and the Small Surface Combatant Trade 
Study. Dr. Adrian Mackenna, the team leader for the RSDE tool, was awarded the 2014 
American Society of Naval Engineers (ASNE) Gold Medal for his work developing and 
applying the RSDE tool. 
NESM—Navy Enhanced Sierra Mechanics (Ship Shock & Shock Damage 
Assessment) 
NESM builds on the Department of Energy’s Sandia National Laboratory shock 
analysis tool Sierra Mechanics to provide a means to assess ship and component response 
to external shock and blast using accurate high performance computational tools. NESM 
can reduce the time and expense required for physical shock testing of ship classes and 
also improves the initial ship design process by assessing planned component installations 
for shock performance prior to final arrangement and installations decisions. The tightly 
coupled multi-physics capabilities include (1) Structural Dynamics (Implicit linear-elastic 
solver: static, modal, transient, acoustics, and more), (2) Solid Mechanics (Explicit plasticity 
solver: failure, high-strain, multi-grid, and more), (3) Fluid Dynamics (Euler solver: shock 
propagation, load environments, and threat modeling), and (4) Fluid-Structure Interaction. 
The solution algorithms in NESM can exploit massively parallel computers, and can scale to 
thousands of cores, enabling efficient computer use and the ability to address full-sized 
naval vessels up and including next generation aircraft carriers and submarines. 
NESM will materially contribute to the design of next generation naval weapon 
systems and platforms, support planning and rehearsal of ship tests prior to Life Fire Testing 
(more “bang” per test dollar), and the evaluation of planned (or potential) operational use 
scenarios. NESM has been officially adopted by the Navy for these uses. “The NAVSEA 
Technical Warrant (for Shock/Ships) concurs that NESM is the appropriate and technically 
acceptable modeling and simulation (M&S) tool which meets the M&S requirements to 
support current and future surface ship shock applications.” NESM was previously approved 
for “Full Ship Shock Trials (FSST) Alternative R&D Programs (PEO Ships & PEO Carriers),” 
which led to the release of OPNAVINST 9072.2A, providing future ship classes with an 
alternative to Full Scale Shock Trials. NESM has been used to support Littoral Combat Ship 
(LCS) Live-Fire Test & Evaluation (LFT&E) and the USS Cole Validation Study, and to 
provide support for Live Fire Test and Evaluation for the Navy’s next generation Nuclear 
Aircraft Carrier (CVN-78 and 79). Dr. Thomas Moyer, the NESM team leader, was awarded 
the ASNE 2015 Soldberg Award for his pioneering research modeling shock effects in naval 
systems, including leading the NESM team.  
NavyFOAM—High Fidelity Predictions of Ship Hydrodynamic Performance 
NavyFOAM is based on the OpenFOAM (http://www.openfoam.org) libraries and 
code architecture. To that base, we have added a number of features and capabilities that 
enable simulation of the air-sea interface (e.g., surface waves) and other effects important 
for naval vessels. NavyFOAM is a fully parallelized, multi-physics computational fluid 
dynamics (CFD) framework developed using modern object-oriented programming (OOP). 
The code enables high-fidelity hydrodynamic analysis and prediction of ship performance 
such as resistance, propulsion, maneuvering, seakeeping and seaway loads. It has 
demonstrated accuracy against experimental data for a number of target applications such 
as resistance, propeller characteristics, hull/propulsor interaction, and six-degree-of-freedom 
ship motion of underwater vehicles and surface ships. Offering a suite of Navier-Stokes–
based flow solvers tailored to specific applications including single- and multi-phase solvers, 
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NavyFOAM allows assessment of alternative hull and propulsor designs. With NavyFOAM 
users can evaluate a ship’s performance in a wide array of operating conditions and sea-
states including both subsea and surface operations. Its modularity and software 
architecture expedites coupling with third-party software and collaborative multi-disciplinary 
software development (e.g., fluid-structure interaction, hydroacoustics). It has been applied 
to many naval systems including assessment of the safe operating envelope of the DDG-
1000, propeller designs, the USMC Amphibious Combat Vehicle, the Columbia Ballistic 
Missile Submarine Program (a $100 billion procurement to replace the aging Ohio-class 
ballistic missile submarines) and many other systems of interest to the U.S. Navy.  
IHDE—Integrated Hydrodynamic Design Environment (Facilitates Hydrodynamic 
Performance Evaluations for Early Stage Ship Design) 
IHDE is a desktop application that integrates a suite of Navy hullform design and 
analysis tools allowing a user to perform evaluations of performance, including visualization, 
in a simplified and timely manner from a single interface. Prior to the development of IHDE, 
naval architects and marine engineers often had to learn how to use a dozen or more 
individual design tools, each with a different user interface and input format. IHDE provides 
a single interface for access to all of the tools. In a few days to weeks, a single user with 
IHDE can finish projects that used to take several highly experienced users many months to 
complete. Current capabilities are geared toward surface ships, both monohulls and 
multihulls—including catamarans and trimarans. Typical uses include predicting (1) 
resistance in calm water, (2) seakeeping behavior in waves, (3) hydrodynamic loads due to 
wave slamming, and (4) operability (percentage of time a ship can carry out its particular 
mission in various parts of the world based on historic sea state data).  
The U.S. Navy’s Center for Innovation in Ship Design (CISD) has used IHDE to 
assess the performance of many ship designs, including (1) T-AGOS-19 Ocean Surveillance 
ship; (2) Hospital ship (Mercy) replacement design; (3) Salvage Tow & Rescue (T-STAR); 
(4) Green Arctic Patrol Vessel (GPAV); (5) Medium Affordable Surface Combatant (MASC); 
and (6) an optimized MASC. IHDE is also an important adjunct capability for medium fidelity 
analysis of ship designs developed with RSDE. It was used with RSDE as part of the 
Amphibious Landing Craft LX(R) Analysis of Alternatives and the Small Surface Combatant 
Trade study. Its use with high performance computers will allow engineers to rapidly assess 
the major performance parameters of thousands to hundreds of thousands of candidate 
design options.  
SENTRi—Electromagnetic Tools for DoD Systems 
SENTRi is a robust and high-fidelity Full Wave electromagnetic prediction code for 
Radio Frequency (RF) modeling of antennas, microwave circuits, and radar cross-section 
prediction. SENTRi is designed for the modeling of complex structures—including highly 
heterogeneous material structures with multi-scaled features. A key goal is the calculation of 
the simultaneous performance of multiple-antenna systems embedded on a platform. The 
key features for electromagnetics are based on solutions of Maxwell’s equations with 
advanced hybrid finite-element boundary-integral techniques. This provides high accuracy 
with the ability to solve large, complex problems. SENTRi is continuously validated with DoD 
measurements. SENTRi is being used for antenna design, antenna in-situ analysis, RF 
signature prediction, Electromagnetic Interference (EMI), Electromagnetic Compatibility 
(EMC), material modeling, microwave device analysis (i.e., waveguides, filters, circulators, 
power dividers), phased array antenna systems, and apertures (i.e., radomes, windows, 
frequency selective surfaces). SENTRi is being used by approximately 60 DoD 
organizations (government and industry).  
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CREATE Ground Vehicles (GV) 
Mercury—Modeling and Simulation of Terrain Mechanics and Ground Vehicle 
Systems 
Mercury incorporates suspension, tire and track, soil modeling, and powertrain 
simulation, and also integrates physics domains for powertrains, vehicle dynamics (wheels 
and tracks), and tire-soil and track-soil interaction. It simulates multiple performance tests 
used in vehicle acquisition: driver comfort (Ride/Shock), soft soil mobility (VCI1, sand-slope), 
maximum speed, vehicle stability (lane changes, circular turns). Mercury allows thousands 
of design concepts where the user can vary spring and damper properties, vehicle mass 
and inertia, tire properties, and axle spacing and location to be tested in a single simulation 
and provides performance metrics.  
MAT—Mobility Analysis Tool 
MAT is a computational tool for analyzing HPC physics data and producing mobility 
performance metrics required for trade exploration and systems engineering. It incorporates 
soil condition, vehicle performance and configuration, vegetation density, average surface 
roughness, average slope, and so forth. MAT converts physics-based vehicle performance 
data and terrain information into mission-based analysis of performance over large areas of 
terrain to predict percent GO/NOGO across selected terrains of interest and mission rating 
speeds. MAT interfaces with Mercury to use simulated performance data to provide 
performance metrics for concept designs.  
Capstone—Rapid Geometry and Mesh generation 
Capstone is a CAD-neutral application that provides two distinct capabilities. The 
first is the capability to develop numerical representations of a DoD weapon system (i.e., a 
Nonuniform Rational B-Splines [NURBS]–based digital product model consisting of the 
platform geometry with the associated attributes). The second is the capability to generate a 
mesh from the geometry. Valid and easily produced meshes with the required accuracy are 
the essential starting point for the other CREATE (solver) tools for detailed analysis. In 
addition, a number of non-CREATE groups use Capstone for its geometry and mesh 
generation capability for their applications. 
A digital product model has many advantages for acquisition. It enables automated 
design optimization. It facilitates the transfer of design information between the government 
and contractors, eliminating much of the reliance on paper documents, and improving the 
accuracy and speed of information flow. It provides a permanent, analysable description of 
the platform through all stages of the acquisition process. Copies of the product model can 
be generated and assigned to individual airplanes and other systems allowing the DoD to 
track the history, performance and maintenance of entire life cycle of each individual 
platform. Together with DaVinci, which builds on top of the Capstone platform, it enables the 
recent Air Force initiatives of the Digital Thread and the Digital Twin (Kraft, 2015). 
CREATE Program Organization and Management 
To develop and deploy the CREATE software applications, we worked with the DoD 
organizations responsible for overseeing the design and analysis of air vehicles, naval 
vessels, RF antennas, and ground vehicles (Figure 2) to empower them to develop and 
deploy the tools. The CREATE Program first formed five projects with a total of 11 multi-
disciplinary teams of DoD subject matter experts. Then we jointly identified a team leader 
within a DoD customer organization for each software product who possessed the right mix 
of subject matter and high performance computing expertise, and the required leadership, 
program, and project management skills. Then we helped the leader build a multidisciplinary 
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software development team with approximately 10–15 members. Each core development 
group is located within a customer organization (e.g., the Navy’s ship design groups are 
located at the Naval Surface Warfare Center, Carderock Division, Bethesda, MD, so the 
CREATE Ships team members are also Carderock employees and contractors and located 
there). Additional developers are drawn from other organizations as needed to provide 
required expertise not available in the customer organization. For instance, the structural 
dynamics modules for NESM and Kestrel are being supplied by the Sierra Mechanics group 
at the U.S. Department of Energy’s (DOE’s) Sandia National Laboratory as part of a highly 
productive DOE/DoD inter-agency collaboration. Generally about one third of each team 
resides at the core organization, and the remaining two-thirds are located at other 
organizations. The CREATE staffing mix is about 90 DoD employees and about 90 DoD 
support contractors. The team members are distributed across ~30 collaborating 
organizations.  
Embedding the code teams and the team leaders in the relevant DoD customer 
organization greatly improves our ability to recruit the most capable talent in the DoD for 
each technical area. It also helps ensure adoption and ownership of the CREATE tools by 
the relevant Service since their experts are responsible for developing the tools and are 
“trusted agents” of that Service. In many cases the design engineers for the relevant 
weapon systems are collocated with CREATE tool developers. This helps the developers 
get rapid feedback on the usability and accuracy of the code, and a sense of satisfaction 
from directly seeing the impact that the code is having on the DoD.  
The CREATE Program leaders sponsor each team by providing funding and active 
management and oversight of the code development process. We developed a set of 
software project management and software engineering practices for the CREATE Program 
and promulgated them to the teams as guidance. We sought a balance between a very agile 
code development process to allow the code development teams the flexibility to accomplish 
technically difficult tasks while ensuring adequate accountability together with an organized 
code development process. The HPCMP and CREATE Program Office actively manages 
the 11 teams cooperatively with the hosting Service organizations. While clear lines of 
authority and obligation have been formally established between the HPCMP CREATE 
program and each executing and hosting organization, both groups have developed a high 
degree of trust and work together to resolve conflicts. There is a strong degree of alignment 
on the technical aspects of the CREATE Program between the CREATE Program 
leadership and the Service organizations.  
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 CREATE Program Organization Chart Figure 2.
Each project has a board of directors consisting of senior members of the relevant 
customer organization (Navy, Air Force, and Army acquisition engineering communities). 
Each board meets at least once a year. The boards review the progress during the prior 
year, advise the project about new requirements, and serve as liaisons between the 
CREATE projects and their DoD customer community. The board members are members of 
the Senior Executive Service, or other senior staff of the Navy, Air Force, or Army. The 
boards provide an additional mechanism for ensuring that the CREATE tools are aligned 
with the needs of the Services. 
The annual CREATE budget is about $30 million/year. The total investment in 
CREATE by the DoD HPCMP from 2008 through 2015 is ~$200 million. The Services 
provide “in-kind” contributions of another ~$11 million/year, a testament to the value of 
CREATE to them. The Service contributions include office space and supplies, 
administrative support, network and other host services, additional professional staff for the 
code development teams, and access to validation experiments and data.  
Building the Right Software Right 
At the beginning of the CREATE Program, we developed a vision for how the DoD 
could implement virtual prototypes with physics-based high performance computing 
engineering software within its own processes to “modernize” its acquisition process. We 
then fleshed out that vision through joint assessments with each service of their detailed 
acquisition processes to identify the specific tools needed to reduce the time, cost, and risk 
and improve the system performance for the Service’s acquisition programs. For instance, 
the CREATE Air Vehicles Program assessed 27 different acquisition workflows to develop 
its requirements. This vision is captured in an “Initial Capability Document” (ICD) for each 
project. The ICDs were reviewed and approved by the Board of Directors for each project 
and are reviewed periodically.  
Although CREATE was proposed to be a 12-year program, the CREATE tools are 
designed for a 30 to 40-year life since that is the expected life span of successful 
engineering codes. Since the DoD spends roughly $200 billion/year acquiring, maintaining, 
sustaining, and modifying major weapon systems, the expectation has been that if the 
CREATE tools were successful in enabling the DoD to significantly improve acquisition 
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outcomes for an expenditure of ~$30 million/year (0.00015 of $200 billion/year), the tools 
would be supported and continue to be modernized until they were no longer needed.  
 
 CREATE Annual Releases With Version Numbers Figure 3.
Note. The FY2017 3rd quarter and subsequent releases are planned. Some CREATE 
products had releases prior to 2011. 
Each CREATE code development team follows a highly disciplined software 
development process. There is a strong emphasis on software quality. To facilitate 
development by non-collocated teams, the CREATE Program, through the DoD HPCMP, 
provides a supportive code development environment with virtual clusters, central servers 
with code and document repositories, issue trackers, user and developer forums, 
configuration management services, and access to high performance computers for testing 
and performance enhancement, and high quality video conferencing. Guided by the ICD, a 
12-year product roadmap and feedback from the BODs and customers, each product team 
issues a new release each year with the upgraded capability and new features needed by 
the customer communities. This places the upgraded tool into the hands of the user 
community and gives the code development team rapid feedback on the quality and 
usefulness of the upgraded code. The annual release cadence (Figure 3) adds discipline 
and accountability to the development process and is a key factor in the success of the 
CREATE development process.  
The CREATE teams generally use an “agile” development process tailored for their 
environment and code. The releases are designed and tested for all the standard Linux and 
Unix HPC operating systems, as well as MacOS and Windows where appropriate. Each 
release is extensively tested both during the development process, and as an integral part of 
the release process. Each software release is documented with a (1)Product Technical 
Description that describes the physics and engineering capabilities (including the equations) 
in the code, the computer science approaches, software architecture, and solution 
algorithms; (2) Developers Manual that describes the source code in detail, provides an 
index/table of contents, and other information essential for understanding the source code; 
(3) Users’ Manual to help the users set up their problems, run the code, and analyze the 
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results; and (4) Test Plan with an archive of test problems with the input and test results. In 
addition, there are tutorials and a user forum on the CREATE server, all backed up by a 
user support group.  
Information Assurance for the CREATE Products 
Information assurance for computational engineering applications can be understood 
from its role in the high performance computing (HPC) ecosystem. The CREATE tools are 
part of an ecosystem consisting of (1) Subject Matter Experts (SMEs) who use the tools on 
high performance computers over high speed networks to generate virtual prototypes and 
analyze their performance; (2) software applications like the CREATE tools that can be used 
to generate virtual prototypes and predict their performance; (3) Experimental testing 
organizations to generate validation data to establish the validity of the models that are the 
basis of the software applications; (4) high speed computer networks that provide the SMEs 
access to supercomputers; (5) supercomputers; and (6) sponsors who need the results of 
the calculations and provide the funds to generate the results.  
CREATE is designed to provide the DoD with a military competitive advantage. Thus 
the CREATE Program and the DoD must control the distribution and use of the codes to 
sustain that advantage. The CREATE codes are unclassified but are subject to the 
International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR). To be effective, DoD users must be able to 
run the CREATE codes securely and access their proprietary data on a high performance 
computer. The codes and data are encrypted at rest and accessed and transferred over a 
secure encrypted network with two-factor authentication. To ensure integrity of the codes 
and the users’ data, the codes and the user’s data are archived on the secure HPCMP 
supercomputers and backed up frequently to several remote secure data repositories.  
However, many, if not most, DoD users (engineers) have access only to a Windows 
Personal Computer (PC) with Microsoft Office and a browser. Usually no other software is 
allowed on these PCs so those engineers cannot easily access the HPCMP 
supercomputers and the CREATE tools. To remove this barrier to access, the DoD HPCMP 
and the CREATE program have developed a “portal” that allows DoD users to access the 
DoD HPCMP supercomputers through their browser. The “portal” features two-factor 
authentication and encrypted data transfer. It allows users to securely set up their job; run it; 
and store, analyze, and visualize the results through their browser.  
To prevent unauthorized access to the CREATE codes and to the intellectual 
property of the users, we limit access to codes to DoD employees or DoD contractors who 
have a valid reason for access to the CREATE software. They must sign a software 
distribution agreement that describes the limitations of their use (not to redistribute the code, 
reverse engineer it, etc.) and their intended use. They also agree to abide by the ITAR 
procedures which have civil and criminal penalties if violated. The CREATE source code is 
only accessible to the development team. The ideal is a “Software as a Service” model 
where the user can only execute the code, but not get a copy, even an executable. 
However, that’s not practical for some users, and those users are handled on a case-by-
case basis.  
Intellectual Property Rights 
The DoD HPCMP must have “government purpose rights” to be able to distribute the 
CREATE software to users. Even a single line of code for which the DoD doesn’t have these 
rights would leave the DoD vulnerable to lawsuits and large financial settlements for 
copyright or patent infringement and theft of intellectual property. Legal reviews of the ~40 
CREATE support contracts have determined that the DoD does have “government purpose 
rights.” Remedial action was necessary for some of the contracts.  
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It is DoD policy to share DoD RDT&E results with the U.S. defense industry if it is in 
the interests of the DoD because a strong U.S. defense industry is essential for national 
security (Weiss, 2014). Several defense industries have expressed a strong interest in 
adopting the CREATE tools for use in their commercial as well as military design work. This 
requires that the DoD have “unrestricted rights” for the relevant CREATE software. As the 
result of further extensive legal reviews of the CREATE AV contracts over the last three 
years, together with additional remedial action, the DoD now has “unrestricted rights” to the 
CREATE AV tools. We anticipate that several large defense companies will be using 
CREATE AV tools for both military and commercial systems, and a few key defense 
industries have already expressed interest in this type of use. 
Transition and Adoption 
Transition of research results to applications and products has been a historic 
challenge for much of the science and technology research done by the DoD research 
community. The approach adopted by the CREATE Program of embedding the CREATE 
development teams in the DoD customer organizations responsible for the design and 
development of the relevant weapon system has been very successful in overcoming that 
challenge. The CREATE teams are trusted agents of their DoD organization. For example, 
to assess various options for a follow-on to the Littoral Combat Ship, or to develop a concept 
for the Ohio replacement submarine, the Navy turned to the trusted organizations 
responsible for those tasks, the Naval Architecture and Engineering Department at the 
Naval Surface Warfare Center at Carderock. These were the same groups developing the 
ship design tool, RSDE and the hydrodynamics tool NavyFOAM. The transition was almost 
automatic.  
In general, computational design tools are very effective methods for capturing the 
corporate knowledge and new research results in a field, and giving design engineers 
access to that knowledge in a tool that the engineer can use to design a new system. This 
greatly facilitates the development of innovative designs. It also gives a design engineer the 
opportunity to compare the impact of new research results in the context of present practice, 
and allows the engineer to answer many “What if?” questions and define the benefit of the 
research for the system of interest. It facilitates a successful transition from research to 
practice, a transition across the “Valley of Death.” This has been recognized by a number of 
groups in the DoD science and technology research community. Some of those groups are 
beginning to work with the CREATE team to incorporate their research results into the 
CREATE codes as a means to transition their research results to acquisition programs. For 
instance, the CREATE Kestrel group is working with the DoD hypersonics R&D community 
to develop a version of Kestrel that incorporates the most recent research results on the 
behaviour of hypersonic air platforms. Aerospace engineers are familiar with Kestrel as a 
validated, user-friendly multi-physics aerospace engineering tool for sub-sonic, transition, 
and super-sonic flight conditions. In a few years, they will have access to the same mature 
engineering tool that has been upgraded to handle supersonic flight.  
Accelerating the Development of Innovative Weapon Systems With Virtual 
Prototyping and HPC 
The CREATE tools enhance the ability of DoD engineers to develop innovative 
weapon systems. With the CREATE tools, these engineers can develop thousands, even 
hundreds of thousands of design options for potential weapon systems, capture their 
properties in digital prototypes, assess the feasibility and capability of each prototype with 
physics-based tools, perform trade-space studies of the prototypes, and develop optimized 
designs. Then high-fidelity tools such as Kestrel and NavyFOAM can be used to assess the 
performance of the final selected design option, a “virtual test.” This process can be done in 
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weeks to months for hundreds of thousands of design options, much faster than is the case 
with physical prototypes that are currently proving to take tens of years to design, develop, 
and test prototypes for only a few candidate design options. This allows the rapid 
identification of design defects and performance shortfalls, well before metal is cut. In 
addition, changes in requirements can be inserted into the design process at almost any 
point until very late in the design process.  
History convincingly illustrates that continual innovation in military technology is 
necessary for achieving and sustaining the competitive military technological advantage 
needed for national survival (Colinvaux, 1980; Kennedy, 1987). By most accounts, the 
worldwide rate of technological change will remain high, or even increase (Desilver, 2014). 
In this context, the United States would benefit from a faster and more agile major weapon 
development process. DoD leadership has recognized this and launched an effort to tap the 
innovation skills of Silicon Valley (the Defense Innovation Unit Experimental; see 
https://www.diux.mil) for DoD acquisition. Virtual prototypes and high performance 
computing offer the DoD an additional opportunity to apply a number of the features of the 
innovation culture of Silicon Valley (Table 2) identified in several short papers published by 
the Harvard Business Review (Anthony, 2013; Fox, 2014; Martins, Dias, & Khanna, 2016) to 
accelerate innovation in the acquisition of major DoD weapon systems. 
Innovation requires the right people working in the right environment and with the 
right tools. In Silicon Valley the product development teams at successful companies are 
small, able to take risks, rapidly develop and try many new product features, and go through 
many trials and failures until success is achieved. The development and design teams own 
the development process. They have the autonomy to be resourceful and make decisions. 
They are able to learn from failures and adapt as the product design evolves. They have a 
day-to-day determination to see something through despite near-constant failure. The 
corporate environment is generally flat. Corporate management is accessible to the teams 
for advice, support, and requests for resources. All the expertise in the company is 
accessible to the teams. There is continuity in the corporate leadership, leading to continuity 
in the corporate memory.  
Table 2. Some Key Features of Silicon Valley Innovation Culture 
 
The best teams are typically small and almost fanatically focused on producing 
features that attract users and customers. The team members work collaboratively with each 
other with a minimum of structure and formality. They move around the company and the 
industry, learning new skills and encountering new ideas. Organizations and companies are 
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fairly flat, not rigidly hierarchal. Management typically sets goals and enforces 
accountability, but the teams have the agility and flexibility to develop the product. Rigid 
planning is not conducive to inventing something new. This is not what one finds in large 
aerospace industries or the DoD, even if the operational part of the DoD does share many of 
these features (Reinertsen, 2009).  
Another feature common in Silicon Valley is that successful innovation is often more 
an evolutionary improvement than a discontinuous and revolutionary advance over present 
capabilities. New products in Silicon Valley are often incremental improvements of 
yesterday’s products. Today’s iPhone7 is the 20th generational descendant of the Apple 
Newton introduced in 1993 (Table 3). In contrast, many large defense acquisition projects 
are structured to produce products that embody very large advances over the capabilities of 
existing systems with few or no intermediate steps. While the F-22 was a major step forward 
in terms of stealth, it took 19 years from the start of the project to the delivery of the first 
operational F-22. During the 26 years of the F-22 program, the Soviets/Russians fielded six 
generations of surface-to-air missiles. In contrast, innovation in Silicon Valley is usually the 
result of many failures that lead to a series of small successes and small evolutionary 
advances (e.g., iPhone 5 to iPhone 6), ending up in revolutionary advances in capability 
(i.e., Newton to the iPhone 7 over the course of 23 years). 
Table 3. History of the iPhone  
(“History of the iPhone,” n.d.)  
 
This incremental approach may not appear to be immediately applicable to the latter 
stages of the development of large-scale weapon systems, particularly aircraft carriers, 
submarines, large surface ships, or many other complex weapon systems. It now takes at 
least 10 to 15 years to design and build a nuclear aircraft carrier for ~$13 billion or more. 
The cost and national importance of this type of system provides considerable incentives to 
minimize risk, so innovations must be and are introduced cautiously. The infrastructure to 
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build large systems also takes time to construct, either by modification of existing facilities or 
construction of new ones. However, as noted above, many aerospace and automotive start-
ups that can trace their roots to Silicon Valley start-ups (e.g., Space-X), are building large-
scale, complex systems, and are certainly among the most innovative members of their 
industry. Many strongly emphasize the use of computational prototypes with high 
performance computing. The advantages of computational prototyping are still very 
applicable to the early stages of design concept development and detailed engineering 
design. Also, even though most IT products are small in physical size compared to ships 
and airplanes, the infrastructure required to build them, such as chip fabrication facilities, 
can cost many billions of dollars. Finally, the integrated circuit vendors (e.g., INTEL) rely 
strongly on computational prototyping. They construct a computational prototype for every 
new chip. It is the only way they can design the layout and test it to put billions of 
components on a single chip successfully (Colwell, 2005). 
Summary and Future 
The CREATE Program is successfully developing and deploying a suite of physics-
based computational engineering software tools with the design and analysis capabilities 
needed by the DoD Air Vehicle, Ship, RF, and Ground Vehicle acquisition engineering 
communities to reduce the cost, schedule, and risk of acquisition programs. The CREATE 
tools enable DoD engineers to generate and analyze virtual prototypes of DoD Air Vehicles, 
Ships, RF antennas and, in the future, Ground Vehicles, and to accurately predict the 
performance of the weapon systems. This approach to product development accelerates the 
development of innovative systems because it enables design engineers to rapidly develop, 
analyze, assess, optimize, and test many design options, without having to construct and 
test physical prototypes until late in the product development process. Design defects and 
performance shortfalls can be detected and fixed well before metal has been cut.  
At the latest count, over 160 DoD acquisition engineering organizations (government, 
industry, and academia) are using the tools to design and assess over 70 DoD weapon 
systems. Acquisition community interest and customer use is growing exponentially (AF, 
Navy & Army engineers, Boeing, LMC, NG, Raytheon, Sikorsky, Bell, Pratt & Whitney, 
AFLCMC, AMRDEC, NAVAIR, NAVSEA, C-130/C-17 Cargo Release, F/A-18E, ARL, 
SPAWAR, Ball Aerospace, etc.). The CREATE tools are already enabling the design and 
analysis of many important DoD systems (e.g., CH-47 rotor-blade retrofit, Ohio replacement 
submarine, CVN-78 shock test, NAVAIR UAV flight certification, Air Force next-generation 
aircraft). The CREATE Program has made significant progress to successfully overcome 
major challenges to provide user support, resolve intellectual property issues, achieve 
successful deployment of software, and implement sound software engineering and 
software project management practices that lead to a high level of software quality, software 
that is usable, maintainable, verified and validated, extensible, scalable, and documented.  
After 10 years of development and deployment, the CREATE Program is beginning 
to achieve the goal of revolutionizing the way the DoD procures major weapon platforms 
through the use of virtual prototypes. These tools will enable the DoD acquisition 
engineering community to develop innovative weapon systems by allowing DoD engineers 
to generate and evaluate thousands of design options, rather than the handful that was 
previously possible. 
The CREATE tools are government-developed, government-owned, and 
government-supported so that the DoD can independently evaluate contractor deliverables. 
The tools are designed to be sufficiently robust and useable that experienced engineers with 
good judgment can utilize the tools with confidence. The tools are designed and built for a 
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~30-year plus life cycle. The tools are on the verge of being adopted by the defense industry 
for commercial use, so that they will contribute to a strong U.S. economy, as well as to a 
strong U.S. defense. The tools are also beginning to be used to improve the effectiveness 
and efficiency of DoD T&E enterprises. 
By 2019, each CREATE tool will deliver the capability promised in its 12-year vision. 
That capability, however, offers a foundation to fill many other DoD capability gaps and is an 
important part of the HPCMP mission for continuous modernization of hardware (DSRCs), 
networks (DREN), and defense-specific software applications. The CREATE tools are 
foundational elements of the OSD Engineered Resilient Systems S&T Initiative (Goerger, 
Madni, & Eslinger, 2014) and the Air Force Digital Thread and Digital Twin Programs (Kraft, 
2015).  
The CREATE team is proposing enhancements and upgrades to the existing 
CREATE that would greatly increase their range of applicability and impact. These include 
upgrades to Kestrel to address hypersonic design tasks, an addition of the ability of RSDE 
and DaVinci to estimate life cycle cost, the ability to produce a full conceptual ship design 
including integrated compartment arrangements and hullform optimization, operational 
assessments, and other aspects of multi-hull surface ships and submarines. With additional 
funding it would be possible to start new CREATE projects to address DoD capability gaps 
such as prediction and design of space satellite performance, rocket propulsions systems, 
structural performance design, combat power and electrical systems layout, and electronic 
warfare systems. The CREATE development process has proved very successful, and 
points the way for the DoD to develop tools to generate virtual prototypes of many different 
DoD systems and to predict their performance with physics-based computational tools.  
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Introduction 
This research project pertains to the identification, review, and potential development 
of existing and alternative ship cost modeling methodologies. Most ship cost modeling has 
been traditionally weight-based. This approach drives the U.S. Navy decision makers to 
acquire smaller ships that require custom-designed shipboard components.  
Current, and future, Department of Defense (DoD) acquisition budgeting processes 
require identifying, modeling, and estimating the costs of shipbuilding. The purpose of this 
research project is to determine if there is a more accurate way to empirically predict and 
model ship acquisition costs. The cost modeling tool developed in this study is intended to 
support development of ship cost forecasts. The proof of concept example for using this cost 
modeling tool included herein will provide a roadmap for other new ship acquisition cost 
modeling. The outcome of this research will likely increase cost savings.  
The focus of this research is a comprehensive review of the most promising cost 
modeling methodologies. Notional cost data, or rough order of magnitude values, will be 
collected or generated to support this review of the cost methodologies. These data will be 
generated by the researchers using archival cost data from ship maintenance projects of 
various destroyer (i.e., DDG) acquisitions. We will identify these extrapolations, and we will 
use the resulting notional data to help evaluate the efficacy of the various cost models. This 
approach allows readers and study sponsors to see the various types of cost models, 
approaches, and sample data variables that are required to run the cost models and to 
examine sample results, as well as review the pros and cons of each approach. This study 
may require a follow-on project if there is a method that is of interest or that the sponsors 
feel might be applicable for a given ship acquisition context. The required data variables as 
well as sample results will be listed in the report, so the sponsors will know what to expect 
prior to engaging in any new research project. A follow-on study would allow us to obtain 
real-life cost data that could be plugged into the desired cost model.  
The selected cost model will likely include the standard parametric models, 
nonparametric methods, systems dynamics based on project management task-based 
schedule and cost models; semiparametric Monte Carlo simulation models; curve fitting, 
time-series, and cross sectional models; nonlinear models, and so forth that have proven 
useful in forecasting costs in other acquisition contexts. 
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The Theory of Predictive Modeling in Cost 
Different Types of Forecasting Techniques 
The review of standard forecasting logic, in what follows, is useful in understanding 
the foundations of the various cost modeling techniques assessed in this study. Generally, 
forecasting can be divided into quantitative and qualitative approaches. Qualitative 
forecasting is used when little to no reliable historical, contemporaneous, or comparable 
data exist. Several qualitative methods exist such as the Delphi or expert opinion approach 
(a consensus-building forecast by field experts, marketing experts, or internal staff 
members), management assumptions (target growth rates set by senior management), as 
well as market research or external data or polling and surveys (data obtained through third-
party sources, industry and sector indexes, or active market research). These estimates can 
be either single-point estimates (an average consensus) or a set of prediction values (a 
distribution of predictions). The latter can be entered into the Risk Simulator software tool, 
used in this study, as a custom distribution and the resulting predictions can be simulated; 
that is, running a nonparametric simulation using the prediction data points as the custom 
distribution. This approach can leverage experts’ knowledge by combining it with available 
quantitative data to arrive at more reliable ship building cost estimates. 
Expert knowledge can be leveraged using the software by including qualitative 
estimates with quantitative analysis techniques. We provide several ship cost modeling case 
examples that are designed to demonstrate how the various cost modeling tools can be 
used in estimating ship building costs. That will also be helpful in learning how to apply the 
Risk Simulator software to develop more robust ship building cost estimates. The appendix 
provides a quick review of the quantitative methodologies that are available in the software. 
Case Application: DDG 51 FLT III 
This section provides a detailed illustration of the proposed integrated cost 
estimation modeling approach. As this is only an illustration, and due to a lack of proprietary 
data for this first phase of the analysis, the input assumptions are only high-level 
approximations based on publicly available information and publicly available subject matter 
expert estimates. Therefore, the results generated are not designed to be used in any 
specific decision making. Nonetheless, the approach presented has proven to be robust and 
valid, and with the correct input assumptions, can be rerun to generate accurate and reliable 
ship cost estimates. Information and data were obtained via publicly available sources and 
were collected, collated, and used in an integrated risk-based cost and schedule modeling 
methodology. The objective of this case study was to develop a comprehensive cost 
modeling strategy and approach, and as such, notional data were used. Specifically, we 
used the Arleigh Burke Class Guided Missile Destroyer DDG 51 Flight I, Flight II, Flight IIA, 
and Flight III (Figure 1) as a basis for the cost and schedule assumptions, but the modeling 
approach is extensible to all other ship building cost contexts within the U.S. Navy. 
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 Overview of DDG 51 Flight III Figure 1.
DoD Spending on the Aegis Destroyer in FY 2012–2014 
Figure 2 shows some sample acquisition budgets for DDG 51 Aegis destroyers from 
FY 2012 through FY 2016. The comprehensive DoD budget was downloaded and analyzed 
in the current research.  
 
 DoD Spending and Procurement for FY 2012–2014 Figure 2.
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High-Level Shipbuilding Process 
Figure 3 shows the high-level process flow of building ship hulls and sections. 
 
 High-Level Process Flow (Hull and Sections) Figure 3.
Information, Communication, and Technology Subprocess 
Figure 4 shows the ship’s subprocess for information, communication, and 
technology (ICT). 
 
 Subprocess for Information, Communication, and Technology (ICT) Figure 4.
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Weapons System Subprocess 
Figure 5 shows the ship’s subprocess for weapons systems.  
 
 Subprocess for Weapons Systems Figure 5.
SPY-6 Radar System 
Figure 6 shows the ship’s radar subsystem’s process. 
 
 SPY-6 Radar System and Rework Figure 6.
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DoD Extras: Electronic Warfare, Decoys, Extra Capabilities 
Figure 7 shows the ship’s Electronic Warfare, Decoys, and Extra Capabilities 
subprocesses. 
 
 Subprocesses and Examples of DoD Extras Figure 7.
Risk-Based Schedule and Cost Process Modeling 
Figures 8 illustrates how the project management tasks are incorporated into the 
Project Economics Analysis Toolkit (PEAT) software application. It includes all the high-level 
tasks required to build the ship along with their attendant costs with one million simulation 
trials that provide the possible distributions of the costing data. The parallel development of 
tasks 20–25 is where the ship’s various subsystems are incorporated into the cost and 
schedule model.  
 
 Input Assumptions Figure 8.
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Similarly, using the cost and schedule modeling approach, we can zoom into various 
tasks and model each task in more detail. This permits us to use the results by reinserting 
the more detailed data values back into the more comprehensive model as required to 
improve accuracy. For instance, Figure 9 shows the ship’s weapons subsystem, with Figure 
10 showing its cost and schedule assumptions. This model’s result can be inserted back into 
Task 23 in the comprehensive model (Figure 5). 
 
 Weapons Subsystem Process Development Figure 9.
 
 Weapons Subsystem Cost and Schedule Assumptions Figure 10.
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Critical Success Factors in Cost and Schedule Estimates 
Tornado analysis is a powerful analytical tool that captures the model’s sensitivity to 
fluctuations in the critical success factors values for cost and schedule. This is done by 
identifying the static impacts of each variable on the outcome of the model; that is, the tool 
automatically perturbs each variable in the model a preset amount, captures the fluctuation 
on the model’s forecast or final result, and lists the resulting perturbations ranked from the 
most significant to the least. Figures 11 and 12 illustrate the application of a tornado 
analysis. Tornado analysis answers the question: “What are the critical success drivers that 
affect the model’s output the most?” 
 
 Tornado Analysis of Critical Success Factors (Cost Factors) Figure 11.
 
 Tornado Analysis of Critical Success Factors (Schedule Factors) Figure 12.
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Risk-Based Schedule and Cost Process Simulation 
Next, the Monte Carlo Risk Simulation capability of the tool was used to create 
artificial futures by generating hundreds of thousands of sample paths of outcomes and 
analyzing their prevalent characteristics. In the Monte Carlo simulation process, triangular 
distributions (i.e., best-case, most-likely case, and worst-case scenarios) were used on the 
previously identified critical inputs. Figure 13 shows the values for a sample distributional 
spread used in Monte Carlo Risk Simulations per the Air Force Cost Analysis Handbook 
(AFCAH). These probability spreads were applied to each of the task’s cost and schedule 
inputs, and each of the tasks was simulated tens of thousands to hundreds of thousands of 
trials. 
Figure 14 shows a sample representation of the results from the simulation process. 
For instance, the figure shows a 90% confidence interval for the total acquisition cost of a 
full-complement ship (fully built ship delivered after tests and sea trials, complete with ICTS, 
weapons systems, electrical systems, SPY-6 radar, and other add-ons). The 90% 
confidence interval pegs the total acquisition costs to be between $2.0 billion and $3.2 billion 
for a single ship. Clearly, these results are only for illustration purposes and are not 
meant to be definitive. Figure 15 shows the probability that there will be a budget overrun. 
For instance, if the acquisition budget is $2.2 billion, then we see that there is an 
approximately 12% probability of the cost coming in at or under budget, which means that 
there is an 88% probability of a budget overrun, with a mean or average actual acquisition 
cost of $2.6 billion.  
Similarly, Figure 16 shows the total schedule from the initial contracting phase to 
delivery of the ship, complete with all subsystems installed and tested. The 90% confidence 
interval pegs the total schedule at between 110 and 146 weeks, averaging at 127 weeks. 
Alternatively, the modeling approach allows us to look at the ship’s subsystems. For 
example, Figure 17 shows the 90% confidence interval for weapons systems costs ($1.1 to 
$1.8 billion), while Figure 18 shows modeling the cost of building the ship without any 
subsystems. Each individual system or combinations of systems can be similarly modeled 
and analyzed (Figure 19), or overlaid on one another, as shown in Figures 20, 21, and 22. 
The probability distributions in these three figures allow you to compare how one system’s 
cost and uncertainties compare to one another. Finally, Figure 23 shows how the individual 
task’s schedule and cost elements impact and are correlated to each other, by way of 
dynamic sensitivity analysis. 
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 Sample Distributional Spread per the U.S. Air Force Cost Analysis Figure 13.
Handbook 
 
 Simulation Results on Shipbuilding Cost (90% Confidence Interval) Figure 14.
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 Probability of Cost Exceeding Budget Figure 15.
 
 Schedule Risk (90% Confidence Interval) Figure 16.
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 Cost of Weapons Systems (90% Confidence Interval) Figure 17.
 
 Simulated Cost of No Weapons and No Aircraft Figure 18.
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 Simulated Cost of Stripped-Down Ship Build Figure 19.
 
 Comparative Analysis of Ship Configurations Figure 20.
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 Overlay of Simulated Probability Distributions (Subsystems) Figure 21.
 
 Overlay of Simulated Probability Distributions (All Subsystems) Figure 22.
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 Dynamic Sensitivities of Stripped-Down Ship Build Figure 23.
Parametric Cost Models With Historical Data 
A complementary approach to generate additional input cost assumptions includes 
the use of parametric modeling. To run parametric models, historical data is first required. 
Figure 24 shows an example dataset obtained via various defense agencies’ publicly 
available information. The dataset shows various ship types, the unit costs (in millions), 
displacement in tons, speed, length, crew size, and year the ships were delivered. 
Parametric models were developed and tested using simple multiple regression 
analysis, nonlinear regression, and econometric models. For instance, the following shows a 
simple linear parametric regression model and its results, where the functional form tested 
was 
𝑦𝑦 = 𝛽𝛽0 + 𝛽𝛽1X1 + 𝛽𝛽2𝑋𝑋2 + 𝛽𝛽3𝑋𝑋3 + 𝛽𝛽4𝑋𝑋4 
𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 = −11837− 0.10 𝑇𝑇𝐶𝐶𝑇𝑇𝐶𝐶 + 80.44 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆 + 55.56 𝐿𝐿𝑆𝑆𝑇𝑇𝐿𝐿𝐶𝐶ℎ + 6.09 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑆𝑆𝐶𝐶 
Although the model looks good, with statistically significant p-values (e.g., 0.0097) 
that are lower than the standard 0.05 or 0.10 significance cutoffs and coefficients of 
determination (R-squared) that are relatively high at 82.60%, the model is flawed. For 
instance, the coefficient for displacement is negative, which defies conventional logic, where 
typically the heavier the ship, the higher the cost. This means the model’s specification is 
incorrect and another model is required. Figure 25 shows a mixed nonlinear parametric 
model with the following specification: 
𝑦𝑦 = 𝛽𝛽0 + 𝛽𝛽1ln (𝑋𝑋1) + 𝛽𝛽2ln (𝑋𝑋2) + 𝛽𝛽3𝑋𝑋3 + 𝛽𝛽4𝑋𝑋4 
𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 = −40271 + 3351 ln(𝑇𝑇𝐶𝐶𝑇𝑇𝐶𝐶) + 3952 ln(𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆) − 26.37 𝐿𝐿𝑆𝑆𝑇𝑇𝐿𝐿𝐶𝐶ℎ − 2.18 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑆𝑆𝐶𝐶 
This model makes slightly more sense in that tonnage and speed have a positive 
relationship to cost and their effects are nonlinear. However, some of the other independent 
variables such as crew and length still show negative effects, albeit all modeled variables 
have the statistical significance of low p-values and a higher adjusted R-squared coefficient. 
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 Sample Dataset for Parametric Modeling Figure 24.
The econometric-based parametric model shown in Figure 25 is the best model both 
in significance as well as logic. For instance, there are polynomial functions and first order 
versus second order interactions of the independent variables. Specifically, the functional 
form producing the best-fitting mixed nonlinear parametric cost model is 
y = 𝛽𝛽0 + 𝛽𝛽1𝑋𝑋1 + 𝛽𝛽2𝑋𝑋3 + 𝛽𝛽3𝑋𝑋4 + 𝛽𝛽4ln (𝑋𝑋1) + 𝛽𝛽5ln (𝑋𝑋2) + 𝛽𝛽6ln (𝑋𝑋3) 
𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 = 86373 − 0.37 𝑇𝑇𝐶𝐶𝑇𝑇𝐶𝐶 + 302.18 𝐿𝐿𝑆𝑆𝑇𝑇𝐿𝐿𝐶𝐶ℎ + 4.39 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑆𝑆𝐶𝐶 + 7108.91 ln(𝑇𝑇𝐶𝐶𝑇𝑇𝐶𝐶)
+ 9778.02 ln(𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆)− 46327.8 ln (𝐿𝐿𝑆𝑆𝑇𝑇𝐿𝐿𝐶𝐶ℎ) 
Clearly these are only illustrations based on sample publicly available data. 
Nonetheless, the approach is similar with actual data. The only difference would be to use 
datasets that pertain to the ship that is being modeled to prevent out-of-sample biases. 
Additional independent variables will need to be collected, and various econometric tests will 
need to be performed (e.g., see Appendix 4 of the primary report for an example list of 
specifications, data integrity, and error tests that will be performed, such as 
heteroskedasticity, multicollinearity, non-sphericity, nonlinearity, and so forth). 
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 Parametric Model With Nonlinear Regression Figure 25.
Parametric Probability Distribution and Curve Fitting 
Another powerful cost modeling approach is distributional fitting; that is, how does an 
analyst or engineer determine which distribution to use for a particular task’s input cost or 
schedule variable? What are the relevant distributional parameters? If no historical data 
exist, we can make assumptions about the variables in question using the qualitative Delphi 
method, where a group of subject matter experts are tasked with estimating the behavior of 
each variable. Then, these values can be used as the variable’s input parameters (e.g., 
uniform distribution with extreme values between 0.5 and 1.2). When testing is not possible 
(e.g., a new or novel weapon subsystem), management can still make estimates of potential 
outcomes and provide the best-case, most-likely case, and worst-case scenarios, 
whereupon a triangular or custom distribution can be created.  
However, if reliable historical data are available, distributional fitting can be 
accomplished. Assuming that historical patterns hold and that history tends to repeat itself, 
then historical data can be used to find the best-fitting distribution with their relevant 
parameters to better define the variables to be simulated. Figure 26 illustrates a 
distributional-fitting example of the costs shown previously (Figure 24).  
The null hypothesis (Ho) being tested is such that the fitted distribution is the same 
distribution as the population from which the sample data to be fitted came. Thus, if the 
computed p-value is lower than a critical alpha level (typically .10 or .05), then the 
distribution is the wrong distribution. Conversely, the higher the p-value, the better the 
distribution fits the data. Roughly, you can think of p-value as a percentage explained, that 
is, if the p-value is 0.9849 (Figure 26), then setting a normal distribution with a mean of 1990 
and a standard deviation of 1290 explains about 98.49% of the variation in the data, 
indicating an especially good fit. The results from the Risk Simulator software also rank all 
the selected distributions and how well they fit the data. The fitted distribution can now be 
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set up to run a simulation. The results from the simulation (tens to hundreds of thousands of 
simulation trials can be run) can be interpreted accurately (Figure 27). 
 
 Parametric Monte Carlo Simulation Model Distributional Fitting Figure 26.
 
 Parametric Simulated Cost Results Figure 27.
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Conclusions and Next Step Recommendations 
Based on this preliminary analysis and review of the alternatives, we conclude that 
the risk-based cost and schedule simulations as well as parametric econometric models can 
be applied to modeling the cost of current and future U.S. Navy warships. It is evident in the 
analysis that any cost modeling must also include schedule risk because schedule delays 
can cause significant cost creep and budget overruns. Using the project process diagrams 
and task-based cost modeling coupled with Monte Carlo simulations to account for 
uncertainties in input assumptions and estimates and risks of overruns, a comprehensive 
methodology was developed. 
We therefore recommend the following:  
• Collect and use actual cost data and develop more accurate cost estimates 
going forward in order to better calibrate the inputs based on real-life 
conditions. (We can provide suggestions on how to generate a database and 
methods to capture said required data.) 
• Use the Risk Simulator–based simulated probability distributions to determine 
how well the vendors are performing (e.g., running at 92% efficiency, etc.), 
thus creating a common set of agreed upon performance metrics for the 
organization. 
• Use control charts (based on simulated results) to determine if processes and 
tasks are in-control or out-of-control over time.  
• Identify critical success factors to start collecting cost and schedule data for 
more accurate estimates.  
• Incorporate learning curves and synergies when more than one ship is on 
order and the unit cost per ship would be lower. 
The next phase of this research will focus on collecting actual cost and schedule 
data from a specific ship with subject matter experts’ inputs to obtain the qualitative values. 
The resulting simulations will provide an alternative to the existing cost and schedule 
forecasting models that can be compared for accuracy over the course of the ship build. If 
complete archival cost and schedule data are available for a specific ship build along with 
the forecasted costs and schedule, this data can be applied to the ship cost model 
forecasting approaches suggested by the current study for purposes of comparison to the 
existing models that were used during the ship build.  
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Appendix: Most Common Forecast and Predictive Modeling Techniques  
• ARIMA. Autoregressive integrated moving average (ARIMA, also known as 
Box–Jenkins ARIMA) is an advanced econometric modeling technique. 
ARIMA looks at historical time-series data and performs back-fitting 
optimization routines to account for historical autocorrelation (the relationship 
of a variable’s values over time, that is, how a variable’s data is related to 
itself over time). It accounts for the stability of the data to correct for the 
nonstationary characteristics of the data, and it learns over time by correcting 
its forecasting errors. Think of ARIMA as an advanced multiple regression 
model, where time-series variables are modeled and predicted using its 
historical data as well as other time-series explanatory variables. Advanced 
knowledge in econometrics is typically required to build good predictive 
models using this approach. Suitable for time-series and mixed-panel data 
(not applicable for cross-sectional data).  
• Auto-ARIMA. The Auto-ARIMA module automates some of the traditional 
ARIMA modeling by automatically testing multiple permutations of model 
specifications and returns the best-fitting model. Running the Auto-ARIMA 
module is like running regular ARIMA forecasts; the differences being that the 
required P, D, Q inputs in ARIMA are no longer required and that different 
combinations of these inputs are automatically run and compared. Suitable 
for time-series and mixed-panel data (not applicable for cross-sectional data). 
• Basic Econometrics. Econometrics refers to a branch of business analytics, 
modeling, and forecasting techniques for modeling the behavior or 
forecasting certain business, economic, finance, physics, manufacturing, 
operations, and any other variables. Running Basic Econometrics models is 
similar to regular regression analysis except that the dependent and 
independent variables are allowed to be modified before a regression is run. 
Suitable for all types of data. 
• Basic Auto Econometrics. This methodology is similar to basic econometrics, 
but thousands of linear, nonlinear, interacting, lagged, and mixed variables 
are automatically run on your data to determine the best-fitting econometric 
model that describes the behavior of the dependent variable. It is useful for 
modeling the effects of the variables and for forecasting future outcomes, 
while not requiring the analyst to be an expert econometrician. Suitable for all 
types of data. 
• Combinatorial Fuzzy Logic. Fuzzy sets deal with approximate rather than 
accurate binary logic. Fuzzy values are between 0 and 1. This weighting 
schema is used in a combinatorial method to generate the optimized time-
series forecasts. Suitable for time-series only. 
• Custom Distributions. Using Risk Simulator, expert opinions can be collected 
and a customized distribution can be generated. This forecasting technique 
comes in handy when the dataset is small, the Delphi method is used, or the 
goodness-of-fit is bad when applied to a distributional fitting routine. Suitable 
for all types of data. 
• GARCH. The generalized autoregressive conditional heteroskedasticity 
(GARCH) model is used to model historical and forecast future volatility levels 
of a marketable security (e.g., stock prices, commodity prices, oil prices, etc.). 
The dataset has to be a time series of raw price levels. GARCH will first 
convert the prices into relative returns and then run an internal optimization to 
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fit the historical data to a mean-reverting volatility term structure, while 
assuming that the volatility is heteroskedastic in nature (changes over time 
according to some econometric characteristics). Several variations of this 
methodology are available in Risk Simulator, including EGARCH, EGARCH-
T, GARCH-M, GJR-GARCH, GJR-GARCH-T, IGARCH, and T-GARCH. 
Suitable for time-series data only. This technique can be used with cost data 
in the current ship costs context by forecasting ship cost volatility. 
• J-Curve. The J-curve, or exponential growth curve, is one where the growth 
of the next period depends on the current period’s level and the increase is 
exponential. This phenomenon means that over time, the values will increase 
significantly, from one period to another. This model is typically used in 
forecasting biological growth and chemical reactions over time. Suitable for 
time-series data only. It can be used in the current cost context by forecasting 
cost growth data. 
• Markov Chains. A Markov chain exists when the probability of a future state 
depends on a previous state and when linked together forms a chain that 
reverts to a long-run steady state level. This approach is typically used to 
forecast the market share of two competitors. The required inputs are the 
starting probability of a customer in the first state returning to the same state 
in the next period, versus the probability of switching to a competitor’s state in 
the next state. Suitable for time-series data only. 
• Maximum Likelihood on Logit, Probit, and Tobit. Maximum likelihood 
estimation (MLE) is used to forecast the probability of something occurring 
given some independent variables. For instance, MLE is used to predict if a 
credit line or debt will default given the obligor’s characteristics (30 years old, 
single, salary of $100,000 per year, and total credit card debt of $10,000), or 
the probability a patient will have lung cancer if the person is a male between 
the ages of 50 and 60, smokes five packs of cigarettes per month or year, 
and so forth. In these circumstances, the dependent variable is limited (i.e., 
limited to being binary 1 and 0 for default/die and no default/live, or limited to 
integer values such as 1, 2, 3, etc.) and the desired outcome of the model is 
to predict the probability of an event occurring. Traditional regression analysis 
will not work in these situations (the predicted probability is usually less than 
zero or greater than one, and many of the required regression assumptions 
are violated, such as independence and normality of the errors, and the 
errors will be fairly large). Suitable for cross-sectional data only. 
• Multivariate Regression. Multivariate regression is used to model the 
relationship structure and characteristics of a certain dependent variable as it 
depends on other independent exogenous variables. Using the modeled 
relationship, we can forecast the future values of the dependent variable. The 
accuracy and goodness-of-fit for this model can also be determined. Linear 
and nonlinear models can be fitted in the multiple regression analysis. 
Suitable for all types of data. 
• Neural Network. This method creates artificial neural networks, nodes, and 
neurons inside software algorithms for the purposes of forecasting time-
series variables using pattern recognition. Suitable for time-series data only. 
• Nonlinear Extrapolation. In this methodology, the underlying structure of the 
data to be forecasted is assumed to be nonlinear over time. For instance, a 
Acquisition Research Program: 
Creating Synergy for Informed Change - 262 - 
dataset such as 1, 4, 9, 16, 25 is considered to be nonlinear (these data 
points are from a squared function). Suitable for time-series data only. 
• S-Curves. The S-curve, or logistic growth curve, starts off like a J-curve, with 
exponential growth rates. Over time, the environment becomes saturated 
(e.g., market saturation, competition, overcrowding), the growth slows, and 
the forecast value eventually ends up at a saturation or maximum level. The 
S-curve model is typically used in forecasting market share or sales growth of 
a new product from market introduction until maturity and decline, population 
dynamics, and other naturally occurring phenomenon. Suitable for time-series 
data only. 
• Spline Curves. Sometimes there are missing values in a time-series dataset. 
For instance, interest rates for years 1 to 3 may exist, followed by years 5 to 
8, and then year 10. Spline curves can be used to interpolate the missing 
years’ interest rate values based on the data that exist. Spline curves can 
also be used to forecast or extrapolate values of future time periods beyond 
the time period of available data. The data can be linear or nonlinear. 
Suitable for time-series data only. 
• Stochastic Process Forecasting. Sometimes variables are stochastic and 
cannot be readily predicted using traditional means. Nonetheless, most 
financial, economic, and naturally occurring phenomena (e.g., motion of 
molecules through the air) follow a known mathematical law or relationship. 
Although the resulting values are uncertain, the underlying mathematical 
structure is known and can be simulated using Monte Carlo risk simulation. 
The processes supported in Risk Simulator include Brownian motion random 
walk, mean-reversion, jump-diffusion, and mixed processes, useful for 
forecasting nonstationary time-series variables. Suitable for time-series data 
only. 
• Time-Series Analysis and Decomposition. In well-behaved time-series data 
(typical examples include sales revenues and cost structures of large 
corporations), the values tend to have up to three elements: a base value, 
trend, and seasonality. Time-series analysis uses these historical data and 
decomposes them into these three elements, and recomposes them into 
future forecasts. In other words, this forecasting method, like some of the 
others described, first performs a back-fitting (backcast) of historical data 
before it provides estimates of future values (forecasts). Suitable for time-
series data only. 
• Trendlines. This method fits various curves such as linear, nonlinear, moving 
average, exponential, logarithmic, polynomial, and power functions on 
existing historical data. Suitable for time-series data only. 
 
Acquisition Research Program: 
Creating Synergy for Informed Change - 263 - 
Estimating the Estimate: Toward a Quick and Inexpensive 
Method for Weapons System Cost Estimation 
Charles K. Pickar—DBA, is a member of the faculty of the Naval Postgraduate School, where he 
teaches project management, defense acquisition, and systems engineering. He is a retired Army 
officer with extensive experience in the U.S. defense industry serving in program manager, systems 
engineer, and business development roles at the director and VP levels at Lockheed Martin, Northrop 
Grumman, and SAIC. Before joining NPS, he led the Applied Systems Engineering Program Area in 
the National Security Analysis Department of the Johns Hopkins University Applied Physics 
Laboratory. He is the current Chair of the Systems Education Technical Committee of the IEEE 
Systems Council. His research and published work focuses on applying systems engineering and 
system dynamics approaches to defense acquisition problems. [ckpickar@nps.edu] 
Kevin G. Feely—is the President and CEO of KCR Business Innovations, a consulting company that 
provides decision analysis models on cost and schedule for defense companies. He is also a licensed 
CPA. He is a cost estimation expert, having served over 25 years in cost estimating and accounting 
roles at defense companies including Boeing, SAIC, and most recently at Aerovironment. He is an 
expert on developing and building algorithm-based decision models and has used that expertise in 
both costing as well as merger and acquisition (M&A) decision-making. [kefeely@kcrbi.com] 
Abstract 
This paper describes a process to provide low-cost and timely cost estimation for weapons 
system and services procurements based on data analytics. This will enable quick estimation 
that can serve as a sanity check for more formal estimation methods. Specifically, this cost 
estimation technique is built on the price-to-win methodology used by defense companies to 
respond to DoD solicitations. The process is based on market clearing prices as reflected by 
actual winning bids, expert knowledge to validate the scope of work, and an algorithm 
developed to incorporate these aspects into an estimate. The process is an “estimate of the 
estimate” and meant as an adjunct to formal cost estimating processes. The value lies in the 
ability to create quick, inexpensive estimates responsive to management needs while the 
formal cost estimating process proceeds. 
Introduction 
Cost estimation is as much science as it is art. And, like most science and art, it is 
resource intensive and time-consuming. The science is driven by the desire to accurately 
capture the elements of cost—including the amount of labor required, labor rates, overhead 
rates, and so forth—to provide an accurate starting point for budgeting and program 
management activities. The art of cost estimation is the fine line between accepting provided 
data and critically examining that data before accepting it. The most basic inputs to a cost 
model are the cost elements defined and captured by accountants: direct labor, materials, 
and overhead. However, identifying these cost elements is just the science. The art 
demands experience with both the data and the requirements of systems development. 
Good cost estimates at every stage of the development process must have this mixture of 
art and science. The goal of this paper is to present a tool that uses the art and science to 
provide inexpensive and timely initial cost estimates for weapons systems and services 
procurements based on data analytics.  
Realistic cost estimation is a necessity for successful weapon systems development 
and services contracts. However, cost estimates are frequently wrong, or unrealistic, and in 
many cases, time-consuming and unresponsive. Further, as the GAO states, “bias and over 
optimism creep into estimates that advocates of weapon systems prepare, and the 
estimates tend to be too low” (GAO, 2009). The science of cost estimation depends on 
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accurate data consisting of unambiguous definitions of the tasks, standardized work 
breakdown structures, recognition of the uncertainties of system development, and the 
recognition that significant program changes will cause changes in the estimate (GAO, 
2009). The art is found in the familiarity and know-how of both the cost estimators as well as 
the cost engineers and others involved in applying knowledge of developments to develop 
estimates.  
Current challenges with the cost estimation process include 
• known costs being excluded without adequate justification 
• invalid historical cost data 
• inconsistent consideration of inflation 
• cost and time necessary to accomplish 
It is this last issue of cost and time necessary to accomplish that is the focus of this 
effort. Whether cost estimator, cost engineer, or project manager, the need for quick, ROM 
(rough order of magnitude) cost estimates is an ever-present requirement of the DoD 
acquisition workforce. Users and contractors routinely ask for more capability from existing 
systems, as well as proposing new systems. Young (Young & Markley, 2008) describes the 
scenario: 
“How soon can you get me a rough order of magnitude [ROM] on the cost?” 
The project engineer does a mental retrieval and concludes that a full 
bottoms up engineering estimate is needed, but that will take too long—about 
three to four months. The project engineer knows it has to be faster, so he 
throws a number out. “I need a month to develop a ROM.” “Give me a ROM 
in two weeks if you really want any chance of funding this initiative,” is the 
reply. 
Unfortunately, the time and money to act on these requests is in short supply. We 
need a tool that can react to the demands of present-day acquisition, yet be accurate 
enough to satisfy the standards of cost estimating. 
The proposed tool was developed for the defense industry while the authors were 
employed by one of the major defense contractors. The development of this tool initially 
focused on one business-focused cost estimating activity, determining the price-to-win 
(PTW) in defense markets. We believe this process, however, offers the means to address 
the scenario described above, and those similar situations that occur every day across the 
DoD acquisition space. It is important to note this process is not a formal cost estimation 
process, nor is it meant to supplant the recognized cost estimating processes. This 
“estimating the estimate” is an adjunct to formal cost estimating to enable cost estimators, 
cost engineers, and the PMO a quick way to develop an estimate—of the formal cost 
estimate. The process is based on basic economic theory—the law of supply and demand 
and market clearing theory, the point where producers’ products and consumers’ demand 
are equal. This quick estimation process can serve as a sanity check for the more validated 
and formal estimation methods. It can also help address the challenge of responding to 
requests for ROM pricing in case of extra funding availability, end of year funding, etc. 
Cost estimation is serious business with very real fiscal and operational 
consequences. This tool builds on the science of cost estimation by incorporating both the 
actual winning bids for DoD competitions and the associated costs throughout the 
development. In other words, it models the market using prices that were successfully bid. 
This becomes the market clearing price. This approach offers the possibility of providing 
macro-level estimates based on microeconomic theory and historical trends and weapon 
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systems development using a data analytics approach. The science still defines the 
determinants or drivers of cost such as productivity or labor rates. The art is in modeling the 
market. 
The following is the research question to be examined: 
Can market pricing provide a reasonably accurate cost estimating methodology that 
is quick and less expensive to execute that provides actionable information to government 
program managers? 
Specifically, we seek to examine whether a data analytics approach based on market 
pricing will yield actionable cost estimates.  
Cost Estimation 
The field of cost estimation is rich in research. However, of late the preponderance of 
the effort appears to be focused on software cost estimation. This is understandable given 
the importance of software in the modern world, and the opaque nature of estimating 
software development. And, of course, the fact that an ever-larger percentage of capability 
in weapons systems comes from the software-hardware integration, rather than hardware 
itself. Regardless of the focus, the basic quantitative and qualitative methods are used in all 
cost estimating.  
Cost estimation for both software, hardware, and service projects is a formal, 
documented process. Review of the field identifies the broadly defined methods to estimate 
costs. These include the following (Boehm, 1984; Evans, Lanham, & Marsh, 2006; 





• algorithmic models; 
• expert judgment; and 
• Price-to-Win (PTW). 
The most commonly used techniques in the DoD are analogy, parametric (top-
down), and engineering (bottom-up) estimating (Mislick & Nussbaum, 2015). Analogy simply 
compares similar developments using historically captured cost information. A parametric or 
top-down estimate builds a cost estimate for the development project from historical data 
comparing variables through a statistical relationship. Finally, an engineering or bottom up 
estimate is a comprehensive cost estimate starting at the work package level and 
aggregating costs to build a more complete estimate. 
The Parkinson estimation is based on the Parkinson principle that “work expands to 
fill the available volume.” It is only mentioned to acknowledge that while not a rigorous 
estimating tool, there are times when the cost is determined by available resources, rather 
than a defined end-state. 
Algorithmic cost estimation models use one or more algorithms to analyze variables 
considered to be the major cost drivers for the weapons system. The algorithmic methods 
are based on mathematical models that produce cost estimates as a function of a number of 
variables that are considered to be the major cost factors (Leung & Fan, 2002). 
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Expert judgment simply acknowledges that engineering experts should be able to 
estimate the effort necessary to accomplish development tasks and translate those 
estimates to costs in technological activities—where they have experience. Thus, expert 
judgment is defined as the consultation of one or more experts (Hughes, 1996). 
Some disagree on whether the final category, price-to-win (PTW), is actually a cost 
estimation methodology, categorizing it as a cost management process rather than a cost 
estimating process (Boehm, 1984). In the PTW, the cost estimate is equated to the price 
believed necessary to beat competitors. In other words, PTW is a market-focused estimate 
focused on identifying the price necessary to win a government competition. Defense 
companies regularly use PTW as a target price to drive internal cost-savings measures as 
well as to drive the design-to-cost (DTC) target. Notwithstanding this characterization, we 
propose that certain aspects of the PTW process can be used to approximate initial system 
costs. The proposed tool combines two of these cost estimation methodologies, expert 
judgment to define an algorithm as a PTW to provide an initial cost estimate.  
Price-to-Win 
Regardless of stated evaluation criteria, price is a significant factor in most 
government contract decisions. PTW is used in industries that have limited customers—
monopsonies including the U.S. defense industry. While often mentioned in the broad 
category of pricing methodologies, it is often dismissed as “the price believed necessary to 
win the contract,” thus not acceptable for formal cost estimating. This definition has evolved 
into developing a strategy that fits the customer budget rather than the effort required to 
complete the work (Leung & Fan, 2002). It is true the defense industry uses PTW for 
competitive reasons. Industry competitors want to present the government customer with 
their lowest price, while ensuring adherence to RFP requirements, at least in comparison to 
other competitors. The PTW is part of a decision-making process that includes an 
assessment of the firms’ ability to develop a cost-competitive offer within their risk tolerance. 
PTW is focused on ensuring the industry solution meets the government needs, while 
emphasizing the competitive advantage of individual companies. It is worth noting that PTW 
is widely practiced in the U.S. defense industry. In fact, as a matter of process, many firms 
require a PTW determination before deciding to spend the money necessary to prepare a 
proposal, and throughout the proposal development.  
The PTW approach consists of estimating the price for each competitor, a potentially 
expensive process in that the current practice of PTW requires accurate assessments and 
analysis of competitive intelligence on the competition. Defense companies seek to 
understand in detail both competitor companies’ strengths and weaknesses, as well as their 
pricing structure. PTW also analyzes the nuances of the government customer, specifically 
what the award history is, as well as any trends in reasons for selections. The competitive 
intelligence is based on open source materials to try to determine both any competitive 
advantages individual companies may have, as well as any unique approaches to solving 
the government’s problem. A type process of PTW includes the steps shown in Table 1. 
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Table 1. The Price-to-Win Process 
 
A consideration in competitive intelligence assessments is that the U.S. defense 
industry is more or less balanced in capability across like companies. For instance, 
Raytheon and Lockheed Martin have legacy radar and missile businesses and compete in 
those areas. Boeing and Lockheed Martin compete in the high-performance fighter aircraft 
market and so on. The drawdowns and consolidations of the defense industry in the 1990s, 
as well as more recent consolidation, make competition in those areas fierce. Losing a 
government contract could mean exiting that line of business, thus determining what the 
competitor is going to do, and deciding an offer price is a high-stakes effort.  
By industry capability we also mean intellectual property, manufacturing efficiency, 
and human resources. Intellectual property is driven by the investment firms make in 
Independent Research and Development (IRAD) efforts. Manufacturing efficiency tends to 
mirror the overall industry and remains a source of potential profit if managed cost-
effectively. Human resources refer to engineering talent—the product of quality education 
and individual potential. The defense industry capability is driven by the labor market, and 
manufacturing efficiency is determined by the overall state-of-the-art. The defense industry 
draws from the same talent pool. Differences in competitive pricing originate from specific 
qualifications or competitive advantage of intellectual property from self-developed research 
and development programs, not necessarily widely varying labor rates. The PTW reflects the 
market clearing price. 
For the defense firm, the PTW analysis should yield a value that addresses customer 
need that also will be successful against competition. A finalized PTW analysis reflects a 
schedule-performance tradeoff that becomes a pacing item for development of the proposed 
system.  
The PTW approach is a macro-economic examination of an existing DoD program. 
While not specific enough to address the actual development of a cost estimate, it could 
serve as both ROM and as an indicator in the continued pursuit of a detailed cost estimate. 
These estimates would not replace the detailed parametric cost estimates, or IGCE, nor be 
a substitute for market research. Instead, the solution would provide the PM/contracting 
officer a means to validate/confirm the results of more in-depth cost analysis, while providing 
program office personnel a starting point for budgeting, and cost realism. 
The PTW Process Translated 
As noted, this tool leverages the science and art of cost estimation through the 
application of expert judgment and algorithmic data modeling. Expert judgment is an 
estimate based on the expertise of one or more people familiar with the costs and scope of 
similar system developments (Keeney & Winterfeldt, 1989; Morris, 1974). In the case of 
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PTW, the expert judgment comes from people familiar with the market for that particular 
product. In defense firms this includes cost engineers, specific engineering domain 
engineering experts, and the business development staff. In use as a cost estimation tool for 
the DoD, expert judgment would include government cost engineers and domain experts, as 
well as results of the market research activities (RFI—Requests for Information).  
The data used for the tool consists of the actual winning bids and the associated 
scope of past programs, plus a mechanism to track the inevitable changes to the cost 
estimate as changes occur throughout the development. This approach could be more 
accurately described as an “algorithmic” method. It offers the possibility of providing macro-
level estimates based on microeconomic theory and historical trends and weapon systems 
development using a data analytics approach.  
Three data elements—scope, budget, and contract award price—were used to 
develop an algorithm to explain the winning price ranges for the competitive solicitations 
chosen. Although focused on the price necessary to win a contract, we believe these price 
ranges should correspond to the initial cost estimates provided by the government. Cost is 
estimated as a mathematical function of product, project, and process attributes whose 
values are estimated by project managers. 
An essential factor of this analysis is the ability to identify both initial costs against 
specific SOW tasks, as well as track cost-growth/scope increase as the product developed. 
As we continue to develop the tool, we expect this analysis to show relationships between 
similar contracts of similar value scope. 
In developing the tool, we started with three basic macro-economic assumptions: 
1. In non-commodity markets the equilibrium price is the mean of a range of 
prices which are normally distributed about the equilibrium price. The 
government contracting market is a non-commodity market. 
2. The equilibrium price represents the balancing of costs, risks, and margin for 
the government and the contractor. If one of these three elements is 
negatively skewed for a specific supplier, they would exit the market. If one of 
these three elements is positively skewed for a specific supplier, competition 
would respond and the price would adjust accordingly. 
3. In the government contracting market, a monopsony, supply exceeds 
demand and the price for the goods or services will be below the equilibrium 
price.  
The first step in this cost estimation process is to identify an equilibrium price (EP). 
The EP is approximated by developing two extreme estimates for a given government 
provided statement of work (SOW). This first task depends on expert judgment to establish 
an initial range of possible prices, a low-price estimate (LPE) and a high-price estimate 
(HPE). These expert estimates are considered from both the government and contractor 
perspective, acknowledging the different ways government and contractor cost estimators 
consider a system cost. The low end of the estimate reflects the expert’s opinion on the cost 
associated with meeting the minimums of schedule and performance. The low-price 
estimate is the absolute minimum the government estimator believes is necessary for 
schedule and performance execution, and therefore reflects a price that represents the 
extreme risk for a contractor to execute. Figure 1 shows the normal distribution of the LPE-
HPE estimates. 
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 Equilibrium Price Figure 1.
On the other end of the spectrum, the HPE represents a price the government 
believes addresses the risk for both government and contractor. These two extremes should 
define the possible market for the system to be developed, with the mean representing the 
equilibrium price in balanced market where the price reflects an optimal balance between 
costs, risks, and contractor margin.  
As noted, the normal market clearing distribution will tend to be skewed because of 
monopsony in defense markets. In this case, supply will always exceed demand; therefore, 
the mean will tend to be lower than the equilibrium price. Figure 2 represents that 
distribution. 
 
 Bids in a Monopsony Market Figure 2.
Obviously, the government expert estimator needs access to the contractor 
perspectives on price, but that is normal. We believe government marketing research RFI 
could assist in this data collection. There are two steps to solicit these estimates. First, as is 
often done today, the PMO would request a ROM price as part of the market research effort. 
The challenge with ROM pricing estimates provided by potential contractors is the contractor 
concern their ROM will become the government target price. Thus, contractors will always 
add a “pad” to the ROM to reflect unknown and unforeseen risk. The government expert 
should be the arbiter of these estimates. In planning the RFI, the PMO should also request 
an LPE and HPE using the definitions provided above. Assuming multiple responses to the 
market research, the government expert would be able to develop a reasonable estimate of 
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the LPE and HPE. The government expert could use those estimates in developing a 
government LPE/HPE or maintain separate analysis and weigh the results prior to the next 
step.  
The next step determines the cost estimate range and uses the second aspect of 
cost estimation, the algorithmic cost model. This step consists of two sequential activities 
built on historical contracting data (at this point proprietary in nature). The first part, which is 
ongoing, is to collect data on the defense industrial market in the United States. This data 
collection captures the open source information available on defense contracts. The data 
include the DoD request for proposal (RFP) details, including project scope and the 
government’s budget. This information is matched to contract award price. Initially the 
emphasis has been on major programs (ACAT I); however, we intend to continue to gather 
as much data as possible. The initial dataset is small and reflects only the past three years. 
As more data becomes available over time, we believe the accuracy of the model will be 
improved. 
The second part of this step uses a statistically relevant number of prior 
procurements (aligned to scope) to estimate the range of costs for a specific SOW type. The 
intent is to create a frequency distribution of the actual bids received. This information forms 
the basis for the algorithm used to identify the competitive price ranges for the sampled 
procurements. From the contractor perspective (PTW) the winning price should be below the 
equilibrium price by bidders altering the balance of cost, risk, and margin to win the 
contract—and reflecting the market clearing price. Thus, from a market clearing perspective, 
using historical data for like-system procurements, an initial estimate of the cost could be 
derived. Figure 3 represents that range. The final price is then determined by using 
statistical tools and applying the algorithm. 
 
 Algorithm Applied Figure 3.
Estimating the Estimate in Practice 
To demonstrate the process, the following example is presented. The example 
project is a communications/electronics retrofit solution for surface ships for the U.S. Navy. 
The desired vehicle is a firm, fixed price contract, and the evaluation criteria is LPTA 
(Lowest Price Technically Acceptable). This effort is for a build-to-print production contract 
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for 89 systems for three different ship types. The expert judgment estimate determined by 
RFI for the LPE and HPE is shown in Table 2. 
Table 2. Cost Estimates Example 
 
The first step is to estimate the market price for each ship type. (For purposes of this 
example, we will estimate Ship A only.) The LPE and HPE represent the extremes of the 
market pricing for the solution fitted on the respective ship. LPE is defined as the estimate 
theoretically technically compliant (in this case LPTA), which minimizes labor costs and 
technical and programmatic risk. HPE is the estimate capturing all reasonable labor costs 
and factors in all programmatic and technical risk. Other factors not apparent in this example 
are the quantities of ships and the corresponding communications/electronics system 
solution. 
Using proprietary historical information, the following calculations in Table 3 
represent a range of LPTA estimates for the Ship Type A work.  
Table 3. LPTA Example 
 
Using the same process, but approaching the problem from a best value approach, 
the results of the analysis are shown in Table 4. Figure 4 is a graphical representation of the 
plotted ranges for the Ship A estimate. In this example, the 90% probability value was within 
3% of the actual winning bid. 
Table 4. Best Value Example 
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 Plotted Ranges Figure 4.
Figure 5 shows the S-curves and the range of estimates for the different contract 
types, LPTA< CP and FFP (Best Value). The end state of this “estimate of the estimate” is a 
statistical range of pricing that provides the key layers, project engineers, cost estimators, 
program office, and contracting officials a starting point. To return to the scenario, instead of 
an expert judgment-only guided “guestimate” or worse, the project engineer can provide an 
empirically based estimate. To be sure, it will not be the final estimate, but it will provide a 
starting point. More importantly it will provide an answer to a very tough question. 
 
 S-Curves for Example Figure 5.
Conclusion 
This paper proposes using a defense industry tool, the price-to-win, to assist the cost 
estimating process for the DoD. Using market pricing and accepting the idea that while costs 
differ between competitors, their costs are generally similar, we suggest that applying 
economic market clearing ideas can provide a quick, inexpensive, and reasonably accurate 
cost estimate for most efforts.  
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This approach provides a macro-economic estimate of DoD programs. While not 
specific enough to address the actual development of a cost estimate, it could serve as both 
ROM, as well as an indicator in the continued pursuit of detailed cost proposals. The 
estimates would not replace the detailed parametric cost estimates, or IGCE, nor be a 
substitute for market research. Instead, the solution would provide a means to 
validate/confirm the results of more in-depth cost analysis, while providing program office 
personnel a starting point for budgeting and cost realism. 
There are both pragmatic and theoretical limitations to this approach. Pragmatically, 
the technique must be tested using real data available only to the government. A second 
potential limitation is confidence in the ability of the government cost engineers (expert 
judgment) to define the LPE and HPE estimates. A major assumption of this approach is 
that government cost engineers and project managers are, in fact, experts and have a 
reasonable understanding of the range of costs for similar development projects. Our 
experience reinforces this belief, but it is clear that the better the estimates for the LPE and 
HPE, the better the overall estimate.  
Theoretically, there must be a spread of at least one standard deviation but not too 
close to the end of the distribution in order to address the entire market. Theoretical 
limitations also include the available market data both in system and software procurements, 
and the amount of variance assumed to be in the distribution.  
Finally, this tool can be improved and constantly updated by linking the DoD 
information on winning bids and the associated scope with the existing algorithm. A next 
step in this research is to request the use of said data and formally establish a validation 
effort to determine the quality of the results of the tools’ computations.  
References 
Boehm, B. W. (1984). Software engineering economics. IEEE Transactions on Software 
Engineering, SE-10(1), 4–21. http://doi.org/10.1109/tse.1984.5010193  
Evans, D. K., Lanham, J. D., & Marsh, R. (2006). Cost estimation method selection: 
Matching user requirements and knowledge availability to methods. University of West 
of England. 
GAO. (2009). GAO cost estimating and assessment guide. Washington, DC: Author. 
Hughes, R. T. (1996). Expert judgement as an estimating method. Information and Software 
Technology, 38(2), 67–75. http://doi.org/10.1016/0950-5849(95)01045-9  
Jorgensen, M. (2005). Practical guidelines for expert-judgment-based software effort 
estimation. IEEE Software, 22(3), 57–63. http://doi.org/10.1109/MS.2005.73  
Keeney, R. L., & von Winterfeldt, D. (1989). On the uses of expert judgment on complex 
technical problems. IEEE Transactions on Engineering Management, 36(2), 83–86. 
http://doi.org/10.1109/17.18821  
Leung, H., & Fan, Z. (2002). Software cost estimation. Handbook of Software Engineering, 
1–14. 
Mislick, G. K., & Nussbaum, D. A. (2015). Cost estimation: Methods and tools. 
Morris, P. A. (1974). Decision analysis expert use. Management Science, 20(9), 1233–1241. 
http://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.20.9.1233  
Young, J. A., & Markley, T. (2008). A better cost estimating tool: The key to not going over 
budget. Defense AT&L, 23–26. 
 
Acquisition Research Program: 
Creating Synergy for Informed Change - 274 - 
Determining the Value of a Prototype 
Zachary S. McGregor-Dorsey—received his degree in mathematics from the University of Colorado 
Boulder. He has worked in the DoD cost-related fields for nearly a decade, working on everything 
from research to detailed life cycle cost estimates. His current interests lie in graph theory, machine 
learning, and banjo playing, and he is always looking for applications of those interests to the cost 
world. [zmcgrego@ida.org] 
Abstract 
Most major defense acquisitions require a technology that is not yet fully developed, 
introducing a non-negligible amount of risk to the program and its cost. Developing a 
prototype or technology demonstrator prior to execution of the program can be useful in 
mitigating this risk, yet these demonstration programs also have associated costs. This paper 
develops a method to value this risk mitigation, setting an appropriate maximum cost for the 
demonstration program. This novel application of Value of Information theory and properties 
of the Bayesian preposterior distribution requires only a program cost estimate distribution 
and some estimate of possible results of the demonstration program. The method is broadly 
applicable to programming with varying amounts of technological uncertainty. We describe 
the method, then show how actual cost overruns of historical programs with and without 
prototypes can be used to estimate a value of prototype efforts relative to estimated program 
cost. We conclude with a discussion of other applications and how to explain the method and 
results to decision-makers. 
Introduction 
With any new defense program, the decision to begin its research, development, 
test, and evaluation (RDT&E) phase is a significant commitment of resources. It is a 
commitment that—due to contracts, regulations, and momentum—is not easily annulled. 
Even programs that experience cancellation tend to do so after appreciable investment. The 
decision-maker faces this weighty determination at a time when information about the 
program and its challenges is largely speculative and difficult to measure, making any 
estimate of its cost subject to a high degree of uncertainty. 
In this situation, a decision-maker may appreciate additional information that helps to 
refine their estimate of the resources necessary to complete the program. A possible source 
of this information is a prototype or technology demonstrator.1 A key attribute of a prototype 
program is its possible existence outside a formal RDT&E program; the information gained 
can then be used to make the riskier decision on moving ahead with the program.2 
However, prototype development itself can be costly, so the decision-maker would prefer to 
know in advance the value of the information that would be provided by the prototype effort. 
This paper is intended to address this wish, providing a method to value the 
prototype effort using the decrease in uncertainty it would provide to the cost estimate. To 
employ the method, the decision-maker needs only an initial cost estimate (presented as a 
                                            
 
 
1 Hereafter, we refer to both prototypes and technology demonstrators as simply prototypes because 
we are only interested in their role as information augmenter. Indeed, any program or project that can 
reduce the uncertainty of a cost estimate is a good candidate for the method herein. 
2 Even if the prototype occurs as part of RDT&E, it still may offer a natural point for reassessment, 
depending on the general shape of the program. 
Acquisition Research Program: 
Creating Synergy for Informed Change - 275 - 
distribution of possible costs), a cost constraint for the program, and some estimate of the 
decrease in uncertainty the prototype effort would provide. We introduce the method through 
increasingly complex illustrations of its application, first employing Value of Information (VoI) 
theory to establish a method for comparing the prototype/no prototype options, and then 
using properties of the preposterior distribution (defined below) to compare the values. We 
end the paper by using the method to create a rule of thumb, developed from historical data, 
for the value of a typical prototype. 
Illustrations of Method 
In this paper, we are concerned with the particular application to determining 
prototype value in the case of defense acquisition. We use language that reflects this focus, 
even though much of the work below is more broadly applicable. We also note that this 
paper presents a nontechnical description of the method; some detail and mathematics are 
omitted and can be found in the references. 
Framework and Terminology 
Before a defense acquisition program begins, a decision-maker is presented some 
estimate of the final cost3 of the program. This estimate will be a probability distribution of 
possible final costs; we call this the prior cost distribution and denote the final cost subject to 
it as the random variable C. The decision-maker also has some cost constraint b for the 
overall program, presumably related to the relative importance of the associated mission 
and the priority of the program within its portfolio. The cost constraint b can be interpreted in 
several ways. It might simply be the maximum amount the decision-maker is willing to spend 
to address the mission. More realistically, it might be the known cost of a lower-risk 
alternative that addresses the same mission need, or the point at which the opportunity cost 
of choosing the program over a lower-risk, less capable system is greater than the 
capabilities gained.4 For simplicity, we assume the cost constraint to be the cost of satisfying 
the mission the program addresses in some other way. 
The cost constraint informs the decision directly: If the final cost of the program is 
expected to exceed b, i.e., 𝐶𝐶 > 𝑏𝑏, the decision-maker should not embark on the program; 
otherwise, when 𝐶𝐶 ≤ 𝑏𝑏, they should. Of course, the final cost C has some probability of 
being greater than b and some probability of being less, but the decision-maker cannot 
make a fraction of a decision. For simplicity, we assume the decision-maker relies on the 
expected value5 of 𝐶𝐶, E[𝐶𝐶], to make their decision.6 That is, the program will only be 
considered if E[C] ≤ b, as illustrated in Figure 1. 
                                            
 
 
3 While by no means necessary, it is helpful to think of this final cost as the cost of the associated 
RDT&E program, because the relationship between RDT&E and a prototype is more direct. 
4 As may be inferred from the interpretations, it is possible that the cost constraint itself is a probability 
distribution of costs. This is a possible extension and we will discuss letting b vary. However, for 
simplicity, we assume the cost constraint is a single value. 
5 Recall that the expected value of a random variable is the average value resulting from (infinite) 
repeated sampling of the random variable. This is calculated as the sum of all possible values of the 
random variable weighted by their associated probabilities. 
6 Other constraints may be used, such as 𝑃𝑃𝐶𝐶(𝐶𝐶 ≤ 𝑏𝑏) for some probability 𝑆𝑆. However, as will be seen, 
to do so requires assumptions about the shape of the resulting cost distributions that the expected 
value assumption does not. 
Acquisition Research Program: 
Creating Synergy for Informed Change - 276 - 
 
 Example of a Program That Should Proceed Figure 1.
We introduce the option of obtaining more information about the distribution of final 
costs through prototype development. The decision-maker now has three choices:7 
1. Start the program (with full intention to complete it); 
2. Pursue the alternative program at cost b; or 
3. Invest in a prototype, after which another decision will be made to start or not 
start the program. 
The decision-maker can choose between the first two options using the cost 
constraint as discriminator. However, the closer in value E[C] and b are, the greater the 
probability that b lies between E[C] and the actual observed final cost, meaning the decision 
was not optimal. As these values approach each other, the decision-maker then loses 
confidence in their decision and becomes more interested in obtaining more information. At 
some point, they instead choose the third option.  
The third option will, at some investment cost I of the prototype program, provide the 
decision-maker with a new probability distribution of possible final program costs. We call 
this a posterior cost distribution and denote the final (uncertain) program cost subject to it by 
the random variable D, adding a subscript when more than one posterior cost distribution is 
referenced. We assume D is the remaining cost of the program after completing the 
prototype, i.e., the cost I is not reflected in D. After a prototype program is pursued, the 
decision-maker will make the decision to continue the main program similarly to the one 
described previously, but now comparing E[D] and 𝑏𝑏 − 𝐼𝐼.  
Note that before the prototype is developed, its resulting D is unknown and, indeed, 
many different posterior cost distributions 𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖 might arise. Each of these distributions has 
some probability of occurring, so we can consider the probability distribution over posterior 
cost distributions, to which we associate the random variable ∆. Abusing notation a bit, we 
can say the values of ∆ are all the possible random variables 𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖. We will actually be more 
interested in the probability distribution of the expected values of E[𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖] of posterior cost 
distributions. We associate the random variable ∆� with this distribution of means. 
The decision-maker is interested in pursuing a prototype only when the result is likely 
to change their decision. If their decision is not changed, they stay on the same path, as 
                                            
 
 
7 Of course, specific real world situations are more complicated, requiring some adjustment of the 
model. 
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initially they gain nothing more than confirmation and the cost I of the prototype is wasted.8 
For example, consider Figure 2. While the decision-maker does not know what the posterior 
cost distribution will be, they do know it is likely to have an expected value somewhere in the 
thick part of the prior cost distribution (blue line). Otherwise, we could not consider the prior 
cost distribution to be an accurate reflection of our prior knowledge, and should change it 
accordingly. The example posterior cost distribution (orange line) given in the figure is 
plausible, though less likely than one in the thicker part of the distribution. 
 
Note. This decision changes with the added information of the posterior distribution whenever 
the cost constraint b lies in the shaded region. 
 When the Posterior Cost Distribution Is Useful Figure 2.
Suppose the constraint b is very high, far to the right in the chart. Here, the decision-
maker would start the program, almost without question. If the initial distribution C is 
accurate, it would be very unlikely that a prototype program would reveal a new expected 
value above that constraint, so a prototype is unlikely to change the decision. In this case, 
the value of a prototype is very low. Similarly, if b is very low, far to the left in the chart, the 
prototype is very unlikely to change the decision to not start the program. In both cases, for 
the specific case of D shown in the chart, the value of the prototype is 0. 
On the other hand, when the constraint b more evenly splits the prior cost 
distribution, it is more likely that a prototype could change the a priori decision. In Figure 2, if 
b took any value in the shaded region, the decision would change after that particular 
prototype result. We can quantify the expected value of the prototype effort using the 
difference in the expected costs to the decision-maker between making a prototype or not. 
                                            
 
 
8 It is likely that the program will benefit from prototype spending if the program is continued, so the 
entire cost of the prototype may not be lost, but we do not address this directly. The benefit from the 
prototype is assumed to be captured in the increased fidelity of the cost distribution. 
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For this calculation to be intuitive, we need to look at all possible posterior cost distributions 
together, using VoI theory. 
Doing so gives us a distribution of values for the prototype determined by ∆, C, and 
the constraint b. We call the expected value of this distribution the value of the prototype. 
We will assume C and b are given, and use the preposterior distribution of program costs 
together with assumptions about the amount of information a prototype provides, in order to 
determine this value. 
We make the following assumptions: 
• Decisions regarding the continuation of the program are based on expected 
values. 
• The distribution of final costs C is reliable, i.e., unbiased with unbiased 
estimation of standard deviation. 
• Any uncertainty in the cost of the prototype program is small compared to the 
cost of the entire program, and thus can be treated as a point value. 
• A firm affordability cap for the program is known and expressible as a 
constant bound. 
• Modifications can be made to the method to relax these requirements, but 
this is not addressed here. 
One assumption requires specific attention. The requirement that the distribution of 
final costs is known and accurate is strong. For example, this implies the program is 
technically feasible and will, if attempted, succeed. Additionally, there is historical evidence 
that initial cost estimates are systematically low. (See the section titled A General 
Application for some evidence of this.) Even if the expected value of the estimate is correct, 
the variance (risk) is not all known and can therefore be vastly underestimated. We have not 
tested the robustness of this method against inaccurate initial cost estimates, although we 
hope to in the future. For that reason, any application requires great care and the most 
conservative of initial cost estimates. 
Value of Information (VoI) 
VoI is a concept from decision analysis. In its simplest form, the theory examines two 
possibilities, one in which a decision is made without a certain piece of information and one 
in which it is made with the information. The decisions have costs and benefits, depending 
on some unknown state of the future, which the information describes in some way. The 
difference between the expected values of these decisions is the value of the information. 
A Simple Illustration 
For illustration, suppose the decision-maker has the information that a program has a 
40% chance of costing $9 billion ($9B), and a 60% chance of costing $14 billion ($14B). The 
expected cost of the program is thus 0.4 ∗ $9B + 0.6 ∗ $14B = $12B. If their cost constraint b 
is $10 billion, they will not initiate with the program as it stands. 
However, they are then told that a prototype effort would give them the information 
they need to determine whether the full program is a $9 billion or $14 billion program. How 
much should they be willing to spend on the prototype? 
Recall that the cost constraint of $10 billion is the value of satisfying the mission, 
which, for purposes of explication, we assume to be the cost of satisfying the mission in 
some other way. If the prototype is not pursued, the decision-maker will pursue the $10 
billion alternative, and so the expected cost of meeting the mission need is $10 billion. 
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If the prototype is pursued, there are two possibilities. The prototype will reveal—
40% of the time—that the program will cost $9 billion. The decision-maker will then spend 
$9 billion to execute the program. The remaining 60% of the time, the prototype will reveal a 
cost of $14 billion. The decision-maker will then stick with the $10 billion alternative. 
Therefore, when the prototype is pursued, the expected cost of satisfying the mission is 
0.4 ∗ $9B + 0.6 ∗ $10B = $9.6B. 
By VoI, we conclude the value of the prototype is $10B− $9.6B = $0.4B to the 
decision-maker, the difference between the two decision paths. That is, the decision-maker 
should be willing to spend up to $0.4 billion dollars on a prototype that can provide this level 
of information. 
This illustration, however, is far from realistic. The distribution of final costs C is not, 
as a rule, discrete, and the prototype effort will typically not provide perfect information on 
the final cost. These observations can be accommodated with a small amount of 
generalization, as we will see in the next illustration. However, we will assume for now that 
we know what the distributions in ∆ look like. This assumption will be addressed in the next 
section. 
Illustration of More Complexity 
Now suppose the decision-maker is presented with any distribution of final costs C 
such that E[C]=$11 billion. Suppose further that the prototype will demonstrate two critical 
technologies, A and B, and each technology will be determined to be easy or difficult to 
mature. Therefore, from the prototype, four new cost distributions can result. Letting the 
random value indicate its distribution, we get ∆ = {  𝐷𝐷1, 𝐷𝐷2, 𝐷𝐷3, 𝐷𝐷4}, where  
𝐷𝐷1 corresponds to both technologies proving easy to mature,  
𝐷𝐷2 corresponds to A being easy and B being difficult,  
𝐷𝐷3 corresponds to A being difficult and B being easy, and 
𝐷𝐷4 corresponds to both being difficult. 
Prior to the prototype development, the conditional expected cost under each case 
was determined, and the probabilities of A and B being easy to mature are found to be 0.6 
and 0.1, respectively, resulting in Table 1. 
Table 1. Properties of the Posterior Cost Distributions in an Illustration of More 
Complexity 
 
Given the cost constraint b of $10 billion, the decision-maker can now compute the 
value of the prototype. If they decide to not pursue the prototype, the mission cost is $10 
billion, as before. With the prototype, note that they will pursue the program if distributions 
𝐷𝐷1 or 𝐷𝐷2result, and cancel the program if distributions 𝐷𝐷3 or 𝐷𝐷4 result. The expected mission 
cost given a prototype effort is thus 
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0.6 ∗ $8B +  0.54 ∗ $9B +  0.04 ∗ $10B +  0.36 ∗ $10B =  $9.34B. 
Therefore, the value of the information from the prototype is, in billions of dollars, 
$10B −  $9.34B =  $0.66B. 
We note here that it is straightforward to apply sensitivity analysis to the cost 
constraint. In Figure 3, we see what happens as the cost constraint varies. The closer the 
constraint is to the E[𝐶𝐶]of $11 billion, the greater the value of the prototype, because the 
constraint is more likely to be between E[𝐶𝐶] and E[𝐷𝐷], for any given posterior cost 
distribution of final costs D. We also see that as the cost constraint approaches the 
extremes, the prototype has no value, because the decision-maker would not change their 
decision from that based on C alone. The values in this figure together with the distribution 
of the cost constraint give the expected value of the prototype. 
The above illustration is instructive, but it is unrealistic in one important way. In 
general, we will know what the distributions in ∆ look like or how they are distributed, i.e., 
what their various probabilities of occurrence are. However, given our assumptions about 
how the decision will be made, we really only need to know the distribution of the means of 
the distributions in ∆. The next section will illustrate this. 
 
 Value of Prototype as the Cost Constraint Varies Figure 3.
Preposterior Distribution 
Our main goal in this section is to describe the distribution of means of posterior cost 
distributions ∆� which we call the preposterior cost distribution. (The initial distribution of final 
costs C is the prior cost distribution and a posterior cost distribution of final costs D, when 
known, is the posterior cost distribution.) Using this notation in application to an illustration of 
more complexity (discussed in the previous section), we have, in billions of dollars,  
𝐸𝐸(∆�) = 0.6 ∗ $8B +  0.54 ∗ $9B +  0.04 ∗ $13B +  0.36 ∗ $14.3B = $11B. 
Before we present the properties technically, we examine them intuitively. This 
section is largely derived from Section 5.4 of Raiffa and Schlaifer (1961); any additional 
justifications may be found there. 
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Creating a prototype provides information about the technical hardship of the 
program, which should have some effect on the prior cost distribution of C of that program. 
There is no reason, a priori, to expect this new information will increase or decrease the 
mean of the initial estimate; if there were, the initial estimate should be adjusted accordingly. 
We emphasize here that a specific posterior cost estimate might have a different mean from 
the prior cost distribution, but the mean of all possible posterior estimates must match that of 
the prior estimate if it is reliable. That is, the expected value of ∆� is the same as that of C, 
because C summarizes all of the information we have about what ∆� could look like. 
The new information gleaned from the prototype will also produce a tighter cost 
distribution (lower variance) than that of the prior cost distribution.9 Let us consider the 
extreme possibilities to gain intuition for this tightening. If the prototype provides no new 
information at all, any value of ∆ is just C—the posterior is the same as the prior. So ∆� would 
consist of a single value, E[C], and clearly E [∆�]=E[C]. Thus, the variance of ∆� would be 0 
and the variance of every possible value ∆ takes on (every D) is equal to the variance of C.  
On the other hand, if the prototype provides perfect information (i.e., tells us the 
exact cost of the program), the prototype gives the same information as actually doing the 
program. Any value D of ∆ is the final cost. It is a degenerate distribution with all mass at 
that final cost, and these values must be random draws of C, since the prior cost distribution 
is accurate. The expected values of these D are the final cost, so ∆� consists of expected 
final costs taken from the prior cost distribution, i.e., ∆�=C. Clearly, then, E [∆�]=E[C] and the 
variance of ∆� and C are equal. The variance of the degenerate distributions ∆ definitionally 
have variance 0. 
Taken together, we see that as the variance of the resulting distributions decreases 
(i.e., as the prototype provides more information), the variance of ∆� increases and is 
bounded by that of the variance of C. Indeed, the more information provided, the more ∆� 
looks like C as a distribution. 
The observations above can be summarized with the following three theorems. 
Stating these theorems exactly requires some technical complexity beyond the scope of this 
paper. See Raiffa and Schlaifer (1961) for proofs. 
Theorem 1. The expected value of the means of new cost distributions 
resulting from the information gained by a prototype is equal to the expected 
value of the prior cost distribution, i.e., 
𝐸𝐸(∆�)  =  𝐸𝐸(𝐶𝐶) 
Theorem 2. The variance of the means of new cost distributions resulting 
from the information gained by a prototype is equal to the variance of the 
prior cost distribution less the expected value of the variances of the new cost 
distributions, i.e., 
                                            
 
 
9 Intuitively, this makes sense; the more the decision-maker knows, the more specific they can make 
their estimate. However, this fact actually relies on the prior cost distribution being accurate, meaning 
no new information can be added that adds new possibilities. If something has not been thought of, 
this is captured by a wider variance and new information will only discount some of those possible 
outcomes. 
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𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝐶𝐶(∆�)  =  𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝐶𝐶(𝐶𝐶) –  𝐸𝐸(𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝐶𝐶(𝐷𝐷)) 
Theorem 3. As the information provided by the prototype approaches perfect 
information, the distribution of ∆� approaches the distribution of C, i.e., 
𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙
𝑛𝑛→∞
𝑃𝑃𝐶𝐶(∆�  <  𝑆𝑆) =  𝑃𝑃𝐶𝐶(𝐶𝐶 <  𝑆𝑆) 
where 𝑇𝑇 is the amount of information. 
The third theorem depends on our assumption that C is a reliable distribution, 
unbiased in mean and standard deviation. It also assumes that we can always add 
information that will sharpen our estimate. The second assumption is true because we can 
always run the experiment of completing the program, at which point the cost will be known. 
The open problem at the end of the previous section was the shape of the 
distribution ∆, without which our VoI calculation would be impossible. While we are not able 
to describe this distribution completely, we now know some key attributes that can help us 
estimate the value of the prototype. 
Putting It Together 
For our final illustration, assume the decision-maker has a particular goal in mind for 
their prototype. Suppose they have a cost estimating relationship (CER) based, in part, on a 
particular technical attribute that is not precisely known, and their prototype will determine 
this attribute nearly perfectly.10 Using the CER, they use Monte Carlo simulation with 
multiple possible values of the technical attribute (and the standard error of the CER) to 
estimate the cost distribution C of their program. For this example, assume that C has a 
scaled beta distribution with support on (0, $40B), mean $11B, and variance 40.11 They then 
apply the CER to specific values of the technical attribute and find that the variance of the 
posterior, on average, is 10.12 
From Theorem 1, the decision-maker knows the expected value of ∆� to be $11 
billion. From Theorem 2, they can compute the variance of ∆� to be 30, the difference of the 
variance of C and the mean of variances of elements of ∆�. Finally, from Theorem 3, lacking 
other information, they assume that ∆� is the same type of distribution as C. They can now 
estimate the value of the prototype. 
Again, we assume the cost constraint is $10 billion. Without the prototype, they do 
not proceed with the program, so the cost of satisfying the mission is $10 billion. With the 
prototype, they consider two situations. In the first, the prototype reveals a cost less than the 
constraint. They then sum these costs, weighted by the probability they occur (given by the 
distribution of ∆�), i.e., they calculate 
∫ 𝑥𝑥 f(x)𝑆𝑆𝑥𝑥100 = 3.1, 
                                            
 
 
10 For example, models may predict a hypothetical aircraft design has a lift-to-drag ratio in a certain 
range, but the exact ratio is not known. A prototype may demonstrate the actual lift-to-drag ratio. 
11 The correct units for variances here is squared billion dollars. We omit the units for clarity. 
12 In this situation, the decision-maker could just generate some representative subsample of ∆ and 
apply VoI directly. We have simplified this example from one in which the reduction in variance after 
the prototype can be estimated but the distributions are not known, for purposes of illustration. 
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where 𝑓𝑓(𝑥𝑥) is the probability density function of ∆. In the second, the prototype reveals a 
cost greater than the constraint, so in each case, the cost of satisfying the mission is $10 
billion. Thus, they calculate 
∫ 10 f(x)𝑆𝑆𝑥𝑥∞10 = 5.2. 
The sum of these is the expected cost of satisfying the mission after the prototype. In 
our case, the expected cost is $8.3 billion. Thus, the decision-maker should be willing to pay 
up to $1.7 billion for the prototype. 
We again consider what happens when we vary the cost constraint in Figure 4. As 
expected, the value of the prototype is greatest when the constraint is near the expected 
value of the prior cost distribution. 
 
 Value of Prototype as the Cost Constraint Varies Figure 4.
A General Application 
Usually, the decision-maker does not have access to the decrease in variance 
provided by a prototype, so it is useful to develop a rule of thumb for the general case. To do 
so, we use historical cost overruns of development programs13 with and without prototypes 
to estimate the change in variance. We take our data from Tyson, Nelson, Gogerty, Harmon, 
and Salerno (1991), which examined the development costs of 51 historical aircraft and 
tactical munition programs, 35 of which did not have prototypes and 16 of which did. The 
report found that, on average, final development costs for programs without prototypes was 
1.62 ± 0.96 the cost of their initial cost estimate, whereas programs with prototypes were 
1.17 ± 0.17 their initial cost estimate. 
                                            
 
 
13 We look at development programs here, not the total program, mainly due to data limitations. The 
effect of the prototype program on production and sustainment also needs consideration. 
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While the cost overruns are important, our goal is simply to compare the variances to 
find the value of a prototype. Suppose we have a new (possible) program. We treat the set 
of programs without prototypes, their costs scaled to their initial estimates to make 
comparable, as describing its initial cost estimate distribution of C. In doing this, we are 
treating these programs as observations of possible outcomes of our hypothetical program. 
Note this does not imply we expect this program to overrun by 62%; we are using this 
database as a reasonable proxy for an accurate prior cost distribution. We can choose our 
own expected value, so for simplicity, we assume E[C] is 1 of some unit. Scaling the 
variance accordingly, we find this distribution has a variance of 0.34. 
We then treat the set of programs with prototypes as a sample of the set ∆� of 
possible means of distributions resulting from a prototype. Because ∆� has the same mean 
as C, we normalize these data to 1 as well and find ∆� has a variance of 0.02. 
Using the above, we can now estimate the value of a prototype for different cost 
constraints. We assume a beta distribution with expected value of 1 and respective 
variances for C and ∆�. (We note that the distribution of the data is well approximated by the 
beta distribution.) In Figure 5, we present the value assuming the expected value of C is 1. 
In Figure 6, we present the value of the prototype as a percent of cost constraint. Note that 
while the figures are similar, Figure 6 shows that the value of the prototype is relatively 
higher for smaller cost constraints. 
 
 The Value of Prototype for a $1 Billion Development Program, Using Figure 5.
Historical Development Cost Distributions 
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 The Value of the Prototype Relative to the Cost Constraint, Using Figure 6.
Historical Cost Distributions 
A possible problem with the above formulation is that we only consider programs that 
successfully start and do not experience cancellation. The underlying data can be improved 
by adding failed programs and should be addressed in future research. Also, while it is safe 
to assume that none of the programs in the historical data benefitted from this research, it is 
unlikely that the decision of whether or not to build a prototype was random; that decision 
process could introduce a bias. On the other hand, it is possible that the decision on building 
a prototype was primarily determined by the political situation at the time and may therefore 
be entirely independent of the technical merits, in which case the sample would be 
unbiased. 
Conclusion 
This work needs expansion in several directions. Our immediate interest is in 
determining the effect of a biased prior. That is, assuming the distribution of C is unbiased in 
mean and standard deviation is a very strong assumption. When that assumption is violated, 
how much is the final value of the prototype affected? To this end, we also want to 
incorporate more historical data, particularly the actual cost of prototype programs, to test 
and refine the method in less than perfect cases. 
We also would like to allow the decision-maker to use values other than the expected 
value for decisions. We do not see this as impossible, but it may be technically difficult and 
rely even more on the assumption that the distribution of ∆� is similar in shape to the 
distribution of C. Other directions of research should allow more generality in the method, 
such as allowing the cost constraint to also come from a distribution. Specific application to 
commodity type should also be studied to find likely reductions in cost variance due to 
prototype development. As always, additional historical data would also be a benefit. 
The method presented above is a relatively simple way of determining the value of a 
prototype. The assumptions, while strong, are not unreasonable. In general, if we cannot 
assume that an initial cost estimate distribution is reliable, we should adjust the estimate to 
reflect our uncertainties. Estimating the amount of variance reduction provided by a 
prototype program is likely possible in cases where the prototype is geared to answering 
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specific technical questions, which is most common. Indeed, the effect on the variance may 
provide a guide to what goals the prototype should have. In the cases where this variance 
reduction is not estimable, we can use historical programs to estimate the variance 
reduction. As shown above, the value of a prototype can reach more than 20% of the value 
of the entire program in those cases where the affordability of the program is most 
uncertain. 
The author has developed several models in the course of this work, using both 
Excel and Python, that are available upon request. 
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William Mark Deskins—rejoined the ASN (RDA) staff in May 2015 to serve as the Director, 
Acquisition Career Management (DACM), the Navy and Marine Corps’ lead for the professional 
development and management of the DoN acquisition workforce. 
With over 25 years of professional experience, Deskins’s spectrum of experience includes private 
industry, Navy field, headquarters, and program office assignments. From February 2009 to May 
2015, Deskins was the Deputy Program Manager for Strategic and Theater Sealift (PMS 385), which 
included two ACAT programs: the Joint High Speed Vessel (JHSV) and the Mobile Landing Platform 
(MLP). During his tenure both programs went from Milestone B to Initial Operating Capability, 
delivering five JHSVs and two MLPs. Prior to joining PMS 385, Deskins was the Chief of Staff for 
Team Ships and was responsible for front office operations and executive coordination and oversight 
of the vast array of issues related to surface ship acquisition, maintenance, modernization, and 
disposal. From 2004 to 2007, he was a member of ASN (RD&A) staff and was responsible for 
executive oversight of issues related to surface ship, submarine and carrier maintenance, 
modernization, and disposal. 
From 2001 to 2007, Deskins was the Deputy Program Manager for Inactive Ships (PMS 333) in PEO 
(Ships), where he was responsible for the planning, programming, budgeting, and execution of the 
U.S. Navy’s inactivation and disposal of conventionally powered surface ships. As the last stage of 
the acquisition life cycle, he oversaw the decommissioning of 20 ships and the disposal of 46 ships 
through foreign military sales (six), scrapping and recycling (12), fleet support through SINKEX (26), 
artificial reefing (one) and the donation of the aircraft carrier ex-MIDWAY that operates today as a 
highly successful ship museum in San Diego. 
Deskins’s previous jobs include working five years as an industrial engineer in private industry in 
North Carolina and beginning his government career as an industrial engineer at the Indian Head 
Acquisition Research Program: 
Creating Synergy for Informed Change - 288 - 
Division of the Naval Surface Warfare Center (NSWC). Promotions brought him to the NSWC 
headquarters staff, where he worked strategic planning and corporate operations. He was selected 
for NAVSEA’s Commander’s Development Program where he held highly responsible positions 
working on combat systems, strategic and business planning at the Division and NAVSEA corporate 
level, and PEO Program Management assignments. 
His awards include two Navy Superior Civilian Service Awards in 2004 and 2014, two Navy 
Meritorious Civilian Service Awards in 1994 and 2000, and several Special Act Awards and 
Outstanding Performance Awards. He is an acquisition professional, DAWIA Level III certified in 
Program Management, and has held memberships in the International Council on Systems 
Engineering and the Institute of Industrial Engineers. 
Deskins’s education includes a bachelor’s in industrial engineering from West Virginia University and 
a master’s in technology management from the University of Maryland University College. His 
executive education includes Harvard Business School and University of North Carolina. 
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Force. His career included assignments as a contracting officer for the Peacekeeper ICBM, Maverick 
Missile, and the F-22 Raptor. He was also a contracting squadron commander and the director of 
contracting for the Space Based Infrared Satellite program and the Evolved Expendable Launch 
Vehicle rocket program. Rene has published in the Journal of Public Procurement, the Journal of 
Contract Management, the Journal of Purchasing and Supply Management, and the International 
Journal of Procurement Management. [rgrendon@nps.edu] 
Edward (Ned) H. Powley—is an Associate Professor of Management in the Graduate School of 
Business and Public Policy at NPS. [ehpowley@nps.edu] 
Abstract 
The DoD obligated approximately $273.5 billion in contracts for major weapon systems, 
supplies, and services in fiscal year 2015. The DoD contracting workforce professionals are 
responsible for managing the millions of contract actions for the procurement of critical 
supplies and services, ranging from commercial-type supplies, professional and 
administrative services, highly complex information technology systems, and major defense 
weapon systems. The DoD’s organizational climate is a significant contributor to the success 
of the contracting workforce. An analysis of an organization’s climate and its various 
components can provide its leadership with a road map for developing a healthier climate, 
and thus improve performance. 
The purpose of this study is to conduct an organizational climate assessment of the Army 
contracting workforce. Using a web-based survey, we assessed the Army contracting 
workforce on the various components of organizational climate. Based on the number of 
survey responses and response rate, we used quantitative data analysis methods to analyze 
the survey data and identify research findings. This research benefits the Army by 
establishing a baseline climate of the Army’s contracting workforce. It also identifies the 
dimensions that need to be addressed in order to improve the Army’s contracting 
organizational climate. These research findings can then guide the DoD, as well as the 
federal government contracting community, in developing a road map for improving its 
contracting organizational climate. 
Research Approach 
In coordination with the Army Deputy Assistant Secretary (Procurement), we 
developed the survey instrument and deployed the survey to the Army contracting 
workforce. We developed the survey on the NPS Lime Survey system and provide the 
survey link to the Army Deputy Assistant Secretary (Procurement) for deployment 
throughout the Army contracting workforce. 
Based on the number of survey responses and response rate, we used appropriate 
quantitative data analysis methods to analyze the survey data and identify research findings. 
This study will provide a baseline measurement of the Army’s contracting 
organizational climate and address the following research questions: 
1. What is the baseline climate of the Army’s contracting workforce in relation to 
the following dimensions: work relationships, employee recognition, 
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employee commitment, supervision, leadership, job satisfaction, 
organizational commitment, employee characteristics, and job stress. 
2. Is a change in the Army’s contracting organizational climate necessary? 
3. What dimensions need to be addressed in order to improve the Army’s 
contracting organizational climate? 
Benefits of Research 
This research will benefit the Army by establishing a baseline climate of the Army’s 
contracting workforce in relation to the following dimensions: work relationships, employee 
recognition, employee commitment, supervision, leadership, job satisfaction, organizational 
commitment, employee characteristics, and job stress. It will also identify the dimensions 
that need to be addressed in order to improve the Army’s contracting workforce climate. 
These research findings can then guide the DoD, as well as the federal government 
contracting community, in developing a road map for increasing its contracting workforce 
climate. 
Organizational Climate  
As noted above, we examined a number of dimensions that, as a whole, are 
indicative of organizational climate and culture and have been used in similar settings 
(Gerbich, 2017; Doelling, 2005). Table 1 outlines the key dimensions captured in this study, 
a brief description of the construct, and sample scale items (see also McKeithen, 2016).  
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Table 1. Organizational Climate Dimensions 
 
Methodology 
We designed the survey to capture professionals’ perceptions of climate, broadly 
speaking. The survey incorporates the dimensions outlined previously. We used a standard 
7-point Likert scale where 1 = Strongly Disagree, 2 = Somewhat Disagree, 3 = Disagree, 4 = 
Neither Agree nor Disagree, 5 = Agree, 6 = Somewhat Agree, and 7 = Strongly Agree. 
There were a total of 136 items and four additional open-ended response questions at 
different points in the survey. These open-ended questions afforded respondents the 
opportunity to offer written comments and feedback for improvement on certain dimensions. 
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The survey was administered using NPS’s Lime Survey tool. The structure of the 
survey comprised four sections, which included several scales based on the dimensions 
indicated: (1) job satisfaction, perceptions of supervisors, job role ambiguity, and job 
characteristics; (2) job stress—personal and work related stress, work-family conflict, and 
commute stress and safety; (3) organizational justice, job fit, workplace values, and high 
quality relationships; and (4) job-related demographics (certification levels, organization 
type, and so forth). Personally identifiable information was not collected from participants. 
Approval for the survey was obtained through the Deputy Assistant Secretary of the 
Army (Procurement) and was launched by the Workforce Development Directorate Office of 
the Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Army (Procurement) office. Human subjects approval 
was secured at the Naval Postgraduate School.  
Our population of interest was contracting professionals within the U.S. Army. The 
survey we developed was sent to approximately 10,000 military, civilian, and Army Corps of 
Engineers in 1102, 1105, 0800, and 51C job categories. Non-acquisition professionals—
those that serve in assistive vice direct contracting roles—have been excluded from the 
study. That is, we included only those professionals with appropriate and valid authorization 
to obligate government funds. The survey was open for approximately two weeks. We 
obtained 1,455 responses; due to incomplete surveys, the final count was 998 surveys, for a 
9.9% response rate. 
The majority of respondents were civilian contracting professionals (89%); 0.9 
percent was military. Six percent held DAWIA Level 1 Certification; 27% were at DAWIA 
Level 2; and 55.5% were certified at DAWIA Level 3 (10% responded Other). In terms of the 
commands represented, most respondents were from the Army Contracting Command 
(ACC) (44%), 12% were from Army Materials Command (AMC), and 21% were from the 
Army Corps of Engineers. Finally, approximately 60% of respondents were non-warranted, 
while just fewer than 40% were warranted contracting officers. 
Results  
The following sections outline some of the topline results from the survey responses. 
We highlight job satisfaction, job role ambiguity, job stress, organizational justice, and 
quality of connections.  
In terms of job satisfaction, contracting professionals report a moderate degree. 
There are no appreciable differences between the civilian and military samples (Figure 1), 
nor are there significant differences between the warranted and non-warranted contracting 
officers (Figure 2). 
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 Job Satisfaction by Civilian and Military Figure 1.
 
 Job Satisfaction by Warranted vs. Non-Warranted Contracting Officers Figure 2.
We also looked at job role ambiguity. Higher ratings for these items suggest that 
contracting professionals are confident about their work and sense low degrees of ambiguity 
associated with their job roles (Figure 3). Uncertainty about job roles appears minimal, 
though higher DAWIA levels show less ambiguity than lower levels (Figure 4).  
 
 Job Role Ambiguity by DAWIA Levels Figure 3.
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 Job Role Ambiguity by DAWIA Levels Figure 4.
Job stress scores were low, suggesting low levels of stress associated with day-to-
day work (Figure 5). Other factors associated with stress are work-life conflicts and 
commute stress and strain. The responses to these scales offer a similar picture, though 
work-life conflict was highest.  
 
 Job Stress by Civilian vs. Military Figure 5.
Organizational justice measures the perceptions of fairness about job processes 
such as performance evaluation. Respondents report lower degrees of organizational 
justice, suggesting a need to focus on better performance evaluation processes (Figure 6). 
As reported by McKeithen (2016), we find a negative correlation between organizational 
justice and job satisfaction. This “suggests that when organizations foster environments 
where employees are evaluated based on their own merits, and employees believe 
supervisors are using accurate information when conducting performance appraisals, job 
stress is low. Conversely, when employees perceive that supervisors are not fully gathering 
accurate assessment information when conducting evaluations and/or appraisals, an 
employee’s level of job- related stress is high” (McKeithen, 2016, p. 101).  
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 Organizational Justice by Civilian and Military Figure 6.
We also examined the quality of connections. Contracting professionals report that 
they have moderately high quality of connections (Figure 7). In addition, we include a table 
that reports all categories and average scores by command (Figure 8).  
 
 High Quality Connections by Civilian and Military Figure 7.
 
 Scores by Command Figure 8.
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Recommendations 
While there are not significant low ratings on the dimensions we captured, our 
analysis is limited given a sole data time point. That said, there are several possible 
opportunities.  
1. Job Stress: Contracting professionals report low levels of job stress, but when 
taking commute stress into account, stress was more pronounced. One 
option may be to “consider incorporating more opportunities for employees to 
telework from home when appropriate” (McKeithen, 2016, p. 103). Open-
ended responses indicated a desire for increased use of telework 
(McKeithen, 2016). 
2. Organizational Justice: Contracting professionals report lower degrees of 
organizational justice, particularly when asked about performance 
management practices. One option might include examining reward 
structures and procedures for evaluation purposes.  
3. Quality of Connections: Contracting professionals indicate they have a 
moderate degree of positive connections with work colleagues. Developing 
high quality connections may indeed have a positive effect on job satisfaction 
(Dutton, 2003), but also may be highly related to building resilience among 
unit members (Challburg & Brown, 2016). 
Future Research 
The most recent survey to our knowledge was in 2005 (Doelling, 2005), nearly 12 
years ago. The time lag between the initial work and this current work is too great to make 
meaningful comparisons. Additional analyses for making population estimates based on the 
sample current sample would provide a stronger argument for the findings. Moreover, 
longitudinal research will invariably yield comparative data and thereby generate potential 
insights about the direction the contracting field. We recommend ongoing assessment of the 
contracting profession. Future assessments may be benchmarked against past 
assessments and provide a dashboard to evaluate the contracting workforce. 
References 
Becker, T. E., Billings, R. S., Eveleth, D. M., & Gilbert, N. L. (1996). Foci and bases of 
employee commitment: Implications for job performance. Academy of Management 
Journal, 39(2), 464–482.  
Chalburg, M., & Brown, C. C. (2016). Resilience among naval recruits: A quantitative and 
qualitative analysis of interventions at Recruit Training Command and implications on 
fleet readiness (Master’s thesis). Monterey, CA: Naval Postgraduate School. 
Cook, J. D., Hepworth, S. J., & Wall, T. D. (1981). The experience of work: A compendium 
of 249 measures and their use.  
Davey, J. A., Kinicki, A. J., & Scheck, C. L. (1997). A test of job security’s direct and 
mediated effects on withdrawal cognitions. Journal of Organizational Behavior, 323–
349. 
Dickenson, M. W., Smith, D. B., Grojean, M. W., & Ehrhart, M. (2001). An organizational 
climate regarding ethics: The outcome of leader values and the practices that reflect 
them. The Leadership Quarterly (12), 197–217. 
Doelling, M. C. (2005). A work environment climate assessment of an Army acquisition 
center (Master’s Joint Applied Project). Monterey, CA: Naval Postgraduate School. 
Acquisition Research Program: 
Creating Synergy for Informed Change - 297 - 
Dulebohn, J. H., & Ferris, G. R. (1999). The role of influence tactics in perceptions of 
performance evaluations’ fairness. Academy of Management Journal, 42(3), 288–303. 
Dutton, J. E. (2003). Energize your workplace. San Francisco, CA: Berrett-Koehler. 
Fields, D. L. (2002). Taking the measure of work: A guide to validated organizational 
research and diagnosis. Thousand Oaks, CA: SAGE. 
Gerbich, L. M. (2017). An organizational climate assessment of the Navy contracting 
workforce (Master’s thesis). Monterey, CA: Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA. 
GAO. (2017). High-risk series: Progress on many high-risk areas, while substantial efforts 
needed on others. Washington, DC: Author. Retrieved from http://www.gao.gov  
Kluger, A. N. (1998). Commute variability and strain. Journal of Organizational Behavior, 19, 
147–165 
McKeithen, M. L. (2016). Organizational climate assessment of the Army contracting 
workforce (MBA professional report). Monterey, CA: Naval Postgraduate School. 
Moran, E. T., & Volkwein, J. F. (1992). The cultural approach to the formation of 
organizational climate. Human Relations, 45(1), 19–47. 
Thomas, L. T., & Ganster, D. C. (1995). Impact of family-supportive work variables on work-
family conflict and strain: A control perspective. Journal of Applied Psychology, 80(1), 6. 
Van Dyne, L., Graham, J. W., & Dienesch, R. M. (1994). Organizational citizenship behavior: 
Construct redefinition, measurement, and validation. Academy of Management Journal, 
37(4), 765–802. 
Wayne, S. J., Shore, L. M., & Liden, R. C. (1997). Perceived organizational support and 
leader-member exchange: A social exchange perspective. Academy of Management 
Journal, 40(1), 82–111. 
Xie, J. L. (1996). Karasek’s model in the People’s Republic of China: Effects of job 
demands, control, and individual differences. Academy of Management Journal, 39(6), 
1594–1619. 
Acquisition Research Program: 
Creating Synergy for Informed Change - 298 - 
Understanding Defense Acquisition Workforce Challenges1 
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Executive Summary 
The DoD acquisition system is a complex enterprise requiring professionals with 
many years of experience to execute the process expertly. However, the acquisition 
workforce faces several key challenges. First, the number of experienced acquisition 
professionals in the DoD is declining. They are being replaced by a young generation facing 
a long learning curve. Second, the acquisition workforce lacks the experience, knowledge, 
and tools necessary to digest and apply the wealth of information related to acquisition. 
Third, the workforce struggles to keep pace with the increasing complexity of the federal 
acquisitions. 
The MITRE Corporation conducted this research to validate the significance of the 
key challenges facing the workforce and provide a foundation for “next steps.” MITRE 
developed an independent survey to document the issues facing practitioners in the field. 
Through our research, we validated that the workforce believes they are ill-equipped 
to meet the demands of the acquisition environment. We determined that the workforce 
needs solutions to assist them to shorten the learning curve, modern tools that appeal to the 
changing workforce demographic, and cultural changes that support and encourage the 
workforce to think critically to successfully operate in a complex environment. The 
recommendations proposed as part of this research include a digitized work environment, 
tailored acquisition models, and workforce cultural changes. 
A digitized work environment is necessary to appeal to the junior acquisition 
workforce. They are accustomed to technology at their fingertips to answer questions and 
solve problems. Currently, acquisition policy and guiding documents are mainly a collection 
of static pdf documents spread across a variety of federal and organizational level websites. 
Digesting volumes of information to understand how to navigate acquisition processes is 
                                            
 
 
1 This technical data deliverable was developed using contract funds under Basic Contract No. 
W15P7T-13-C-A802. Approved for Public Release; Distribution Unlimited. Case Number 17-1585. 
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neither efficient nor appealing to a young and digitally focused workforce. Digitized policy 
provides centralized access to current policy and reference material to simplify complex 
processes. 
Tailored acquisition models provide streamlined approaches to address direction 
from acquisition leadership to tailor acquisition strategies when appropriate. Tailored models 
include only the required elements for a specific type of acquisition and enable less-
experienced professionals to successfully navigate a tailored approach.  
Workforce cultural changes include recommendations to address implementation at 
the workforce level. For example, policy changes to approve tailored models, implementing 
a coaching environment to transition the knowledge of the departing experienced workforce 
to the junior workforce, and implementing modern tools and apps to deliver digital 
capabilities. 
Workforce Challenges With Experience, Knowledge, and Tools 
The government constantly calls upon the federal acquisition workforce to deliver 
acquisition solutions in an increasingly complex environment. Successfully accomplishing 
this task requires an extensive understanding of the acquisition system, a wide awareness 
of best practices and exemplars, and access to state-of-the-art digital tools to develop and 
leverage solutions across the DoD enterprise.  
Overview of Workforce Challenges  
Our research discussed in this paper shows that federal acquisition requires a 
unique skill set to navigate successfully so that government agencies can deliver systems 
and services that meet mission needs. Our research also supports that, in many cases, the 
acquisition workforce lacks the requisite experience, knowledge, and tools to keep pace with 
the demands of this environment. 
Early career acquisition professionals receive Defense Acquisition University (DAU) 
classroom and online training to gain an overview of the core acquisition elements. Yet they 
cannot apply the knowledge in practice until they accumulate actual on-the-job experience. 
Going through the core activities to guide programs through the acquisition life cycle 
represents the ultimate development of an acquisition professional.  
Ideally, acquisition professionals would be exposed to a broad array of acquisition 
types early in their career. While some are so fortunate, such as military professionals who 
transfer every two to four years, not all are exposed to the variety of acquisitions and the 
skills necessary to develop a broad knowledge base. For example, the process for acquiring 
large weapons systems subject to DoD Instruction (DoDI) 5000.02 is clearly much more 
complex and rigorous than that for acquiring general services. Agile development 
acquisitions present even more unique challenges. Nonetheless, acquisition professionals 
are expected to have the capability to operate in any of these environments. At the very 
least, they are expected to turn to the massive amounts of statutory, regulatory, and 
guidance information currently available through online resources and figure out what they 
need to know to execute the acquisition successfully.  
Our research illustrates that changing demographics present another challenge. Half 
of the DoD acquisition workforce is eligible to retire within the next 10 years—depriving 
countless programs of decades of experience. Compounding this loss of expertise, evidence 
shows that 40–50% of the workforce has less than five years of experience. With the 
workforce peaks at the early and late career stages, DoD reports often cite the huge 
shortfall of mid-career professionals who anchor most program offices. While the DoD has 
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made progress over the past few years in addressing this shortfall, it still poses a major risk 
to the acquisition workforce.  
One of the most significant challenges in this area is an information gap. The existing 
DAU classroom and online training can provide the basic information, but without years of 
experience gaining the knowledge needed to successfully execute the variety of DoD 
acquisitions, or access to professionals with the requisite knowledge, young professionals 
will be at a significant disadvantage. 
Our research shows that acquisition involves a long learning curve. It takes many 
years of experience to develop the depth and breadth of skills and acquire adequate 
knowledge to execute the acquisition process for all types of requirements. Acquisition 
professionals are expected to have a broad knowledge base, but those practical skills come 
only with hands-on experience.  
It is impossible to curb the pending retirement of experienced acquisition 
professionals. Therefore, the acquisition community needs advances in technology and 
tools to enable the next generation of the acquisition workforce to rapidly digest and 
synthesize the vast amounts of information in the acquisition environment. This is especially 
critical as the up-and-coming acquisition workforce is accustomed to digital technology and 
social media that enable instantaneous access to current and accurate information to solve 
problems. The federal government will find it difficult to hire, retain, and train a developing 
workforce capable of tackling complex acquisitions without incorporating advances in the 
digital space to replace the lack of long experience and knowledgeable professionals to 
consult. 
The difficulties confronting the acquisition workforce are serious and have the 
potential to negatively impact the government’s future ability to effectively execute 
acquisitions. Changes are desperately needed to adequately prepare and arm the workforce 
for the task at hand.  
Research Methodology 
The MITRE team first conducted a literature review to understand current 
assessments of the federal acquisition workforce. The review focused on the demographics 
of the current workforce, the rising complexities of federal acquisition, and the availability 
and access to acquisition knowledge and training. 
Based on this literature review, the MITRE team developed hypotheses regarding 
workforce perceptions about achieving proficiency, the changing complexity of federal 
acquisition, and the availability of relevant and helpful tools and resources. MITRE then 
conducted a survey focused on acquiring data and metrics to test those hypotheses. MITRE 
analyzed this data to identify areas where improvement is needed to empower and assist 
the acquisition workforce to succeed in meeting federal acquisition needs.  
MITRE also assembled three focus groups to assist in the analysis of our survey 
data and the data gathered in terms of the tools associated with learning acquisition. The 
focus groups were asked questions to assess the data gathered in terms of tool availability, 
tool design, and creating an efficient learning environment for acquisition professionals.  
Literature Review 
The literature review examined existing research and surveys of the acquisition 
workforce performed in recent years. MITRE found several recurrent themes in the existing 
data. 
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The federal government must meet wide-ranging and dynamic mission imperatives 
with limited budgets and resources. Programs are regularly faced with budget reductions 
and cost saving/efficiency targets, but are also challenged to think critically to develop 
innovative solutions to quickly acquire and deliver services and solutions to users. To 
address these challenges, the government relies on acquisition professionals who are 
knowledgeable of the acquisition system and capable of developing creative and innovation 
solutions in a constrained environment. 
To understand the specific factors preventing the workforce from successfully 
developing and implementing innovation solutions, the MITRE team reviewed the 2016 
government-wide survey of federal acquisition executives conducted by Grant Thornton 
Public Sector and the Professional Services Council (PSC), Aligning for Acquisition 
Success: Overcoming Obstacles to Results. One of the areas explored by this survey is 
barriers to innovation in acquisition. The survey asked about the perceived challenges 
preventing the acquisition workforce from successfully developing and implementing 
innovative solutions. Figure 1 depicts the breakout of the top reported barriers to innovation 
in acquisition. 
 
 Reported Barriers to Innovation in Acquisition Figure 1.
(Grant Thornton & PSC, 2016) 
Workforce skills was reported as the top inhibitor to innovation. The fear of oversight 
and protests was the second highest barrier to innovation. These two factors combined 
make up approximately 55% of the barriers reported. This is important as these responses 
suggest the workforce believes it is not adequately skilled to develop and acquire innovative 
solutions nor adequately supported to take risks. Grant Thornton and PSC (2016) also go on 
to say that “these factors contribute to a confidence gap, as workers remain unprepared or 
unwilling to take well-reasoned risks to achieve potential innovations or cost savings, 
instead defaulting to familiar, often suboptimal, strategies.”  
Grant Thornton and PSC (2016) made an important observation that “these inhibitors 
are interconnected. Acquisition workers’ inexperience means they tend to focus on 
compliance and don’t understand the flexibilities in the FAR. Thus, they tend to be overly 
risk-averse out of fear of protests or punishment, rather than trying new and different things.” 
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An unskilled acquisition workforce has severe impacts on the government and its 
ability to execute its missions effectively. The Center for the Study of Democratic Institutions 
at Vanderbilt University, in cooperation with Princeton University and the Volcker Alliance, 
conducted a survey on the future of government service, garnering responses from over 
3,500 federal executives that found very similar results. When asked if the executives worry 
about an inadequately skilled workforce as a significant obstacle to fulfilling their agency’s 
core mission, 39% responded “agree” or “strongly agree” (Center for the Study of 
Democratic Institutions, 2015).  
These results highlight the need to improve workforce skills and to develop and 
shape a workforce confident in their abilities and in having the right tools and access to 
information to develop and execute innovative solutions to achieve mission objectives.  
MITRE also wanted to understand the impact of the changing acquisition workforce 
demographic on the government’s ability to effectively execute acquisitions. Figure 2 shows 
that approximately 50% of the acquisition workforce within the DoD is eligible to retire within 
the next 10 years. Jeffrey Koses, a Federal Acquisition Institute board member, notes that 
“fully developing an acquisition professional takes five to 10 years.” A transitioning workforce 
combined with a steep learning curve for acquisition has led to a knowledge gap. Koses 
says it best in terms of the future acquisition workforce, noting that the government should 
be “rethinking training to match the way these digital natives are accustomed to receiving 
and consuming information” (McCabe & Laurent, 2015). 
 
 Civilian Acquisition Workforce Demographics (FY 2008–2016Q1) Figure 2.
(USD[AT&L], 2016) 
Grant Thornton and PSC (2016) elaborate on this, stating that generational issues 
present a major challenge for the future. This includes replacing the retiring baby boomers 
who make up 50% of the retirement-eligible workforce and training and retaining the 
millennials who will replace them. A Grant Thornton and PSC (2016) respondent 
commented, “The federal employment construct of a ‘job for life’ is not the mindset of 
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millennials.” This makes revitalizing acquisition workforce training and tools imperative not 
just to educate the new workforce but also to retain them. 
McCabe and Laurent (2015) note that keeping and maintaining a workforce from the 
millennial generation is very difficult because they tend to stay in jobs for only about two to 
three years. The Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics 
(USD[AT&L]) Performance of the Defense Acquisition System: 2016 Annual Report 
highlighted the need for a focus on younger generations given the amount of retirement 
eligible workforce members (see Figure 2).  
As the experienced workforce retires and moves on, federal acquisitions are 
challenged to bridge the knowledge gap and prepare the next generation of professionals to 
face the challenges of an increasingly complex acquisition system. We believe the changing 
workforce demographic is a significant impact to federal acquisitions.  
Also of interest to our research is the workforce thoughts on existing acquisition 
training and tools. Acquisition workforce training and tools haven’t modernized much over 
the past two decades. Stan Soloway, PSC’s former President and Chief Executive Officer, 
states that training is “bound to traditional models and assumptions far more relevant to a 
hardware-dominated, single-customer market of limited commerciality.” Existing training and 
tools provide a basic level of understanding necessary to establish a solid acquisition 
foundation, but they remain relatively focused on tried and true methods that don’t always 
lend to the innovative thinking and problem-solving. The dated and status quo focus on the 
FAR being rigid and unforgiving discourages new hires from thinking outside of the box and 
doesn’t develop skills to take advantage of the flexibilities it offers. The government must 
encourage the future acquisition workforce to change acquisition and its culture, and it must 
embrace the innovative ways this generation learns (McCabe & Laurent, 2015). 
Additionally, more agile training methods are required to address the changing 
nature of acquisition, innovation, and the marketplace. The typical large hardware system 
acquisition rubric doesn’t translate well when acquiring rapidly changing technologies or 
services. Acquisition techniques need to evolve from those established decades ago to 
result in a successful acquisition workforce. 
MITRE Acquisition Workforce Survey Methodology  
MITRE conducted a survey to collect information to test the below hypotheses and to 
assess the need for development of solutions that enable the acquisition workforce to better 
navigate the acquisition processes, access acquisition information, and improve knowledge 
and skills to operate in the complex federal acquisition environment. 
The survey was designed to explore the following theories: 
• Federal acquisition has a long learning curve. Only those with five or more 
years of experience have adequate knowledge and confidence to execute 
their role in the acquisition process for any size acquisition and any type of 
product or service without having to rely heavily on the expertise of others in 
their field. More than 25% of the current DoD acquisition workforce has less 
than five years of experience. Therefore, the DoD does not have enough 
experienced acquisition professionals to adequately execute acquisitions 
(USD[AT&L], 2016).  
• Acquisition professionals rely heavily on the expertise of more experienced 
colleagues to learn acquisition skills. As the number of proficient acquisition 
professionals continues to decrease (due to attrition), those with less than 
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five years of experience will not have enough experienced professionals 
available from whom to learn how to execute their role in the acquisition 
process. 
• Acquisition has become increasingly complex over the past five years. If this 
trend continues and acquisition complexity continues to increase, it will 
become even more challenging to train an inexperienced workforce, 
especially if existing tools are inadequate and not updated in a timely 
manner. This will decrease the likelihood that programs can successfully 
navigate the acquisition life cycle to deliver within cost, schedule, and 
performance requirements. 
• Acquisition professionals do not have the necessary knowledge, tools, and 
training to tailor the acquisition process for the specific solution they are 
acquiring. Furthermore, the available information is not organized in an easily 
navigable fashion. 
Survey Results  
Survey responses were received from over 250 individuals supporting the DoD, 
civilian agencies, and the intelligence community. Figure 3 depicts the survey respondents’ 
demographics. 
 
 Respondent Community Breakdown Figure 3.
Acquisition Has a Long Learning Curve 
Of the total respondents, 64% stated that it takes 10 years or more to become fully 
proficient in acquisition. Furthermore, the longer the respondent had been in the acquisition 
workforce, the more years of experience the respondent believed that it took to become 
proficient: 18% of respondents believed it took upwards of 15 years to become proficient 
and 10% believed that it takes 20 years or more to become proficient. These responses are 
shown in Figure 4 and validate MITRE’s hypotheses. MITRE’s hypotheses are further 
supported by a Harvard Business Review (HBR) article stating it takes time to become an 
expert, a minimum of 10 years, and in some cases 15 to 25 years of steady practice 
(Ericsson, Prietula, & Cokely, 2007).  
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 Respondent Proficiency Responses Figure 4.
Nearly 50% of the DoD acquisition workforce lacks the necessary years of 
experience to be considered proficient in acquisition using this measurement (see Figure 2). 
This data supports the findings in the literature review of a sub-optimally experienced 
workforce. Taking into consideration the hypothesis that the learning curve associated with 
acquisitions is steep, the lack of experience equates to a sub-optimally skilled workforce as 
well.  
Acquisition Professionals Rely Heavily on Expertise of More Experienced Colleagues 
and Reference Tools 
First the study aimed to identify respondents’ preferred sources of information about 
federal acquisition. Figure 5 shows how respondents ranked formal training, more 
experienced colleagues, and reference tools. 
 
 Preferred Sources of Information Figure 5.
Only 10% of the respondents cited formal acquisition training as their primary avenue 
for learning. While classroom training supplies foundational knowledge about acquisition, it 
does not deliver the specific acquisition knowledge that easily translates into day-to-day 
practice. Respondents preferred to use either their more experienced colleagues or 
reference tools to answer their acquisition questions. 
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Approximately 46% of respondents confirmed that experienced colleagues are their 
primary source of acquisition information, while 44% use reference tools as their first choice. 
This confirms our hypothesis that acquisition professionals rely heavily on the expertise of 
more experienced colleagues, but also that professionals rely almost as much on reference 
materials. As the number of experienced professionals continues to decrease, the need for 
tools to bridge the knowledge gap becomes even more critical. 
Acquisition Has Become Increasingly More Complex 
The survey specifically asked if respondents believed acquisition has become more 
complex over the last five years; 74% of respondents believe that acquisition has become 
slightly more or significantly more complex. Along with this, respondents reported the results 
shown in Figure 6 regarding rating the most prevalent challenges to learning and executing 
acquisitions.  
 
 Rank Order of Challenges Figure 6.
Respondents felt pressure to “think outside of the box” and to be innovative, but did 
not feel supported in doing so and encountered considerable resistance when they sought 
to deviate from the status quo. The results also show that the government releases a large 
amount of policy and guidance that respondents are unable to appropriately adjudicate due 
to uncertainty of application or time to process the new changes. This confirms the 
hypothesis that acquisition continues to become more complex. This data also illustrates 
that the acquisition workforce is neither adequately empowered nor equipped to successfully 
execute acquisitions. If the government continues trying to “fix” acquisition by releasing 
additional policies and guidance, the risk that programs will miss cost, schedule, and 
performance goals rises.  
Acquisition Professionals Do Not Have the Necessary Knowledge, Tools, and 
Training to Tailor the Acquisition Process for the Specific Solution They Are 
Acquiring 
The survey then focused on the current tools and guidance that respondents noted 
they rely on to learn a new process and stay current with new information, for example, DAU 
Portal, or agency/organization-specific tools. The survey asked respondents to rate on a 
scale of 1 to 5 the following aspects of the existing tools and guidance: 
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• Currency: Is the available information accurate and up to date? 
• Relevancy: Does the information help you execute your acquisition? 
• Availability: Are you able to easily find the information that you need when 
you need it? 
• Usability: Are you able to easily navigate the tools (e.g., search capabilities)? 
• Digestibility: Is the information conveyed in a way that is easy to understand 
and apply to your acquisition? 
Respondents rated four out of the five aspects as poor, marginal, or fair. Figure 7 
shows that the workforce believes current tools lack relevance, usability, digestibility, and 
availability. Most survey respondents believe the existing tools are difficult to navigate to find 
the relevant information sought. 
 
 Current Tool Ratings Figure 7.
Finally, the survey asked respondents to rate the adequacy of existing tools, 
information, and training to help the acquisition workforce to tailor processes to fit unique 
acquisition needs. Of the respondents, 55% believe existing tools, information, and training 
are inadequate or only somewhat adequate to conduct tailoring activities.  
These ratings reinforce MITRE’s hypothesis regarding the state of existing tools for 
accessing the knowledge to execute acquisitions. In fact, a review of the major acquisition 
sites that provide the tools and information to the workforce revealed broken links, scattered 
information that is often outdated, misaligned guidebooks and recommendations with new 
policy, and scattered exemplars and best practices. Many of these websites were developed 
and designed in the 1990s/early 2000s and have never been updated. 
Overall, the survey results, literature review, and data analysis confirmed the 
hypotheses that MITRE developed about the acquisition workforce. MITRE used this 
information and generated recommendations for further research and development. 
Analysis 
MITRE found a disconnect between the expectations of DoD acquisition leadership 
and the capabilities of the workforce. For example, the workforce is constantly encouraged 
and challenged to be “innovative,” yet policy and processes for executing an acquisition 
program remain unchanged. The current acquisition environment is largely confined to 
executing acquisitions in an outdated manner that does not align with the demands for a 
workforce that thinks critically and is equipped to develop innovative strategies and solutions 
to meet warfighter needs faster than ever.  
The acquisition workforce is key in meeting Third Offset Strategy objectives that call 
for delivering innovative capabilities to ensure U.S. military superiority, which is being 
challenged by our “pacing competitors” (Pellerin, 2016). Yet the workforce is not currently 
trained to think critically or provided tools to enable such thinking. Fostering innovative 
acquisition thinking and strategies is essential to addressing acquisition challenges and 
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keeping pace with technological challenges. The government must also institute cultural and 
organizational changes to incentivize the workforce to deliver innovative solutions. 
Frank Kendall, Under Secretary for Defense, Acquisition, Technology & Logistics, 
has long encouraged critical thinking through the Better Buying Power 1.0–3.0 initiatives. 
DoD acquisition leadership also encourages tailoring of policy, when appropriate, to 
streamline acquisition timelines. For example, DoDI 5000.02 contains more than 12 
references to tailoring. The recent DoDI 5000.75, Business Systems Requirements and 
Acquisition, issued in February 2017, includes the following guidance regarding tailoring: 
Tailoring. The procedures used to develop business capability requirements 
and supporting systems will be tailored to the characteristics of the capability 
being acquired. Tailoring will focus on application of best practices to the 
totality of circumstances associated with the program, including affordability, 
urgency, return on investment, and risk factors. The functional sponsor, MDA, 
and CAE or designee will collaborate to tailor program strategies and 
oversight, including: program information, acquisition phase content, and the 
timing and scope of decision reviews and decision levels. (DoD, 2017, Sec. 4: 
Procedures) 
This policy gives acquisition professionals the latitude to tailor requirements and use 
best practices to address affordability, urgency, return on investment, and risk factors. But it 
assumes the workforce is familiar with business systems best practices and has the in-depth 
knowledge to apply tailoring to a unique acquisition program. Much of the acquisition 
workforce does not have the deep understanding of acquisitions necessary to know which 
processes and documents can be tailored to achieve effective and efficient results.  
The government must make revolutionary changes to align with the changing 
workforce demographic. Despite the massive amount of information available through online 
resources, the current acquisition environment lacks tools that enable the workforce to sort 
through all the policy, guidance, and available information to develop tailored solutions that 
satisfy warfighter needs.  
Conclusions and Recommendations 
The DoD is heavily burdened by bureaucratic processes, policies, and culture that 
prevent it from effectively exploiting leading technologies for military advantage. Former 
Defense Secretary Carter proclaimed that the DoD has a strategic imperative to innovate, 
with speed and agility the key factors, and championed investment in agile, innovative 
organizational structures/constructs. He chartered the Defense Innovation Board, composed 
of executives from the leading Silicon Valley companies and academia, to infuse innovation 
in the DoD. General Selva, Vice Chair of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, says the DoD is not 
organized for innovation and needs more operational experimentation.  
These expectations are lofty given the trajectory of the acquisition workforce. To 
achieve the success metrics established by DoD leadership, the DoD must make 
fundamental changes at the workforce level. The workforce needs modern tools to 
maneuver through the acquisition system and fill the gaps left by the retiring experienced 
personnel. To meet demands to identify, develop, and integrate game-changing 
technologies for our warfighters to maintain a technical superiority, the DoD must focus 
attention on the acquisition workforce to ensure it can respond to the ever-changing threat 
environment and the associated demands. 
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A Digitized Work Environment 
The government needs new tools to shorten the learning curve and appeal to a 
younger workforce accustomed to digital solutions. Although many online resources are 
currently available, they are limited in functionality and still require an extensive baseline 
knowledge of the acquisition system.  
Digitized policy allows the acquisition workforce, especially a more digitally focused 
workforce, to quickly access what is currently a collection of hundreds of pages of static .pdf 
documents with pages of reference documents. It provides instant clarification of 
terminology, links to relevant sections of up-to-date policy documents, and access to 
reference documentation without the user’s having to leave the site.  
Tailored Acquisition Approaches 
HBR cites an argument from 13th-century philosopher and scientist Roger Bacon 
that it would be impossible to master mathematics in less than 30 years. Today, individuals 
can master complex frameworks such as calculus in their teenage years. HBR attributes this 
to a change in the organization and accessibility of material and states, “Students of 
mathematics no longer have to climb Everest by themselves; they can follow a guide up a 
well-trodden path” (Ericsson, Prietula, & Cokley, 2007). This concept of repacking and 
improving accessibility can be applied to acquisitions through tailored models. 
Tailored acquisition models give users the benefit of pre-tailored, approved 
acquisition solutions for a variety of acquisitions. For example, tailored models for agile 
acquisitions can offer streamlined processes to guide implementation of agile solutions. 
Chang & Modigliani (2017) liken tailored acquisition models to “Google maps for 
acquisition”: 
Today, acquisition professionals are expected to tailor the DoDI 5000.02 on 
their own. This can be compared to handing them a map and telling them to 
figure out the best way to drive from New York City to Los Angeles. If this is 
their first time traveling this route, it would take a lot of time to study the map, 
plan the route, talk to others about shortcuts, and encounter traffic and 
detours along the way. Perhaps they will reach their destination, but not 
without wasting significant time and fuel. Proactively tailored models are the 
Google Maps for acquisition. Routes are optimized for the type of product or 
service being acquired with turn by turn guidance for each acquisition phase. 
Tailored acquisition models provide the acquisition workforce with a pre-
chartered route that guide users on a path for success. 
Tailored acquisition models are pre-filtered to provide only the information, 
processes, documentation, and reviews that are relevant for that type of 
acquisition. If a Service or Portfolio Acquisition Executive approves these 
models for their organization, programs no longer should request tailoring 
permission and obtain waivers from multiple oversight organizations. 
Programs can operate with pre-authorization to streamline specific 
procedures and documents based on the type of product or service being 
acquired. 
Tailored models aid acquisition professionals who lack a full understanding of the life 
cycle DoDI 5000.02 process to quickly determine the applicable processes, artifacts, and 
milestones necessary to execute a specific type of acquisition, such as an acquisition for an 
agile IT system. These tailored models include only the necessary artifacts and consolidated 
processes and milestones to eliminate unnecessary requirements. The government cannot 
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expect the workforce to move toward innovative and streamlined acquisition when they are 
clearly struggling with the basics.  
Workforce Cultural Changes 
In addition to new tools, such as tailored models and digitized policy, cultural 
changes are necessary to support and accomplish innovative solutions and translate high-
level policy into actual implementation at the workforce level. For example, tailored models 
can only succeed if acquisition executives and leadership at the Program Executive 
Organization (PEO) levels approve the use of tailored models and the accompanying 
modified processes.  
Accelerated learning can also be addressed by optimizing learning through on-the-
job training opportunities. For example, rather than assigning a crushing workload to 
acquisition veterans, organizational leaders could instead refocus the priority of seasoned 
veterans on growing the junior staff. Given the overwhelming workload that plagues many 
organizations, this may be difficult to implement. Per HBR, having expert coaches makes a 
big difference in the learning process to include accelerating the learning process (Ericsson, 
Prietula, & Cokely, 2007). But not attempting to identify opportunities to implement 
organizational cultural changes focused on developing the junior acquisition workforce 
present a long-term threat to the ability to execute acquisitions. 
The increasing complexity of acquisition also must be addressed. Business models, 
as well as technology, are changing. Continuing to rely upon traditional tools and training 
doesn’t support the acquisition workforce to “think outside the box” and “think critically.” The 
government has an opportunity to reshape the way it approaches acquisitions by leveraging 
the inexperience of the junior workforce. To do this, the government must create training 
opportunities that embrace the complex and changing landscape. For example, if the 
government were to simplify access to statutory and regulatory information through modern 
digital tools and implement tailored models, or even apps that speak to upcoming 
generations, training could instead focus around thinking critically and developing innovative 
solutions.  
FFRDC Digital Acquisition Capability 
To accelerate the learning curve through digital tools, MITRE recently launched 
ACQUIRE, a digital platform for acquisitions (http://acquire.mitre.org) to accelerate the 
learning curve through digital tools. ACQUIRE presents a new way of thinking about and 
executing acquisitions. 
• ACQUIRE provides a digital capability for acquisition professionals to 
understand the mechanics of implementing a type of acquisition with which 
they may be unfamiliar. 
• The platform contains digitized policy and tailored acquisition models that 
enable less-experienced professionals to quickly navigate the complex 
acquisition environment by consolidating and simplifying the vast amounts of 
available information.  
ACQUIRE gives members of the workforce one-stop access to current acquisition 
policy and enables them to quickly navigate to helpful and relevant information about the 
problem they are attempting to solve. 
Since MITRE is a Federally-Funded Research and Development Center, the 
ACQUIRE capability was developed for the public good and is available for use and 
application to the acquisition work environment.  
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Federal acquisitions can also leverage leading Artificial Intelligence (AI) tools, like 
IBM’s Watson, to digest vast amounts of structured and unstructured data from policies, 
guides, and program documentation to help programs apply the vast information sources 
and provide executives better visibility into their enterprise.  
References  
Center for the Study of Democratic Institutions. (2015). Survey on the future of government 
service. Washington, DC: Author.  
Chang, S., & Modigliani, P. (2017). Proactively tailored acquisition models. Defense 
Acquisition University. 
DoD. (2017). Business systems requirements and acquisition (DoD Instruction 5000.75). 
Washington, DC: Author. 
Ericsson, K., Prietula, M., & Cokely, E. (2007). Managing people: The making of an expert. 
Harvard Business Review. 
Grant Thornton & PSC. (2016). Aligning for acquisition success: Overcoming obstacles to 
results. Washington, DC: Author. 
McCabe, K., & Laurent, A. (2015, April 3). The real problem with acquisition training. 
Retrieved from http://www.govexec.com/contracting/2015/04/real-problem-acquisition-
training/109138/  
Pellerin, C. (2016, October 31). Deputy secretary: Third offset strategy bolsters America’s 
military deterrence. DoD News Defense Media Activity. 
Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics (USD[AT&L]). (2016). 
Performance of the defense acquisition system: 2016 annual report. Washington, DC: 
DoD. 
The Volcker Alliance. (2016). Doing the people’s business: Key competencies for effective 
public procurement. New York, NY: Author. 
 
Acquisition Research Program: 
Creating Synergy for Informed Change - 312 - 
2016 Assessment of the Civilian Acquisition Workforce 
Personnel Demonstration Project 
Jennifer Lamping Lewis—is an economist at the RAND Corporation and a member of the Pardee 
RAND Graduate School faculty. She has applied her expertise in strategy, incentives, and 
quantitative analysis to a number of issues in defense acquisition and workforce management, 
including a study exploring the relationship between the characteristics of the defense acquisition 
workforce and the performance of defense acquisition programs. Lewis has co-led or contributed to a 
number of other studies on workforce management issues, ranging from extending military tour 
lengths to facilitating military-to-civilian conversions to using auctions to induce voluntary separations 
and set incentive pays. Lewis formerly served as the associate director of RAND’s Forces and 
Resources Policy Center. Prior to joining RAND, she spent six years on the faculty of the University of 
Colorado at Boulder. Lewis received her doctorate in economics from Columbia University. 
Additional Authors: 
Laura Werber—is a senior management scientist at the RAND Corporation and a professor at the 
Pardee RAND Graduate School. She has experience applying a variety of research methods to 
defense workforce management and business process improvement concerns and has been 
recognized for her expertise with qualitative data in particular. Werber co-led the fiscal year 2012 
AcqDemo assessment and has led or contributed to studies pertaining to the need for STEM-degreed 
personnel in the Air Force, barriers to promotion for minorities within an intelligence agency, and best 
practices for recruiting and retaining members of the Air Force civilian acquisition workforce. Werber 
received her doctorate in organizational behavior from Stanford University. 
Cameron Wright—is a doctoral candidate at the Pardee RAND Graduate School and an assistant 
policy analyst at the RAND Corporation. His work includes devising and implementing a quality 
ranking system for over 500 engineering colleges in India, helping the U.S. Army improve deployment 
processes, and conducting a survey analysis of U.S. Special Operations Forces on their attitudes 
regarding the integration of women into their units. Wright received his master’s degree in business 
administration from Ohio University and a bachelor’s degree in economics from Bowling Green State 
University. 
Irina Danescu—is a research assistant at the RAND Corporation. She has contributed to a number 
of studies in defense acquisition and workforce management, including an examination of whether 
Australia should procure ships from foreign shipbuilders and an analysis of the U.S. Air Force’s 
capacity to provide intelligence analysis. Danescu received a bachelor’s degree in economics and a 
bachelor’s degree in public policy from Duke University. 
Jessica Hwang—is a doctoral candidate in the Statistics Department at Stanford University. Her 
contributions to RAND studies have included estimating installation-specific rates of sexual assault 
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Key Findings 
• Salary levels, salary growth, and retention outcomes in the Department of 
Defense Civilian Acquisition Workforce Personnel Demonstration Project 
(AcqDemo) were similar to those in the General Schedule (GS) system, after 
controlling for an array of other factors. 
• AcqDemo employees earned higher starting salaries but were promoted less 
frequently relative to equivalent employees in the GS system. 
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• Within AcqDemo, higher levels of contribution to the organizational mission 
were associated with higher salaries, more-rapid salary growth, more 
promotions, and a greater likelihood of retention. 
• However, less than half of AcqDemo survey respondents perceived a link 
between contribution and compensation. Possible explanations include a 
perceived lack of transparency regarding how performance ratings are 
calculated and translated to pay; difficulty measuring employee performance 
objectively and inclusively, particularly for managers; and a narrowing spread 
in salaries resulting from pay caps and AcqDemo business practices. 
• A majority of AcqDemo survey respondents expressed concerns about the 
transparency and fairness of various aspects of the appraisal and 
compensation system. 
The executive summary can be found at 
http://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR1783z1.html  
The full report can be found at 
http://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR1783.html  
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Abstract 
Our interest is to stimulate the development of innovative approaches to continuously 
assuring the cybersecurity of open architecture (OA) software systems. We focus on 
exploring the potential for using blockchains and smart contract techniques and how these 
techniques can be applied to support acquisition efforts for software systems for OA 
command and control, or business enterprise (C2/B) systems. We further limit our focus to 
examining the routine software system updates to OA software configuration specifications 
that arise during the development and evolution processes arising during system acquisition. 
We discuss new ways and means by which blockchains and smart contracts can be used to 
continuously assure the cybersecurity of software updates arising during OA software system 
development and evolution processes. We present a case study examining the software 
evolution process that updates an OA C2/B system to describe these details. We then 
discuss some consequences that follow for what emerges from these innovations in the 
expanded scope of cybersecurity assurance of not just the delivered OA C2/B software 
systems, but also in the engineering processes which create, transform, or otherwise update 
technical data that is central to the acquisition of OA software systems. 
Overview 
How might we stimulate the development of innovative approaches to continuously 
assuring the cybersecurity of open architecture (OA) software systems? This is the 
acquisition research challenge we are addressing. In particular, we are interested in 
investigating innovations that represent either incremental improvements or substantial 
departures from our current acquisition practices for such systems. We target our efforts to 
practical OA software system production, deployment, and sustainment, for applications like 
command and control or business enterprise (C2/B) systems that are central to the mission 
and operations of military or industrial enterprises. We seek to stimulate significant 
innovations that employ emerging concepts and technologies to problems observable in the 
acquisition, development, and evolution of modern C2/B systems.  
Problem 
The particular problem we investigate here is how best to develop and demonstrate 
a new conceptual approach to providing continuous cybersecurity assurance (DoD & GSA, 
2013) with OA C2/B software systems in response to evolutionary updates to currently 
Acquisition Research Program: 
Creating Synergy for Informed Change - 317 - 
installed software configurations that routinely arise during the technical development and 
maintenance, upkeep, and sustainment in the field—what we call “software evolution.” 
Solution 
The innovations we focus our attention to are the concepts, techniques, and 
technologies that denote blockchains and smart contracts, along with how they can be used 
to continuously assure the cybersecurity of software updates arising during OA software 
system development and evolution processes. 
Approach 
Our efforts focus on an innovative utilization of blockchains and smart contracts 
within the technical software development and evolution processes that arise within the 
acquisition of complex OA C2/B software systems. We are not focusing attention at this time 
to software purchasing activities or financial transactions, though blockchains and smart 
contracts are likely to stimulate innovations in this aspect of OA software system acquisition. 
Why This Approach? 
Based on prior studies of issues and challenges arising in the development and 
evolution of OA software systems for C2/B system applications (Guertin, Sweeney, & 
Schmidt, 2015; Scacchi & Alspaugh, 2012–2017; Womble et al., 2011), we have already 
drawn attention to technical problems that arise in the software engineering processes that 
software producers, system integrators, and customer end-users (both enterprises and 
individuals therein) experience. But we recognize these processes are partially-ordered sets 
of activities whose completion often entails technical data transactions like creation of digital 
system design documents, composition and integration of software components (e.g., 
applications, mobile apps, plug-in widgets), and deployed software executable/update 
packages that are stored, installed, and tracked in different online repositories across a 
network environment. At present, these transactions often lack a common or centralized 
repository for tracking these diverse transactions across networked platforms that span an 
OA software system ecosystem (a supply chain network from producers to system 
integrators to customer enterprises/individuals). We believe blockchains are a candidate for 
this. These transactions similarly lack a common and potentially reusable specification for 
how to manage and track such software engineering transactions in forms that are open to 
independent validation and audit. We believe smart contracts are a candidate to address 
this. 
Background: Blockchains and Smart Contracts as Ledgers and Contractual 
Agreements for Tracking and Managing Transactions 
Blockchains are a 21st century computational mechanism for realizing the equivalent 
of the traditional bookkeeping ledger utilized in finance and accounting. Such ledgers record 
and track the assignment of incoming (budget authorization or revenue) and outgoing 
(allocations and expenses) enterprise transactions and denominated amounts, whether in a 
monetary currency, bartered trade, or some other transactional resource (e.g., gold bullion, 
Bitcoins, original artworks; DuPont & Maurer, 2015). Such transactions are grouped in 
blocks; for example, a set of interrelated OA software system updates may be grouped 
together into a block that denotes a transformation of the current system configuration into 
an evolved system configuration. Both transactions and blocks are serialized, logged, 
timestamped, and tracked in ways that are open to internal, external, or independent 
verification and audit by decentralized third-parties (“Blockchain,” n.d.). Updates to the 
blockchain are allowed only by consensus of remote mechanisms and proofs of work by 
anonymous, untrusted service providers (called miners) who collect a modest execution fee 
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for their efforts. The payment and deposit of an execution fee also mitigates against the 
actions of unknown others who might act to corrupt the blockchain state. Finally, 
blockchains can be realized as persistent databases or cloud-based repositories 
(“Blockchain,” n.d.). Figure 1 displays a traditional centralized ledger versus a decentralized 
blockchain ledger. 
 
 Traditional Ledger Network (Left) and Decentralized Blockchain Ledger Figure 1.
Network (Right) 
Blockchains operate as an append-only data structure or database maintained by a 
decentralized collection of mutually distrusting computational nodes participating in a peer-
to-peer network. Blockchains are secure by design (“Blockchain,” n.d.). Blockchain ledgers 
are updated (appended) as a result of recorded transactions, much like a personal bank 
account is updated through deposit, withdrawal, credit, or debit transactions made by the 
account holder, through a third-party (the bank or transaction system processor), who may 
charge a fee for transactions. Much like bank account transactions, blockchain update 
transactions are distributed over a network, time-stamped, persistent, and verifiable. 
However, the peer-to-peer network of blockchain nodes is a decentralized autonomous 
authority without legal standing, compared to the centralized authority taken by a bank or 
credit/debit card transaction processor.  
Smart contracts are similarly the computational counterparts of traditional paper 
contracts for how a group of interrelated transactions will be governed to assure fulfillment of 
terms, conditions, rights, and obligations. Such transactions, for example, may be 
associated with the acquisition of a complex system or with the ongoing procurement of 
retail supply purchasing agreements. These smart contracts denote networked software 
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system protocols that facilitate, verify, or enforce the negotiation or performance of a 
specified contract, and thus denote which transactions to process (where, when, how, and 
for what parties) in what order (“Smart Contracts,” n.d.). They are realized using computer-
based, formal specifications of transaction-based processes that can be codified into 
executable computer programs. Such computational support allows for modeling, analysis, 
and simulation of transactions or processes that can be enacted, verified, and validated at 
Internet-time speeds, with precision and automated recall of transaction details well beyond 
what enterprises have traditionally performed. Smart contracts also allow for the 
establishment and operation of decentralized autonomous services that allow for 
cooperating parties to enact and fulfill the details of a shared contract through only 
automated means. Next, smart contracts are automatically enforced by the consensus 
mechanism associated with the blockchain. Smart contracts are thus attractive to use to 
securely manage recurring transactions between known or unknown parties, such as those 
associated with updating the technical data, source code, repositories, and related artifacts 
associated with the software development and evolution processes of large, long-term 
software acquisition efforts.  
Blockchains are being extended to accommodate smart contracts that allow for the 
formation of virtual, decentralized autonomous organizations that act to govern, enforce, and 
assure the integrity and validity of complex or idiosyncratic blockchain update transactions 
(“Smart Contracts,” n.d.). For example, multi-party agreements whereby two or more 
program offices or other enterprises can act to share the procurement costs of a new C2/B 
system application or component of mutual interest to the participating parties (Reed et al., 
2012; Reed et al., 2014; Scacchi & Alspaugh, 2015). Similarly, smart contracts can govern 
transactions between mutually distrusting participants that are automatically enforced by 
automated consensus mechanisms associated with blockchain updates. This capability thus 
provides a mechanism for detecting, rejecting, or preventing unauthorized update 
transactions to the blockchain, as might be attempted via a cyber attack during OA software 
system development or evolution. Accordingly, our interest is to investigate how 
blockchains, smart contracts, and related technologies can be utilized to improve 
cybersecurity, specifically to manage and track software engineering development and 
evolution processes that entail process transactions that update the configuration of OA 
software systems. 
So how might we utilize blockchains and smart contracts to innovate the continuous 
development and evolution of OA systems? How can this be conceived and applied in ways 
that are not specifically limited to financial transactions commonly associated with system 
acquisition?  
Blockchains and Smart Contracts for Installed Software Configurations 
How might we utilize blockchains and smart contracts to record, track, and verify 
updates to OA software system configurations as they evolve over time? We examine this 
question in this section. 
Ledgers of Installed Software Configurations 
We envision a new kind of ledger: one that records executable computational 
updates to the specification of the current installed, operational configuration of C2/B 
systems of interest. The executable computational updates are similar to scripts in a 
declarative scripting language, like those used to direct the invocation of utilities on an 
operating system, procedural scripts involved in building (compiling and integrating) a 
targeted software executable, or for customizing the functional display and navigation 
operations within a Web browser. We call the repository in which this specification is 
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recorded the installed software configuration (ISC) ledger. Such a specification is a kind of 
technical data to be managed with an acquisition effort.  
The ISC ledger records the transactions that update the software applications, 
including their components, interconnections, interfaces, or licenses for such installed on 
each machine of interest, such as a desktop PC, smartphone, or central computation server 
within a mission command or enterprise data center. The installation is enacted via an 
installation (update) transaction, which may be enabled using an “installation wizard” for a 
standalone PC application, or using a ready-to-install packaged software app acquired from 
an online app store. For each application installed, the ledger lists the repository from which 
the software app or update was acquired, the version of the application or update, and some 
information with which to confirm/verify the version, such as the size of that version of the 
app, meta-data about where it resides in storage on the machine, other information, or a 
combination of these. How do we ensure that the repository’s copy is safe, has not been 
unintentionally modified, and has not been attacked or unknowingly compromised? How do 
we ensure that attacks are not falsely recorded in the ledger?  
In order for a ledger to be up-to-date, each approved installation must be recorded 
there. How do we ensure this is the case for approved installations? If a ledger is up to date, 
then an auditor can verify the approved installations by examining the ISC specification for 
the machine of interest (e.g., a smartphone or laptop PC). Furthermore and most 
importantly, the blockchain can be queried to identify non-approved or non-compliant 
installations and whether these are apps or updates that were innocently installed but not 
recorded in the ledger or attacks—maliciously injected software for some nefarious purpose, 
which would not be recorded in the ledger. In either case, the auditor can then institute for 
each application that does not match the ledger a rollback to a known safe ISC state 
matching what has previously been verified on the ledger. 
The following issues must be managed appropriately for the ledger scheme to 
succeed.  
• How is it ensured that the origination or destination repository’s copy is 
safe and has not been attacked? 
This is a separate concern, and one that is equally problematic with or 
without a ledger system. We do not discuss it further here, merely noting that 
it must be ensured for devices to remain secure. But in normal operation, the 
ISC specification has a unique identifier in the hashcode value associated 
with the current system when last updated and verified by miners, and this 
hashcode may reveal whether the ISC specification copy’s hashcode 
matches the one checked during audit or subsequent miner verification 
activities. If the hashcode values are different, then something has altered the 
copy, and thus it may be rolled back to a prior verified state or ISC 
specification. 
• How is it ensured that every approved installation or update is recorded 
in the ledger? 
The ledger system must be integrated with whatever system manages 
installations and updates for the machines in question. We note that 
unapproved installations or updates can be automatically detected and can 
be rolled back or reverted at the next audit point/event, so there will be a 
strong motivation to ensure that desired transactions are recorded. 
• How do we ensure that attacks are not falsely recorded in the ledger? 
Obviously this is a key concern. As discussed later, changes to the ledger are 
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validated by multiple autonomous parties (miners) using several sources of 
information, and each particular copy of a ledger competes with all others for 
accuracy as part of the blockchain scheme. 
Transactions for Installed Software Configurations 
Each transaction in a ledger records an installation or update of an app on a specific 
machine. How do we ensure that all valid installations or updates are presented? Every time 
a new application is installed, or an existing application is updated, the appropriate 
information is recorded in the ledger. If an application is installed or updated without being 
recorded in the ledger, that installation or update is recognized as unverified, and thus rolled 
back the next time the machine is audited. Audits may simply involve checking a hashcode 
value (a long, non-guessable string of characters that is generated within the blockchain 
system) associated with the current ISC specification on the target machine, with the 
corresponding value in the blockchain (this is a simple match-checking query that can be 
performed periodically), or by enterprise policy. When the audit reveals a mismatch, then a 
rollback may be triggered that reverts the ISC on the machine to a previously trusted ISC, 
and then removes, deprecates, or flags the unverified ISC as suspect, along with distributing 
a notification to relevant parties of such action following enterprise policy. But how do we 
ensure that only valid installations or updates are presented? Transactions that would 
record an invalid installation or update, fraudulently misrepresenting the repository’s 
version’s size or hash or from an untrusted repository, are identified by comparison with the 
set of trusted repositories, with the size and hash information recorded there for the 
installation or update in question, and for the data calculated from the destination machine 
afterwards. Accordingly, we are acting to use blockchain techniques as intended, but for a 
new kind of use case, namely that of ISC specification update, verification, and 
reconciliation. 
Smart Contracts for Installed Software Configurations 
A smart contract works within the framework of the blockchain ledger and transaction 
system, ensuring that the required obligations for each transaction are met before the 
transaction is enacted, verified, and then recorded in the ledger. These obligations are 
associated with those we have previously identified and specified as security requirements 
for ensuring access and update rights encoded in a software system’s security license 
(Alspaugh & Scacchi, 2012). 
An Example Ledger, Transaction, Smart Contract Implementation System 
Ethereum is being used to implement smart contracts, transactions, and a blockchain 
ledger (“Ethereum,” n.d.). Ethereum is a set of technologies: a general-purpose 
programming language, open application program interfaces (APIs), and an open 
transaction/blockchain repository associated with the APIs. Ethereum uses a cryptocurrency 
called ether, and users of Ethereum can transfer money, ownership, or control of exchanged 
resources whose (fungible) value is denominated in the form of ether between each other 
and to contracts to hold in escrow. Online currency exchange markets can exist for 
converting ether to a traditional currency like U.S. dollars. Users of Ethereum send 
transactions to it in order to create contracts, invoke existing contracts, and transfer ether. 
The transactions are public and permanently recorded in the blockchain, unless access to 
the blockchain is restricted/private to an authorized set of known parties who must be 
granted permission to access or update the blockchain.  
Ethereum is decentralized, with a network of blockchains for which each transaction 
is processed by a number of miners, possibly anonymous actors, who perform computations 
on the blockchain that collectively verify the validity of a transaction of data/value between 
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the participating parties. These miners are mutually-untrusted peers who are paid fees (in 
ether) for the work of processing each transaction and its contract provisions. A miner 
groups transactions into blocks and performs a calculation (or “solves a puzzle”) that takes 
as inputs the previous block in the blockchain and the transactions in the new block. A valid 
block, one whose puzzle has been solved and which meets certain other conditions, can be 
appended to the blockchain. The miner broadcasts the new valid block to the network and 
receives the ether paid for each of the transactions by their originators. In this way, 
Ethereum-based smart contracts are validated by decentralized miners who receive 
payment when contracted transactions they verify are successfully appended by consensus 
to the blockchain. 
A transaction may appear in a number of different blocks, produced by different 
miners and appended to different blockchains. Ethereum pays miners somewhat more to 
append a block to a longer blockchain, which has the effect, over time, of converging the 
ledger to the blocks and thus transactions that the majority of miners agree are valid. 
Continuous Software Development and Evolution Processes for Open Architecture 
Software Systems 
In previous work, we have identified and substantiated seven types of software 
evolution process update transactions, shown in Figure 2. We further observe that a given 
software evolution process may entail either (a) one type of transaction per update, or (b) 
multiple concurrent types of updates per transaction. This may be due to current-to-evolved 
transformations where the evolved system version of the OA configuration involves the 
replacement of more than one component arising from the availability of a new technology 
that represents a departure from the current system architecture, or that integrates 
functionally similar capabilities through a new mix of components, interfaces and 
interconnections (e.g., when combining multiple widgets into mashups; Endres-Niggemeyer, 
2013). The purpose may be to reduce software maintenance complexity and extend the 
sustainability of a deployed current (or legacy) system through adoption and integration of 
remote (cloud-based) services that are functionally similar to the capabilities formerly 
available in multiple components. For example, replacing legacy office productivity 
applications (word processor, email, calendar) with browser-based remote networked 
services (Google Docs, Microsoft Office 365), can provide end-users with functionally-similar 
processing capabilities, but with fewer application components installed on the end-user’s 
desktop PC system. Furthermore, subsequent updates to remote services may by policy be 
integrated and deployed automatically for minor functionally equivalent evolutionary updates 
(e.g., bug fixes), or be deployed only by request or authorization when functionally similar 
system version updates are made available (Scacchi & Alspaugh, 2013a, 2015, 2016, 
2017). 
Blockchains and Smart Contracts for Managing Software Development and 
Evolution Process Transactions 
How might we utilize blockchains and smart contracts to manage software 
development or evolution updates to OA software system configurations over time? We 
examine this question in the following section.  
Ledger: What Versions of What Software Components and Connectors Are Integrated 
in What OA Configuration Topology 
A ledger records and defines through the design-time OA specification, the 
ecosystem in which the OA is evolving (Scacchi & Alspaugh, 2012). The OA is represented 
using an architecture description language, and successive ledger entries record successive 
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configurations of the OA system as it evolves. The ledger as a whole presents the history of 
the OA’s evolution, and as long as the components and connectors remain available from 
their repositories, an instance of any stage of the OA can be rebuilt as needed. At a 
minimum the ledger records every release of the OA system. 
 
 Seven Types of Software Evolution Update Transactions  Figure 2.
(Scacchi & Alspaugh, 2013) 
If a machine on which the OA ISC is installed needs to be rolled back to an earlier 
configuration, the desired version of the ISC can be rebuilt guided by the corresponding 
ledger entry. 
Transactions: OA Evolution Steps 
Each transaction corresponds to one (or several) of the seven types of OA evolution, 
stating which component, connector, or license is being changed or what change is being 
made to the OA topology. In total, the sequence of all transactions for an OA system 
represents the history of its evolution. The ledger summarizes the system’s evolution, based 
on the transactions made to it, and presents each of the versions that the evolution has 
proceeded through. 
Not everyone can record a transaction with the ledger, and each actor that can 
record a transaction may be restricted in precisely what sorts of transactions can be 
recorded. These restrictions ensure that the OA ISC is evolved through steps that preserve 
its security. It also accommodates actors who may or may not have been vetted and 
authorized so that they are trusted to preserve the system’s security through their 
transactions. 
Smart Contracts: Enforcing Obligations for Each OA Evolution Step 
Smart contracts restrict the transactions that may occur to those believed to preserve 
the OA system’s security as the system evolves. A transaction may only be enacted if the 
actor doing to has been vetted and authorized for it, and has presented credentials 
identifying himself appropriately; and also only if the current state of the OA system 
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development and the evolution step(s) proposed meet the conditions imposed by a smart 
contract associated with the ledger. The smart contract in essence states obligations that 
the actor, the evolution step, and the OA system must meet in order for the transaction to 
occur; if the obligations are not met, then the transaction cannot be performed, at least not 
with this smart contract. The obligations declared in a smart contract indicate which parties 
or actors can access/update what OA system elements or other technical data arising during 
software development or evolution processes. As before, these process obligations are 
similar to those previously identified for controlling software system/data usage obligations, 
along the rights to access and update the system/data provided to developer, system 
integrators, or end-users (Alspaugh & Scacchi, 2012). 
It is possible that more than one smart contract may potentially allow a specific 
transaction, each contract presenting a different set of obligations. But in any case the 
transaction cannot proceed until a smart contract for the ledger allows it to do so. 
To help make clear what we are looking to accomplish through our efforts to 
stimulate innovation in securing the development and evolution of OA software systems, we 
now turn to present a case study focusing on updating the installed software configuration of 
a deployed current OA C2/B software system. 
Case Study: OA C2/B Software System Evolution Process Updates 
In this case study, we describe how blockchains and smart contracts can be 
employed to model and analyze cybersecurity requirements for OA software systems that 
arise during the software evolution processes. As described previously, there are seven 
types of software evolution process updates that take a current system, transform it one of 
the seven ways, which produces an evolved system. This evolution process iteratively 
cycles through software development processes that build, release, and deploy (Scacchi & 
Alspaugh, 2013b, 2017) installed software configurations once the development life cycle 
starts. The process continues to (slowly) cycle over time, until the system is retired or 
abandoned. Our focus further narrows to evolving OA C2/B systems that incorporate 
multiple end-user computing platforms, such as smartphones, tablets, or other Web-
compatible “edge” devices (Zheng & Carter, 2015), as we have addressed before (Scacchi 
& Alspaugh, 2015, 2016). 
Blockchain ledgers serve to verify in a decentralized manner the proper sequencing 
of valid transactions for a user/device account. Such an account operates like a personal 
bank account that can be used to deposit and withdraw funds (e.g., through account 
transactions associated with a debit/credit card that is bound to the account). The enterprise 
that manages accounts for users may charge a fee for account transactions, though such 
fees may be assigned to a third-party (e.g., the party who receives payment via a card that 
has been authorized to possess sufficient funds balance to cover the payment in the future). 
The current “balance of funds” in a software evolution process account indicates the name, 
size, and other meta-data that identify executable software applications (including mobile 
apps, plug-in widgets, or other installed software). At present, computing platforms or 
devices do not maintain software process transaction accounts, but in our scheme they 
would.  
Next, the blockchain ledger as a decentralized database would be distributed across 
a (virtual private) network of computing systems, such as those with restricted, authenticated 
access to a centralized C2/B system host/sub-network. Said differently, if we have 
smartphones or mobile/laptop PCs that can roam in the wild, and intentionally or 
unintentionally acquire software updates (e.g., known app updates but with revised access 
rights; new social media apps; or cyber-penetration attack vectors via misdirected access to 
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a remote server), we want all such evolutionary software update transactions to be 
reconciled and validated against the corresponding virtual private network’s blockchain 
ledger in ways that maintain device/user autonomy, but reveal and can reject unvalidated 
evolutionary updates. The ways and means for how valid or invalid transactions are 
revealed (externally documented on the blockchain) or rejected (e.g., enforced automated 
uninstallation, external network access blocked, or notify user of problematic update) are 
determined by enterprise cybersecurity policies encoded into an associated smart contract 
(a functional software program logically isolated from end-user application software).  
Let us consider the following usage scenario. Suppose we have a mission platform 
like a battleship or a multi-ship flotilla (or, alternatively, an aircraft flight wing, a ground-
based command post, or remote enterprise business office) assigned to operate within an 
international location. Such a location may be in a region known to have a history of prior 
cybersecurity attacks on personal computers, mobile, or Web-based devices that access the 
public Internet. Mission personnel are restricted by policy from using their enterprise mobile 
devices outside the cybersecurity perimeter of the mission platform. However, personnel 
may also possess and use private personal devices, such as low-cost smartphones that are 
used for non-mission purposes.  
As anyone who possesses and routinely uses a mobile/edge device like a 
smartphone or laptop PC now frequently experiences, software (evolution) updates are 
common, sometimes one or more per week across the 30–60+ apps found on such devices. 
Sometimes mistakes are made by personnel regarding which device to use for accessing 
remote services like making phone calls to home, to informally coordinate with friends in 
allied forces, to check for local restaurants offering interesting local cuisines, or to post data 
for sharing on social media. Access control to some devices may be misconfigured due to a 
prior update or unintentionally left open in a discoverable device pairing mode, so that other 
unknown devices or remote computers can quietly/covertly make network connections that 
enable data/files upload, download, or remote control. Mobile or web-based edge devices 
will be relentlessly targeted for cyber attack, so when a cyber attack vulnerability is in the 
hands of opposing forces or hostile competitors, we assume they will seek out and attack 
these vulnerabilities at some time and place. It is therefore these invalid software evolution 
updates to installed software configurations that denote potential cyber attacks that we seek 
to detect, isolate, trace, expunge or prevent, using the capabilities of blockchains and smart 
contracts. In this way, our use of blockchains and smart contracts is innovative, original, and 
not previously associated with software evolution process transactions. 
Consider a desktop PC with apps/widgets acquired from either a restricted-access 
enterprise-specific app store, a Defense app store (George et al., 2014; George, Morris, & 
O’Neil, 2014), or else from a public-access app store or OSS component repository. Web 
browser-based apps like cloud-based word processors, calendars, and email app services 
are frequently included in such stores. However, open access app stores (like those 
operated by Apple, Google, Microsoft, and others) also offer free/low-cost apps that offer 
many other remote, cloud-based services. In either situation, these remote service apps 
may operate downloaded software code that runs within a platform-based Web browser that 
accesses public or (virtual) private networks. Enterprise end-users with computer 
programming expertise may even create and integrate multiple apps/widgets into mashups 
as a kind of end-user software evolution process update (Endres-Niggemeyer, 2013; 
Scacchi & Alspaugh, 2015). These mashups may enable the participating apps/widgets to 
interoperate, exchange or update local data, or transfer data/files to/from remote networked 
repositories (Scacchi & Alspaugh, 2015, 2016). 
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If our mobile device is a laptop PC, its current (or legacy) OA software configuration 
may include open source software (OSS) or proprietary closed source software (CSS) 
versions of a common Web browser, word processor, email, calendar, and more hosted on 
the PC’s operating system. For instance, a laptop may have a Firefox web browser (OSS), 
AbiWord (OSS) or Microsoft Word (CSS) word processor, Gnome Evolution (fOSS) or 
Outlook (CSS) for email and calendaring, and host a PC operating system like a 
Fedora/Linux distribution (OSS), Microsoft Windows (CSS), or Apple OSX (CSS and OSS). 
The deployed, run-time executable version of this OA ISC system on the laptop PC may 
appear to an end-user as an array of loosely-coupled applications, such as displayed in 
Figure 3. Now, suppose a decision has been made to update this OA ISC system, to evolve 
it from the current configuration to one where the word processor, email, and calendaring 
applications hosted on the laptop PC are to be replaced with functionally similar remote Web 
services that will operate within the existing Web browser. These remote services thus entail 
reliance and usage of browser-based software components that are hosted in the cloud and 
downloaded on user demand. This transition can simplify and reduce the costs of 
corresponding software update services associated with locally hosted applications (e.g., 
recurring license fees for CSS elements). The resulting deployed and evolved laptop PC 
software system may appear to the end-user as shown in Figure 6. 
Each type of software evolution process update can have a smart contract 
associated with it. Each such contract programmatically specifies what computational 
actions need to be performed to complete the transaction with the affected technical data 
and associated data repositories, and similarly, what actions need to be performed on the 
blockchain. Let us consider the following transformation of a current ISC shown in Figure 3 
to an evolved ISC seen in Figure 6. Figure 3 corresponds to its ISC model visualized in 
Figure 4, which is derived from its specification in an architectural description language 
(ADL), as we have established before (Alspaugh, Asuncion, & Scacchi, 2013a; Alspaugh, 
Scacchi, & Asuncion, 2010). As the current system, we assume for this moment, that it has 
previously been submitted via an earlier transaction on the blockchain that was verified by 
miners and thus is now a recorded part of the blockchain. Thus we can determine the 
provenance of the current ISC system and its specification. This blockchain contains a 
record of the ISC specification and the results (e.g., blockchain hashcode values) that the 
miners computed and agreed by anonymous vote to denote the ISC installed and 
operational on the target machine/platform. The transformation from this current system to 
the evolved system thus entails enaction of the associated smart contracts associated with a 
set of embedded evolution update transactions that collectively denote what updates must 
be verified as a block for the evolved ISC specification to be appended to the blockchain. 
For example, we may elect to use a predefined smart contract (an executable 
software script) whose transactions transform a component-based C2/B system with a Web 
browser installed, into a remote service-based C2/B system, where Web/cloud-based 
services provide functionally similar capabilities to end-users. This might entail a smart 
contract that performs the following transactions (described in English for simplicity): (1) 
check that the ISC blockchain hashcode value(s) match those for the current system; if 
matching, then proceed; (2) deprecate and replace designated software application 
components with remote service apps/widgets; (3) replace deprecated component licenses 
with remote services licenses (e.g., ToS); (4) replace ISC interconnection topology with the 
evolved ISC; (5) send request to miners to independently compute and verify the evolved 
ISC specification hashcode value on the target machine/platform denotes the ISC and 
associated meta-data they independently build to compute the evolved ISC hashcode; (6) if 
miners’ vote independently verifies the ISC specification, then assert into the blockchain the 
evolved ISC specification value as denoting the new current ISC ready for use; and (e) 
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perform end of contract transactions. Many low-level details are not described here, but 
would need to be in a smart contract. These details can include, for instance, the installation 
parameter settings that are selected or configured by either the end-user or installation 
script, in line with a security technical implementation guide (STIG) for the targeted 
machine/platform.  
The software evolution conveyed in the smart contract example will change the 
topological configuration of software components found in the system integration build 
specification, release, and deployed run-time architectures. Here we see that in Figure 5, 
the configuration model of the evolved OA system still incorporates the same kind of 
components as the current system model (shown in Figure 4), but now the topology of 
components interconnections and interfaces has been updated to realize the deployed, run-
time desktop software. Last, a transformation from the current software components with 
their respective licenses, to the evolved configuration will also entail an update to new 
licenses (e.g., Google Terms of Service), and how these components will be secured (from 
end-user level assurance of locally installed components to end-user agreement with 
remotely provided component security that is mostly invisible to end-users).  
 
 Current Deployed OA ISC Corresponding to Figure 4, Utilized by End-Figure 3.
Users 
Note. Firefox Web Browser (Upper Left), Evolution Calendar (Lower Left), AbiWord Word 
Processor (Upper Right), and Fedora/Linux Desktop Operating System Platform (Lower 
Right) 
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 Current ISC Specification for OA C2/B System Figure 4.
(Scacchi & Alspaugh, 2013, 2017) 
Note. This is the current ISC specification for an OA C2/B system within security containers 
at build-time, intended to denote a record on the blockchain for which components need to be 
included during integration (and testing) of the software components and code APIs within 
the released and deployed ISC. 
 
 The Evolved OA ISC Specification at Build-Time Figure 5.
Note. The topology of the ISC has evolved, including where now legacy components have 
been deprecated and likely marked for eventual removal, so as to eliminate any residual 
vulnerability pathway still present. 
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 Evolved OA ISC Corresponding to Figure 5, Installed for Utilization by Figure 6.
End-Users 
Note. Firefox Web Browser as Before (Upper Left), Google Calendar (Lower Left), Google 
Docs (Upper Right), and Fedora/Linux Operating System Platform as Before (Lower Right) 
The transformation of the current system in Figure 3 and Figure 4 to the evolved 
system in Figure 5 and Figure 6 entails multiple types of software system evolution updates. 
But now we must consider whether and how such evolution process transactions potentially 
allow for introduction of cybersecurity vulnerabilities or attack vectors. This can happen, for 
instance, in the following ways: If the current system is trusted, because its components 
have individually had their security tested for known vulnerabilities and have passed 
assurance checks, then evolution process update transactions may introduce unintended 
vulnerabilities, either within the components replaced, within the new topological 
configuration, via shifts in the obligations or rights (added, subtracted, revised) in the new 
components, or via the overall incorporation of all of these evolutionary updates. So we 
need to assure the security of the update transactions acquired from the component 
producers and from the system integrators.  
As these transactions entail request-response transactions with remote parties 
across a network, then they may be vulnerable to “man-in-the-middle” attacks, as well as to 
mistakes made in selecting the appropriate component versions for the specific edge device 
platform. So we want these transactions to be coordinated and tracked using blockchains 
and smart contracts, so that we can better trust the security of the evolution process 
updates. Said differently, we want any and all updates that affect the OA software system 
components, interconnections and interfaces, or licenses to be mediated and verified by 
remote parties via blockchain transactions. This entails that each edge device or system 
platform must be able to periodically (e.g., daily, after an application program exits, or by 
mission-specific policy) identify itself and assert the “value” of its current ISC elements and 
configuration specification, in a way that can be reconciled against the last known 
corresponding verified values on the blockchain. If a discrepancy between the value of the 
last known (and trusted) current system configuration, and the system evolved configuration 
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is detected, then some unknown evolution update has occurred, such that system security is 
now unknown and may no longer be trusted. Such a condition may then produce a 
notification of such discrepancy, automatically revert to the last known trusted current 
system, or some other intervention action, depending on the evolution process update 
security policies expressed in the corresponding smart contract. Subsequently, we now 
have new ways and means for assuring, detecting, or preventing authorized/unauthorized 
evolutionary changes to an OA ISC during the software development and evolution 
processes which occur routinely during a system acquisition effort. 
Overall, the purpose of this case study is to help describe and reveal that common 
and widespread acquisition processes associated with the development, usage, or evolution 
of OA software systems supporting C2/B mission applications is not necessarily secure, and 
thus can allow for unknown or poorly understood evolutionary updates that are intended or 
not. Our efforts begin to characterize the need to continuously secure and assure these 
software engineering process updates and their provenance. Such continuous assurance 
capabilities are needed in addition to other techniques that focus on assuring the security 
and integrity of the individual software components acquired from diverse producers or 
integrators through software ecosystems that release deployable run-time software 
applications or remote services. 
Discussion 
There are three topics we find merit consideration, given what now appears possible 
in the use of blockchains and smart contracts as mechanisms for assuring software 
development and evolution process update transactions for OA C2/B systems. These are 
(a) how cyberattacks that may potentially arise in traditional software engineering processes 
can now be prevented, detected or marked for action; (b) innovations in acquisition research 
that may follow; and (c) future extensions of this line of research and study. 
Cyberattacks on Software Evolution, Release, and Update Processes  
The types of software evolution updates in Figure 2 also classify comparable types of 
attacks on OA systems during their development, build, deployment, and run time 
processes. The difference being that cyberattacks on software denote unauthorized or 
unverified updates from the current ISC during design-time, build-time, and deployment-time 
software engineering activities, to an evolved ISC. This implies that covert software 
evolution changes by an attacker may follow the same steps as those by a trusted software 
producer or system integrator, namely replacement of a component by a newer version or 
by a different component, access to a component through a different interface, replacement 
of a connector, or replacement of the topological configuration. (We are presently unaware 
of attacks involving replacement of a component license, but such attacks that 
change/rewrite IP or security license obligations and rights are clearly possible [Scacchi & 
Alspaugh, 2012, 2015, 2016].) The result is a compromised version of the system that is 
functionally similar to the current (trusted) ISC system, but masquerading as one that is 
authorized, validated, and functionally equivalent intended not to be recognized as 
something different. 
When the attack is made on a deployed instance of the ISC system, its presence can 
be identified by the change in the size or hashcode value of the compromised system, 
compared to the current system’s provenance established in the blockchain. The window of 
time during which the attacked system may take effect is limited by the frequency with which 
the edge device’s software is compared with what the blockchain ledger recorded as being 
installed, as after any change is discovered the edge system’s software can be rolled back 
to its (prior, now current) trusted configuration. 
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The process is more complex for attacks during development, build, and deployment, 
because the context is more complex. Here we wish to prevent insecure components, 
connectors, and configurations from being incorporated into the OA system, but an OA 
system is by its nature typically the result of a distributed, decentralized development, with 
components coming from other projects and developed and evolved by parties distant and 
often unknown to the OA system’s integrators. We foresee the use of blockchains, 
transactions, and smart contracts to record each component and connector’s provenance, 
vetting, and authorization. Smart contracts restrict the possible transactions (evolution steps) 
to those believed to preserve the OA system’s security. When an unexpected change is 
discovered in an edge device system’s software, it is rolled back to a safe version; when a 
security fault is discovered in a version of the system, a process that may be much more 
involved, the components, connectors, and topology involved may be rolled back to a 
trusted safe version, and the smart contracts through which the fault was introduced may be 
updated to prevent a “similar” evolution in the future. This may be done either by 
withdrawing authorization from actors involved, by blacklisting a component repository 
whose vetting was careless, or by similar means. The blockchain ledger records the 
information needed to take such steps. 
This points to two further areas of research. First, the blockchain ledger system now 
becomes a locus against which attackers will wish to operate, and further study is needed to 
examine how to resist such attacks, isolate their effect, and to the extent possible reject 
them through the blockchain and transaction mechanism itself. Second, can the ledger be 
used as a database of information for effectively distinguishing fraudulent or corrupted 
evolution steps? Further research will be necessary.  
The only allowed OA evolution updates of the secure system are those that are first 
verified as valid updates, from known trusted parties, and that satisfy a contract for the 
blockchain ledger. In cases where a vulnerable or corrupted component, connector, or 
topology successfully runs this gauntlet, the ledger provides a means for rolling back 
transactions to a secure version of the system that can be deployed in place of the insecure 
later version. 
We note that in contrast to a procedural programming language such as the Solidity 
language used for Ethereum contracts, a declarative scripting language mitigates against 
recently discovered vulnerabilities of smart contract technologies, such as those found for 
the Ethereum run-time interpreter (Atzei, Bartoletti, & Cimoli, 2016). 
Innovation for Acquisition Research 
The work prior to this paper in software cybersecurity is primarily focused on making 
a particular version of the software system itself, as a product, secure. In this paper, we are 
expanding our view to include the ecosystem within which the system evolves, the software 
architecture specification that defines and constrains that ecosystem, the evolution of the 
components and connectors that are integrated into the system, and the OA evolution 
process by which any OA system evolves from version to version. To this, we are adding the 
ability to record, track, verify, and maintain the security of the OA system throughout its 
development and evolution processes. 
We are proposing the use of blockchains and smart contracts to assure the security 
of software engineering process update transactions. We are not at this time investigating 
how blockchains and smart contracts may be used as potential mechanisms that support 
the financial transactions or new business models for purchasing the services or products 
associated with a OA software system acquisition (Scacchi & Alspaugh, 2016). That is a 
topic for future research. Similarly, though blockchains and smart contracts are relatively 
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new, they also entail their own set of vulnerabilities associated with their different 
technological implementations (Atzei, Bartoletti, & Cimoli, 2016) that must be addressed. 
Whether or how such vulnerabilities may manifest within acquisition processes is also a 
topic for future research. 
Future Extensions and Elaborations of This Approach 
We have discussed the application of a blockchain system for coordinating and 
steering the evolution of an OA software system that is produced or integrated by a single 
party. But a blockchain system is by its nature a distributed system, and though its 
distributedness does not in itself give extra benefit in multi-producer, multi-integrator 
software ecosystems, clearly it is as effective in recording evolution and provenance in 
them, and it is already adapted to the challenges of interactions with many parties. 
In our prior research, we have called for a declarative domain-specific language 
(DSL) for specifying the obligations and rights incorporated into IP and security licenses for 
OA software (Alspaugh & Scacchi, 2012; Scacchi & Alspaugh, 2013a). Now we see that 
such a DSL can be extended to incorporate software engineering process transactions 
using a process modeling language like PML (Noll & Scacchi, 2001; Scacchi, 2001) or a 
similar notation and that such extension is advantageous for managing OA software security 
system and engineering process challenges. The design and incorporation of these 
extensions into the DSL is thus a next step for us to research, develop, and refine. 
Last, we have also called for research and development of software obligations and 
rights management systems (SORMS) as a core capability for the DoD, government 
agencies, and other enterprises to help manage and improve their OA software system 
buying power (Scacchi & Alspaugh, 2015, 2016). We envision a SORMS that interprets and 
evaluates DSLs for software licensing as an essential tool for enterprises that manage OA 
software systems, such as those found in most large organizations in industry, government, 
and defense. Thus, we call for effort to add capabilities that extend the SORMS to 
accommodate blockchain ledger repositories, as decentralized or centralized databases, on 
which are enacted smart contracts for handling software development and evolution process 
update transactions. 
Conclusions 
In this paper, we sought to stimulate the development of innovative approaches to 
continuously assuring the cybersecurity of open architecture (OA) software systems. We 
focused on exploring the potential for using blockchains and smart contract techniques and 
how they can be applied to support acquisition efforts for software systems for OA command 
and control or business enterprise (C2/B) systems. We further limited our focus to examining 
the routine software system updates to OA software configuration specifications that arise 
during the development and evolution processes arising during system acquisition. Our 
efforts described through our case study and related efforts thus denote a promising line of 
work in progress. Much remains to be done, but the direction forward appears robust and 
productive. We welcome questions and comments that identify possible oversights, and we 
suggest complementary capabilities that enhance the potential of blockchain and smart 
contract tools, techniques, and technologies for continuously assuring the cybersecurity of 
modular open architecture software systems. 
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Abstract 
Evaluating the software assurance of a product as it functions within a specific system 
context involves assembling carefully chosen metrics that demonstrate a range of behaviors 
to establish confidence that the product functions as intended and is free of vulnerabilities. 
The first challenge is to establish that the requirements define the appropriate security 
behavior and the design addresses these security concerns. The second challenge is to 
establish that the completed product, as built, fully satisfies the specifications. Measures to 
provide assurance must, therefore, address requirements, design, construction, and test. We 
know that software is never defect free. According to Jones and Bonsignour (2012), the 
average defect level in the United States is 0.75 defects per function point or 6,000 per 
million lines of code (MLOC) for a high-level language. Thus, software, on average, cannot 
always function perfectly as intended. Additionally, we cannot establish that software is 
completely free from vulnerabilities based on our research which indicates that 5% of defects 
should be categorized as vulnerabilities. So how can we establish reasonable confidence in 
software security? To answer this question, the Software Engineering Institute (SEI) is 
researching how measurement can be used to establish confidence in software security. This 
paper will share our progress to date. 
Is the System Secure? 
The Department of Defense (DoD) has followed a well-structured acquisition and 
development life cycle for decades. The rules for these activities are clearly laid out in 
Department of Defense Instruction (DoDI) 5000.2 (DoD, 2003)1. There are a series of 
activities and milestone reviews that require a program office to demonstrate to 
management and oversight groups that good engineering is underway as the acquisition of 
a system moves from an idea through to final implementation. Can we leverage this process 
focus to establish confidence that software assurance is well-integrated into each of the life 
cycle steps? The current acquisition focus is on establishing appropriate requirements and 
ensuring these are met in the delivery of the system.  
The evaluation of the security of the same system is equally as well-structured using 
the guidance provided in DoDI 8510 (DoD, 2014). These guidelines were recently rewritten 
to broaden the focus beyond the security technology controls to include protection of critical 
                                            
 
 
1 The most recent version effective February 2, 2017, is available at http://www.acqnotes.com/wp-
content/uploads/2014/09/DoD-Instruction-5000.02-The-Defense-Acquisition-System-2-Feb-17-
Change-2.pdf  
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assets based on potential risks. If selected controls are implemented to protect these key 
assets and these are validated through the certification and accreditation reviews, is the 
system secure? It is hard to say since the engineers are focused on requirements and the 
security analysis is focused on security controls. How sufficient are the security 
requirements? Requirements are subject to change as the system progresses into the life 
cycle, but the security controls are not typically reviewed after the initial selection.  
The acquisition is focused on delivery of a system, and software is typically viewed 
as a necessary component. In reality, software is quickly becoming the major component. 
Software handled 8% of the functionality of the F-4 Phantom fighter in 1960, but by 2000, its 
role grew to 80% for the F-22 Raptor, and the trend does not appear to be abating (National 
Research Council, 2010). We know that software is never defect free. According to Jones 
and Bonsignour (2012), the average defect level in the United States is 0.75 defects per 
function point or 6,000 defects per million lines of code (MLOC) for a high-level language. 
Very good code levels would be 600 to 1,000 defects per MLOC, and exceptional levels 
would be below 600 defects per MLOC. Thus, software, cannot always function perfectly as 
intended since there will always be defects. Additionally, we cannot establish that software 
is completely free from vulnerabilities based on our research which indicates that 5% of 
defects should be categorized as vulnerabilities (Woody, Ellison, & Nichols, 2014). Hence, 
as the role of software increases, the availability of software vulnerabilities also increases. It 
is impossible to avoid the constant news that systems are under attack and vulnerabilities 
are so prevalent that attackers are successful. Software security is a growing concern and 
needs to be effectively managed as part of an acquisition. Can we do this? 
The Program Protection Plan2 assigns a software assurance reporting responsibility 
to the program office, but they are typically not the group building and maintaining the 
software, so they pass this responsibility to the contractor. How will a program office know if 
there is sufficient software security in the system the contractor delivers? Few engineers in a 
program office are trained in security, and even with training, will they be able to directly 
evaluate the product? Maybe not, but they should be able to evaluate the quality of the 
processes used by the contractor in building, integrating, and verifying the system. Higher 
quality with fewer defects, along with a focus on software security, should result in fewer 
defects and fewer vulnerabilities. 
The program office can ask the contractor to report on a wide range of metrics. 
There are metrics for cost, schedule, quality, complexity, resiliency, and technical debt just 
to list a few of the categories. Capers Jones (2015) reports that over 3000 different metrics 
are in use, and most of them are inconsistent at best and typically misleading. In his 2015 
report, Jones notes “the software industry labors under a variety of non-standard and highly 
inaccurate measures compounded by very sloppy measurement practices.” What are the 
metrics for software security? We can count vulnerabilities just as we count defects. Can we 
assume all code will be of high quality so that defects and vulnerabilities are at a minimum? 
High quality development requires resources with the capability to deliver high quality as 
well as effective processes to ensure the results delivered meet expectations. What kind of 
useful measurements can we apply to these?  
                                            
 
 
2 See Defense Acquisition University (DAU; n.d.) for a description of the Program Protection Plan. 
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Using Engineering Evidence to Reduce Fear, Uncertainty, and Doubt (FUD) for 
Software 
For a measurement to be useful in engineering, there are three questions that need 
to be addressed: 
• Are we measuring the right things at the right time? 
• Are our measurements trending in the right direction? 
• Do we collect information soon enough to react to problems within other 
constraints? 
As an example, let’s consider how these questions are addressed in the acquisition 
of an airplane. How do we establish that the plane will fly when it is delivered? The planes 
are engineered to meet requirements that are defined for the expected use. The Dreamliner 
is designed to carry up to 330 passengers on long distances in comfort (Boeing, n.d.). It is 
reported to have a range of 11,910 kilometers, or 6,430 nautical miles. The wing span is 197 
feet and 4 inches, height is 55 feet and 10 inches, and the length is 224 feet. All of these 
characteristics are determined based on lift and speed and other aerodynamic 
characteristics to allow the plane to meet its flight requirements. The F35 has a very different 
set of requirements as a single-seat, single-engine, all-weather stealth fighter plane 
(Lockheed Martin, n.d.). It is designed for a maximum speed of Mach 1.5 at altitude, with a 
range of approximately 1,620 nautical miles using internal fuel. The wing span is 32.78 feet, 
height is 13.33 feet, length is 50.5 feet, and wing area is 450 feet. Each of these planes is 
built in a highly structured manufacturing operation using best practices for constructing and 
testing the parts and validating the assembled whole. Reviews are conducted at scheduled 
times throughout the development and testing of prototypes is extensive to ensure 
requirements are met. There should be no surprises at the point of delivery about the 
plane’s ability to meet its flight requirements (NASA, 2009). To apply this approach to 
software security, we need effective processes and a means of measuring how well they are 
working. 
Building Blocks for Engineering Software Security 
After determining that there were many software security practices, but nothing 
structured for evaluating software assurance, SEI undertook the task of developing the 
Software Assurance Framework (SAF)3. The SAF defines a set of cybersecurity practices 
that programs should apply across the life cycle and supply chain. The SAF can be used to 
assess a program’s current practices to identify gaps and chart a course for improvement. 
By verifying and identifying improvements for a program’s cybersecurity practices relevant to 
software, the SAF helps to (1) establish confidence in the program’s ability to acquire 
software-reliant systems that are sufficiently secure, and (2) reduce the cybersecurity risk of 
deployed software-reliant systems. When developing the SAF, we leveraged the software 
acquisition and cybersecurity expertise of the SEI’s technical staff and also referenced a 
variety of acquisition, development, process improvement, and cybersecurity documents 
including the following: 
                                            
 
 
3 A technical note, CMU/SEI-2017-TN-001, that provides a detailed description of the key practices 
selected for the SAF, is in the publication process and is expected to be available on the SEI website 
this spring. 
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• National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) Special Publication 
800-53, titled Security and Privacy Controls for Federal Information Systems 
and Organizations (NIST, 2013) 
• NIST Special Publication 800-37, titled Guide for Applying the Risk 
Management Framework to Federal Information Systems: A Security Life 
Cycle Approach (NIST, 2010) 
• DoDI 5000.2, titled Operation of the Defense Acquisition System (DoD, 2003) 
• Capability Maturing Model® Integration (CMMI®; CMMI, 2007) 
• Build Security In Maturity Model (BSIMM; McGraw, Migues, & West, 2015) 
The selected practices fall into four general focus areas: process management, 
engineering, project management, and support. Within each of these general areas we have 
grouped practices within subcategories. 
Process management would include the following categories of practices: 
• process definition 
• infrastructure standards 
• resources 
• training 
Engineering would include the following categories of practices: 




• testing, validation, and verification 
• support documentation and tools 
• deployment 
Project management would include the following categories of practices: 
• project plans 
• project infrastructure 
• project monitoring 
• project risk management 
• supplier management 
Support would include the following categories of practices: 
• measurement and analysis 
• change management 
• product operation and sustainment 
In order to link the detailed practices from the SAF framework to a specific program 
to address software assurance, we have used a standard software management technique, 
Goal-Question-Metric (GQM) Approach developed in the 1980s as a structuring mechanism 
(Basili, 1984). This is a well-recognized and widely used metrics approach. It requires the 
establishing of a goal for which we structure questions with associated metrics that begin to 
answer each question. In the following section, we will show an example of how these 
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building blocks can be used to structure an answer to our question about whether a system 
is secure. 
Engineering for Software Security 
If we apply the engineering approach described earlier about the plane’s flying to 
security, we must start with establishing our engineering goal for software security. We 
would like to establish a requirement that software critical to mission and flight functions 
have no vulnerabilities, but this is not feasible (Woody, Ellison, & Nichols, 2014). However, 
we can structure a goal for the airplane that the critical software be of the highest quality 
such as: 
Mission- and flight-critical applications executing on the plane or used to 
interact with the plane from ground stations shall be high quality, with no 
more than 600 defects per MLOC and vulnerability levels below 30 per 
MLOC. 
As the saying goes, quality cannot be tested in, it must be built into the product 
(Koch, n.d.). In order to meet this goal, the contractor would have to ensure they are building 
the system using high quality engineering processes at each step of the life cycle. This 
system goal would need to flow down to each step in building the software. To define how 
we might measure and monitor these processes to ensure high quality, we can create sub-
questions for each major area of software development that reflect the contribution to be 
made to the system as follows: 
• Software Requirements. Does the program/project define and manage 
software security requirements? 
• Software Architecture. Does the program/project appropriately address 
security in its software architecture and design? 
• Implementation. Does the program/project minimize the number of 
vulnerabilities inserted into the code? 
• Testing, Validation, and Verification. Does the program/project test, 
validate, and verify security in its software components? 
• Support Tools and Documentation. Does the program/project develop 
tools and documentation to support secure configuration and operation of 
software components? 
• Deployment. Does the program/project consider security during the 
deployment of software components? 
Each of these questions could be addressed within the software life cycle through 
the selection of appropriate practices, outputs, and metrics that demonstrate quality results. 
For each of the software development areas, we would want to confirm that best practices 
are performed and these are producing expected outputs along with metrics appropriate to 
expected results. 
As an example, since much of the concern with software security is tied to 
vulnerabilities, consider how we could be confident that the number of vulnerabilities 
introduced into the critical code are minimized. There are several best practices in secure 
coding that we would expect to be performed as follows: 
• Secure coding standards are applied. 
• Code developers are trained in the use of secure coding standards. 
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• Evaluation practices (e.g., code reviews and apply tools) are applied to 
identify and remove vulnerabilities in delivered code (including code libraries, 
open source, and other reused components). 
In addition, we should expect to see outputs and metrics that reflect that these 
practices are appropriately addressed as shown in Table 1. 
Table 1. Activities/Practices, Outputs, and Metrics 
 
Subsequent steps in the development process should continue to confirm that 
vulnerabilities are at a minimum through testing, validation, and verification. 
Conclusion and Next Steps 
Returning to our initial question about determining if the system is secure, we have 
established that our evaluation must focus sufficient attention on the quality and security 
built into the software which makes up over 80% of the functionality of most systems. If this 
software is well-defined, well-built, and well-implemented using best practices for 
engineering software with good security, we should be able to review outputs and confirm 
through metrics with reasonable confidence that the system is secure. There is information 
we can collect and evaluate all along the life cycle about the product, processes, and 
practices to give us confidence in achieving our goal that the final product will be sufficiently 
secure. System engineering reviews can be used to confirm progress as follows: 
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• Initial Technical Review (ITR). Assess the capability needs (including 
software security) and materiel solution approach. 
• Alternative Systems Review (ASR). Ensure that solutions will be cost-
effective, affordable, operationally effective. Ensure that solutions can be 
developed in a timely manner at an acceptable level of software security risk. 
• System Requirements Review (SRR). Ensure that all system requirements 
(including security) are defined and testable, and consistent with cost, 
schedule, risk (including software security risk), technology readiness, and 
other system constraints. 
• Preliminary Design Review (PDR). Evaluate progress and technical 
adequacy of the selected design approach including software security. 
• Critical Design Review (CDR). Determine that detail designs satisfy the 
design requirements (including software security) established in the 
specification and establish the interface relationships. 
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Abstract 
The U.S. DoD transition to a multi-tier, risk management framework aims to streamline 
information assurance assessments by promoting alignment with NIST information assurance 
control sets. While these control sets are broadly applicable and comprehensive, those 
responsible for accreditation will continue to struggle with assessing security risk in 
dynamically reconfigurable systems. Security analysts rely largely on background knowledge 
and experience to make security-related decisions. With increasingly dynamic software, 
analysts need to resolve dependencies among components and understand how those 
dependencies affect security requirements. Analysts need new decision-support tools based 
on models that predict how analysts reason about security in distributed systems. We present 
an approach that formalizes security expert assessments of security requirements nested in 
scenarios into threat mitigation rules. The assessments are collected empirically using 
factorial vignettes. The vignette results are statistically analyzed to yield membership 
functions for a type-2 fuzzy logic system. The corresponding type-2 fuzzy sets encode the 
interpersonal and intrapersonal uncertainties among security analysts in their decision-
making. This work establishes an early foundation for a digital cyber-security decision-
support service where an IT professional with any level of security background can benefit 
from efficiently receiving security assessments and recommendations. 
Introduction 
The U.S. DoD acquisition process goes through well defined and documented 
security guidelines. Security guidelines and checklists are widely available and well-
documented, but organizations and government agencies like the DoD are still relying on 
human security analysts to evaluate the security of their systems and reason over these 
guidelines. The DoD transition to a multi-tier, risk management framework aims to 
streamline information assurance assessments by promoting alignment with National 
Institute Standards and Technology’s (NIST) information assurance control sets 
(Marzigliano, 2014; Swenson, 2009). The DoD considers NIST security controls to be the 
minimum and requires an additional set of controls that vendors need to meet before they 
can work on classified networks (Swenson, 2009). NIST controls such as the 800-53 
(“NIST/ITL Special Publication (800),” 2015) would need to go through a process of 
implementation to create system design and development requirements. Each control 
represents a class of technology aimed at mitigating a security threat.  
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Review of the controls is done by human security analysts who are supposed to 
have sufficient expertise to reason over potentially millions of scenarios that account for 
various permutations of controls. Under NIST SP 800-53, the analyst decides if a specific 
system is high, medium, or low impact and then the analyst satisfies the impact rating by 
selecting security controls (e.g., audit events, lock sessions, etc.).  
Human security assessment can be impacted by context, where security 
requirements apply; priorities that some requirements have over other requirements; 
uncertainty due to human’s experts’ memory constraints; and the stove-piped knowledge 
among security experts who come from a variety of backgrounds, such as systems, 
networks, databases, and web applications. We try to use an approach that helps address 
these challenges. Figure 1 summarizes the steps of our overall approach. In each step, we 
use methods and techniques that would help understand and address the challenges 
mentioned above. We have completed two phases of this project, where in each phase we 
sun a series of studies. In the first phase, we ran all the steps shown in Figure 1. In the 
second phase, we completed steps 1 through 4 and we are still conducting more studies to 
refine our results. In the upcoming sections, we will explain the studies conducted, research 
methodology, and technical challenges of each phase. 
 
 The Overall Process to Build Security Assessment Digital Solutions Figure 1.
Phase 1: Secure Web Transaction Scenarios  
Step 1: Creating Security Scenarios  
The main theme in this phase is secure web browsing. We conducted a user study 
using scenarios where participants are asked to rate the security of performing an online 
transaction (e.g., reading email or credit card purchasing) (Hibshi, Breaux, & Broomell, 
2015). Participants were presented with a variety of settings (security requirements) that 
were manipulated throughout the study to measure which different requirements 
compositions contribute to the overall security of the scenario and to understand the 
priorities that exist among requirements. Figure 2 shows the template used to generate 
security scenarios or vignettes. 
 
 Vignettes Template Used in Phase 1  Figure 2.
(Hibshi et al., 2015) 
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The template shows variables (starting with $) that are each replaced by a security 
requirement. We call values that replace the variable levels of the requirements variable. We 
generate different vignettes by using different combinations of requirements levels. In Table 
1, we show the variables used in phase 1 vignettes and their levels.  
Table 1. Variables Used in Phase 1 and Their Levels 
 
This technique of using scenarios with discrete factors that get manipulated to study 
human judgment is called factorial vignettes (Rossi & Nock, 1982; Wallander, 2009). We 
chose this empirical method because it was shown to be more reliable to evaluate and 
collect human judgment as compared to direct questioning (Rossi & Nock, 1982; Wallander, 
2009). Our purpose is to measure the effect of security requirements’ composition on the 
analysts’ risk perception and therefore their overall ratings; to identify priorities among 
requirements, and to understand the effect of ambiguity on analysts’ security decisions 
(Hibshi et al., 2015). 
Step 2: Designing the Experiments  
We use a mixed-effect design (a combination of within-subject and between-subject 
factors) for the user study. We ran two separate experiments. First, we invited participants to 
evaluate scenarios for Man-in-the-Middle threat, then we re-invited them after two weeks for 
the second experiment where the participants evaluate the packet-sniffing threat. In each 
experiment, each participant is assigned a condition where they see four scenarios. They 
see all the four different values for the $NetworkType variable (within-subject effect), but 
they only see one value for all the other variables (between-subject effect; see Figure 2 and 
Table 1; Hibshi et al., 2015).  
For each scenario, the participant is asked to rate the overall security of the scenario 
choosing one of the three following ratings:  
• Excessive security measures that exceed the requirements to mitigate the 
threat 
• Adequate security measures that are enough to mitigate the threat 
• Inadequate security measures that are not enough to mitigate the threat 
After rating the overall security, we ask participants to rate each individual 
requirement shown in the scenario. The ratings 5-point scale, where point 1 is labeled 
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“inadequate mitigation,” point 3 is labeled “adequate mitigation,” and point 5 is labeled 
“excessive mitigation.” Participants are also given the opportunity to list additional security 
requirements that they believe contribute to increasing the security level to adequate (Hibshi 
et al., 2015).  
Participants in this study need to have sufficient security expertise. Therefore, we 
ask participants to answer a list of security knowledge questions that would help assess 
their level of security understanding, followed by background demographic questions about 
their years of expertise, number of courses in security, and their job roles. We also collect 
general demographics such as age, gender, and highest level of education (Hibshi et al., 
2015).  
Step 3: Collecting Data From Experts  
In this study, we sent invitations to security mailing lists at Carnegie Mellon 
University and North Carolina State University, and we offered participants a $10 Amazon 
Gift card as a compensation. A total of 174 participants responded to the Man-in-the-Middle 
threat survey, of which, 116 returned to respond to the Packet-Sniffing survey. The sample 
has 101 graduate students, 42 undergraduate students, and 2 university professors (Hibshi 
et al., 2015). 
Step 4: Analyzing Experts’ Data  
In this step, we use two methods of analysis:  
• Multi-level modeling of the user security assessments. This method is 
suitable to analyze data from our study that instruments a mixed effect 
design.  
• Grounded analysis (Corbin & Strauss, 2007) of additional requirements. We 
code the statements provided by participants, and then we categorize the 
codes into one of six categories: server, client, encryption, network, 
encryption, attack detection/prevention, and integrity and authentication.  
Our study results show that security requirements’ composition affect the experts’ 
risk perception and security assessment. For example, in scenarios where the password 
level is strong, participants rated the overall security of the scenario to be less than 
adequate if the $Networktype is public Wifi. Participants view the network to be have 
higher priority than the three requirements: password, timer, and SSL. Once the 
$Networktype is raised to an adequate level, then other requirements will start impacting 
the risk assessments (Hibshi et al., 2015).  
Step 5: Formalizing Results Into Rules and Fuzzy Sets  
We formalize the results of the empirical study to derive if-then rules that we use in a 
security assessment system based on rule-based interval type-2 fuzzy logic (Hibshi, Breaux, 
& Wagner, 2016). The following is an example rule that we derived from the results: 
𝑅𝑅1: 𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼 𝑵𝑵𝑵𝑵𝑵𝑵𝑵𝑵𝑵𝑵𝑵𝑵𝑵𝑵𝑵𝑵𝑵𝑵𝑵𝑵𝑵𝑵 𝑙𝑙𝐶𝐶 𝑰𝑰𝑰𝑰𝑰𝑰𝑰𝑰𝑵𝑵𝑰𝑰𝑰𝑰𝑰𝑰𝑵𝑵𝑵𝑵 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝐸𝐸𝑇𝑇 𝑶𝑶𝑶𝑶𝑵𝑵𝑵𝑵𝑰𝑰𝑶𝑶𝑶𝑶𝑶𝑶𝑰𝑰𝑵𝑵𝑶𝑶𝑰𝑰𝑶𝑶 𝑙𝑙𝐶𝐶 𝑰𝑰𝑰𝑰𝑰𝑰𝑰𝑰𝑵𝑵𝑰𝑰𝑰𝑰𝑰𝑰𝑵𝑵𝑵𝑵 
Any fuzzy logic system needs fuzzy sets that can be constructed using experts’ 
input.Type-2 fuzzy sets allow us to model the uncertainty in the data by providing a footprint 
of uncertainty (FOU; Mendel, 2001). It is important to point out that uncertainty in our data is 
always present because it relies on experts’ input. Experts’ data include interpersonal 
uncertainty, which is the uncertainty between different experts, and intrapersonal 
uncertainty, which is the uncertainty that the same expert may experience on two different 
occasions due to the nature of humans’ memory (Hibshi et al., 2016).  
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To build fuzzy sets in our security assessment system, we conducted another 
empirical study on security experts where we asked participants to provide an interval on a 
range from 1 to 10 to represent linguistic labels for adequacy (Hibshi & Breaux, 2016; Hibshi 
et al., 2016). Figure 3 shows the results of the collected intervals from 38 security experts. 
Then, we use the data collected to construct type-2 fuzzy sets and their membership 
functions. Figure 4 shows the membership functions for the three fuzzy sets: inadequate, 
adequate, and excessive. 
 
 The Fuzzy Sets With the Start and End Means and Standard Deviation  Figure 3.
(Hibshi et al., 2016) 
 
 . Membership Function for Inadequate, Adequate, and Excessive  Figure 4.
(Hibshi et al., 2016) 
Step6: Building a Security Assessment System  
We will explain how we build and evaluate a security assessment system that would 
help security analysts evaluate their security decisions. Figure 5 shows the overall 
architecture of our assessment system.  
 
 Mamdani IT2FLS for Security Assessment  Figure 5.
(Hibshi et al., 2016) 
We use the type-2 fuzzy sets and rules formalized in step 5 of the process to build 
our assessment system.  
Step 7: Validate Results of the Assessment System 
Our goal here is to evaluate the system and to measure how well it mimics human 
experts’ reasoning. Hence, we designed a survey similar to the survey used in the data 
collection step (see steps 1 and above), and we sent the survey to 13 security experts who 
rated 52 scenarios (four scenarios per expert). Then, we used the individual security 
requirements ratings as inputs to our assessment system, which will produce an overall 
security assessment output. Later, we interviewed the experts and asked them to provide 
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reasoning behind their ratings. Finally, we showed them the system’s rating and asked them 
to compare it to their overall ratings. The results show that the security analysts found the 
assessment system to provide reliable security ratings, generating more conservative 
assessments in 19% of the test scenarios compared to the experts’ ratings (Hibshi et al., 
2016).  
Phase 2: Security Administration Scenarios  
The studies conducted in phase 1 have the following limitations:  
• We used a single security scenario that puts the participant in the role of a 
user.  
• We recruited mostly graduate security and privacy students for the user 
study.  
To address these limitations:  
• We increased scenario coverage by selecting scenarios from four security 
domains: networking, operating systems, databases security, and web 
applications security.  
• We used a language in the scenarios that puts the study participant in an 
expert role analyzing the requirements shown in the scenarios. 
• We recruited security professionals from industry and government. 
Figure 6 shows the template used to generate vignettes for the web applications 
security study.  
 
 Scenario Template Used in the Web Applications Security Study Figure 6.
The $WebAuth variable represents the type of authentication used in the web 
application and it can take on one of many values. To illustrate, we consider two extremely 
different values: “basic authentication,” which is a weak form of web-based authentication, 
or “form-based authentication using encrypted credentials stored in a database,” which is 
stronger. Similarly, the $StoredUserData variable represents how the user input is being 
collected and could take the values: “collect user-supplied content from GET request” or 
“require CSRF tokens and escape and validate user supplied content from POST requests 
before storing.” Again, the latter value is stronger than the former. 
In a similar fashion, we constructed scenario templates to generate vignettes for the 
remaining security domains: networking, operating systems, and database security. 
Currently, we are still collecting and analyzing data for this phase to help design and build 
our next security decision-support system.  
Summary and Future Work  
In this paper, we summarized our research that consists of a series of empirical 
studies where we study how security experts make their decisions. We used the data 
collected from experts to formalize and model the human reasoning to build decision-
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support tools. One of the major challenges in security decision-making is the amount of 
interpersonal and intrapersonal uncertainties present in the data. Hence, we choose to 
model experts’ data using interval type-2 fuzzy logic, which can handle these uncertainties. 
We continue to create scenarios, design experiments, and collect data from experts so we 
can build decision support tools that would better assist the security experts as they make 
their decisions and evaluate requirements. These smart tools would help security analysts 
with their acquisition process, as it is a building step towards semi-automating the currently 
manual process of reviewing systems and evaluating them against security requirements.  
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Abstract 
The acquisition field continues to face increasing pressures to perform under conditions of 
escalating complexity, uncertainty, and ambiguity. These conditions suggest that traditional 
approaches, practices, and acquisition technologies might be incongruent with support 
demands for acquisition practitioners. This research is focused on exploiting and extending 
recent developments in Complex System Governance (CSG) to advance the acquisition field. 
CSG is focused on the design, execution, and evolution of fundamental system functions 
necessary for control, communications, coordination, and integration of complex systems 
(e.g., acquisition). CSG is based in Systems Theory (fundamental laws governing complex 
systems), Management Cybernetics (the science of effective system organization), and 
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Governance (provision of direction, oversight, and accountability for systems). Recent 
advances in CSG (Keating, Katina, & Bradley, 2015) make this an opportune time for 
exploitation of this field to advance acquisition research and practice in novel ways. Following 
an introduction and literature review, this paper reports on efforts to (1) establish a systems 
theory based framework for Acquisition System Governance, (2) mapping of systems 
pathologies (systemic errors that degrade system performance) to a CSG Reference Model 
with implications for acquisition practice, and (3) suggests implications for moving CSG 
forward to improve acquisition practice. The paper closes with directions for bringing CSG to 
practice through research based application development. 
Introduction 
The Defense Acquisition System continues to struggle in the midst of increasing 
levels of complexity, uncertainty, and ambiguity. There are enormous pressures on the 
acquisition field and practitioners faced with the new realities of increasingly complex 
systems, resources become further constrained, and expectations for maintenance of cost, 
schedule, and performance projections escalating. These pressures for change (a.k.a. 
reform) in the Defense Acquisition System to evolve in response to shifting circumstances is 
not new or unprecedented. In fact, the history of defense acquisition has been one marked 
by numerous attempts at reform. For instance, Fox (2011) has traced 50 years of acquisition 
reform through several periods from the 1960s. Among these reform periods he identified 
were the following: (1) 1960s and 1970s McNamara innovations and the birth of DoD 
Directive 5000.1 specifying the Acquisition process; (2) 1980s Carlucci initiatives, PPBS, 
and weapons acquisition reform; and (3) 1990s, where the DoD 5000 series incorporated 
less than 50% of reform initiatives. The difficulties and results of Defense Acquisition System 
reform were captured by Fox’s (2012) assertion that 
despite the defense community’s intent to reform the acquisition process, the 
difficulty of the problem and the associated politics, combined with 
organizational dynamics that are resistant to change, have led to only minor 
improvements. The problems of schedule slippages, cost growth, and 
shortfalls in technical performance on defense acquisition programs have 
remained much the same throughout this period. (p. vii) 
Numerous authors have echoed these sentiments. In fact, Schwartz (2013) cites that 
over 150 major studies examining acquisition reform have been conducted since World War 
II—with the state of continuing cost overruns, schedule slippages, and missed technical 
performance remaining. However, Swartz (2013) also cites multiple improvements in the 
processes used by the DoD to procure goods and services, such as (1) the creation of the 
Federal Acquisition Regulation; (2) the formation of the Defense Acquisition University: and 
(3) the institution of such changes to acquisition as multi-year procurement, independent 
cost estimation, joint requirements board, and movement to commercial technologies. 
However, despite improvements and initiation of (e.g., should-cost analyses) a recent GAO 
(2007) assessment of defense acquisition for selected weapon programs concluded that 
programs continued to experience cost increases and schedule delays. Continuing 
difficulties in acquisition of defense systems does not to minimize either the dedicated 
professionals in the acquisition workforce, the well-intentioned aspirations of acquisition 
institution leaders, or system modifications instituted. Instead, it invites new and novel 
thinking in response.  
Given this seeming consensus on the state of affairs for acquisition, and 
corresponding attempts for reform, the question is begged, why does this state of acquisition 
continue to have difficulty in meeting cost, schedule, and technical performance 
expectations? There have been many attempts to explain the factors that delineate the 
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nature and sources of failure in acquisition (Berteau, Levy, Ben-Ari, & Moore, 2011; Francis, 
2008, 2009; Rascona, Barkakati, & Solis, 2008). In fact, a look at recent Government 
Accountability Office assessments of major acquisition programs continues to accentuate 
difficulties in the acquisition field (Cilli, Parnell, Cloutier, & Zigh, 2015). However, there are 
continuing efforts at Acquisition System reform (Bucci, Slattery, & Maine, 2015) that 
recognize the need to streamline the system and craft a more agile and flexible Acquisition 
System. While these are noble ideals, agreement on how to engage such an endeavor is far 
from a consensus. The outward appearance of the Acquisition System is that of a monolithic 
system not well-suited for the complexity, speed, uncertainty, and ambiguity that exist in 
warfighting needs and environments. 
Although the underlying reasons for Fox’s (2012) criticisms of the performance of the 
Defense Acquisition System might be debatable, adequately addressing the continuing 
difficulties in defense acquisition appears to remain an elusive goal. Providing a sampling of 
external examinations of past and current reports on defense acquisition program difficulties 
supports the conclusion that Defense Acquisition continues to struggle, suggesting that “In 
general, these reports call for early, robust, and rigorous assessments of a broader range of 
alternatives across a thorough set of stakeholder value criteria to include life-cycle costs, 
schedule, and performance” (Cilli et al., 2015, p. 587). From a systems perspective of the 
state of acquisition, we suggest five thought provoking considerations (Figure 1). These 
considerations provide a systemic frame of reference for the modern landscape of defense 
acquisition. While these characteristics are endemic to modern systems in general, the 
particular emphases of the Defense Acquisition System invites a different level of dialog, 
exploration, and systemic understanding.  
1. Sprawling Complexity Exceeding Absorptive Capacity of the System. While 
the technologies and operation and maintenance demands for future 
weapons systems have continued to rise exponentially, so too has the 
complexity of systems designed to acquire them. For the Defense Acquisition 
System this suggests that the calls for reform, increased agility, and other 
such suggestions by numerous authors, is perhaps best summed up in 
Kendall’s (2014) congressional testimony stating,  
Our system over time accumulated excessive levels of complex 
regulatory requirements that are imposed on our program managers 
and other acquisition professionals. … One thing I hope we can all 
agree on is the need to simplify and rationalize the bureaucratic 
burdens we place on our acquisition professionals. (p. 6) 
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 Five Systems Perspectives for the Defense Acquisition Field Figure 1.
2. Process and Event Centric Focus. Although the Defense Acquisition System 
is proclaimed to be a system, in reality it is hard pressed to meet the standard 
tenets that are central to classification as a system (e.g., boundary, 
transformation, etc.). Instead, the Acquisition System is a collection of 
elements for which the precise representation is not presented, operated, or 
evolved holistically as a system. For instance, Friar’s (2015) depiction of the 
sprawling regulatory environment surrounding the FAR and its 
implementation notes the precarious relationship of related FAR elements, 
such as service specific FAR supplements, corresponding guidebooks, 
implementation instructions, and the DoD 5000 series. Even the DoD 5000 
refers to the Defense Acquisition Management System as both a “framework” 
as well as an “event-based process.” The demands placed on the systems 
that are the product from the Defense Acquisition System are somehow held 
to a different standard when it comes to systemic grounding (design, 
execution, development) expectations. Processes and events fall short in 
classification as a system. The ramifications of this distinction are profound 
and far reaching for understanding of critical issues and future development. 
3. Response to Increasing Complexity Relegated to Increasing Complication. 
The original intent of the FAR was quite straightforward in attempting to 
provide a streamlined approach to the acquisition of material to support the 
effective functioning of the government enterprise. However, in the time since 
the inception of the FAR it has continued to elaborate in structure, volume, 
and complication of process and implementation controls. For instance, the 
Federal Acquisition Regulation expanded from 1,953 pages at introduction in 
1984 to 2,193 pages by 2014, with the DFAR supplement adding another 
1,554 pages and each of the services initiating a host of their own specialized 
implementation guides, instructions, directives, and memorandums (Friar, 
2015). 
4. Driving Paradigm Embedded in an Output Emphasis. Outputs from the 
Defense Acquisition System are those tangible, verifiable, and objective 
elements that serve as products that provide value consumed external to the 
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system. This provides the basis for a worldview (the system of values and 
beliefs through which all that is sensed is processed) which translates into the 
design, execution, and development of the Defense Acquisition System. It is 
hard to read a criticism of the current state of affairs for acquisition that is not 
targeted to cost, schedule, and technical performance. However, we suggest 
that these indicators are systemically limited in their measuring the value of 
the Defense Acquisition System. While these indicators (cost, schedule, 
performance) are necessary indicators of system performance, they alone do 
not provide sufficiency as a set of judgments of Acquisition System 
performance. For example, Cilli et al. (2015) point out the sunk costs of five 
programs between 2006 and 2011 in excess of $32 billion. The question for 
examination of paradigm consistency would need to consider whether or not 
the failure in these programs, and the acquisition system which permitted 
those failures, might be found beyond the cost, schedule, and technical 
performance triad. 
5. Prominence of Global Control. From a systems perspective, control is about 
providing constraint of a system only to the degree to which is necessary to 
assure continued performance (Keating et al., 2016). Excess constraint in a 
system (control) wastes resources and limits local autonomy independence 
for decision, action, and interpretation. The common manifestation of 
excessive global control is what has been described aptly in much of the 
acquisition literature as overregulation, bureaucracy, and excessive 
constraint without evidence of commensurate value added to the system. The 
near constant state of acquisition reform (Fox, 2012; Schwartz, 2014) 
supports the increasing elaboration of the system in ways that do not 
necessarily enhance performance. This does not demean the improvements 
achieved in reform processes, but instead suggests that a different (systemic) 
viewpoint might shift the premises, and thus understanding of the 
complexities inherent in the system. 
This systems perspective for the Defense Acquisition System is intended to suggest 
that a different frame of reference might be helpful. Our intention is to invite a dialog to 
further exploration and understanding of the current system, while offering insights into 
issues in design, execution, and development of the system from an alternative frame of 
reference. For our purposes, the alternative frame of reference is focusing on understanding 
system difficulties through discovery of underlying pathologies (aberrations from ‘healthy’ 
functioning of a system). To achieve our purpose, the remainder of the paper is organized 
around four primary objectives. First, in Literature Review for Defense Acquisition System 
Governance, we provide a literature review targeted to an examination of defense 
acquisition in relationship to the emerging Complex System Governance field. Second, in 
the section titled A Systems Theory Based Paradigm and Model for Complex System 
Governance for Defense Acquisition, we elaborate a Systems Theory based paradigm for 
Complex System Governance and draw the relevance for the Defense Acquisition System. 
Third, the System Pathologies in Complex System Governance for Acquisition section 
describes a set of pathologies in the governance of complex systems and projects that set 
to the acquisition field. Fourth, the final section concludes the paper with implications for 
further research and application development of CSG for the acquisition field, focusing on 
the Defense Acquisition System.  
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Literature Review for Defense Acquisition System Governance 
The literature for the Defense Acquisition System is substantial. A simple search of 
Google Scholar (April 2, 2017) identified over 3,400 citations for “defense acquisition 
system.” The detailed parsing of this literature is beyond the scope of this paper. However, 
we can engage a level of literature review to suit our purpose of this paper—exploiting and 
extending recent developments in Complex System Governance (CSG) to advance the 
acquisition field. To tailor the literature we have focused on three primary objectives (Figure 
2) for the literature review, including (1) capture the literature of the Defense Acquisition 
System with respect to inclusion of the Systems Theory, Management Cybernetics, and 
System Governance fields; (2) examine the premier defense acquisition related journals for 
distribution of literature across a taxonomy of research and development areas; and (3) 
suggest preliminary literature review implications for CSG development in relationship to the 
Defense Acquisition System.  
  
 Organization of the Literature Review Figure 2.
CSG Related Field Coverage in the Defense Acquisition System Literature 
The three primary informing fields for CSG are found in Systems Theory (Adams et 
al., 2014; Whitney et al., 2016; von Bertlanffy, 1968), Management Cybernetics (Beer, 1972, 
1979, 1985), and System Governance (Calida & Keating, 2014). Several predominant 
scholarly databases were reviewed for each of the CSG informing fields with respect to 
“defense acquisition system.” The results of the review of the CSG informing fields identified 
a scarcity in coverage in relationship to Defense System Acquisition. The results of this 
examination are summarized in Table 1. 
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Table 1. Coverage of CSG Related Field in the Defense Acquisition System 
Literature 
 
From this preliminary review of literature for the Defense Acquisition System body of 
knowledge, we make three initial conclusions. First, the coverage of the three informing 
fields for CSG have not received significant levels of development. While we might 
conjecture as to the proximate cause of this scarcity, the fact remains that the coverage is 
minimal. Second, it appears that there is an opportunity to project relatively unexplored 
fields into the Defense Acquisition System dialog. The extension of CSG to the Defense 
Acquisition System might provide fruitful insights into developmental issues that continue to 
plague the field. Third, we must be cautious not to overextend these preliminary results. This 
is representative of an initial exploration of the vast literature for defense acquisition. Care 
must be taken not to amplify this “glimpse” as more than an invitation for further examination 
at this point. For example, there were other references to “governance” in acquisition 
literature (e.g., Rebovich, 2007; Gansler, Lucyshyn, & Rigilano, 2012). However, these 
articulations were tangential to the primary focus on the systemic nature of governance in 
relationship to the Defense Acquisition System. 
Emphasis of Premier Journals for Defense Acquisition System Literature 
The literature for the Defense Acquisition System is immense. For the second phase 
of the literature review we examined three premier sources of literature supporting 
development of the acquisition field. The purpose of this exploration was to examine the 
distribution of articles across a spectrum of the acquisition body of knowledge, ranging from 
conceptual/theoretical to practical tools. This provided a gestalt view of the distribution of 
field development. The sources for this review included (1) the Defense AT&L Magazine, a 
publication of the Defense Acquisition University serving professionals in the acquisition 
community; (2) the Defense Acquisition Research Journal, a publication of the Defense 
Acquisition University targeted to development of a spectrum of topics targeted to the 
professional acquisition community of researchers and practitioners; and (3) the Systems 
Engineering Journal, a peer reviewed journal published by Wiley publishers under the 
auspices of the International Council on Systems Engineering (INCOSE). INCOSE is an 
organization dedicated to the advancement of systems engineering, of which acquisition is a 
central focus for the organization. Our approach was to fit the documents from a 10-year 
window (2006–2016) into a taxonomy (based on the description of the classification 
identified in Table 2).  
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Table 2. Distribution of Literature Published (Focused During the 10-Year Period 
of 2006–2016, Total 151 Articles) 
 
We used these results to establish an initial view of the distribution across a 
spectrum of focal areas contributing to the body of knowledge for acquisition. This 
classification provided a gestalt indicator of the emphasis for the field.  
Implications of Literature Related to CSG for the Defense Acquisition System 
We are hesitant to draw absolute conclusions based on our preliminary review of 
literature. However, this analysis does suggest several indications that warrant further 
exploration in a more rigorous examination of the literature in the acquisition field. Among 
these we include the following: 
1. The existence of Defense Acquisition System literature directly drawn from 
the underlying CSG informing fields (Systems Theory, Management 
Cybernetics, System Governance) is scarce. What is there is limited in depth 
related to the CSG fields. This is not unexpected and suggests that inclusion 
of these fields, and CSG which is drawn from them, might enhance the 
Defense Acquisition System literature. 
2. There appears to be a heavy inclination toward the practice side of literature 
(tools, methods, models) as fully 127 articles (84%) fit into these categories. 
Without explanation as to why this skewed distribution exists, it does lend 
itself to a closer examination of the literature and proclivities of the 
community. 
3. At the level of Methodologies and Conceptual Foundations there were 22 
articles (approximately 15%). This result provides an interesting pivot point to 
provide a closer examination as to the degree that this relatively limited 
balance in acquisition field development might offer new insights. 
4. These preliminary results ask many more questions than they answer. 
However, they do suggest some different paths of inquiry into further 
research based development of the Defense Acquisition field. For instance, 
can tools, methods, and models be more insightfully grounded in an 
underlying conceptual/theoretical base? Are there implications for acquisition 
tool/method development stemming from expanding conceptual foundations? 
And, do failures of tools/methods for acquisition programs suggest that 
underlying conceptual/theoretical foundations might be contributing to 
failures? 
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The initial results of this literature have served the purpose for this paper. The review 
provides sufficient motivation to pursue two further aims in establishing CSG research in 
relationship to Defense Acquisition System development. First, a deeper examination and 
more extensive/rigorous classification of literature is warranted based on initial results. 
Second, the scarcity of CSG and informing fields application to the acquisition field suggests 
an opportunity to expand the breadth and depth of the body of knowledge for the Defense 
Acquisition System. At this point of examination, it does not appear that CSG or its tenets 
have been a subject of investigation or application in Defense Acquisition System 
research/applications. 
A Systems Theory Based Paradigm and Model for Complex System 
Governance for Defense Acquisition  
In this section we provide the basis for CSG with respect to defense acquisition. To 
provide this link, three primary themes will be developed. First, we provide the underlying 
source for CSG as stemming from the intersection of three fields, including Systems Theory 
(propositions that define behavior and explain performance of all complex systems), 
Management Cybernetics (the science of effective structural organization of systems), and 
System Governance (provision of direction, oversight, and accountability) for a system. 
Second, we introduce the paradigm for CSG. Our emphasis is to provide the high-level 
depiction of CSG such that the ensuing detailed development of CSG will have an 
intellectual grounding. Third, we introduce the CSG reference model. This model is 
explained in relationship to the underlying CSG paradigm and implications for extension to 
the Defense Acquisition System and field are suggested. We close this section with CSG 
implications for defense acquisition and a summary of the paradigm as it relates to defense 
acquisition. 
In broad terms, DoD Directive 5000.01 (2007, p. 4) defines the Defense Acquisition 
System as “the management process by which the Department of Defense provides 
effective, affordable, and timely systems to the users.” with the primary objective (DoD 
5001.01, p. 3) being “to acquire quality products that satisfy user needs with measurable 
improvements to mission capability and operational support, in a timely manner, and at a fair 
and reasonable price.” At an abstract level, the ambitions of the acquisition system are 
certainly noble. However, as identified in the previous section, the Defense Acquisition 
System continues to be a source of challenge. While the precise cause-effect relationships 
generating difficulties in acquisition deployment are uncertain, the drive for reform, 
adjustment, and performance improvement in the system continue. Given the complexity in 
modern warfare systems, and the processes necessary to bring those systems to fruition, it 
is not likely that a single breakthrough will vanquish issues in the acquisition field. Instead, it 
is likely that there are numerous contributors to issues, and the resolution of acquisition field 
issues will require a continuing series of evolutionary changes. In pursuit of Defense 
Acquisition System improvement, we suggest that new thinking and approaches might 
provide an acceleration of advancement. CSG is proposed as a contribution to bring the 
Defense Acquisition System to a different level of understanding. This different level of 
understanding might provide for a corresponding different level of decision, action, and 
interpretation to guide evolution of the field in different directions.  
As the basis for this different understanding of the Defense Acquisition System, CSG 
offers three important distinctions. First, CSG is built on an underlying foundation steeped in 
a strong conceptual grounding. The conceptual basis for CSG development and application 
is found in Systems Theory (Whitney et al., 2015), Management Cybernetics (Beer, 1979), 
and System Governance (Calida & Keating, 2014; see Figure 3). 
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 CSG Draws Upon Governance, Systems Theory, and Management Figure 3.
Cybernetics 
In essence, Systems Theory offers the set of propositions that have been continually 
developed and applied over the past eight decades. The propositions have withstood the 
test of time and application, defining the structure, behavior, and performance of all 
systems. Management Cybernetics provides a strong conceptual foundation for 
communication and control essential to CSG. In particular, Management Cybernetics offers 
CSG design cues for control through the model of a metasystem. The metasystem is a set 
of functions that stand above/beyond the particular systems/entities that it seeks to steer—in 
the cybernetic sense of providing control. Management Cybernetics also provides a set of 
communication channels associated with the steering functions of the metasystem. System 
Governance is concerned with the provision of direction, oversight, and accountability for a 
system such that future performance and trajectory are ensured. 
Governance and systems perspectives were chosen for very specific reasons versus 
the management and process terms used with respect to defense acquisition. First, the 
focus on governance permits a distinction to be made from the management perspective. 
Second invoking systems allows distinction from more limited process perspectives for 
acquisition. Table 3 is offered as an attempt to clarify distinctions across several attributes. 
This listing is not intended to provide absolutes, but rather to point out that (1) the 
Governance/System orientation operates at a different level than more traditional 
Management/Process focused thinking; (2) in actuality, the table provides bookends along a 
spectrum—the realities of any system might vary along that spectrum for each attribute; and 
(3) the shift in perspective for Governance/System introduces the opportunity to foster 
different thinking, decision, action, and interpretation possibilities. 
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Table 3. Attributes of a Governance/System Perspective Versus a 
Management/Process Perspective 
 
We now shift attention to the underlying paradigm that defines the essence of the 
shift to CSG. 
The CSG Paradigm Shift  
CSG is built upon an underlying paradigm intended to suggest a departure from 
more traditional reductionist thinking concerning the design, execution, and evolution of 
systems. In this sense, the paradigm construct is used intentionally to signal a shift in 
thinking. The CSG Paradigm is composed of three primary elements, including (1) the 
Systems Philosophical, Theoretical, Conceptual foundations which act to provide a stable 
theoretical/conceptual grounding for everything that follows; (2) Metasystem Functions 
which include nine essential functions, drawn from Management Cybernetics, that define 
what must be performed by any complex system to remain viable (continue to exist); and (3) 
Implementing Mechanisms that are specific to a particular system and define how it 
performs metasystem functions. Together, these three elements form the triad of CSG 
(Figure 4) and are invoked to produce governance. In turn this governance is responsible for 
the behavior/performance of a complex system and the degree to which a system continues 
to exist (i.e., remain viable). Continued viability will be determined by (1) the degree to which 
the design for CSG is capable of meeting the demands of the system environment; (2) the 
effectiveness of CSG execution consistent with the design; and (3) the ability of the system 
to evolve in response to the nature and pace of perturbations emanating from internal 
system flux and external environmental turbulence. 
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 The CSG Paradigm Figure 4.
The high level CSG paradigm can be stated succinctly through the definition as 
“design, execution, and evolution of the metasystem functions necessary to provide control, 
communication, coordination, and integration of a complex system” (Keating et al., 2015, p. 
274). A further elaboration of the terms in the definition provides insight into the nature of 
CSG: 
• Design: purposeful and deliberate arrangement of the governance system to 
achieve desirable system performance and behavior. 
• Execution: performance of the system design within the unique system 
context, subject to emergent conditions stemming from interactions within the 
system and between the system and its environment. 
• Evolution: the change of the governance system in response to internal and 
external perturbations as well as revisions to system trajectory. 
• Metasystem: the set of nine interrelated functions that provide for 
governance of a complex system.  
• Control: invoking the minimal constraints necessary to ensure desirable 
levels of performance and maintenance of system trajectory, in the midst of 
internally or externally generated perturbations of the system. 
• Communication: the flow, transduction, and processing of information within 
and external to the system, that provides for consistency in decisions, 
actions, interpretations, and knowledge creation made with respect to the 
system. 
• Coordination: providing for interactions (relationships) between constituent 
entities within the system, and between the system and external entities, 
such that unnecessary instabilities are avoided. 
• Integration: continuous maintenance of system integrity. This requires a 
dynamic balance between autonomy of constituent entities and the 
interdependence of those entities to form a coherent whole. This 
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interdependence produces the system identity (uniqueness) that exists 
beyond the identities of the individual constituents. 
• Complex system: a set of bounded interdependent entities forming a whole 
in pursuit of a common purpose to produce value beyond that which 
individual entities are capable. 
It is important to note that all systems must perform the metasystem functions at a 
minimal level to maintain viability. However, viability is not a guarantee of performance 
excellence. On the contrary, viability simply assures is that the system continues to exist. 
There are degrees of viability, the minimal of which is existence. Implementing Mechanisms 
are the specific vehicles (e.g., processes, procedures, activities, practices, plans, artifacts, 
values/beliefs, customs, mores) that implement metasystem governance functions for a 
system. These mechanisms are not a general set of mechanisms, but rather exist as unique 
to a specific system to define how a specific system performs the functions. CSG 
mechanisms may be explicit/tacit, formal/informal, routine/non-routine, effective/ineffective, 
or rational/irrational. However, all mechanisms can be articulated in relationship to the 
metasystem governance functions which they support. 
The essence of this paradigm can be used to guide thinking about CSG for 
acquisition. We now shift attention to the CSG Reference Model. This model is consistent 
with the CSG paradigm shift and provides a detailed description for application.  
The Complex System Governance Reference Model 
Central to CSG is a reference model that depicts the central elements of CSG and 
their interrelationships (Figure 5). A brief depiction of the nature and role of the CSG 
functions (identified as Metasystem functions) has been previously developed in several 
publications (Keating et al., 2015; Keating et al., 2016; Bradley et al., 2016). 
 
 The CSG Reference Model Figure 5.
We summarize the nine critical functions performed by a complex system to maintain 
viability (continued existence): 
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• Metasystem Five (M5)—Policy and Identity—focused on overall steering of 
the system, giving policy level direction, representation of the system to 
external constituents, and maintaining identity for system coherence. For 
example, M5 would be concerned with the generation and propagation of 
consistency of purpose for a particular acquisition program. 
• Metasystem Five Star (M5*)—System Context—focused on the specific 
context within which the metasystem is embedded. Context is taken as the 
circumstances, factors, conditions, trends, or patterns that constrain and 
enable the execution of a system. For example, the particular political 
dynamics in play for an acquisition program would be an element of 
consideration for context.  
• Metasystem Five Prime (M5')—Strategic System Monitoring—focused on 
oversight of the system at a strategic level. This monitoring is essential to 
ensure that the trajectory of the system is consistent with the desirable future 
state. For example, stability of future program resources essential to maintain 
system development would be a possible area for strategic monitoring. 
• Metasystem Four (M4)—System Development—focusing on the long-range 
development of the system to ensure future viability. This function ensures 
that the current and future models of the system are examined to ensure 
consistency with trajectory and expectations for system development. For 
example, this function would identify inconsistencies between existing 
capabilities in the program (system) and those required for realization of the 
future capabilities required to ensure integrity of the program (system). 
• Metasystem Four Star (M4*)—Learning and Transformation—focused on 
facilitation of learning based on detection and correction of design errors in 
the metasystem and guiding planning to support transformation of the 
metasystem. For example, execution of design reviews targeting errors in 
material procurement. 
• Metasystem Four Prime (M4')—Environmental Scanning—focused on 
sensing the environment for circumstances, trends, patterns, or events with 
implications for both present and future system performance. For example, 
the early identification of new regulatory requirements. 
• Metasystem Three (M3)—System Operations—focused on the day to day 
operations of the metasystem to ensure that the system maintains 
performance levels. For instance, responding to schedule shifts to 
compensate for supplier shifts in material availability.  
• Metasystem Three Star (M3*)—Operational Performance—focused on 
monitoring system performance to identify and assess aberrant or emergent 
conditions in the system. For example, conducting audits of resource 
utilization.  
• Metasystem Two (M2)—Information and Communications—focused on the 
design for flow of information and consistent interpretation of exchanges 
(communication channels). For instance, providing forums for dissemination 
of information for access throughout the system. 
Ultimately, effectiveness in purposeful design, execution, and evolution of the nine 
metasystem governance functions, via implementing mechanisms, determines system 
performance, including acquisition systems. We now examine the essence of CSG for 
defense acquisition.  
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Essence of CSG for Defense Acquisition 
Although the underlying theory, concepts, and execution of CSG are challenging, the 
essence of CSG related to defense acquisition is not difficult to gasp. The essence of CSG 
for acquisition might be captured in the following paragraph and elaborated in the four points 
that follow: 
Subject to fundamental system laws, all systems engaged in acquisition 
(programs, projects, entities, agencies, etc.) perform essential governance 
functions. System performance is determined by effectiveness in 
achievement of nine governance functions consistent with system laws. 
Violation of system laws degrades system performance. System performance 
can be enhanced through purposeful development of governance functions 
and their implementing mechanisms. 
1. All systems are subject to the laws of systems. Just as there are laws 
governing the nature of matter and energy (e.g., physics law of gravity), so 
too are our systems subject to laws found in Systems Theory and 
Management Cybernetics. These system laws are always there, non-
negotiable, non-biased, and explain system performance. The implication for 
acquisition practice is understanding system performance in relationship to 
underlying systems laws. 
2. All systems perform essential governance functions that determine 
system performance. Nine system governance functions are performed by 
all systems, regardless of sector, size, or purpose. These functions define 
what must be achieved for governance of a system. Every system invokes a 
set of unique implementing mechanisms (means of achieving governance 
functions) that determine how governance functions are accomplished. 
Mechanisms can be formal-informal, tacit-explicit, routine-sporadic, or limited-
comprehensive in nature. CSG produces system performance which is a 
function of previously discussed communication, control, integration, and 
coordination. Acquisition practitioners must ask, “Do we understand how our 
system performs essential governance functions to produce performance?” 
3. Violations of systems laws in performance of governance functions 
carry consequences. Irrespective of noble intentions, ignorance, or willful 
disregard, violation of system laws carries real consequences for system 
performance. In the best case, violations degrade performance. In the worst 
case, violations can escalate to cause catastrophic consequences or even 
eventual system collapse. Acquisition practitioners must ask, “Do we 
understand problematic system performance in terms of violations of 
fundamental systems laws?” 
4. System performance can be enhanced through purposeful development 
of governance functions. When system performance outputs fail to meet 
expectations (e.g., cost, schedule, technical performance), deficiencies in 
governance functions can offer novel insights into the deeper systemic 
sources of failure. Performance issues can be traced to governance function 
issues as well as violations of underlying system laws. Thus, system 
development can proceed in a more informed and purposeful mode. 
Acquisition practitioners must ask, “How might problematic performance be 
explained as stemming from deeper system governance issues and violations 
of system laws, suggesting different development directions?” 
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We now shift our attention to exploration of pathologies that are representative of 
violations of systems laws in performance of CSG functions.  
System Pathologies in the Complex System Governance for Acquisition 
At a basic level, a system pathology has been described as a “circumstance, 
condition, factor, or pattern that acts to limit system performance, or lessen system viability, 
such that the likelihood of a system achieving performance expectation is reduced” (Keating 
& Katina, 2012, p. 253). The basis for pathologies in systems, including the acquisition 
system, stems from Systems Theory (the set of principles, laws, and concepts that explain 
behavior and performance of systems) and Management Cybernetics (focused on the 
structure that serves to produce system organization). Stemming from the work of Katina 
(2015, 2016) and Keating and Katina (2012) a set of 53 system pathologies has emerged. 
While each of these pathologies is mapped to the underlying systems law(s) in violation, that 
mapping is beyond the scope of this paper. However, in this section we present the current 
state of set of pathologies and project their implications for the Defense Acquisition System. 
We close the section with the implications that further development of pathologies can hold 
for improving the acquisition system. 
Table 4. Metasystem Pathologies With Acquisition System Applicability 
Metasystem 
function 
Corresponding Set of Pathologies Acquisition System Applicability 
Metasystem Five 
(M5): Policy and 
Identity 
M5.1. Identity of system is ambiguous and 
does not effectively generate consistency 
system decision, action, and interpretation. 
Identity clarity is essential to increase the 
likelihood of consistency in establishment of 
priorities and tradeoffs. For example, given cuts in 
scarce resources, the tradeoffs among cost, 
schedule, and technical performance should be 
informed by a consistent and stable reference 
frame (identity). 
M5.2. System vision, purpose, mission, or 
values remain unarticulated, or articulated 
but not embedded in the execution of the 
system. 
Consistency in program tradeoffs occurring 
throughout the acquisition system are dependent 
on the congruence of thinking, decisions, and 
interpretations held by the entity. 
M5.3. Balance between short-term 
operational focus and long-term strategic 
focus is unexplored. 
Every program has a tension between long- and 
short-term objectives. The explicit definition and 
resolution of this tension over the acquisition 
process is essential to avoid unnecessary crises 
and conflicts. 
M5.4. Strategic focus lacks sufficient clarity 
to direct consistent system development. 
Purposeful direction for strategic development of 
an acquisition program/entity should be by design, 
explicit, measurable, and dynamic—not a 
haphazard endeavor in response to crises. 
M5.5. System identity is not routinely 
assessed, maintained, or questioned for 
continuing ability to guide consistency in 
system decision and action. 
Every acquisition entity has an identity that marks 
its uniqueness. Purposeful articulation and 
development left to chance misses the opportunity 
to exploit this advantage in dealing with 
complexity. 
M5.6. External system projection is not 
effectively performed. 
Providing clarity in communication and messaging 





M5*.1. Incompatible metasystem context 
constraining system performance. 
Potential incompatibilities between a program 
design and execution with the context within 
which it is embedded invites system degradation. 
M5*.2. Lack of articulation and 
representation of metasystem context. 
Lacking an explicit mapping of contextual 
influences misses opportunities to influence 
impacts or preclude disruptions stemming from 
context. 
M5*.3. Lack of consideration of context in 
metasystem decisions and actions. 
Performance impacts of contextual factors should 





M5’.1. Lack of strategic system monitoring. Strategic system performance indicators should 
be monitored to identify emergent variability. 
M5’.2. Inadequate processing of strategic 
monitoring results. 
Program/system development should be in direct 
response to identified strategic variabilities. 
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M5’.3. Lack of strategic system performance 
indicators. 
Strategic system performance indicators, beyond 
cost, schedule, and technical performance should 




M4.1. Lack of forums to foster system 
development and transformation. 
Beyond day-to-day execution, strategic 
development activities should be engaged for long 
range, strategic system evolution. 
M4.2. Inadequate interpretation and 
processing of results of environmental 
scanning—non-existent, sporadic, limited.  
Results of active scanning for potential system 
perturbations should be routinely processed and 
responses formulated. 
M4.3. Ineffective processing and 
dissemination of environmental scanning 
results. 
Scanning results should be disseminated to the 
point where responsive decision/action can be 
implemented. 
M4.4. Long-range strategic development is 
sacrificed for management of day-to-day 
operations—limited time devoted to 
strategic analysis. 
Appropriate balance in emphasis between present 
and future is essential to ensure that both short-
term and long-term viability are maintained. This 
balance may dynamically shift over time for the 
program and/or changing circumstances. 
M4.5. Strategic planning/thinking focuses on 
operational level planning and improvement. 
Programs that are consumed with day to day 
existence sacrifice long-term viability and 





M4*.1. Limited learning achieved related to 
environmental shifts. 
Without a continuous and explicit learning system 
in place, opportunities for system development 
can be missed. 
M4*.2. Integrated strategic transformation 
not conducted, limited, or ineffective. 
Long-range viability of a program/system should 
be by active comprehensive design, not left to 
chance. 
M4*.3. Lack of design for system learning—
informal, non-existent, or ineffective. 
Vehicles to invoke continuous detection and 
correction of design, execution, and development 
issues should be in place. 
M4*.4. Absence of system representative 
models—present and future. 
Programs/systems should have a dynamic 
mapping showing how value is produced, for both 





M4’.1. Lack of effective scanning 
mechanisms. 
Environmental scanning mechanisms should be 
comprehensive, focused, and integrated. 
M4’.2. Inappropriate targeting/undirected 
environmental scanning. 
Program/system environmental scanning should 
be by purposeful design. 
M4’.3. Scanning frequency not appropriate 
for rate of environmental shifts.  
Timing of environmental scanning should be 
appropriate and shift over the life cycle of a 
program. 
M4’.4. System lacks enough control over 
variety generated by the environment. 
Filtering of environment noise and amplification of 
the program to the environment (e.g. external 
stakeholders) should be instituted by design. 
M4’.5. Lack of current model of system 
environment. 
Programs/systems should have a dynamic explicit 





M3.1. Imbalance between autonomy of 
productive elements and integration of 
whole system. 
Constituent systems/entities should be given the 
maximum autonomy possible without degrading 
program/system performance. 
M3.2. Shifts in resources without 
corresponding shifts in accountability/shifts 
in accountability without corresponding 
shifts in resources. 
For every shift in resources provided for a 
program/system, there should be a corresponding 
negotiated adjustment in expectations. 
M3.3. Mismatch between resource and 
productivity expectations. 
Alignment between expectations for program 
value production and resources allocated for that 
production should be congruent. 
M3.4. Lack of clarity for responsibility, 
expectations, and accountability for 
performance. 
Roles for system design, execution, and 
development should provide clarity of assignment 
and eliminate unnecessary redundancy. 
M3.5. Operational planning frequently pre-
empted by emergent crises. 
Crises must be understood in relation to 
underlying issues in system design, execution, or 
development. 
M3.6. Inappropriate balance between short-
term operational versus long-term strategic 
focus. 
Continual sacrifice of system long-term 
development can degrade near-term performance 
or sacrifice long-term viability. 
M3.7. Lack of clarity of operational direction 
for productive entities (i.e. subsystems). 
Program/system entities producing core value 
should be given clear, concise, and timely 
direction for expectations as to what must be 
accomplished. 
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M3.8. Difficulty in managing integration of 
system productive entities (i.e. subsystems). 
Constituent entities of a program/system must be 
provided clear direction on limits for autonomy 
and expectations for integration into the program. 
M3.9. Slow to anticipate, identify, and 
respond to environmental shifts. 
Robust processes must mount timely, resilient, 
and effective responses across a spectrum of 
environmental perturbations.  
Metasystem 
Three Star (M3*): 
Operational 
Performance 
M3*.1. Limited accessibility to data 
necessary to monitor performance. 
Actionable data on performance of operation 
design and execution must be available.  
M3*.2. System-level operational 
performance indicators are absent, limited, 
or ineffective. 
Program/system performance indicators, in 
addition to cost, schedule, and technical 
performance should exist to provide a holistic 
performance picture.  
M3*.3. Absence of monitoring for system 
and subsystem level performance. 
Monitoring performance must be accomplished for 
variances in operational trajectory and 
expectations. 
M3*.4. Lack of analysis for performance 
variability or emergent deviations from 
expected performance levels or the 
meaning of deviations. 
Programs/systems should have analysis methods 
in place to systemically examine sources of 
performance variation to derive interpretations 
and support informed responses. 
M3*.5. Performance auditing is non-
existent, limited in nature, or restricted 
mainly to troubleshooting emergent issues. 
Non-pejorative internal auditing of performance 
should be conducted routinely within the 
program/system to determine consistency in 
design and execution of the program/system. 
M3*.6. Periodic examination of system 
performance largely unorganized and 
informal in nature. 
Examination of system performance across 
operational design and execution should be 
efficient with minimal disruption. 
M3*.7. Limited system learning based on 
performance assessments. 
Results of performance assessment should be 
interpreted and actionable across system design, 






M2.1. Unresolved coordination issues within 
the system. 
Program/system entities should not continue to 
experience identified coordination issues. 
M2.2. Excess redundancies in system 
resulting in inconsistency and inefficient 
utilization of resources—including 
information. 
Existence of potentially unnecessary 
redundancies within the program/system should 
be continually questioned and identified for 
elimination when necessary. 
M2.3. System integration issues stemming 
from excessive entity isolation or 
fragmentation. 
Isolation/fragmentation of entities attributable to 
inadequacies in system design, execution, or 
development should be targeted for elimination. 
M2.4. System conflict stemming from 
unilateral decisions and actions. 
Conflicts stemming from decision/action execution 
should be mapped to identify system 
design/execution/development inconsistencies. 
M2.5. Excessive level of emergent crises 
associated with information transmission, 
communication, and coordination within the 
system. 
Crises should be examined for design and 
execution issues in communications and 
implications for system development. 
M2.6. Weak or ineffective communications 
systems among system entities (i.e. 
subsystems). 
Communications within the program/system 
should be explicitly designed and execution 
monitored to identify performance or development 
issues. 
M2.7. Lack of standardized methods (i.e. 
procedures, tools, and techniques) for 
routine system level activities. 
Expectations for design, execution, and 
development of standardized methods within the 
system should be clear. 
M2.8. Overutilization of standardized 
methods (i.e. procedures, tools, and 
techniques) where they should be 
customized. 
Programs/systems should understand their unique 
needs and question application of standardized 
approach compatibility and necessity. 
M2.9. Overly ad-hoc system coordination 
versus purposeful design. 
Program/system design should preclude repetitive 
coordination conflicts. 
M2.10. Difficulty in accomplishing cross-
system functions requiring integration or 
standardization.  
Interfaces between program/system entities 
should enhance rather than detract from cross-
functional activities. 
M2.11. Introduction of uncoordinated 
system changes resulting in excessive 
oscillation. 
Changes in programs/systems should be 
integrated by design with minimal disruption to 
ongoing operations or system development. 
There are four primary conclusions with respect to pathologies identified for CSG 
functions and their implications for the Defense Acquisition System. First, these pathologies 
Acquisition Research Program: 
Creating Synergy for Informed Change - 370 - 
are not unique to any given acquisition entity (program, project, agency). They may certainly 
be present or absent and vary in degree should they be present in any system. The set of 
pathologies are indicative of aberrant conditions in the metasystem functions necessary to 
maintain viability for complex systems, including acquisition systems. Thus, the 53 
pathologies (Table 4) can act to limit system performance, or lessen system viability, such 
that the likelihood of a system achieving performance expectations is reduced. This is 
particularly critical in acquisition systems that must function in conditions of increasing 
complexity. Second, these pathologies do not exist in a binary fashion of “present” or “not 
present.” Rather, they may be experienced in “degrees of existence” along a continuum 
ranging from minimal to significant. This opens the possibility of pathologies having not only 
a degree related to their existence, but also the potential system degradation that may be 
experienced stemming from that level of existence. Third, the existence of a pathology has 
real consequences for performance of a given acquisition system—measured in terms of a 
range of possible effects. These effects may not be easily derived from the observable (e.g., 
crisis) surface manifestations resulting from the underlying pathology. As each acquisition 
system is unique, so too will be the associated pathologies that become apparent as the 
system operates. The pathologies will not be static over the life cycle for a given 
program/system. Thus, the impact of a pathology may lessen or exacerbate over time as the 
acquisition system is executed. Fourth, based on prior research, these pathologies should 
be a subject of exploration during problem/program formulation, since bringing change to 
the system is largely dependent on understanding the current state of the system (Dery, 
1984; Katina, 2015; Quade, 1980). We suggest that in the formative stages of acquisition 
system exploration, knowledge of pathologies and their assessment can play a vital role in 
targeted system design and subsequent development. They can serve in both the design of 
new acquisition programs/systems or evaluation of programs/systems currently underway. 
Conclusions and Implications 
CSG is a systems based field in the embryonic stages of development. The 
contribution of CSG to the Defense Acquisition System is targeted to enable practitioners to 
better deal with issues stemming from the problems associated with increasing complexity in 
the systems and environment they face. In essence, CSG purposefully addresses system 
drift. System drift denotes systems/programs that, irrespective of the best intentions, have 
either never been purposefully designed or whose execution continually fails to meet 
desired performance expectations. In short, these drifting systems/programs fail to deliver 
anticipated value, much less produce high performance. We do not need to look far to see 
examples of drifting systems/programs related to defense acquisition. Consider the following 
examples (Table 5) and the suggestion of how the CSG perspective might view the program 
failures (Bradley, Katina, & Keating, 2016). While CSG provides a set of lenses from which 
to view program deficiencies, CSG pathologies provides a deeper examination of the deep 
systems sources of program failure or degradation in relationship to system functions 
necessary for CSG. We cannot provide assurance that CSG and discovery of pathologies in 
these efforts would have precluded failure. However, CSG pathologies provide a different 
perspective and set of insights. This might direct acquisition professionals to early 
identification of sources of system errors with sufficiently early identification to provide 
correction prior to program/system collapse. 
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Table 5. Analysis of Troubled Programs Through the Lens of CSG 
 
Further research and development directions for CSG in relationship to research in 
acquisition is envisioned in the application of the research and development model provided 
in Figure 6. This model suggests a close coupling of four primary elements to holistically 
engage CSG development and deployment to improve practices in the acquisition field. In a 
nutshell, we summarize this as The system-science based engineering of technologies to 
support application development that advances practices related to design, execution, and 
development of complex systems. These four elements include the following: 
1. System Science Based. System science is a broad area that includes 
multiple different fields that explore the phenomena associated with 
explaining the behavior and performance of systems. For our purposes, we 
suggest that system science provides the conceptual underpinnings for all 
derivative developments (e.g., technologies, methods, tools) based on 
application of the science. For CSG, the systems science basis is found 
primarily in Systems Theory and Management Cybernetics. 
2. Engineering of Technologies. Based upon the underlying systems science, 
engineering involves the development of implementing technologies. These 
technologies are developed as CSG supporting artifacts (e.g., tools, 
techniques, software), grounded in systems science and addressing a 
targeted aspect of design, execution, or development of complex systems. 
3. Application Development. Application is focused on development of the 
particular methods and methodologies that bridge the divide between the 
engineering of technologies and preparation for deployment in practice. The 
application emphasis is the appropriate preparation of technologies 
respective of their qualification for deployment for particular purposes, 
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integration with other technologies and methods/methodologies, and 
providing for effective deployment within operational/practice contexts. 
4. Practice. Ultimately the beneficiary of the systems science, engineering, and 
application triad is the practice field where deployment is targeted. This is 
where the different technologies, as deployed through application design, are 
targeted to enhance practices related to better design, execution, and 
development of complex systems and their problems. 
A central and critical aspect of this framework is the close coupling of science, 
engineering, application, and practice. Each of the elements in this framework are 
interrelated. This suggests that their execution is not mutually exclusive or independent of 
one another. On the contrary, the breakthroughs in CSG for acquisition are seen as four 
interconnected elements operating to inform, and be informed by, the other elements. We 
postulate that this interdependent coupling will moderate the trajectory of each of the 
constituent elements in ways not accessible with their independent development. 
 
 The CSG Research and Development Framework Figure 6.
Further development of CSG pathologies for acquisition systems is focused on four 
critical challenges: 
1. Maintenance of grounding in Systems Science. There is a propensity in the 
professions (e.g., acquisition) to be pragmatic and practitioner focused. While 
this is expected from a practitioner’s perspective, development of the CSG 
field will be enhanced by the appreciation and grounding of advancements in 
the underlying theoretical and conceptual basis. Further development of 
pathologies must remain grounded in the Systems Science base if the 
ultimate utility of this area is to be achieved. 
2. Engineering of technologies to support practical applications of CSG. 
Technologies are the byproduct of engineering to address problems or fulfill 
needs in ways that advance practical purposes. Engineering of CSG 
technologies (tools, techniques, artefacts) is critical to help link the 
theoretical/conceptual science-based formulations of CSG in preparation for 
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deployment. CSG technologies should advance practical aspects of 
deployment for practitioners and also be appreciative to their fit within the 
larger landscape of the emerging CSG field for application to acquisition. 
3. Design for application and deployment of technologies. CSG technologies are 
not intended for direct deployment to acquisition practice settings. Instead, 
emphasis must be placed on effectively bridging between technologies and 
their deployment. This bridge exists as the design for application. The design 
for application must take into account the wider perspective of the 
problem/need, the context, qualifying assumptions, and so forth. The building 
of applications of CSG from this perspective is essential to enhance the 
appropriate qualification of technologies to unique acquisition practice 
circumstances. This requires that the technologies be fit to (a) the particular 
context within which they will be deployed and operate and (b) the specific 
acquisition problems for which the technology is appropriate. 
4. Case demonstration of deployable applications. Advancing CSG for 
acquisition cannot be achieved separate from the world of practice. The 
determination of application utility for practice can only be established from 
deployment in practice. The pragmatic focus of the acquisition field 
necessitates the development of practice enabling tools, techniques, and 
technologies. CSG must emphasize producing these tools to aid practitioners 
in the acquisition field. 
The acquisition field is under tremendous pressure to increase effectiveness in 
delivery of on time, on budget, and on performance systems. While this has always been an 
objective for acquisition systems, the current nature of the problem domain has substantially 
increased the challenges facing the field. Further development of CSG and systemic 
analysis of pathologies can serve to advance the capabilities and capacity of the acquisition 
field and professionals to better address current and future challenges. 
References 
Beer, S. (1972). Brain of the firm: The managerial cybernetics of organization. London, 
England: Penguin Press. 
Beer, S. (1979). The heart of enterprise. New York, NY: John Wiley & Sons. 
Beer, S. (1985). Diagnosing the system for organizations. Hoboken, NJ: John Wiley & Sons. 
Bertalanffy, L. V. (1950). An outline of general systems theory. The British Journal for the 
Philosophy of Science, 1(2), 134–165.  
Bertalanffy, L. V. (1968). General system theory: Foundations, development, applications 
(Rev. ed.). New York, NY: George Braziller. 
Berteau, D., & Ben-Ari, G. (2014). Identifying governance best practices in systems-of-
systems acquisition (No. CSIS-AM-14-006). Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and 
International Studies. 
Berteau, D., Ben-Ari, G., Hofbauer, J., Sanders, G., Ellman, J., & Morrow, D. (2011). Cost 
and time overruns for major defense acquisition programs: An annotated brief. Paper 
presented at the Eighth Annual Acquisition Research Symposium, Monterey, CA.  
Berteau, D., Levy, R., Ben-Ari, G., & Moore, C. (2011). Defense Industry access to capital 
markets: Wall Street and the Pentagon. An annotated brief. 
Bradley, J. M., Katina, P. F., & Keating, C. B. (2016). Complex system governance for 
acquisition. In Proceedings of the 2016 Acquisition Research Symposium. Monterey, 
CA: Naval Postgraduate School.  
Acquisition Research Program: 
Creating Synergy for Informed Change - 374 - 
Calida, B. Y., & Keating, C. B. (2014). System governance: Emergence of practical 
perspectives across the disciplines. In Infranomics (pp. 269–296). Cham, Switzerland: 
Springer International. 
Cilli, M., Parnell, G. S., Cloutier, R., & Zigh, T. (2015). A systems engineering perspective on 
the revised defense acquisition system. Systems Engineering, 18(6), 584–603. 
Dery, D. (1984). Problem definition in policy analysis. Lawrence, KS: University Press of 
Kansas. 
Boudreau, M. (2007). Acoustic rapid COTS insertion: A case study in modular open systems 
approach for spiral development. Paper presented at the IEEE International Conference 
on System of Systems Engineering. 
Fauser, M. (2006). Transnational migration–A national security risk? Securitization of 
migration policies in Germany, Spain and the United Kingdom. Retrieved from 
http://pdc.ceu.hu/archive/00004804/01/rap_i_an_0206a.pdf  
Fox, J. R. (2012). Defense acquisition reform, 1960–2009: An elusive goal (Vol. 51). 
Government Printing Office. 
Francis, P. L. (2008). Defense acquisitions: Zumwalt-class destroyer program emblematic of 
challenges facing Navy shipbuilding. Washington, DC: GPO. 
Francis, P. L. (2009). Defense acquisitions: Cost to deliver Zumwalt-class destroyers likely 
to exceed budget (1437909310). Washington, DC: GPO. 
Friar, A. (2015). Swamped by regulations: Perils of an ever-increasing burden. Ft. Belvoir, 
VA: Defense Acquisition University. 
Gansler, J. S., & Lucyshyn, W. (2015). Allocating national security resources. In F. Melese, 
A. Richter, & B. Solomon (Eds.), Military cost–benefit analysis: Theory and practice 
(Vol. 14, p. 18). New York, NY: Routledge. 
Gansler, J. S., Lucyshyn, W., & Rigilano, J. (2012). Implementing system-of-systems 
governance. Maryland University College Park Center for Public Policy and Private 
Enterprise. 
GAO. (2008, June 25). Risk management: Strengthening the use of risk management 
principles in homeland security (GAO-08-904). Washington, DC: Author. 
GAO. (2008, August 8). DOD business transformation: Air Force’s current approach 
increases risk that asset visibility goals and transformation priorities will not be achieved 
(GAO-08-866). Washington, DC: Author. 
GAO. (2012, July 11). Information technology cost estimation: Agencies need to address 
significant weaknesses in policies and practices (GAO-12-629). Washington, DC: 
Author. 
GAO. (2016, January 12). National security cutter: Enhanced oversight needed to ensure 
problems discovered during testing and operations are addressed (GAO-16-148). 
Washington, DC: Author. 
GAO. (2016, August 12). Department of Transportation, Federal Transit Administration: 
Transit asset management; national transit database (GAO-16-847). Washington, DC: 
Author. 
GAO. (2017, March 17). Defense acquisitions: Assessments of selected weapon programs 
(GAO-16-333SP). Washington, DC: Author. 
Jaradat, R. M., & Keating, C. B. (2014). Fragility of oil as a critical infrastructure problem. 
International Journal of Critical Infrastructure Protection, 7(2), 86–99.  
Acquisition Research Program: 
Creating Synergy for Informed Change - 375 - 
Kadish, R. T., Abbott, G., Cappuccio, F., Hawley, R., Kern, P., & Kozlowski, D. (2006). 
Defense acquisition performance assessment report. Washington, DC: Pentagon. 
Katina, P. F. (2015). Emerging systems theory–based pathologies for governance of 
complex systems. International Journal of System of Systems Engineering, 6(½), 144–
159.  
Keating, C. B. (2014). Governance implications for meeting challenges in the system of 
systems engineering field. Paper presented at the IEEE System of Systems 
Engineering Conference, Adelaide, SA.  
Keating, C. B., & Bradley, J. M. (2015). Complex system governance reference model. 
International Journal of System of Systems Engineering, 6(1), 33–52.  
Keating, C. B., & Katina, P. F. (2011). Systems of systems engineering: prospects and 
challenges for the emerging field. International Journal of System of Systems 
Engineering, 2(2–3), 234–256.  
Keating, C. B., & Katina, P. F. (2012). Prevalence of pathologies in systems of systems. 
International Journal of System of Systems Engineering, 3(3–4), 243–267. 
Keating, C. B., Katina, P. F., & Bradley, J. M. (2015). Challenges for developing complex 
system governance. Paper presented at the Proceedings of the 2015 Industrial and 
Systems Engineering Research Conference. 
Kendall, F. (2014, July 10). Testimony before the House Committee on Armed Services. 
Mills, S., & Goldsmith, R. (2014, September–October). Cybersecurity challenges for 
program managers. Defense AT&L.  
Naphade, M., Banavar, G., Harrison, C., Paraszczak, J., & Morris, R. (2011). Smarter cities 
and their innovation challenges. Computer, 44(6), 32–39.  
O’Rourke, R. (2014). Case studies in DoD acquisition: Finding what works (1437928390). 
Washington, DC: Congressional Record. 
Quade, E. S. (1980). Pitfalls in formulation and modeling. In G. Majone & E. S. Quade 
(Eds.), Pitfalls of analysis (Vol. 8, pp. 23–43). Chichester, England: Wiley-Interscience. 
Rascona, P. M., Barkakati, N., & Solis, W. M. (2008). DOD business transformation Air 
Force’s current approach increases risk that asset visibility goals and transformation 
priorities will not be achieved. Washington, DC: GPO. 
Rebovich, G. (2007, April). Engineering the enterprise. In Proceedings of the First Annual 
IEEE Systems Conference, 1–6. 
Schwartz, M. (2014). Defense acquisitions: How DOD acquires weapon systems and recent 
efforts to reform the process. 
Schwenn, K., Colombi, J., Wu, T., Oyama, K., & Johnson, A. (2015). Toward agent-based 
modeling of the US Department of Defense acquisition system. Procedia Computer 
Science, 44, 383–392. 
Sheard, S. A., & Mostashari, A. (2010, July). 7.3. 1 A complexity typology for systems 
engineering. In INCOSE International Symposium, 20(1), 933–945. 
Skyttner, L. (2005). General systems theory: Problems, perspectives, practice (2nd ed.). 
Singapore: World Scientific. 
Walker, R. G. (2014). A method to define requirements for system of systems. Old Dominion 
University. 
Whitney, K., Bradley, J. M., Baugh, D. E., & Chesterman, C. W., Jr. (2015). Systems theory 
as a foundation for governance of complex systems. International Journal of System of 
Systems Engineering, 6(1), 15–32.  
Acquisition Research Program: 
Creating Synergy for Informed Change - 376 - 
Willette, S. E. (2014). AQ methodology study of complex adaptive system emergence in the 
defense acquisition structure (Doctoral dissertation, Walden University). 
 
Acquisition Research Program: 
Creating Synergy for Informed Change - 377 - 
Optimal Selection of Organizational Structuring for 
Complex Systems Development and Acquisitions  
Alexandra Dukes—is a Graduate Student in the School of Aeronautics and Astronautics at Purdue 
University. She is currently conducting research in the Center for Integrated Systems in Aerospace 
(CISA) led by Dr. Daniel DeLaurentis. [dukes@purdue.edu] 
Scott Parrigon—is a Graduate Student in the Department of Psychological Sciences at Purdue 
University. He is currently part of Dr. Sang Eun Woo’s research group. [spariggo@purdue.edu] 
Navindran Davendralingam—is a Research Scientist in the School of Aeronautics and Astronautics 
at Purdue University. He is currently conducting research in the Center for Integrated Systems in 
Aerospace (CISA) led by Dr. Daniel DeLaurentis. [davendra@purdue.edu] 
Sang Eun Woo—is an Associate Professor of Industrial and Organizational Psychology in the 
Department of Psychological Sciences at Purdue University. Her research focuses on how people’s 
personality and motivation can help explain various psychological phenomena in the workplace. 
[sewoo@purdue.edu] 
Daniel DeLaurentis—is a Professor in the School of Aeronautics and Astronautics, Purdue 
University. His research and teaching interests focus on design and optimization of aerospace 
vehicles and systems of systems. [ddelaure@purdue.edu] 
Abstract 
Research suggests that product designs tend to reflect the structure of the organization in 
which they are conceived (i.e., Conway’s Law). Prior works on this topic, especially in the 
context of acquisitions, have been largely descriptive without prescribing tangible ways to 
reduce the inefficiencies resulting from possible misalignments between a product’s structure 
and the structure of the organization that builds the product. We present a mathematical 
modeling framework that enables the optimal selection of an organization’s structure (here, 
the different ways that various types of program managers are allocated) and its product 
structure (here, a modular, complex system structure). We leverage quantitative and 
qualitative methods from areas of organizational sciences, systems engineering, and 
operations research in a unified manner. We demonstrate application to a defense acquisition 
concept problem that seeks to maximize overall performance of a complex system (the 
“product”) being developed, while minimizing risks associated with mismatches between 
program manager competencies and system development (“the organizational structure”). 
Introduction 
A product’s structure is strongly affected by organizational structure, communication 
mechanisms, and resource channels between organizational units that work together to 
realize an intended product. Inefficient setup in an organization’s structure often results in 
poor requirements being set, poor understanding of interfaces between elements of the 
product, and ultimately, a poor return on investment due to a consequently subpar product 
being realized. Prior research conducted in software engineering analyzes this relationship 
and concludes that product designs tend to reflect the structure of an organization in which 
they are conceived, also known as Conway’s Law (Conway, 1968). Work by Ulrich (1995) 
and Sinha (2012) explored the question of how the degree of a new product’s novelty affects 
the structure of an organization. In more recent literature, Honda performed a comparison of 
information passing strategies in system-level modeling and found that the structure of 
information coordination, for the case of an example satellite design problem, directly 
impacts the drive towards an optimal design configuration (Honda, Ciucci, Lewis, & Yang, 
2015). A recent article, published in Harvard Business Review, presents a case study of 
how Juniper networks, a company that provides IT routing and network solutions, utilized 
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HR strategies to improve business processes across its complex organizational structure 
(Boudreau, 2015). The strategies reduced the number of decision chains involved in product 
development and sought to identify “clusters” of employees with the most diverse 
experience in promoting healthy innovation.  
While these prior literatures allude to the coupled nature between a product structure 
and the structure of the organization that builds it, they are mainly descriptive in nature. 
These literatures do not provide a framework to improve decision-making processes related 
to the product structure (e.g., what collection of systems to acquire and connect) and to the 
organizational structure (e.g., how to allocate human resources such as program managers 
to constituent systems). Such decision-making processes have significant implications for 
improving the performance of the product. It is the couplings between organization structure 
and product architecture, in the context of acquisition, which forms the heart of our research 
goal. 
Motivation 
Our research is motivated by a need to enable better decision-making on how to 
objectively select systems that comprise a complex system and allocate program managers 
to each of these selected systems in a manner that maximizes complex system 
performance, while minimizing risks associated with mismatches between program manager 
competencies and system development. More specifically, we refer to organizational 
structures based on the allocation of program manager types (based on a spectrum of 
program management competencies) to manage each of the selected systems in the 
complex system. We follow Simon’s definition of a complex system as being a hierarchical 
collection of systems and subsystems that are interconnected to provide some desired 
capability (Simon, 1962). We consider multiple collaborating systems within this definition 
too since complex systems are typically developed within a collaborative construct of units 
within and/or across an organization.  
Currently, there is a lack of systematic and quantitative modeling framework to assist 
decision-makers in forming organizational structures that best fit the desired complex 
systems development and vice versa (Honda et al., 2015; MacCormack, Baldwin, & 
Rausnak, 2012). This lack is driven in part by difficulties associated with underlying problem 
of simultaneously selecting a product structure and an organizational structure in an optimal 
fashion. From a product perspective, the task of maximizing a product’s (here, complex 
system) performance may result in a product structure that cannot be well managed, given 
the population and distribution of program manager types. From an organizational 
perspective, on the other hand, fixing the selection of an organization’s distribution of 
program managers will limit the types of products that can be effectively developed. 
Therefore, there needs to be an objective means of selecting systems in a complex system 
and allocating managers in a quantitative manner.  
Methodology 
We first define a scope for the “product” and “organizational” components of our 
mathematical framework. For the organizational structure, we focus on the program 
manager competencies and how various skillsets and variability can impact product 
development. On the product side, we adopt a modular perspective on the complex system 
architecture where the complex system consists of a hierarchical tree of constituent systems 
that connect via defined interfaces and standards. We illustrate our methodology in the 
context of defense acquisition; here, the organizational structure is reflected by the 
distribution of Department of Defense (DoD) program manager types, and the complex 
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system architecture is reflected by modular systems that are yet-to-be acquired and 
connected to form a complex defense system. 
Our research employs a cross-discipline strategy that seeks to allocate different 
organizational program manager types, based on program management competency 
ratings, to the system acquisition life cycle architecture for optimal performance through its 
phases. For the organizational elements of our framework, we adopt methods from 
organizational psychology to translate qualitative insights from literature into a quantitative 
assessment of program manager competency requirements and clarify how they may relate 
to the execution of the defense acquisition life cycle. For the complex system architecture, 
we adopt the mathematical modeling techniques and abstractions as used by 
Davendralingam (Davendralingam, Mane, & DeLaurentis, 2012) and an optimization 
perspective to enable objective selection of both the complex system architecture and 
organizational structure. 
Problem Description 
We seek to address the problem of how to optimally select systems, from a 
candidate pool of modular systems that constitute a complex system and allocate program 
managers to each system in a manner that maximizes overall performance of the complex 
system (the “product”) while minimizing risks associated with mismatches between program 
manager competencies and system development (“the organizational structure”). Our 
problem is based on a defense acquisitions and is motivated by availability of data and 
inputs. We first establish a model for the organizational component and a model of the 
complex system components of our work. The organizational model reflects the relationship 
of program manager competencies to defense acquisition processes that need to be 
executed in developing a constituent system. The product model, on the other hand, reflects 
how selection of different collections of constituent systems, when combined, provide a 
desired overarching military capability. In the following sections, we explain our modeling 
perspective of the organizational and product portions of our framework. We then present an 
optimization based approach that unifies both models within a decision-making framework. 
The data available for this study is derived from studies conducted on program manager 
competencies by Roy Wood (2010, 2014), and prior case study reports on various defense 
acquisition programs. 
Modeling Organizational Structures (i.e., Program Manager Competency Mapping) 
In modeling the organizational component of our mathematical framework, we first 
need to understand the context by which the organizational units (here, the program 
managers) perform. In the case of our defense acquisition problem, the program manager 
performs a series of required programmatic tasks throughout an acquisition process life 
cycle. The ability of the program manager to execute each of the required tasks in the life 
cycle, is based on a list of program manager competencies; this naturally has an impact on 
the end development of each system and the complex system as a whole. First, we need to 
identify/create a life cycle model that allows us to readily map program manager 
competencies. Second, we need to identify a list of program manager competencies that are 
relevant to our life cycle model. Lastly, we need to effectively map these program manager 
competencies onto the life cycle model by relating relevant subsets of these competencies 
to each phase of the life cycle model. In the following sections, we articulate each of the 
steps in the development of our organizational structure model, beginning with the 
identification of our life cycle model. 
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Life Cycle Model Identification 
The first step in our organizational structures modeling process was to identify a 
useful model of the acquisition life cycle. For this purpose, we chose to use a swim lane 
process model. The decision to create a swim lane model stemmed from a qualitative 
analysis of life cycle models provided by the Department of Defense and the Defense 
Acquisition University. There are two prominent models used to describe the system 
acquisition life cycle of the DoD. Figure 1 is titled “Generic Acquisition Phases and Decision 
Points” within the literature and is presented in multiple variations throughout DoD 
Instruction (DoDI) 5000.02 (DoD, 2015). 
 
 Generic Acquisition Phases and Decision Points Figure 1.
(DoD, 2015, p. 6) 
For our purposes, this model does not provide enough detail to properly distinguish 
where the competency data would be utilized through the different phases. A significant 
contribution of the 5000.02 documentation is the descriptions of the phases given with 
Figure 1 and its ability to provide insight into the DoD program manger’s role throughout 
each step within the life cycle. The second model, provided by the Defense Acquisition 
University and presented in Figure 2, provided significantly more visual detail in the 
processes occurring within each phase. 
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 Integrated Defense Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics Life Cycle Figure 2.
Management System 
(Defense Acquisition University, 2009) 
Due to the scope of this research, this diagram was not ideal for the time frame given 
to perform our analysis. Thus, we synthesized the information from both existing models 
forming a new model (swim lane model, Figure 3) that was executable within our given time 
frame.  
 
 Swim Lane Model Depicting Processes Within the DoD System Figure 3.
Acquisition Life Cycle 
The swim lane model encompasses DoD System acquisition processes from the 
inception of acquisition process to Milestone B. To reduce scope for demonstration, the 
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model was furthered reduced to processes between Milestone A and Milestone B for 
evaluation in the optimization problem of this paper. The swim lanes represent the tasks and 
interactions between the Stakeholders, Program Management, Design Engineering, 
Production Engineering, Sustaining Engineering, and Contractors. Each swim lane contains 
several actors within the DoD that were grouped within these categories based on the 
functions they are described to perform by DoDI 5000.02, Defense Acquisition University’s 
Integrated Defense Life Cycle Management System visualization, and the DoD Product 
Support Implementation Roadmap. For example, the “Product Support Management” as 
stated in the DoD Integrated Product Support Implementation Roadmap diagram would fall 
into the “Product Management” swim lane (DoD, 2012). The elements within the swim lanes 
are grouped within four major categories: Milestones, Program Review Decisions, 
Documents, and Tasks. The Milestones, Program Review Decisions, and Documents are 
referenced in the instructional and GAO literature. We created the Tasks to capture steps 
within the life cycle that must be accomplished but are not given a formal title within the DoD 
literature. A description of each of the tasks are provided in Table 1. 
Table 1. Swim Lane Model Task Descriptions 
 
In this study, we focus on the Technology Maturation & Risk Reduction phase. The 
Technology Maturation & Risk Reduction phase aims to mitigate potential risks and develop 
a program plan, budget, and schedule. After this phase, a contractor has been selected to 
pursue the program and the DoD commits its resources to the development, manufacturing, 
and fielding of the selected solution. The Technology Maturation & Risk Reduction was 
partitioned into four phases for evaluation within the optimization problem. Phase 1 begins 
at the conclusion of Milestone A and ends at the start of DET/PET2. Phase 2 begins at 
DET/PET2 and ends at the start of DET3 and DET4. Phase 3 begins at DET3 and DET4 
and ends at the start of SRR. Phase 4 begins at the start of SRR and ends at the conclusion 
of Milestone B. The competencies addressed in Wood and the availability of qualitative data 
describing the program manager’s role within the life cycle motivated the selection and 
partitioning of this phase as well as the time frame of this pilot study. 
With the components of the swim lane model articulated, we can now move onto the 
second major phase of our organizational structure modeling—identifying the program 
manager competencies that can be effectively mapped onto the swim lane model. In the 
following sections, we articulate the competencies used, as well as the process we used to 
map them onto the swim lane model. 
Identifying Program Manager Competencies 
To map program manager competencies onto this swim-lane model, we needed to 
first obtain a relatively comprehensive initial list of relevant program manager competencies. 
For this, we utilized data collected by Wood (2010, 2014) that used a set of 35 program 
manager competencies indicative of the major capabilities that influenced how successful a 
program manager would be. Specifically, these were designed to assess the program 
manager competencies that “can be used in drafting project management interviewing 
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questions, developing appraisal models to select the most qualified project managers for 
promotion, and designing job descriptions for project managers that can be tailored by an 
organization to clearly outline the roles, duties, and responsibilities of a project manager” 
(Golob, 2002, p. 7). These competencies were developed based upon a literature review, 
subject-matter expert reviews, and two surveys of program managers and the managers of 
program managers. A more detailed explication of these and this process can be found in 
Golob (2002).  
These 35 competencies that resulted from this process were posited to measure 20 
technical (or “hard” skills), and 15 behavioral (or “soft” skills). However, as has been posited 
recently in the program manager literature (Nijhuis, Vrijhoef, & Kessels, 2015) these 
individual program manager competencies likely are subcomponents that are attributable to 
more general, higher-order taxonomies of competencies from the general 
management/organizational psychology literatures. For example, Nijhuis et al. (2015) found 
that these higher-order taxonomies were effectively able to integrate the diversity of program 
manager competencies that had been identified in the extant literature. For example, the two 
soft skill competencies of project leadership (i.e., the ability to set a vision, identify the action 
steps, motivate others to maintain their commitment to program success and the ability to 
influence a team to willingly work toward predetermined program objectives) and facilitation 
(i.e., the ability to facilitate or guide team members through a process that helps them 
discover answers and overcome barriers to successful program completion) likely map onto 
the higher-order managerial competency of Leading and Deciding that has been well-
validated within the general managerial/organizational psychology literatures (Bartram, 
2005; Kurz & Bartram, 2002). Thus, while these 35 competencies are a great start, to make 
them practically useful for our optimization problem, as well as more theoretically 
parsimonious, it is important for us to map them onto these higher-order managerial 
competencies. 
For this higher-order managerial competency mapping, we used the Great Eight 
model of managerial competencies (Bartram, 2005; Kurz & Bartram, 2002). These 
researchers defined competencies as “sets of behaviors that are instrumental in the delivery 
of desired results or outcomes (Bartram, Robertson, & Callinan, 2002, p. 7). The Great Eight 
competencies represent a parsimonious representation of the domain of managerial 
competencies that exist in the extant literature. The Great Eight structure has been 
extensively validated and refined. This refinement has created not only the broad Great 
Eight, but 112 component competencies that underlie the eight core dimensions. The eight 
core dimensions are Leading and Deciding, Supporting and Cooperating, Interacting and 
Presenting, Analyzing and Interpreting, Creating and Conceptualizing, Organizing and 
Executing, Adapting and Coping, and Enterprising and Performing.  
Due to the high degree of conceptual overlap between our 35 program manager 
competencies and the Great Eight dimensions, we used the Great Eight as the basis for our 
higher-order managerial competencies. To link our 35 competencies to the Great Eight 
dimensions, we engaged in an iterative process of mapping the individual competencies 
onto the broad Great Eight. Once complete agreement of the mapping was established 
between all members of the research team, this mapping was finalized. With this mapping in 
hand, we can parsimoniously integrate these program manager competencies into our swim 
lane. 
Deriving Baseline Great Eight Ratings From Qualitative Data 
In this part, we derive a set quantitative ratings for each of Great Eight dimensions 
where each rating represents the degree to which each Great Eight dimension is important 
towards accomplishing the acquisition tasks in the swim-lane model; these ratings are 
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considered to be baseline as they each represent an aggregate, required rating for each 
Great Eight dimension, based on the qualitative data from the GAO reports. To accomplish 
the task of generating these baseline values, it becomes necessary to properly map the 
program manager competencies from Wood (2010) onto the swim-lane model, through 
integrating the qualitative data available from the GAO reports and instructional 
documentation with the Wood competencies. Specifically, we utilized information regarding 
the tasks and competencies required at each stage of the swim-lane model to determine the 
importance of each competency for successful performance of the program manager at that 
stage in the life cycle. As articulated previously, rather than mapping each of the 35 specific 
competencies used within the Dr. Wood’s research, we use the higher-order Great Eight 
dimensions that these 35 specific competencies correspond to as depicted in Table 2. This 
reduces our mapping from 140 ratings (i.e., 35 competencies x 4 phases) to 32 (i.e., 8 
competencies x 4 phases) that is more theoretically and empirically parsimonious due to the 
aggregation of theoretically-redundant competencies.  
Table 2. Placement of the Roy Wood Competencies to the Great Eight 
Dimensions 
 
The process of mapping the Great Eight dimensions onto the swim-lane model was 
done via a systematic coding process. First, aggregated qualitative data from the GAO 
reports and instructional documentation were reviewed by a two-person cross-discipline 
team (an example of this aggregated data can be found in Table 3).  
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Table 3. Example of the Qualitative Aggregated Data Used to Map the 
Competencies to the Life Cycle Phases 
 
The two-person coding team consisted of one engineering graduate student with 
expertise in the intricacies of the program management/engineering life cycle a doctoral 
student in organizational psychology with expertise in leadership competencies and job 
performance. During the review of the aggregated GAO reports/instructional documentation, 
this team discussed each stage of the project life cycle, the tasks involved, how each phase 
fed into those which followed, and the metrics for successful performance at each phase. 
Once a similar frame-of-reference was created, the team discussed each of the Great Eight 
dimensions (considering both the general dimension, as well as the specific Roy Wood 
competencies underlying it) and its relevance to each phase. After the general relevance 
was thoroughly articulated by both members of the team, a consensus as to a numeric 
rating of importance (ranging from 1 to 10) for each Great Eight dimension was mapped 
onto each phase of the swim-lane model, for a total of 32 ratings. The team had 100% 
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consensus as to the final ratings. These final ratings were then used as a baseline in the 
development and execution of the optimization model and are presented in Table 4. 
Table 4. Great Eight Mapping to Life Cycle Phases and PM Archetypes 
 
Table 4 shows both the Great Eight Mapping assessment scores that were 
ascertained for each of the four studied phases of the total defense acquisition life cycle; 
columns 1–4 provide estimated numerical values of required level of competence, in each of 
the Great Eight dimensions, for the corresponding life cycle phase. Table 4 also shows a set 
of notional Great Eight Mapping scores for four classifications (columns 5–8) of program 
managers. In this example used to generate the product architecture, we assume that there 
exist four archetypes of program managers, each with a different distribution of Great Eight 
Mapping strengths. While the values and number of program manager archetypes in this 
example problem are for illustrative purposes only, we note that there are well-known 
quantitative methods that can be used to solicit such values in real world situations. For 
example, clustering algorithms such as hierarchical clustering can be used to quantitatively 
determine the number of clusters and the values of Great Eight dimensions for program 
managers in each cluster, given a large survey pool and survey instrument that is executed 
to extract relevant information. 
Modeling Complex System Structures 
The complex system (product) architecture portion is modelled as an interconnected 
set of nodes, each having a finite set of inputs and outputs. The interconnections 
characterize how node capabilities (outputs) feed and consequently fulfill requirements 
(inputs) of any connected compatible node.  
Figure 4 (a) and (b) show a generalized representation of a complex system which 
has interdependencies between constituent systems, across multiple layers of the 
hierarchical structure. Each node (system) is connected to other nodes on the network, in 
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accordance with the set of requirements needed for them to interdependently operate. The 
connections between nodes are also governed by a set of interaction rules. Interactions 
between systems are modeled as relatively simple nodal behaviors that are applicable to a 
wide variety of types of inter-system connections. While not exhaustive, the combinations of 
these nodal behaviors as modeling rules can cover a large set of real world inter-system 
interactions.  
 
 (a) Complex System Hierarchy (b) Nodal (System) Behaviors Figure 4.
Figure 4 (b) shows the five most intuitive system (node) interactions: 
• Capability: systems have finite supply of capabilities that limit the number of 
connections they may form. 
• Requirements: System requirements are fulfilled by receiving connections 
from other nodes that possess a capability to fulfill said requirements.  
• Relay: Systems can relay capabilities between adjacent system. This can 
include excess input of capabilities that are used to fulfill node requirements.  
• Bandwidth: Total amount of capabilities and number of connections between 
systems are bounded by the bandwidth of the connection linkages between 
systems. 
• Compatibility: Systems can only connect to other systems based on a pre-
established set of connection rules. 
The performance of the complex system is related to the ability of the connected 
network of individual systems to fulfill overarching core objectives. System-wide 
performance is quantified by the capability of nodes that most directly contribute to the core 
objectives.  
An Optimization Approach to Selecting Optimal Organizational and Complex 
System Structure 
We pose the task of selecting the optimal organizational architecture and product 
architecture as a mathematical programming (optimization) problem involving two main 
segments. The first segment of an optimization problem involves an objective function 
equation that is either maximized or minimized, depending on the metric that is being used. 
The second segment involves a set of equations called constraints that reflect rules as in 
Figure 4 (b). A simple example of a mathematical program is the maximization of expected 
stock investment returns, subject to constraints on availability of funds to invest, where the 
decision variables are which stocks to buy, and how much to buy of each stock. 
The problem of selecting an optimal complex system architecture and its 
organizational architecture is more specifically posed as a multi-objective optimization 
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problem that addresses both an index that describes the level of performance for a chosen 
product architecture and the uncertainty in program manager performance allocated across 
the selected architecture. (In the simple case of the stock problem, the notion is tradeoff 
between expected portfolio returns and risk). The decision variables involve which systems 
to select in the product architecture and which program manager types to be assigned to 
systems that need to be developed (we explain types in a subsequent section).  
Concept Application: Naval Warfare Scenario Acquisitions 
Our naval warfare scenario concept application problem is based on developing a 
complex military system, through selection of constituent systems (from a candidate set of 
systems), and allocating DoD program managers in a way that maximizes the complex 
system performance, while minimizing risks associated with mismatches between program 
manager competencies and system development. The performance of the complex system 
is based on an aggregated performance index of its constituent systems, and risks of 
mismatches between program manager competencies and system development are 
reflected in each program manager’s competencies in executing the Technology Maturation 
& Risk Reduction phase of the defense acquisition life cycle. 
Table 5. Candidate Systems or Naval Warfare Scenario 
 
Table 5 lists a catalogue of systems and their hypothetical characteristics. The table 
shows 23 available systems that can be acquired towards development of an overarching 
capability, across five classes of systems (Control Station, First Satellite, UAV, Carrier Ship, 
Second Satellite). The first three columns (SoS CAP1, SoS CAP 2, SoS CAP 3) list outputs 
of system level capabilities that directly contribute to the top-level performance of the overall 
complex systems. For example, Control Station 1’s SoS Cap1 contribution of 150 refers to a 
capability of 150Mbps of communication bandwidth that contributes directly to the overall 
performance index of the complex system in general. Columns three and four are 
capabilities that do not contribute directly to the top-level performance index, but contribute 
to satisfying constraints at a lower level of abstraction; for example, the same Control 
Station 1 generates 150 units of power that can be distributed to other systems that connect 
to it. While power is an output of Control Station 1, it is not a capability that directly 
contributes to the top-level capabilities of the overall complex system. Columns 5–6 are the 
requirements of each system. Column 7 reflects acquisition costs. Columns 8 and 9 reflect 
the number of other systems can link to each system; this constraint, in the case of Control 
Station 1, is to be able to provide power to up to three other systems that connect to it.  
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The last column is the Technology Readiness Level (TRL) of each system. We 
assume that high TRL numbers denote a commercial off-the-shelf type of system that has 
relatively straightforward acquisition processes in place, where as a lower TRL level system 
will require the assignment of a program manager to develop and mature the system 
towards final acquisition. We assume a finite number of each type of program managers that 
are available to be assigned to each system listed in Table 5. For simplicity, the measure of 
performance of each program manager type, in executing acquisition tasks listed in Table 1, 
is defined as the Euclidean norm of program managers dimensional scores (columns 5–8) 
that are less than the estimated required values (columns 1–4). The overall performance of 
the program manager in executing acquisition tasks is taken as simply the average 
Euclidean norm values across the four loops—here, we term this as an average risk. Values 
of the average risk and population of program managers for each type are tabulated in 
Table 6. 
Table 6. Concept Problem Program Manager Population per Type 
 
Mathematical Formulation: Mixed Integer Programming (MIP) 
We formulate our concept problem of maximizing a complex system’s performance 
while minimizing program manager competency related risks as a multi-objective 
optimization problem. We adopt a modified version of a prior optimization model by 
Davendralingam that views a complex systems architecture as a collection of nodes with 
interdependency rules that govern their connectivity. The resulting mathematical program is 
as follows: 
     (1) 
subject to: 
      (2) 
     (3) 
     (4) 
     (5) 
     (6) 
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     (7) 
    (8) 
     (9) 
    (10) 
    (11) 
    (12) 




Sic  capability (c) of system (i)  
w,  weighting factor vector of SoS capabilities (constant) 
xib binary decision variable for selecting system (i) 
Rc base SoS capability for normalization 
xcij quantity of capability (c) between system (i) and (j) 
xij adjacency matrix (binary) that indicates connection between systems 
(i) and (j) 
Srj   requirement (r) of system (j) 
M  Big-M constant value 
Q -set of all possible system choices (q = 1 … 23) 
The mathematical model as represented by Equations 1–13 represent the 
formulation of a mixed integer linear programming model. The “mixed” term denotes the 
existence of both integer and continuous decision variables. Equation 1 is the objective 
function that represents the maximization of the overall complex system capability index. 
Here, the capability index is the normalized sum of capabilities of the complex system level 
capabilities (columns 1–3 in Table 5), where the normalization is done with respect to some 
lowest common denominator, R. Equation 2 ensures that for each system type (j) selected, 
there is sufficient capability type (C) being received from other connecting systems (i) that 
can satisfy the requirement type (R). Equation 3 ensures that the amount of capability 
provided by each system, type (i) for each capability type (c) does not exceed the maximum 
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capability of type (c) for the system. Equation 4 generically defines mutual exclusivity rules 
for systems—for example, if selection of system 1 (x1) and system 2 (x2) is a mutually 
exclusive condition, then the constraint would be (X1+X2 ==1) where x1 and x2 are binary 
variables and constant T denotes the condition that the sum of the can only result in one 
system. Equations 5 and 6, more specifically, follow a “Big-M formulation” that facilitates the 
calculation of the number of connections that can be made to individual nodes. Equation 7 
constrains the number of connections that can exist for each system type (i) and for each 
capability type (c) for the system. Equation 8 enforces that the total of some capability (q) 
that is supplied to a node (e.g., power flow or communications bandwidth), combined with its 
inherent capability (q) is not exceeded by demand for the capability from connected nodes.  
Equations 9 and 10 jointly enforce that if a system type (q) is selected from the set of 
systems that have a TRL level less than 9, then a program manager must be assigned to 
the system. Equations 9 and 10, like Equations 5 and 6, employ the use of a Big-M 
formulation where the pairs of constraints act as logical conditions. Equation 11 sets the 
condition that only up to one program manager from the four types (t) can be assigned to 
each system. Equation 12 imposes the condition that for each system type (q) that belongs 
to the set of systems with a TRL of level 5 or below, the program manager assigned to the 
system needs to have a Great Eight competency score that at least meets the score for the 
requirements of a critical subset of the Great Eight in columns 1–3 of Table 4; these critical 
subsets are for the top three highest scores for the loops (1–2). Equation 13 limits the total 
performance error, accumulated due to assigning program managers across different 
systems, to a maximum value of Emax; this value is varied to generate an efficiency frontier 
that trades off the overall complex system performance against the uncertainty in overall 
program manager performance. It must be noted that while Equation 13 is a linear equation 
and is reflective of the relatively simple model used for our concept problem, it does not 
detract from more complex forms of modeling for program manager performance. With a 
richer collection of data, approaches that account for more explicit interdependencies 
between program manager interactions, when allocated to systems, can be modeled in 
quadratic forms (Davendralingam et al., 2012) that can be efficiently included in the current 
modeling framework, even under conditions of data uncertainty. Furthermore, there are a 
range of robust optimization techniques that can be applied to address data uncertainty as 
well (Davendralingam et al., 2012).  
Results  
The resulting optimization model as represented by Equations 1–13 is solved in 
MATLAB 2016b using the YALMIP toolbox with the GNU Linear Programming Kit (GLPK) 
solver. The problem is solved for a bounded range of values of Emax in Equation 13 
(5≤Emax≤50) to generate the Pareto frontier that trades off the overall complex system 
capability index (optimal values of the objective function) against overall program manager 
performance; this includes Pareto filtering to only include non-dominated solutions on the 
efficiency frontier. Figure 5 shows the filtered Pareto frontier generated by solving the 
optimization model for each range value of Emax . Table 7 provides the breakdown of 
selected systems that comprise the portfolio of systems within the overall complex system, 
and program manager allocations across each portfolio point on the efficiency frontier.  
Acquisition Research Program: 
Creating Synergy for Informed Change - 392 - 
 
 Efficiency Frontier of Performance Against PM Competency Risk (Risk Figure 5.
Measured as Average Mean Squared Error) 
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Table 7. Portfolio of Systems and Program Manager Allocations 
 
The results generated through solving the optimization problem of Equations 1–13 
provide a way for decision-makers to assess potential tradeoffs between selecting different 
complex system architectures (here, portfolio of interconnected systems) and organizational 
architecture (here, program manager type allocations) by relegating some combinatorial 
aspects of the problem to the algorithm and delegating decision-making to the practitioner. 
The results show the progressive levels of complex system performance that can optimally 
be achieved, given each prescribed acceptable level of risk associated with the program 
manager performance, for each portfolio. As more capable systems are brought into the 
picture, to generate a higher performing complex system, program managers are 
additionally added in an optimized sense, in a manner that bounds risk the sequential 
increments enforced in Equation 13. The program manager allocation also adheres to the 
rulesets established (for example, the constraints established for allocation of program 
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managers to systems with TRL<9 and TRL<5 as established in prior sections). While an 
initial instinct may be to first select program managers that are, on average, the least risky 
following Table 6, we see instead that the optimization selects program manager Type III in 
Portfolio 1 and Portfolio 2, due to the enabling effect that Type III manager has on 
developing low TRL systems with a higher potential to improve the complex system 
performance index. Another useful observation of the results presented, is that the solution 
generated by the optimization routine, reveals potential pathways for evolving an 
architecture; for example, when considering portfolios 3 and 4, we observe that a future 
upgrade from portfolio 3 to 4 will include retirement of Carrier-Ship 2 and a Second Satellite-
2 unit, in favor of a Second Satellite-3 unit and a Carrier-Ship 3; this path of system addition 
and replacement is complemented by the need to replace a Type I program manager with 
two Type II program managers to facilitate the architectural transition. Early stage 
knowledge on such shifts can enable the correct requirements to be set on what type of 
program managers to look for or train for these future updates, thereby minimizing risks and 
organizational misalignments.  
As the number of candidate systems increases and the dependencies increase as 
well, it becomes very difficult to objectively select systems that constitute a complex system 
and program managers that manage each of the constituent systems without the aid of 
quantitative means such the mathematical framework presented in this paper. The mixed 
integer programming formulation is efficient even for much larger instances of number of 
systems (and/or number of program manager types), assuming the same problem 
abstraction being used in this paper. Furthermore, the MIP perspective lends itself to further 
formulations of the problem at hand to better account for various forms of interdependencies 
between product and organization and data uncertainty. 
Concluding Statements and Future Work 
The approach presented in this paper represents a preliminary quantitative 
framework that facilitates the optimal selection of an organizational architecture and product 
architecture (in this case, a complex system architecture). The approach leverages theories 
from industrial organizational psychology and mathematical programming techniques from 
operations research to yield a unified approach that facilitates the selection of an optimal 
composition of systems and organizational structure (in this case, program managers) 
towards achieving a desired complex system performance.  
We demonstrate the work for a concept problem based on a naval defense 
acquisition scenario and present the mathematical formulation and example solution of the 
problem. The concept problem utilizes a combination of qualitative and quantitative 
measures, driven by prior literature and a priori insights from program manager competency 
literature, to form the foundation of the organizational elements in our concept problem. The 
resulting mathematical programming problem is posed in a very flexible framework of a 
mixed integer linear programming problem—to which there are very well understood means 
of solution, even for large scale problems. 
Potential future research may encompass extensions on the modeling techniques for 
capturing interdependency behaviors between interacting organizational elements (e.g., 
modeling interaction behaviors of program managers) and adapting the mathematical 
modeling to more explicitly include such interactions. Furthermore, additional elements of 
organizational structure, such as acquisition processes relevant to the acquisition of 
individual systems, can also be brought to bear within this framework. 
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Abstract 
Development and acquisition efforts of cyberphysical systems can often encounter cost or 
schedule overruns due to the complexity of the system. It has been shown that a certain 
amount of system complexity is related to the system functionalities (effective complexity), 
whereas excessive complexity is related to unnecessary intricacies in the design (apparent 
complexity). While the former is necessary, the latter can be removed through precise local 
redesign. One of the major challenges of systems engineering today is the development of 
tools, quantitative measures, and models for the identification of apparent complexity within 
the system. 
This research has the goal of evaluating and measuring the structural complexity of the 
engineered system, and does it through the analysis of its graph representation. The 
concepts of graph energy and other spectral invariant quantities allow for the definition of an 
innovative complexity metric. This metric can be applied knowing the design of the system, to 
understand which areas are more in need of redesign so that the apparent complexity can be 
reduced. 
Introduction 
Complexity is one of the hallmarks of all engineered systems, specially a prominent 
feature of defense acquisition programs. Complex engineered systems are continuously 
exposed to various types of uncertainties, risks, and failures in their life cycle. The causes of 
failures and risks are either a known observed phenomenon and perhaps overlooked in the 
development phase, or it is a new type of failure. The former case can lead to improvements 
in engineering design and management and systems engineering processes of a complex 
system. The latter case, instead, can potentially provide useful information that can be 
obtained only through unfolding of these types of failures and events. Complex engineered 
systems design effort resides partially in the domain of known risks and uncertainties. This 
domain, also known as the domain of complicated systems, is characterized by known 
unknowns which can be addressed with time and effort, through theoretical and 
experimental research. This means that systems in this domain can express large 
epistemological emergence, given to the lack of knowledge, but a low ontological one, 
meaning that the knowledge can be obtained. 
However, the engineered systems with high levels of ontological emergence, 
meaning that the system under study is so far from the current level of knowledge, show low 
levels of predictability in behavior. Complex engineered systems involve humans with 
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certain levels of autonomy interacting with the engineered systems. Predicting the behavior 
of a complex system, characterized emergent phenomena is very challenging. To reduce 
various risks in design and operation of an acquisition program, systems engineers have 
attempted to operate within the domain of knowable risks as much as possible, through 
mitigation and exploitation techniques such as trade space exploration, modular designs, 
open architectures, redundancy, verification, and testing. However, a comprehensive, 
applied, and formal way to measure and capture various dimensions of complexity and risks 
in the life cycle of a complex engineered system or an acquisition program is lacking. In past 
years, the systems engineering research community has introduced some measures of 
complexity for engineering design; however, domain dependence and limitation in 
universality of use of these measures has seriously limited their use in the decision-making 
process. In this paper, we introduce a constructed measure of complexity that has carefully 
tried to address as well as to avoid many shortcomings of existing quantitative measures of 
complexity. 
This paper begins with a literature review on state of the art complexity and 
emergence. The literature review also covers some existing measures of complexity and 
their merits as well as shortcomings and limitations. The paper continues to introduce the 
concepts of spectral theory of systems complexity and explains matrix energy and directed 
edges in our suggested complexity measure. The paper concludes by analyzing the results 
and sets the stage for the future work of various case studies, quantitatively connecting 
emergence to spectral complexity measures of an engineered system or an acquisition 
program. 
Literature Review 
What Is Complexity? 
Three Types of Problems 
The first hint to the role of complexity in science and engineering design has been 
given by Weaver (1948). He described three distinct types of problems: problems of 
simplicity, problems of disorganized complexity, and problems of organized complexity. 
Problems of simplicity are the problems with a low number of variables that have been 
tackled in the nineteenth century. An example is the classical Newtonian mechanics, where 
the motion of a body can be described with differential equations in three dimensions. In 
these problems, the behavior of the system is predicted by integrating equations that 
describe the behavior of its components. Problems of disorganized complexity are the ones 
with a very large number of variables that have been tackled in the twentieth century. The 
most immediate example is the motion of gas particles, or as an analogy, the motion of a 
million balls rolling on a billiard table. The statistical methods developed are applicable when 
particles behave in an unorganized way and their interaction is limited to the time they touch 
each other—which is very short. In these problems, it has been possible to describe the 
behavior of the system without looking at its components or the interaction among them. 
Problems of organized complexity are the ones that are to be tackled in the twenty-first 
century, and the ones that see many variables showing the feature of organization. These 
problems have variables that are closely interrelated and influence each other dynamically. 
This high level of interaction that gives rise to organization is the reason these problems 
cannot be solved easily. Weaver (1948) described them as solvable with the help of 
powerful calculators, but today’s technology is not yet able yet to solve the most complex of 
these problems. These are the problems that nowadays we define as “complex.” Predicting 
the behavior of a system with many interconnected parts changing their behavior in line with 
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the state of other components is a problem of organized complexity, and the system itself is 
referred to as a complex system. 
The Point of View of the Observer 
On his blog, Rouse (2016) wrote about the absolute or relative nature of complexity. 
To illustrate his stand on the matter, he considers two uses for a Boeing 747: as a 
paperweight and as an airliner. This thought exercise allows us to understand that the 747 
as a paperweight is not very complex. It does a perfect job, given its large mass, but carries 
no complexity in its operation. On the other side, the airliner function exposes all the 
operational difficulties of flying and maintaining an airplane. From this example, he 
concludes that complexity should be defined in terms of a relationship between the entity 
and an observer. Thus, complexity is relative to the point of view of the observer. 
Wade and Heydari (2014) categorized complexity definition into three major groups, 
according to the point of view of the observer. When the observer is external to the system 
and can only interact with it as a black box, then the type of complexity that can be 
measured is called behavioral complexity, since it looks at the overall behavior of the 
system. When the observer has access to the internal structure of the system, such as 
blueprints and source code for engineered systems, or scientific knowledge for natural 
systems, then the structural complexity of the system is the one being measured. If the 
process of constructing the entity is under observation, then the constructive complexity is to 
be measured, which is the complexity of the building process. This definition relates 
complexity to the difficulty of determining the output of the system.  
Fischi built a framework for the measurement of dynamic complexity entirely based 
on the role of the observer (Fischi, Nilchiani, & Wade, 2015). The definition of complexity 
used in this framework is based on the system being observed, the capabilities of the 
observer, and the behavior that the observer is trying to predict. 
Complexity and Emergence 
Often complex systems have behaviors that cannot be immediately explained, and 
for this reason complexity is associated with the concept of emergence. As defined by 
Checkland (1981), emergence is “the principle that entities exhibit properties which are 
meaningful only when attributed to the whole, not to its parts.” In other words, an emergent 
phenomenon is a phenomenon at the macro-level that was not hard-coded at the micro-
level (Page, 1999), and which can be described independently from the underlying 
phenomena that caused it (Abbott, 2006). 
Both natural and engineered systems are capable of expressing emergence. One 
example of emergence in natural system is wetness. Water molecules can be arranged in 
three different phases (i.e., solid, liquid, and gas), but only one of them expresses a certain 
type of behavior—that is, high adherence to surfaces. This behavior is due to the 
intermolecular hydrogen bonds that affect the surface tension of water drops. These bonds 
are also active in the solid and liquid phase, but in those cases, they are either too strong or 
too weak to generate wetness. As we will see for many systems, some properties emerge 
only when conditions are just right. In engineered systems, the system requirements and 
software specifications are supposed to be written in such a way that they are independent 
from their implementation. For this reason, the functions and properties they describe are 
emergent (Abbott, 2006). 
These definitions of emergence often do not differentiate on whether the emergent 
property is expected or unexpected, and this is obvious, since not every system has a 
designer that is putting together components to generate the system, and therefore 
Acquisition Research Program: 
Creating Synergy for Informed Change - 399 - 
sometimes there is no one to expect the property. Natural systems, which are created 
through evolution, do not justify the classification of emergence into expected and 
unexpected. In engineered systems, this is of course not true. The system engineer is 
responsible for the identification of the properties of the system in relation to its environment. 
Not only the operational environment, but also assembly, integration, testing, and disposal 
environment. In the design process, it is customary to differentiate between the attributes of 
the system that are wanted, and therefore expected, and the ones that are unexpected, 
which can be beneficial or adverse. 
Two Types of Emergence 
The works of Chalmers (2008), Bedau (1997), and Kauffman (2007) identify 
differences between two types of emergence: epistemological and ontological. 
Kauffman proposes two approaches to the nature of emergence. The reductionist 
approach sees emergence as epistemological, meaning that the knowledge about the 
systems is not yet adequate to describe the emergent phenomenon, but it can improve and 
explain it in future. This is the case of wetness, where knowledge about molecules and 
intermolecular interactions can explain the emergent phenomenon. On the other hand, there 
is the ontological emergence approach, which says that “not only we don’t know that will 
happen, [but] we don’t even know what can happen,” meaning that there is a gap to fill not 
only about the outcome of an experiment (or process), but also about all the possible 
outcomes (Kauffman, 2007). Ontological emergence is given by the enormous amount of 
states the system could evolve into. The evolution of the swimming bladder in fish is an 
example of ontological emergence (Longo, Montévil, & Kauffman, 2012). An organ that 
gives neutral buoyancy in the water column as its main function also enables the evolution 
of some kinds of worms and bacteria that will live in it. Ontological (or radical) emergence is 
given by the enormous amount of states the system could evolve into. In these cases, we 
not only are not able to predict which state will happen, but not even what are the possible 
states. 
Chalmers (2008) provides definitions for two different types of emergence, weak and 
strong, based on the capabilities of the observer. At the lower level, there is weak 
emergence, which includes any property possessed by the whole and not its parts. A chair 
is an example of weak emergence since the property of allowing someone to sit is present in 
the whole but not in its parts. At the upper level, there is strong emergence with the example 
of consciousness. In the case of weak emergence, the emergent phenomenon is just 
unexpected, while in the case of strong emergence, it is completely non-deducible. This of 
course depends on the capabilities of the observer in linking the phenomena at the two 
levels. Chalmers, being a philosopher and cognitive scientist, implicitly assumes that the 
observer has the knowledge and capabilities of a human being. An example that he 
provides to illustrate the difference between weak and strong emergence is the high-level 
patterns in cellular automata. These patterns are unexpected but deducible just by looking 
at the low-level rules of the automaton, making them weakly emergent and not strongly 
emergent. The only example that Chalmers provides of strong emergence is consciousness, 
and he goes along to state that there is no other such phenomenon other than the ones in 
which the strong emergence derives “wholly from a dependence on the strongly emergent 
phenomena of consciousness.” Thus, the way of differentiating between a system with weak 
or strong emergence is to look for conscious elements within the system. 
Complexity and Complication 
The idea that complexity also depends on the tools and knowledge available to the 
observer is common to many researchers. Crawley, Cameron, and Selva (2015) use the 
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concepts of essential and apparent complexity to make a distinction between complexity 
and complication. Being engineers, they only consider designed systems. Essential 
complexity comes from functionality and represents the minimum amount of complexity 
required for the desired functionalities to emerge. Apparent complexity, on the other hand, 
represents the unnecessary intricacies that a designed system can have. These are the 
architectural features that are not required from the functionality, which make the design 
complicated and hard to understand. The role of the system architect is to minimize the 
apparent complexity without affecting the essential one. 
Evolved systems do not have functions, but they create advantages to their 
stakeholders. The presence of a heart in the cardiovascular system of many animals is only 
explained by the advantage it creates in the distribution of resources within the organism. 
The heart does various things, such as pumping blood and making the characteristic heart 
sound. The categorization of these behaviors into functions and side effects has no meaning 
in evolved systems, and therefore the concepts of essential and apparent complexity lose 
their validity (Longo, Montévil, & Kauffman, 2012). On the other side, the work of Chaisson 
suggests that evolution keeps the apparent complexity as low as possible by selecting the 
unfit organisms. This implies that the complexity of an evolved organism, which has thrived 
for a substantial amount of time in its environment, is close to its essential complexity 
(Chaisson, 2014). This means that evolved systems are complex but not complicated. 
Gell-Mann (1995), being a physicist, has a more holistic definition of effective 
complexity and logical depth (apparent complexity). Effective complexity is the length of a 
concise description of the regularities of an entity. This quantity should not be confused with 
logical depth. Mandelbrot’s set has high logical depth, since being a fractal, a simple rule is 
applied infinite times in a recursive fashion, but a low amount of effective complexity, since 
the formula used to describe it is relatively short. This is in general true for all fractals. 
In the decision-making field, the Cynefin framework has been proposed by Snowden 
(2005) to help identify the best approach to solving a specific problem.This sense-making 
model can be used to understand (from the data available) the characteristics of the 
problem at hand and which strategy will lead to a solution. As shown in Figure 1, the 
framework identifies five domains of knowledge: simple and complicated, which are ordered; 
complex and chaotic, which are unordered; and disorder. 
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 Representation of the Cynefin Framework Figure 1.
(Snowden & Boone, 2007) 
In the simple domain, systems decisions can be taken unanimously with all the 
parties, due to the shared understanding of the matter and to the clear relationships 
between cause and effects. The simple domain is the domain of best practice, where once a 
solution to a problem has been found, it is applicable unless there is a domain shift. In the 
complicated domain, there still is a relationship between cause and effect, but not all the 
parties are able to discern it. The answer to the problem often is not best practice, and some 
relatively deep analysis is necessary to find a proper solution. This definition is common to 
the definition of complication as arising from intricacies, where the problem is made difficult 
because of the way it is formulated. In the complex domain, there might not be a right 
answer at all, and the relationships between cause and effect can be identified only in 
retrospect. This is due to ontological emergence, which can create higher logical structures 
in which feedback loops are hidden. In the chaotic domain, no patterns are discernible, and 
no relationships can be identified. This is the domain of emergency, where the immediate 
goal is not to find a solution to a problem, but to bring the system back to an ordered state, 
from which a solution can be found (Snowden & Boone, 2007). 
Wade and Heydari (2014) provide a more technical description of the Cynefin 
framework. The simple and chaotic domains have both low complication, the former with low 
complexity, and the latter with high one. The complicated and complex domains have both 
high complication, the former with low complexity, and the latter with high one. Systems with 
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high complication can be analyzed with a reductionist approach such as decomposition, 
while systems with high complexity cannot. This point of view on reductionism is shared by 
Bedau, according to whom weak (epistemological) emergence can be analyzed using 
reductionist techniques (Bedau, 1997). The possibility of applying a reductionist approach to 
the systems exhibiting only weak emergence allows to connect these two types of 
emergence with the definition of complicated and complex system. Complicated systems are 
the ones which exhibit weak emergence, which can be analyzed using reductionist 
techniques, and in which the emergent phenomena are unexpected but still predictable. 
Complex systems are the ones in which strong emergence comes in place, where the 
reductionist approach does not work, and where high-level behaviors are not predictable. 
Structural, Dynamic, and Socio-Political Complexity 
In engineered systems, complexity can be divided into six types (Sheard & 
Mostashari, 2010). 
• Structural complexity 
o Size, or number of elements in the system, number of types of 
elements, instances of a certain type. 
o Connectivity, number of connections, types of connections. 
o Topology, architectural patterns, local and global patterns. 
• Dynamic complexity 
o Short term, at the time scale of the system operations, behavior of the 
system while executing its functions. 
o Long term, at the lifetime scale, evolutionary process of the system, 
retirement or mission extension. 
• Socio-political complexity, anything having to do with humans, cognitive 
limitations, social phenomena. 
How to Measure Complexity? 
With a better understanding of complexity, we can now look at how this quantity can 
be measured. 
Cyclomatic Complexity 
McCabe (1976) provided a complexity metric for software systems. This metric looks 
at the graph representation of the program, and it is defined as 
𝑣𝑣(𝐺𝐺) = 𝑆𝑆 − 𝑇𝑇 + 𝑆𝑆 
where e is the number of edges, n the number of vertices, and p the number of connected 
components in the graph. This metric is called the cyclomatic number. It can be 
demonstrated that in a strongly connected graph, the cyclomatic number is equal to the 
maximum number of linearly independent circuits (McCabe, 1976). 
Free Energy Density Rate 
Chaisson (2004) proposed a metric for the evaluation of complexity based on the 
amount of energy of the entity under study. More precisely, energy rate density, which is 
“the amount of energy available for work while passing through a system per unit time and 
per unit mass” (Chaisson, 2015). This metric is a boundary metric, since it considers the 
input and output of the system without looking at its internal structure. It has been derived 
through the generalization of various metrics used in various fields, such as propellant to 
mass ratio for engineering, or metabolic rate for biology. The metric has been evaluated for 
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multiple entities such as galaxies, stars, planets, plants, animals, societies, and 
technological systems, showing a rising trend in complexity (Chaisson, 2014). 
Per this metric, a system with a large intake of energy per second (i.e., power) and a 
low mass will be a very complex one. From the engineering point of view, this can also 
represent a very inefficient system. The success of Chaisson’s metric is because the 
systems under study are mostly evolved systems or are designed with efficiency in mind. 
Therefore, the applicability of this metric assumes that the system has been designed, or 
shaped by evolution, in such a way that there is no waste of energy, or useless mass. 
Propagation Cost and Clustered Cost 
MacCormack presented two types of metrics for the evaluation of the complexity of 
software systems (MacCormack, Rusnak, & Baldwin, 2006). The directed dependency 
between files in the source code is the function call. The propagation cost is the average of 
the visibility of modifications to dependent files, while the clustered cost considers the 
importance of the node scaling the relative cost accordingly. 
Spectral Structural Complexity Metric 
Sinha presented a structural complexity metric based on the design structural matrix 
(DSM) of the system (Sinha & de Weck, 2012). The metric is defined as 















where n is the number of components in the system, m the number of interfaces, A 
the DSM, 𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖 the complexity of each component, 𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖 the complexity of each 
interface, 𝛾𝛾 = 1/𝑇𝑇 a normalization factor, and E(A) the matrix energy of the DSM. 𝐶𝐶1 is the 
complexity contribution of the components, 𝐶𝐶2 is the contribution of the interfaces, and 𝐶𝐶3 is 
the contribution of the topology. The application of the metric sees the evaluation of 𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖 
through expert judgment, and assumes 𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 1 for lack of information (Sinha & de Weck and 
Olivier, 2013). 
Graph Energy 
The metric is inspired from the Hückel Molecular Orbital (HMO) Theory, which 
evaluates the energy of 𝜋𝜋-bonds in conjugated hydrocarbon molecules as a solution of the 
time-independent Schrödinger equation 
𝑇𝑇𝐻𝐻 = 𝐸𝐸𝐻𝐻 
where H is the Hamiltonian matrix, and E the energy corresponding to the molecular orbital. 
This equation is an eigenvalue problem of the Hamiltonian. In 1978, Gutman defined the 
energy of a graph, as 




where 𝜆𝜆𝑖𝑖 are the eigenvalues of the adjacency matrix representing the carbon substructure 
of the molecule (Gutman & Shao, 2011). 
Instead of the eigenvalues, the approach introduced by Nikiforov (2007) and 
embraced by Sihna evaluates the graph energy using the singular values of the matrix. This 
modification extends the applicability to directed graphs where the adjacency matrix is not 
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symmetric, while for undirected ones where the adjacency matrix is symmetric matrix, this 
new approach is coincident with the original eigenvalues one. 
The HMO theory is applied to structures of carbon atoms, which are homogeneous. 
Its application to systems of heterogeneous components, this metric does not consider the 
role of components with different levels of complexity. 
Methodology 
 
 Graph Representation of a System Figure 2.
The goal of this research is to measure the structural complexity of engineered 
systems. The system of interest can vary from a piece of software controlling a reaction 
wheel to an attitude control system, a satellite, and up to a whole network of satellites. Let’s 
consider the system represented in Figure 2. This graph is a general representation of any 
engineered system, in which the components are represented by the vertices and the 
interfaces by the edges. The generality of this approach allows one to evaluate the 
complexity of the more disparate engineered systems if they can be represented as a graph. 
The complexity metric proposed by Sinha needs the following data to be available: the 
complexity of each component 𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖, the complexity of each interface 𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖, and the adjacency 
matrix A. Here we describe two limitations of Sinha’s approach, which will be overcome by 
the newly developed metric. 
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Component Swap Test 
 
 Swapping of Nodes Within a Graph Figure 3.
The component complexity 𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖represents the complexity of the irreducible 
components at a certain hierarchical level within the system representation. In the graph 
representation of the system, it can be represented as the weight of a looping edge over 
each vertex. Let’s consider two vertices, 𝑢𝑢 and 𝑣𝑣, and their weights, 𝐶𝐶(𝑢𝑢,𝑢𝑢)  = 𝛼𝛼𝑢𝑢 and 
𝐶𝐶(𝑣𝑣, 𝑣𝑣)  = 𝛼𝛼𝑣𝑣. Swapping the weights to have 𝐶𝐶(𝑢𝑢,𝑢𝑢)  = 𝛼𝛼𝑣𝑣and 𝐶𝐶(𝑣𝑣, 𝑣𝑣)  = 𝛼𝛼𝑢𝑢 should generally 
reflect a change in the value of the structural complexity metric. 
As an example, consider two separate temperature control systems within a building. 
One takes care of a conference room and the other one of a biotech laboratory. These two 
systems are going to have in general very different essential complexities, as it can be seen 
from their required level of performance (e.g., accuracy, responsiveness). The complexity of 
the whole building would generally be affected in case these two systems are swapped. A 
good complexity metric should be able to verify the component swap criterion. 
The complexity metric developed by Sinha is not able to distinguish between the two 
systems. This is because the contribution of the components 𝐶𝐶1 is evaluated using a sum of 
the component complexities, which is commutative. 
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Interface Swap Test 
 
 Swapping of Edges in a Graph Figure 4.
The interface complexity 𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖 represents the complexity of the interconnection between 
two components at a certain hierarchical level within the system representation. In the graph 
representation of the system, it can be represented as the weight of the edge between two 
vertices. Let’s consider two edges having weights 𝐶𝐶1(𝑢𝑢1,𝑣𝑣1) = 𝛽𝛽1 and 𝐶𝐶2(𝑢𝑢2,𝑣𝑣2) = 𝛽𝛽2. 
Swapping the weights to have 𝐶𝐶1(𝑢𝑢1,𝑣𝑣1) = 𝛽𝛽2 and 𝐶𝐶2(𝑢𝑢2,𝑣𝑣2) = 𝛽𝛽1  should generally reflect a 
change in the value of the structural complexity metric. 
In this case as well, the metric developed by Sinha does not reflect a change 
following this swap because of the commutative property of the sum. 
Approach for the Development of a New Metric 
Requirements for a Structural Complexity Metric 
In this research, we are developing a spectral structural complexity metric that can 
overcome the limitations in other structural complexity measures while maintaining all the 
good features of the existing ones. The new metric shall be able to 
1. Measure the complexity of a system with directed interfaces, in which the 
adjacency matrix is asymmetric. 
2. Measure the complexity of a system with multiple parallel edges, in which two 
components can be connected via more than one edge. 
3. Measure the complexity of a system with respect to its size, meaning that the 
complexity metric should be normalized with respect to the extension of the 
system. 
4. Pass the component swap test. 
5. Pass the interface swap test. 
Directed Edges 
Any engineered system can be represented through a graph in which the 
components are vertices and the interfaces are edges. In general, interfaces have a 
direction, such as for broadcasting communication systems in which one components 
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transmits data to many receivers. Directionality can create asymmetry in the representation 
of the graph, in case the adjacency matrix is used, with subsequent complex eigenvalues. 
This approach will use the Laplacian matrix, which is Hermitian, and since we are going to 
use real values for the matrix, it will be symmetric. Therefore, the use of the Laplacian matrix 
allows us to have real eigenvalues—more precisely non-negative ones—which can be used 
for the definition of the metric. 
Multiple Parallel Edges 
Engineered systems can also have multiple interfaces between components. In a 
graph representation, this means that the edge (𝑢𝑢, 𝑣𝑣) can have multiple instances, namely, 
(𝑢𝑢, 𝑣𝑣)1 , (𝑢𝑢, 𝑣𝑣)2 , … , (𝑢𝑢, 𝑣𝑣)𝑘𝑘. For example, the interfaces between two components in a 
cyberphysical system can be thermal, mechanical, electromagnetic, or logical (i.e., in 
software). In our approach, multiple interfaces are simply bundled together and considered 
as one. The same approach has also been used already by Sinha, even if without explicit 
mention (Sinha & de Weck, 2012). 
Size Normalization 
Since the size of the system influences its complexity, we want to adopt Chaisson’s 
approach and normalize the metric with the size of the system. This can be done by 
normalizing the graph metric with the number of vertices, or by using normalized matrices 
such as the normalized Laplacian, which is normalized with the degree of the nodes. 
Weighted Edges 
The role of the graph in this application is to carry the information about complexity of 
components and interfaces. For this reason, the edges of the graph need to be weighted 
according to their complexity. The complexity of the components is represented through 
weights on self-looping edges. 
In the following section, the theory behind the development of a new metric is 
presented, and a running example is used to illustrate the 𝛼𝛼𝑢𝑢 = 1 for all the vertices, and 
𝛽𝛽𝑢𝑢𝑣𝑣 = 1 for all the edges. While the theory considers the more general case and is not 
based upon this assumption, its use in the illustrative example allows the reader to more 
easily focus on the topological contribution to the system complexity. 
Spectral Theory of Systems Complexity 
Spectral Graph Theory 
Spectral Graph Theory is the study of graphs through the eigenvalues of their matrix 
representation. The set of eigenvalues is known as the spectrum. The elements of spectral 
graph theory here reported were published by Chung (1997) and Spielman (2007). Let’s 
consider a graph with n vertices and m edges. If u and v are two vertices in the graph, and 
they are connected by an edge, we say that they are adjacent. An edge that connects a 
vertex to itself is called a loop. Graphs that contain no loops are called simple graphs. 
Edges can be associated to a direction. Directed graphs have edges with an associated 
direction, meaning that the edges (𝑢𝑢, 𝑣𝑣) and (𝑣𝑣,𝑢𝑢) are two distinct entities. For undirected 
graphs, those are two representations of the same entity. 
Edges in a graph can also be weighted, meaning that we can define a function 
𝐶𝐶(𝑢𝑢, 𝑣𝑣) ∶  𝑉𝑉 ×  𝑉𝑉 → ℝ . 
where 
𝐶𝐶(𝑢𝑢, 𝑣𝑣) ≥ 0 
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and, in the case of undirected graphs, 
𝐶𝐶(𝑢𝑢, 𝑣𝑣) = 𝐶𝐶(𝑣𝑣,𝑢𝑢) 
The degree of a vertex is defined as the number of incoming edges connected to it, 
and in the case of weighted edges  
𝑆𝑆𝑣𝑣 = �𝐶𝐶(𝑢𝑢, 𝑣𝑣)
𝑢𝑢
 
In this section, we introduce various matrix representations of graphs that will be 
useful in the creation of a spectral complexity metric. To do this, we will consider the graph 
represented in Figure 2 as a running example. 
Adjacency Matrix 
The adjacency matrix is defined as 
𝐴𝐴(𝑢𝑢, 𝑣𝑣) = �1 𝑙𝑙𝑓𝑓 𝑢𝑢 𝑉𝑉𝑇𝑇𝑆𝑆 𝑣𝑣 𝑉𝑉𝐶𝐶𝑆𝑆 𝑉𝑉𝑆𝑆𝑎𝑎𝑉𝑉𝑎𝑎𝑆𝑆𝑇𝑇𝐶𝐶,0 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶ℎ𝑆𝑆𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑙𝑙𝐶𝐶𝑆𝑆.
 
The adjacency matrix is symmetric in the case of undirected graphs. For directed 
graphs, the symmetry holds only if edges appear in pairs. In the case of weighted edges, the 
adjacency matrix is defined as 
𝐴𝐴(𝑢𝑢, 𝑣𝑣) = �𝐶𝐶(𝑢𝑢, 𝑣𝑣) 𝑙𝑙𝑓𝑓 𝑢𝑢 𝑉𝑉𝑇𝑇𝑆𝑆 𝑣𝑣 𝑉𝑉𝐶𝐶𝑆𝑆 𝑉𝑉𝑆𝑆𝑎𝑎𝑉𝑉𝑎𝑎𝑆𝑆𝑇𝑇𝐶𝐶,
0 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶ℎ𝑆𝑆𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑙𝑙𝐶𝐶𝑆𝑆.
 
The eigenvalues of the adjacency matrix are labeled in increasing order and 
represented as 
𝜆𝜆1 ≥  𝜆𝜆2 ≥ ⋯ ≥  𝜆𝜆𝑛𝑛 









In our example, the adjacency matrix will have the following values in case we 
consider the edges of the graph as directed or undirected 
 
Laplacian Matrix 
The Laplacian matrix is defined as 𝐿𝐿(𝑢𝑢, 𝑣𝑣) = 𝐷𝐷(𝑢𝑢, 𝑣𝑣) − 𝐴𝐴(𝑢𝑢, 𝑣𝑣), where 𝐷𝐷(𝑢𝑢, 𝑣𝑣) is the 
diagonal matrix of the vertex degrees. This definition is equivalent to 
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𝐿𝐿(𝑢𝑢, 𝑣𝑣) = �
𝑆𝑆𝑣𝑣 𝑙𝑙𝑓𝑓 𝑢𝑢 = 𝑣𝑣,
−1 𝑙𝑙𝑓𝑓 𝑢𝑢 𝑉𝑉𝑇𝑇𝑆𝑆 𝑣𝑣 𝑉𝑉𝐶𝐶𝑆𝑆 𝑉𝑉𝑆𝑆𝑎𝑎𝑉𝑉𝑎𝑎𝑆𝑆𝑇𝑇𝐶𝐶,
0 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶ℎ𝑆𝑆𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑙𝑙𝐶𝐶𝑆𝑆.
 
If edges are weighted, its definition is given by 
𝐿𝐿(𝑢𝑢, 𝑣𝑣) = �
𝑆𝑆𝑣𝑣 − 𝐶𝐶(𝑢𝑢, 𝑣𝑣) 𝑙𝑙𝑓𝑓 𝑢𝑢 = 𝑣𝑣,
−𝐶𝐶(𝑢𝑢, 𝑣𝑣) 𝑙𝑙𝑓𝑓 𝑢𝑢 𝑉𝑉𝑇𝑇𝑆𝑆 𝑣𝑣 𝑉𝑉𝐶𝐶𝑆𝑆 𝑉𝑉𝑆𝑆𝑎𝑎𝑉𝑉𝑎𝑎𝑆𝑆𝑇𝑇𝐶𝐶,
0 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶ℎ𝑆𝑆𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑙𝑙𝐶𝐶𝑆𝑆.
 
In the case of directed graphs (Chung, 2005), the Laplacian matrix is defined as 




where Φ is the diagonal matrix of the flow of a vertex 𝜙𝜙(𝑣𝑣) and 𝑃𝑃 is the transition probability 





The Laplacian matrix is always symmetric, both in the case of directed and 
undirected graphs. The eigenvalues of the Laplacian matrix are usually labeled in a 
decreasing order, and are represented as 
0 = 𝜇𝜇1 ≤ 𝜇𝜇2 ≤ ⋯ ≤ 𝜇𝜇𝑛𝑛 
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Normalized Laplacian Matrix 
The normalized Laplacian matrix for undirected graphs is defined as ℒ =









𝑙𝑙𝑓𝑓 𝑢𝑢 𝑉𝑉𝑇𝑇𝑆𝑆 𝑣𝑣 𝑉𝑉𝐶𝐶𝑆𝑆 𝑉𝑉𝑆𝑆𝑎𝑎𝑉𝑉𝑎𝑎𝑆𝑆𝑇𝑇𝐶𝐶,
0 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶ℎ𝑆𝑆𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑙𝑙𝐶𝐶𝑆𝑆.
 













𝑙𝑙𝑓𝑓 𝑢𝑢 𝑉𝑉𝑇𝑇𝑆𝑆 𝑣𝑣 𝑉𝑉𝐶𝐶𝑆𝑆 𝑉𝑉𝑆𝑆𝑎𝑎𝑉𝑉𝑎𝑎𝑆𝑆𝑇𝑇𝐶𝐶,
0 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶ℎ𝑆𝑆𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑙𝑙𝐶𝐶𝑆𝑆.
 
In the case of directed graphs (Chung, 2005), the normalized Laplacian matrix is 
defined as 
ℒ(𝑢𝑢, 𝑣𝑣) = 𝐼𝐼 −
Φ1 2⁄ 𝑃𝑃Φ−1 2⁄ + Φ−1 2⁄ 𝑃𝑃∗Φ1 2⁄  
2
 
where I is the identity matrix, 𝛷𝛷 is the diagonal matrix of the flow of a vertex 𝜙𝜙(𝑣𝑣), and P is 





The normalized Laplacian matrix is always symmetric, and its eigenvalues are 
represented as 
0 = 𝜈𝜈1 ≤ 𝜈𝜈2 ≤ ⋯ ≤ 𝜈𝜈𝑛𝑛 
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Matrix Energy 
Graph Energy 
Graph energy has been defined by Gutman in 1978 (Gutman, 2001; Gutman & 
Shao, 2011) as 




and it has the following properties 
1. 𝐸𝐸(𝐺𝐺) ≥ 0, where equality is attained only for m = 0, meaning that the graph 
has no edges, and all the vertices are disconnected; 
2. the energy of two disconnected graph components 𝐺𝐺1and 𝐺𝐺2 is 𝐸𝐸(𝐺𝐺)  =
 𝐸𝐸(𝐺𝐺1)  +  𝐸𝐸(𝐺𝐺2) 
3. if one component is 𝐺𝐺1 and all the other components are isolated vertices, 
then 𝐸𝐸(𝐺𝐺)  =  𝐸𝐸(𝐺𝐺1). 
Laplacian Graph Energy 
Gutman also defined the Laplacian energy of a graph (Gutman & Zhou, 2006) as 









where 𝛾𝛾𝑖𝑖 are the auxiliary Laplacian eigenvalues defined as 




Generalized Matrix Energy 
A generalization of all these definitions can be given considering a general matrix 
(Cavers, Fallat, & Kirkland, 2010) 






where 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶(𝑀𝑀) is the trace of the matrix M. Thanks to this generalization it is possible to define 
the normalized Laplacian energy of a graph 









Spectral Structural Complexity Metrics 
The advancements in spectral graph theory presented in the previous section allow 
us to define a series of complexity metrics based on the spectrum of a certain 
representation of the system. Let’s start with defining the weight function as 
𝐶𝐶(𝑢𝑢, 𝑣𝑣) = �
𝛼𝛼𝑢𝑢 𝑙𝑙𝑓𝑓 𝑢𝑢 = 𝑣𝑣
𝛽𝛽𝑢𝑢,𝑣𝑣 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶ℎ𝑆𝑆𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑙𝑙𝐶𝐶𝑆𝑆
 
where 𝛼𝛼𝑢𝑢 represents the complexity of the component 𝑢𝑢, and 𝛽𝛽𝑢𝑢,𝑣𝑣 the complexity of the 
interface between components 𝑢𝑢 and 𝑣𝑣. This function allows us to use the definitions for the 
weighted adjacency, Laplacian, and normalized Laplacian matrices, for both the case of 
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directed and undirected graphs. The structural complexity evaluated using the adjacency 





where the adjacency matrix considers the weights of the edges, and n is the number of 
vertices of the graph. In the case of unweighted edges, this metric is equivalent to the 𝐶𝐶3 
component of the one defined by Sinha (Sinha & de Weck, 2012). The adjacency matrix is 
historically the most used in systems engineering (as DSM) and in spectral graph theory. In 
recent years, there has been a shift in spectral graph theory, given by the interesting 
properties of the Laplacian eigenvalues. The second smallest eigenvalue is particularly 
interesting, since it represents the connectivity of the graph. Also, the multiplicity of zero in 
the Laplacian spectrum represents the number of connected components, used in the metric 
proposed by McCabe. For these reasons, we are defining the structural complexity 





where the Laplacian matrix considers the weights of the edges, and n is the number of 
vertices of the graph. This type of normalization has an alternative, which is to normalize 
using the degree matrix of the system. This alternative approach brings to the normalized 
Laplacian matrix. The structural complexity evaluated using the normalized Laplacian matrix 
is defined as 
𝐶𝐶ℒ = 𝐸𝐸ℒ(𝐺𝐺) 
where the normalized Laplacian matrix is defined considering the weights of the edges. 
In Figure 5 we report the values of these metrics for the directed and undirected case 
of our running example. 
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 Evaluation of Complexity Metrics Based on the Matrix Energy of the Figure 5.
Adjacency Matrix, Laplacian Matrix, and Normalized Laplacian Matrix, for 
the Directed and Undirected Graph Represented in Figure 2 
Conclusion and Future Work 
In this paper, we presented an alternative to existing structural complexity metrics. 
The purpose of the metrics is to measure the structural complexity of the system, 
considering the contributions of the size, the connectivity, and the topology of the system. At 
this stage of the research, the focus has been shifted on the topological contribution, with 
the plan of addressing size and connectivity in a later stage. 
These metrics will subsequently be applied to real world systems, with the goal of 
verifying their applicability and understanding their differences in terms of features and 
limitations. The results will then be compared to the ones from other complexity metrics, with 
the goal of validating the new metrics and clarifying their possible shortcomings. 
In the context of the systems engineering practice, these metrics represent a 
continuation of the widespread effort to introduce quantitative tools to increase objectivity of 
measurements. The spectral approach developed by Sinha is the starting point of possibly a 
series of research efforts that will gradually introduce new metrics trying to patch limitations 
in the existing ones. The long-term expectation is for practitioners to converge on the use of 
a low number of metrics that will be applied depending on the specific case. 
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